A Personalist Cosmology

*in Imago Dei*

a Three Volume Work on the Nature of Substance

Volume I

PERSONALITY, EMPIRICISM, & GOD

The Substance

of

Persons & Community

F. Earle Fox
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Preface

A. Introduction

A-1. Philosophy for the Trenches

a. Why Write Such a Book?

[NOTE: You are reading a work still in progress, and available at . Some chapters are still being finished, as well as the Index and Study Guides. You will see occasional notes to myself and “change bars” as at the left of this paragraph, which indicate text that has been changed. These will all disappear in the final edition, formatting will be finished, etc. This is a full copy of the available text. When the book is published, the available copy will contain only selected sample text for those who wish to consider purchase of the book.

Any suggestions about possible improvements would be much appreciated. E. Fox. embus@theroadtoemmaus.org ]

This book is for the brave hearted and intellectually stout who understand that we are perhaps two centuries into a new Dark Age, that we must paradigm shift ourselves back toward Godly common-sense sanity, that civilization will have to be rebuilt from the bottom up, and that we must be in it for the long haul. It is for those who are willing to explore their own chasms of doubt and despair.

By “bottom up”, I mean, among other things, from the very bottom levels of the ground of our being, the very foundations of all life and civilization. That means the deepest religious and philosophical issues. But the intellectual battle for truth is not limited to ivied towers, it goes on most importantly in the trenches, in our daily lives.

The Problem: the collapse of the Newtonian worldview which failed to secure objectivity, long ago seen by George Berkeley, David Hume (destruction of Newton's notion of "cause"), and Immanuel Kant.

All this was ignored probably because Newton's worldview was thought to be necessarily attached to secularized "science". Newton's mathematics perhaps did not fail, but his metaphysics, that is, his worldview of inert massy at-
oms bumping around to form the cosmos, was inadequate.\(^1\) It took until the 20th century to collapse, and then mostly under pressure from relativity and quantum mechanics, not directly from metaphysical issues. But even then no one noticed much that there was a Biblical cosmology waiting in the wings, offering answers to these problems, a Biblical Enlightenment.

The cosmological argument for God does several things: (1) it defines the meaning of 'meaning', (2) establishes the bottom foundation for both logical and empirical truth, (3) creates a rational and personalist (rather than impersonal) cosmos, (4) thus establishing persons (not things) as the basic ontological entities, and (5) prevents the fatal "infinite regress" -- the black hole of cosmology.

The cosmological argument for God is the Biblical doctrine of creation in substantial philosophical format -- the solid metaphysical foundation upon which all Biblical theology must rest. It is the metaphysical answer to random, chance evolution as the explanation of the cosmos. It is the necessary metaphysical undergirding for inductive reasoning.\(^2\)

We all begin our lives “in the trenches”, trying to survive, trying to make our way into this totally new thing called “life”, with hardly a clue, not even some of the basic instincts which are programmed into animals. We have to learn a greater percentage of how to survive than probably any other living being, at least with which we are familiar. My life was exactly that.

I was raised in a nominally Christian home. We never spoke about our religion because my father was then not a believer, but honest and very proper. But he understood that going to church was proper, and so we went.\(^3\) My mother was a closet Christian, closet, mostly, I suppose, because the subject of religion made my father so uncomfortable. But at the tender age of about 7, I “caught” religion because my mother (it had to be the hand of God) had persuaded my then unbelieving father to read to me and my year-older brother from the Bible. Being a logical sort, he began at the beginning with chapter 1 of Genesis. I sat and watched creation happen right before my seven-year-old eyes, and thought dad and my brother had seen it too. It did not take long to discover that they had not, and that we would still not speak about religion in our home.

So I stuffed it under my hat until high school, but the religion I was discovering both in church and with some of my Christian friends did not sit well. I did not trust it, hardly knowing why. But it had to do with a sense of being hussled and huckstered, and a lack of intellectual credibility (though I would probably not then have used that phrase).

I knew I had a good mind, but had not the least idea of using it for anything

---

1. Newton himself was a Christian, a bit unorthodox, but would probably have been horrified at the suggestion that his world-machine would, as Berkeley predicted, get in the way between God and we humans, blocking God out. But that is exactly what happened.
2. The specific relation between science and the Biblical worldview will be the subject of Vol. II of *A Personalist Cosmology in Image Dei*.
3. My father, Deo gratia!, became a believer about 35 years later....
in particular, certainly not for rewriting the cosmological argument for God. But then my junior year at Trinity College, in Hartford, Connecticut, something ignited both my imagination and intellect. Edmond Cherbonnier, the religion professor, was telling us that the Biblical worldview was the only logically consistent worldview there was, that all others fell into contradiction. I was majoring in philosophy, and no one there was saying such things, so I took all Cherbonnier’s courses, and decided that he was right.

In the course of that maturing, I wrote a paper which defined for me the basics of ethical theory. I knew from that moment on that Christians could (and eventually would) win the intellectual war -- because he who holds the moral high ground will win the public arena. The paper developed into Defining ‘Oughtness’ & ‘Love’. Since then it has been joined with Biblical Theology & Pelagianism to become Law & Grace in Imago Dei.\(^{(4)}\)

The first and second volumes of this present work come from several years later, my D. Phil. thesis at Oxford University on the relation between science and theology, Personality, Empiricism, & God. My father’s unwitting conversion of me with the creation story had made creation the foundation of my thinking and my life ever since.

This will be a long preface, but it is essential to understanding the reasons for writing such a book, and what is at stake.

**b. Why a Work on the Nature of Substance**

...as notes the subtitle of the three-volume series?

We begin here with a hefty preface on why a book such as this is being written in an age which has all but abandoned, not just religious truth, but truth at all as a subject of intelligent discussion.

A book could be written on “Why write such a book as this? Why bother trying to defend Judeo-Christendom, that dying belief system -- as though it were true?” An immediate response might be:

*What else, other than truth, could possibly be a subject of intelligent discussion? And what if Christianity can be shown to be true?*

C. S. Lewis wrote in *Miracles*:

No philosophical theory which I have yet come across is a radical improvement on the words of Genesis, that “In the beginning, God made Heaven and Earth...”

This book is part of my case to demonstrate the truth of that statement. The Biblical worldview is the only both logically consistent and empirically relevant worldview there is. That is why science as we know it in the West emerged under its auspices. The Biblical worldview has the only sustainable notion of “substance”.

The three overriding aims of this volume will be to present, *first*, that truth

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\(^{(4)}\) Both papers were published in the *Journal of Religion*, the first in the July 1959 issue, and the second in the same journal in July, 1961. The two have become one book, *The Law & the Grace of God*, available until publication (hopefully in 2012) for perusal at http://www.theroadtoemmaus.org/EM/ShpMl/Law&Grace/00Law&Grace.htm -- in pdf format.
is both real and discernible, secondly, that there is a viable, indeed compelling, philosophical foundation for the Biblical worldview, and, thirdly, that science arose out of the Biblical worldview precisely because the Biblical worldview has a primary focus on objective truth with a depth and consistency not found anywhere else -- before, then, or since.

The Bible has been defended in many ways, some of them neither morally nor intellectually credible. Asserting that the Bible says that it is “infallible” or some similar attribute, is, of course, a circular argument. A thing cannot stand on its own self-proclaimed credibility -- a conflict of interest, one must say. The Bible must have evidence and support independently of itself, just as St. Paul suggests with his comments about the reality of natural theology in I Corinthians 1:18 ff. We are doing natural theology here. Or, you might say, metaphysics.

The authenticity of the Bible must be supported by a prior defense that we live in the sort of cosmos in which such a book of revelation would even be intelligible -- a cosmos with an Intelligent Designer who creates the cosmos ex nihilo, out of nothing, who can then make the alleged revelations.

If we do not live in such a cosmos, then no assertion of the revelation of God makes sense. This book is meant to give substance to the claim that we live in the sort of cosmos in which one might intelligibly expect, indeed successfully search for, such a revelation from such a God.

The “prior defense” of the Bible noted above will have to show that the Biblical (rather than the pagan or secular) notion of “substance”, the basic “stuff” of the cosmos which explains all else, is in fact the most rational and productive way of looking at the matter.

The word ‘substance’ is a bit misleading because it usually refers to an impersonal “stuff”, not a person. But in the Biblical view, the foundational explanation of all other existing things is indeed a person, not an impersonal stuff. So, we assert the living God to be the “substantial being”, who alone can explain the world in which we live.

The contest in which we are engaged is between precisely that personal substantial being who explains all else and the competing totally impersonal “stuff”, a material or a spiritual substance, out of which all things emerge.

This Preface and Chapter I, An Historical Introduction, are the foundation for making practical sense of these efforts of the intellect -- because ideas have life-and-death consequences. In this Preface, we deal with some of the personal and cultural reasons for writing such a book. In Chapter I, we look at the philosophical history leading up to our problem.

So, let us proceed.

c. Intellectual Atoms

In the midst of some of the most fundamental (and sometimes abstract) of issues, I aim to be as simple and clear as possible. Yet addressing the basic fundamentals is like looking for the atom in physics, the smallest indivisible particle. Atoms, by definition being indivisible, are supposedly the simplest
physical entities there are. Yet finding and identifying them is neither simple nor easy. Every time we think we have found the physical atom, the next generation divides the indivisible. We have gone from atoms to protons, electrons, and neutrons, and then to quarks, and now to strings, with something else even smaller, I hear, also in the wings.

We are looking here, however, for the intellectual atoms of life, those concepts which are simple, indivisible, and can thus form the very bottom explanatory foundation for all other aspects of life. In their interrelationships, they define the words ‘meaning’, ‘truth’, and ‘explanation’.

Despite the general collapse into relativism and the discouragement abroad about finding the truth concerning anything, let alone about the basic building blocks of the meaning of life, religion, philosophy, politics, culture, and everything else, I believe it not to be a fruitless quest. There are discernible reasons for the collapse, and there is a discernible way back to cultural, moral, and spiritual stability and sanity.

But engaging in such a task will make no sense to a consumerist, soundbyte, or couch-potato culture. Like honest soul therapy, culture therapy means digging to the deepest levels of one’s existence to find out what, if anything, is there. It sometimes feels like rebuilding a ship, plank by plank, while still at sea. How can we do this without sinking ourselves? Only, I think, by the grace of God. There are no metaphysical dry-docks. Life goes on whether or not we are sinking.

Wrestling with life in my early adulthood, I would come to what looked like looming chasms of doubt and despair beneath what I had been taught were the foundation stones of life. The foundation stones themselves seemed to have no clear explanation, making all things questionable and at risk.

But, the message which I heard over and over from deep down in my spirit was, “You must plunge to the bottom,” or, “Go to the heart of danger...” It was scary stuff, sometimes terrifying. But I know now it was the voice of God, and that over time, even my tepid obedience has led to enormous fruit.

Like physical atoms, finding our intellectual atoms, the stuff of which thinking is made, is hard and often scary work. It means taking apart those ideas on which we have grown accustomed to relying as true, and risking that maybe they are not. What then? We will be engaged at the most simple level of meaning, which does not mean simple to understand. In this case, simple often means highly abstract.

d. Paradigm Shifts - from the Bottom Up

But, dear reader, be not frightened off. Our difficulties with understanding are due in part to an inherent difficulty of the topic, but even more to some enormous paradigm shifts which we must make to get rid of faulty assumptions embedded in our present cultural and philosophical confusion. We must do a lot of unlearning before we can secure a new learning. As bad as they are, our

5. ‘Atom’, from the Greek ‘a’ (not) + ‘tom’ (divisible).
contemporary secular humanist assumptions about life are what we are used to, and, in “Stockholm syndrome” fashion, we have become addicted to them.(6) Biblical religion is despised in most pseudo-“inclusive” university and political settings, yet Christians and Jews currently show little capacity to revive their religions.

Today all of these mysteries have lost their force; their symbols no longer interest our psyche. The notion of a cosmic law, which all existence serves and to which man himself must bend, has long since passed through the preliminary mystical stages represented in the old astrology, and is now simply accepted in mechanical terms as a matter of course. Not the animal world, not the plant world, not the miracle of the spheres, but man himself is now the crucial mystery.(7)

The human race, however, is not flourishing under secularism, it is disintegrating. *(One false premise -- especially at that bottom, metaphysical level -- and logic does the rest.)* Wars continue ever more viciously and (by mind-control) more insidiously, people are living longer but often getting sicker, literally breeding new diseases,(8) and culture keeps dipping toward a nervous breakdown.

Yet some catch on. Ralph Peters writes of his intelligence career, that life is fundamentally human and personal, not technological:

...we have a network of intelligence services that can count bomb craters with great accuracy, but upon which we cannot count to warn us of “illogical” dangers, such as the brilliant, if ultimately counterproductive, strikes of September 11, 2001. As I have written, to the point of whining, it is a paradox of the 21st century that in this age of technological wonders, the threats to our lives, wealth, and order are fundamentally, crudely human. We may diagram bunkers, bombs, and entire armies, but we falter at understanding the human soul. Nor will the human heart fit into our templates. Love, fear, and hatred, not machines, are the stuff of which wars are made, whether we speak of terrorist jihads, campaigns of ethnic cleansing, or conventional offensives (and do not underestimate the deadly power of love, whether felt toward a god, a people, a clan, a flag, or an individual).

Yet, America, for a short while the freest nation on earth, now no longer even understands, and thus can no longer sustain, its own freedom -- let alone market it to others.(9) America was once protected by two enormous oceans, but no longer. We seem to be still protected by our oceans of economic abundance, giving the illusion of safety. That too is rapidly diminishing under the erosion of sub-prime loans, etc., a disaster perhaps engineered for political rea-

6. Thieves in Stockholm some years ago held several persons captive as hostages. The hostages grew to love and respect the thieves in the process. So getting to like one’s captors is called the Stockholm syndrome.
7. This is taken from a quote in *The New Lust*, p. 167, an unpublished (so far as I can tell) manuscript, by Ron James. His footnote reads:
   
8. Just a few decades ago, one could count the number of sexually transmitted diseases on one hand. Now there are over 35 and counting. Our so highly valued and openly defended, even by our medical associations, sexually promiscuous behavior appears to be providing the genetic hotbed for such breeding.
9. America is drifting quickly toward a centralized, totalitarian government because it is hacking away at its Biblical foundations, with almost no effective resistance from Western Christians or Jews. Europe is literally dying (depopulating), and Islam, an inherently totalitarian religion, is taking the offensive to fill the void -- or more likely, being used by the Globalists to create the chaos they need to seize power.
If the paradigm shifts needed are indeed those proposed in the following pages, they will help explain why the pursuit of truth has so consistently run aground, dipping, cycling into despair, coming up for breath with a new generation, and then again down into despair. It need not be that way.

But where civilization shows perhaps a chance of being restored is where Christians are winning the culture war -- such as China and places in Africa.(11)

Some of the thoughts wrestled with herein will be very difficult for those not used to metaphysics, the study of “being”, which is inherently an abstract subject. But I hope to make it understandable for those in the trenches who intend to persist through some heavy material. With time, experience, and patience, it may not be so heavy after all. It may turn out to be enabling. Even life-saving -- as with, “My yoke is easy, my burden light...” “Being” in the Biblical world is far more intuitively understandable than in the Greek pagan philosophical tradition.

The hard part is submitting to that yoke of Christ before knowing from experience that it is indeed “easy”. That, after all, is what yokes are for, to make burdens you must bear easier, not harder. If we are yoked to Jesus, it is He who is taking on someone else’s burden, not we.

And just so, the Biblical notion of metaphysical substance turns out to be far more intellectually friendly than the Hellenic notion of substance precisely because it is personal, not impersonal. Persons explain things better than things do.

A-2. A Brief History of Western Civilization

a. Restoring Intellectual Credibility

This will be a view of history quite different from that taught in schools or heard through the media. But it is, I believe, provably accurate. Western education has chosen to use the power of governmental coercion to tell a story about us which no freemarket education system, no system governed by parents, those rightfully in charge of child education, would sponsor. Western public (government controlled) education has, as we say, an agenda. The agenda is control, not education, and especially not the freedom engendered by good education.(12)

Education is the passing on of truth by those who have some of it to those who do not. That thought is seen my many to be arrogant -- “Who are you to think you know the truth?!” Nevermind that the very question says that the speaker believes himself to know at least some truth -- enough to think that you or I cannot know it.

10. For some astonishing information on this disaster, go to www.moneymasters.com. Their DVD, The Money Masters, explains much of the story of modernity’s continual cycling in and out of self-destruction.


12. Read, for example, John Taylor Gatto’s The Underground History of American Education, or two books by Samuel Blumenfeld, Is Public Education Necessary? and NEA: Trojan Horse in American Education.
Truth has been declared “relative”, not because it is indeed so (a logical impossibility), but because relative truth can be used to give license to manipulators and charlatans to define education any way they want, and so to control the thinking of the population.

The dead giveaway is that these same people typically insist on government control of education as necessary. Necessary for what? All government is about control, in this case to control the thinking down a preordained channel. If truth is all so relative -- why bother to control it?

That is not education, that is brainwashing. Until we reestablish the integrity of truth, education anywhere in the West will be suspect, especially that by government agencies. Helping to reestablish the integrity of truth in a free market of ideas is part of the mission of these pages. Getting government totally out of education, top to bottom, and putting it back into the hands of parents and non-government institutions, would be the most significant systemic step we could take to restore of a freemarket of ideas and a healthy America.(13)

Universities were first founded by Christians in the late Middle Ages precisely to promote a free-market of ideas, a natural offshoot of the notion that all men are made in the Image of God. Out of those universities came our western science. Government control of education, on the other hand, has been designed, right from Horace Mann on (1830’s and forward), to control thinking, not to set us free, as Jesus said, with truth.

b. Truth-Seeking

Truth-seeking is the primary bond and obligation of all conversation and relationship.(14) That was at some level simply assumed by all cultures, at least in the West, up until our recent invention of “pluralism” and “relative truth” -- both of which (though we never say it out loud) give us permission to lie. Those who are conned into accepting truth as relative quickly become the dupes of evil-minded manipulators -- who want you to relativize your truth so that you will not defend it. Then the manipulator can insert his ”truth” unopposed.

Relative truth is impossible to live by, and everyone knows that we all require a certain foundation of at least minimal truth simply to get out of bed in the morning. Will the floor hold me up? Etc.

The commitment to truth-seeking is the bottom foundation of the Kingdom of God. One cannot be a disciple of either Moses or of Jesus without first being a truth-seeker. That principle is plain on any honest reading of probably every page in the Bible. It is illustrated by the covenants with which God binds Himself to us and us to Himself. The words ‘truth’ and ‘true’ together occur

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14. The word ‘obligation is derived from the Latin ‘ligo’, meaning, ‘to bind together’. Obligations bind together a society, defining the difference between right and wrong. They create a shared moral consensus, the fundamental unity of any society. Only God can define obligations. See Bibliography for The Law & the Grace of God.
over five hundred times in the Bible. Those words are almost totally absent from modern curriculum material.

‘Come, let us reason together...’ is the invitation of God to engage with Him and each other in that seeking for truth. What better teacher could we look for? Truth-telling is the high ground on which God stands, not our clearly fallen university intellectuals. Truth-seeking establishes the only viable public arena, the beginning foundation of the Kingdom of God, who is the Way, the Truth, and the Life.

Reasoning together does not imply, as secularists would have it (and so many Christians have been duped), the denial of revelation. Rather, it becomes quickly evident in any competent investigation that there are some things which can be known only by asking God. He must, for example, reveal His will to us, for that is the source of all moral order.\(^\text{(15)}\) So honest and competent truth-seeking requires revelation-seeking.

c. A Biblical Philosophy?

The suggestion of a Biblical philosophy seems anomalous. The Hebrews did not think about how we think, or create rules for abstract thinking, as did the Greek philosophers. They did not have the incentive to do so as did the pagan world.

The Hebrews were having restored to them a world, a cosmos, a reality which was evident and apparent, but which had been lost to the world in the Fall, a world of a Creator God who loved His people. There were those even among the Hebrews, apparently, who denied the existence of God. Some Hebrews remarked, ‘The fool says in his heart that there is no God...’ So atheism was not unknown. But the existence of God was so obvious to the practicing Hebrews that they considered atheism either a stupidity issue or a moral issue, a rebellious heart.

The pagan world was, one might say, forced into philosophy by the inability of their world view to yield consistent common sense answers to their heartrending questions. Their incentive to develop abstract thinking was an intellectually opaque and obdurate world. Their worldview did not yield, for example to Socrates, information on the meaning of man as man.\(^\text{(16)}\)

They knew that something was fundamentally amiss in their thinking, and so tried to take thinking apart to find out what. It yielded marvelous results, but it did not solve their problem -- which was not a defect in their thinking, it was in their abstract vs. material oriented worldview. They could not unite the abstract with the material, so had to go for one end or the other. The Biblical worldview never had spiritual/intellectual disunited from the physical -- until the Fall.

The immoral and contradictory behavior of pagan deities caused many pa-

15. On God as the source of all moral order, see Bibliography for *The Law and the Grace of God*, especially the addendum to Part I, on the place of Greek philosophers in our current discussion.

16. See Bibliography for *The Law & the Grace of God*, especially, the addenda to Part I, “Socrates, Plato, & Aristotle”. 


gan thinkers to reject the deities, leading to either a materialist, atomized cosmos, or a totally abstract and/or mystical cosmos. Either way created a depersonalized, and therefore human-unfriendly cosmos. It led also in our contemporar
The transcendent God, who, by virtue of being the Creator of all things, was thus also the Lord of all things.\textsuperscript{(19)}

The Hebrews were the first to understand history, the empirical world of space and time, to be not only good, but sacred. They, in a sense, invented history, they took the passage of time as meaningful and important -- because it was important to God. No pagan society did so because history and nature were perceived as essentially chaotic, not the place one would expect to find order. But for the Hebrews, history was God’s story, and He was inviting His creatures to join Him in that story, to weave their own storyline into that of God and of each other.

The Greeks had Herodotus and Thucidides, and other cultures had story tellers and chroniclers who passed on their history. But only the Hebrews had a notion of universal history with a meaning and direction to it, which was picked up by the Christians. Augustine’s \textit{The City of God} (ca. 400 AD) was the first philosophy of history to be written.

As G. E. Wright explains in \textit{The Old Testament Against Its Background}, the Biblical world could not have evolved out of the surrounding culture because it stood contrary to it in almost every possible respect -- morally and cosmologically, a theme to be underscored by this present work. It is still true that when Christians are faithful to live and preach the Gospel message, they tend to create conflict with their surrounding culture. And Jews have routinely been persecuted almost wherever they have gone.

The appearance among the Hebrews of a worldview unique in all the world, especially one which makes so many people mad, demands an explanation. We hope to give some of it.

\textbf{e. Hellenic Beginnings}

The Greek and Roman civilizations were attempts to rise above the chaos endemic to the pagan cosmos. By “pagan” cosmos, I mean the view of life without a God who creates everything \textit{ex nihilo} (the Biblical view), and which sees all things instead beginning out of a primordial “something”, which is almost always ineffable, indefinable, unknowable by human categories -- the Great Mother, the cosmic womb of all being. In Greek lore, this was Gaia, or in Babylonian lore, Tiamat.

The beginnings of all things in time and space is usually the birth of some divinity (Uranus for the Greeks), often a male figure who becomes the consort of the Great Mother, who then have other “children”, the pantheon of divinities, which then devolves and degrades, as time goes on, into the lower beings such as we humans.\textsuperscript{(20)}

\textsuperscript{19} See bibliography for ‘Defining ‘Oughtness’ & ‘Love’ and the argument that morality comes only from a creator of all things.

However, a cautionary word. There have been reports from all over the world that aboriginal tribes often have distant memories of a “high god” whom they once worshipped, but offended so that He withdrew. Some of those tribes had predictions of people coming with a “book” which would tell them the way back to this high God. Some even predicted that those coming would be white, and on large ships with white clouds (sails). See \textit{Eternity in the Hearts}, by Don Richardson, . And also \textit{Discovering God} by Rodney Stark.
The short-lived high-Hellenic era tried to rise above chaos through pursuit of reason and by the invention of the polis, the city state. The Romans tried to rise above it with their republic, and then empire. Both, as do almost all nations, tried to rise above the chaos with military might, by imposing on the chaos their own order.

But neither reason, orderly politics, nor the military of the mightiest could sustain themselves in the pagan world. The substrate of chaos implied in their concept of the Great Mother origin of all things prevented it. Even Alexander “the Great” (whom some claim to be the world’s greatest military leader) could not effectively pass on his heritage. The pagan cosmology could provide neither ontological nor moral stability, and so civilizations tend to end, using Gilbert Murray’s phrase, in failure of nerve, or in cataclysm.

f. Christian Beginnings

The Christian era was occasioned, as Christians believe, by the coming into Jewish history of the Messiah. Christianity changed from what in Judaism was (at least by comparison) a live-and-let-live religion into an aggressively evangelical religion, brooking no compromise with paganism or emperor worship. The “no compromise” was, strangely but compellingly and in principle, at the cost of their own lives, not the lives of their opponents.

The empirical world was discovered first in history, not in the natural sciences. And it was discovered, or revealed, first to the Hebrews as God’s story, which lifted them out of the heavily sexualized mytho-poetic form of understanding life.

Understanding history laid the foundations for understanding science, so the empirical sciences rode into town on the wagon of Biblical empirical history. History is God’s story, written and directed by Himself with freewill characters in the plot, all of whom are invited into His story-line. Salvation means our failing individual story-lines joining with His abundant life storyline. That means standing with God on His home ground -- the intellectual, spiritual, and moral high ground.

St. Augustine redefined the meaning of ‘civilization’ with his monumental City of God. He was responding to pagan charges that this new-fangled Christianity had eroded the Roman Empire to such a degree that it was incapable of defending itself against barbarian onslaughts from the north.
Augustine replied that Rome fell because any nation which rejected the purposes of God for its own meaning and purpose in history would not survive, and that Rome had failed the test. History is not cyclical, it is linear, going somewhere defined by God. God has a purpose, and that story-line will come to its righteous conclusion.

Augustine was implying that there is really only one civilization, and that all others are “barbaric”, that is to say, “fallen”. The Kingdom of God, the community of creatures under God, defined by the two great commandments to love God and one another, is the only real civilization, the only civilization which will survive, and, indeed, the best of all possible worlds.

Christianity inherited an already spiritually dying Roman empire, which then suffered further attacks from northern and eastern barbarians, and then, the Norsemen. But during those dark ages, in the monasteries and local churches, a civilization new on the face of the earth had been gestating, based on the radical Hebrew notion that God was Creator of all things, and thus Lord of all things, including Caesar. Ethical monotheism.

God had declared the world good, and had formed it with reason and design. And He had declared that all human beings were equally created in His image, the divine *Imago Dei*.

These ideas began to ferment consequences radically different from pagan civilization. There was a cosmological order and a moral order which began to produce technology (unheard of inventions, farm tools, improved ships, weapons), led to ideas of possible progress in history, and slowly but gradually, the equality of all persons, including the end of slavery and a new freedom for women.

The Middle Ages saw recovery from the Norse invasions, the building of great cathedrals, the invention of the university with its growing freemarket of ideas, many technical inventions for common use, in all of which God was the center. It was, with all of its faults, the Christian version of the High Hellenic era.

Out of these uniquely Biblical notions emerged the four crown jewels of Western Civilization: intellectual freedom (science), political freedom (limited government for a free people), economic freedom (freemarket economy and entrepreneurship), and religious freedom (the ability to have more than one religion in a nation). (25)

**g. The Sword of the Spirit**

Science is about truth-seeking, getting the truth of whatever matter might be at hand. Greek thinkers had developed tools mostly for logical, *apriori* thinking, but little for empirical investigation. Their worldview militated against the empirical realm, for their worldview did not tell them that the material world was rational, good, or improvable. It was chaotic and seductive.

History had a way of devolving from the original divinities to lower beings, not progressing from good to better. And, history was circular, not linear. There was no cosmic purpose. Purpose was what the strong man (tyrant) imposed. It was not in nature.

But the Christian mindset was open to the empirical world. God had created the world good, with a purpose defined by His law, and then the Son of God had done the incomprehensible, entering the world on our terms, one of us. God was again affirming the goodness of the creation announced in Genesis I.

The rise of science was, one might suspect, intended by God as a gift to His people for honing the Sword of the Spirit to a fine edge, for giving substance to that verse:

Prove all things; hold fast that which is good. (1 Thessalonians 5:21 KJV)

“Prove” means to test, to find out the truth of claims. One would have thought Christians would have rejoiced in the rise of science. God was giving them tools for openly and honestly promoting their beliefs. Many did indeed rejoice, but many others in the power structure felt (correctly) an erosion of their often overweening control, and resisted the advancement of more easily available knowledge. Control of education has always been a tool of the power-hungry.

We might also imagine those two edges of the sword to be reason and revelation welded back to back, reflecting the commitment of God to revealing Himself reasonably, and reflecting the reasonableness of revelation itself. So the Sword of the Spirit would have been a weapon for promoting and defending truth itself, not with violence but by “speaking the truth in love”, a fundamental Biblical principle. Reason and Revelation welded back to back in the right hands would be a nearly invincible weapon against ignorance, deception, and evil-mindedness.

But trouble was afoot.

**h. A New Dark Age**

As Emile Cammaerts relates, the High Middle Ages can lay claim to being the high point of Christian art. Contrary to what we hear from “modern art” proponents, the best art always has a spiritual vision. It is giving us something of a truth, beauty, and goodness from beyond the created world. Art developed technically long after the High Middle Ages, but it had begun to lose its Biblical inspiration and thus also its spiritual unity, fragmenting, drifting toward a secular vision, and losing focus on the *Imago Dei* which alone can unify human life.

Other aspects of Biblical civilization, such as theology, would begin as time went on to erode and fragment as well -- and for the same reason, a progressive loss of the *Imago Dei*. Some aspects, such as the notion of a Biblical

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26. See *Art & Religion*, by Emile Cammaerts in Bibliography.
27. See, for example, Peter Kreeft in C. S. Lewis for the Third Millennium,
politics which inspired the American founding fathers, would blossom much later, but then quickly begin to fade behind the now strongly rising acid mists of “enlightenment” secularism.

Biblical civilization has thus faded for the same basic reasons as the fall of Greek civilization and then Rome. By compromising and abandoning basic Biblical principle, Western Christianity put itself increasingly in the same position as the pagan societies, lacking ontological and moral stability, thus leaving us moderns with the same option -- having to create our own stabilities by craft and power-struggle.

Because Hebrew culture had little or no philosophical tradition, Christians and Jews alike had tended to adopt that tradition begun by the Greek masters some five centuries earlier. Greek philosophers had begun the development of the tools of abstract reasoning with which the human race has been blessed.

But Christian thinkers did not clearly distinguish between the tools of intellectual pursuit from the worldview in which the Greeks had inevitably embedded them. The result was a serious compromising of Biblical thought, and steady erosion of the Biblical Gospel over the following two millennia in the direction of the Hellenic worldview, and, in the late 20th century, a return openly to paganism. The Christian community had become incapable of defending itself.\(^{(28)}\)

The compromise might be summed up as the drift backward toward the depersonalized concept of the divine inherent to paganism everywhere, and a subversion of the radically personal understanding of Yahweh, I AM, He Who Is -- not “That Which Is” or “It Which Is”.

As a result, by the late Middle Ages, Christian thinking had lost much of its centering in creation theology and was becoming atonement centered. Sin and the Fall rather than the goodness of creation were increasingly the foundation concepts. The Original Goodness (or, as some say, the Original Justice) of Genesis 1 and 2 was overpowered by the Original Sin of Genesis 3. God seemed to drift off into a hypermasculine, judgemental heaven, and so the notion of salvation became more and more meaningless to what thought itself to be an emerging economic, military, and intellectual powerhouse -- all secularized.

Western Christians made the two most horrendous errors in their history which for centuries sealed the fate of Western Christendom:

1. the use of coercive force to win and hold adherents to the faith; and
2. believing that reason and revelation, science and faith, were opposed to each other.

A depersonalization of life inevitably accompanied these two errors, drifting back toward paganism.

The early Church notion was lost that God had written two books, first the Book of Nature (to be read, as we came to understand, by the rules of science),

\(^{(28)}\) One might read, for example, *The Perennial Philosophy*, by Aldous Huxley, or *The Great Chain of Being*, by Arthur O. Lovejoy, two descriptions of our Hellenic philosophical heritage. Also, see *Total Truth* by Nancy Pearcey, on the corrosive effects of such Hellenic thought on the Biblical community.
and then secondly, because the human race in the Fall had so badly warped its knowledge of Nature and its Creator, the Book of Revelation to draw us back. Revelation was pointing us back, yes, to science, honesty, truth.

The tradition begun by the early Church fathers of reason wedded to revelation progressively broke down, notably at the Reformation, largely through a faulty interpretation of the nominalist-realist controversy. The interpretation often given to “sola Scriptura” fostered the notion that Scripture and reason were opposed to one another rather than eternally wedded in the mind of God. *Sola* for many meant “apart from -- reason”. Reason, it seemed to many, belonged to the pagan Greeks, then later, to the secularists.

The Reformation and Counter-Reformation did many good things to clean up a corrupt Church, but both, falling into the two errors, also unwittingly caused major collateral damage. These grievous errors led to the theological fragmenting of Christendom, to Christians slaughtering one another in religious wars, and to the secular “Enlightenment” rejection of Judeo-Christianity by the West. And all that despite the fact that Western Civilization was built almost entirely on an eminently *reasonable* Biblical inheritance. (29)

Biblical civilization was given a new birth in America, but the Calvinist theology upon which much of it had been built was disintegrating by the early 1800’s because the Christians of that time had no reasonable response to the secular Enlightenment, and seemed totally unaware that there was a much more powerful Judeo-Christian Enlightenment hovering in the background, waiting to be discovered -- with a newly honed Sword of the Spirit.

During the 20th century, the Biblical view was flogged from the public arena because of its perceived irrationality, and perceived rejection of science and reason. Whittaker Chambers wrote in the mid-19th century, “It is idle to talk about preventing the wreck of Western civilization. It is already a wreck from within.” (30)

Mostly thanks to inept and disloyal Christians.

**i. Mind-Control vs. Education**

The “vs.” is important. Mind-control is an enemy of, and is *meant* to subvert, any honest education.

In the late 1800’s, a new weapon was discovered for gaining control over those freedoms inspired by the three crown jewels -- mind-control. (31) It is a much more effective way to subdue a people, and destroys much less of the infrastructure of the targeted society than does physical warfare. You persuade the gullible to like being controlled, you sell it to them as a necessity for their own protection, survival, and comfort.

Mind-control was begun by German psychologists in the late 1800’s with

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29. Rodney Stark, for example, has written *The Victory of Reason: How Christianity Led to Freedom, Capitalism, and Western Success*, an astonishing rebuttal of almost everything we have heard over the last century and a half about the rise of science, capitalism, and freedom out of pagan and secular foundations.

30. This was possibly written in his book, *Witness*, about 1951.

their new “behaviorist” psychology, largely at the University of Leipzig under Wilhelm Wundt, advanced by Pavlov under Stalin, and perfected (so to speak) by the Chinese and North Koreans in the 1950’s.\(^{32}\) This absolute antithesis of honest commerce, politics, and education is now routinely being used by advertisers, politicians, and (especially government-controlled) educational institutions all over the world.\(^{33}\) It is a staple of globalist-oriented politicians, and of their flagship institution, the United Nations.

It thus took no time at all for the control-minded to seize the opportunity to subjugate the population “peaceably” (as in *Brave New World*, or *1984*, or *Animal Farm*), to render us all slaves on their government plantation. Brainwashing is effective precisely because ideas have consequences. Change a people’s ideas, and you can change their goals and loyalties.

Once you have made the Church irrelevant by divide and conquer, it is an easy matter to control the mind of the public through coercive government education. A secure renewal of freedom will not come until there is a dispersion of power and authority such that the family is the center of both education (not the State) and religion (not the Church). The role of the State is to be the referee for society, and of the Church to be the conscience, moral and spiritual educator, and worship leader. And all this to be done with a freemarket of ideas, not a market of ideas controlled by either Church or State. That, on the Biblical view, is God’s way of doing things.

A neo-pagan society, on the other hand, which openly advertises relative truth and relative morality has nothing in its worldview to deny that might makes right, that the powerful should rule the weak, and that survival of the fittest (where fittest means whoever gets the levers of control) is the rule of life. Control, then, not truth or freedom, is the way of life.

This new Dark Age (secular “Enlightenment”) was caused more by Judeo-Christian ignorance, incompetence, and cowardice than by the strengths of secularism. It led to the most brutal century in human history (the 20th), to the manipulative, deceitful destruction of truth and morality, to depersonalization of the human soul, and more recently, to impending total centralization of civil government, i.e., global tyranny. All three crown jewels are being subverted because the pagan worldview (including a secularized/paganized Church) cannot sustain any one of them.

The Christian community has only recently (late 20th and early 21st centuries) shown signs of recovering its intellectual integrity, with almost all of that recovery being well outside of the mostly oblivious institutional Church.

Most people do not think philosophically, let alone metaphysically. But ideas nevertheless have consequences, especially metaphysical ideas. The re-

\(^{32}\) *The Leipzig Connection*, by Paolo Lionni gives an excellent introduction to the enormous (and devastating) effects of Wundt and his new behaviorism on American education.

jection of metaphysics for behaviorism was at least in part deliberate by those who wanted to get rid of God. As one philosopher candidly admitted, he did not want God to exist because God would get in the way of his sexual and political aspirations.

Those who do not think philosophically nevertheless most often look to those whom they consider experts at doing so. Christianity lost the war for the 19th century and following because they were perceived to have lost the intellectual war to the secular experts. They were incompetent to give good answers to Marx, Freud, Darwin, Dewey, and others.

They were perceived most of all to have lost the moral high ground. “Moral high ground” resonates with almost all persons. People will support that group which appears to hold the moral high ground. And everyone considers himself an expert on morality. They think they know right and wrong when they see them.

Either the Church will recover that moral high ground, or it will continue to fail. It will not recover moral credibility unless it also recovers its intellectual credibility. And that means an adequate response to Darwin and evolution as the explanation of why things are the way they are. And that means our primary topic for this Volume I: the cosmological argument for God.

A-3. Recovering the Real (Judeo-Christian) Enlightenment

a. A Personalist Worldview

There are two fundamental worldviews: the Biblical and the secular/pagan. This three-volume work, *A Personalist Cosmology in Imago Dei*, is my attempt to help rebuild the Biblical foundations of Western Civilization, a worldview with Good News which can be marketed around the world with commanding credibility.

Two professors, whom I wish to honor here, were largely responsible for my developing the Biblical version of a worldview which the reader will find in these pages, Edmond Cherbonnier, under whom I learned at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut, that the Biblical worldview is the only logically consistent worldview there is, and Ian T. Ramsey, under whom I learned at Oriel College, Oxford University, that George Berkeley had the key to resolving many worldview and metaphysical problems.(34)

Neither of these notions are widely held. And, indeed, few recognize either of the above names. But they are persons whom God put in my path to help produce a rewriting of Biblical theology which will be able to stand upright with intellectual credibility in the public arena -- something which has hardly happened for at least two centuries. Bad ideas can have horrific consequences.

34. A short biography of Ian Ramsey can be found on Wikipedia at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ian_Ramsey. And the works of Edmond Cherbonnier are discussed, and some printed out, at http://www.philosophy-religion.org/cherbonnier/index.htm Unfortunately, Cherbonnier has done little writing on the worldview issues.
Volume I - Personality, Empiricism, and God, on the relation between science and Biblical cosmology, originated at Oxford University as the thesis for my D. Phil. degree, being completed in 1964 under Ian Ramsey. Since then, I have done very little in the empirical scientific cosmology area, concentrating on the philosophical, psychological, and spiritual aspects of cosmology. But now I return to my earlier interests -- to show how all these areas are interrelated.

_Personality, Empiricism, & God_ lays the philosophical foundations for the Biblical worldview (cosmological argument for God), and, _ipso facto_, for empirical science.

We will be asking:

What would happen to science if we took seriously the personal nature of the cosmos as given in the Bible, that the fundamental being of the cosmos is a Person, and that the fundamental creatures are also persons -- made in the image of that first Person? What if the cosmos is not, after all, basically impersonal, with persons only an accidentally added point of meagre interest?

Philosophers, and even theologians, have seldom taken such a possibility seriously, mostly because of the dominance of the very impersonal Hellenic tradition. It is long past time to explore the other possibility, that persons are the basic building blocks of the cosmos, not things, not atoms, quarks, or strings, and that the whole of the physical cosmos is here to provide a stage upon which the community of persons can communicate and relate to one another.

Volume II, _Epistemology & the Substance of Science_, applies the implications of the cosmological argument and the Berkeleian view of things to some specific areas of natural science, such as the need for God to justify inductive reasoning, some questions regarding relativity and quantum mechanics, and the nature of theological language.

Volume III, _Yahweh or the Great Mother?_, will fill in many of the specifically theological aspects of the contention between these two worldviews.

All the rules of knowing truth, of life, and of personal engagement change between the two worldviews. The line between them defines the boundary of the fundamental intellectual, moral, and spiritual warfare all around us.

_Yahweh or the Great Mother?_ will define and distinguish the two worldviews more fully, but it can be said here that the difference centers on the Biblical Image of God, _Imago Dei_, and its denial by secular and pagan systems. The difference marks the fundamental ontological, metaphysical, and moral reality-cleavage of the two cosmic viewpoints. The two worldviews have contradictory notions of ontological and moral stability -- defined by their respective understandings of the divine. Western Civilization, including science, could have developed only out of the Biblical view.

The Fall is largely about the _de_-personalization of the cosmos. Salvation is thus largely about the _re_-personalization of the cosmos. Depersonalization can take place in three ways of conceiving ultimate reality: 1. the impersonal Great
Mother of paganism; 2. the impersonal because abstract realm of Platonic Ideas; and 3. the materialism of secularism.

Sadly, we get used to our depersonalized imprisonment, and often resent the Biblical challenge to it. Only the God of Abraham, Isaac, & Jacob can rescue us from depersonalization because only the God of the Bible is above all a Someone, not a Something. A person, not an it, not a thing. An individual, not an abstraction, not a state of being.

Personhood turn out to be (of all things...) the “irreducible complexity” of the cosmos. To support that contention, we must (and will) produce an appropriate definition of the word ‘person’. (35)

Epistemologically, we will be asking,

What if God is asking us to join Him on a level playing field where God puts truth ahead of even Himself? ...where God is putting His own case up for an honest up or down test -- as in “Come, let us reason together...”? By putting truth ahead of Himself, God is making pursuit of truth the royal road to Himself. That is the foundation of the Biblical Enlightenment.

Western Civilization is being driven to those questions by the logic of its own philosophical development (and collapse), and, more importantly, by the purposes of God.

b. Western & Christian Civilization

Western Civilization is identified by those three major elements unique in world history: (1) the rise of the freemarket of ideas and the empirical sciences, (2) the development of due process, equality before the law, and ordered freedom in civil government, a Godly republic (which generally, but very mistakenly, goes under the name of “liberal democracy”), and (3) the rise of economic freedom, i.e., freemarket capitalism, in which the rich can no longer commandeer the coercive force of civil government to plunder the poor -- bottom-up capitalism. (36)

But since at least the late 1700’s, all three have been spiced with an increasingly secular flavor so that the Biblical worldview has been all but chased from the public arena in the West, and secular interests have laid claim to these three crown jewels of Western Civ., science, politics, and economics. Christians participate in all three, but only rarely as Christians. And when they do, they are thought to be very much out of place -- and by some, dangerous.

Nevertheless, that which ordered our freedom and gave rise to Western civil law was precisely the moral law of God, as stated in the American Declaration of Independence, and symbolized, for example, by the Decalogue posted in the American Supreme Court, and by celebration of the Biblical themes in American history all through the capitol building in Washington, D. C.

And, more to the point for our present purposes, that which ordered the cosmos, making the rise of empirical science almost inevitable, was the natural law of God -- which alone gave rational order to the world. No cosmology
other than the Biblical offers such a foundation, so that what we call science today could have arisen only in a culture such as that of the Biblical Middle Ages, that supposedly benighted era from which “enlightened” secularism claims to have saved us. No cosmology other than the Biblical asserts that the cosmos is orderly, morally good, and designed to be human-friendly -- three essentials for the rise of science.

The secular worldview wants to claim the crown jewels of Western Civilization as its own production, but that worldview could not have produced those jewels. It got them from the Biblical view, now in such bad repair and repute (when one can find it at all).

The Middle Ages was hardly perfect, and was only beginning to explore some of the wider possibilities of Biblical culture. It failed to provide the intellectual, moral, and spiritual leadership which could have averted the schisms of the Reformation, the resulting religious wars, and the devastating secular response to the mess that Christians (not Christ) had made. But those failures do not change at all the fact that without the Biblical base, empirical science as we know it could never have arisen.

Rodney Stark writes in his conclusion to *The Victory of Reason: How Christianity Let to Freedom, Capitalism, and Western Success*:

Christianity created Western Civilization. Had the followers of Jesus remained an obscure Jewish sect, most of you would not have learned to read and the rest of you would be reading from hand-copied scrolls. Without a theology committed to reason, progress, and moral equality, today the entire world would be about where non-European societies were, say, in 1800: A world with many astrologers and alchemists but no scientists. A world of despots, lacking universities, banks, factories, eyeglasses, chimneys, and pianos. A world where most infants do not live to the age of five and many women die in childbirth -- a world truly living in “dark ages”.

The modern world arose only in Christian societies. Not in Islam. Not in Asia. Not in a “secular” society -- there having been none. And all the modernization that has since

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36. Democracy was universally despised by the American founding fathers, who saw it (rightly) as mob rule, the tyranny of the majority. In practice, it turns into a tyranny of the elite who learn how to manipulate the levers of government over that now hapless and atomized majority, to their own advantage.

What the Constitution gave us, as Ben Franklin noted, was a republic. America is a democratic republic under God. There is, of course, a democratic element (the people chose their own rulers, and are thus the primary officers of the state). America is a republic in that the laws are made not by the people directly, but by their elected representatives. And, it is all under the law of God, as stated by the Declaration of Independence. Only under the law of God can either rights or obligations be objective, let alone inalienable.

See Bibliography for *Defining 'Oughtness' and "Love"* on the case for the law of God being the only foundation for objective ethics.

Freemarket capitalism set the common man free from the plundering of the rich and powerful (and hence fostered the rise of a middle class), but it could happen only under the growing political freedom provided by the emerging Biblical political structure which rested on the notion that all men are created in the image of God. The powerful became less and less able to plunder the poor. Rodney Stark makes this case in *The Victory of Reason: How Christianity Led to Freedom, Capitalism, and Western Success*.

Capitalism, the boogey man of socialism and communism, becomes dangerous only when it colludes with government, whether communist or fascist. It tries to enlist the coercive power of government to secure its profits against competition. Government then becomes a player in the commercial game and can no longer be an honest referee.
occurred outside Christendom was imported from the West, often brought by colonizers and missionaries.\(^{37}\)

If that seems absurd and pluralistically challenged, consider the following:

One of the things we were asked to look into was what accounted for the success, in fact, the pre-eminence of the West all over the world. We studied everything we could from the historical, political, economic, and cultural perspective. At first, we thought it was because you had more powerful guns than we had. Then we thought it was because you had the best political system. Next we focused on your economic system. But in the past twenty years, we have realized that the heart of your culture is your religion: Christianity. That is why the West is so powerful. The Christian moral foundation of social and cultural life was what made possible the emergence of capitalism and then the successful transition to democratic politics. We don’t have any doubt about this.

And who would write such outrageous prose? Stark introduces that paragraph as a “recent statement by one of Communist China’s leading scholars”. Perhaps the same Chinese communist leader who said that if he had his choice of a national religion, it would be Christianity -- because it was the Christians, he said, who were taking care of the social problems, reaching out to the poor and needy.\(^{38}\)

Making Christianity a “national religion” (if that means enforced) would, of course, effectively destroy its power of redemption. Judeo-Christianity is built on freedom, not coercion.

The secular and the pagan worlds are deficient in both ontological and moral substance.\(^{39}\) That is a bold counter-cultural claim, for which this present volume and those to follow are part of my attempt to help establish the point. As Stark peers into the sociological and cultural reasons for the (to most contemporary Westerners) astonishing Biblical foundations of science, economics, and a freedom-promoting government, likewise we are here peering into the \textit{metaphysical} reasons for it being so.

As Stark and others document, to almost all of the early scientists it was not astonishing, it was just ordinary fact, the way things were. They were discovering God’s laws after Him. And, despite the blunders and crimes of an all-too-often power-oriented Church, it was also standard teaching among both Catholic and protestant Christians up through the American colonial period. The sovereignty of God over all things was part of English common law, as recorded by William Blackstone, the preeminent English jurist at the time of the American Revolution, and as understood by our founding fathers.\(^{40}\) God was understood to be sovereign precisely because He was creator. The ontological and moral foundations are logically wedded.\(^{41}\)

Among others aiming to get Christians back into the fray are some in the

\(^{37}\) \textit{The Victory of Reason}, p. 233.

\(^{38}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 235.

\(^{39}\) These claims against secularism and paganism will be given some substance here in \textit{Personality, Empiricism, & God}, but will receive further explanation in \textit{Yahweh or the Great Mother}?


\(^{41}\) See Bibliography for my book, \textit{The Law & the Grace of God}.\n
Intelligent Design movement, about which these volumes will have things to say.\(^\text{42}\) The 21st century promises to be quite different from the previous two, as Christians, with painful slowness, regain their intellectual, moral, and spiritual credibility.

Increasing numbers of Christians are discovering that Christian apologetics (explaining how Christian faith is intellectually, morally, and spiritually compelling) is necessary to the recovery of a Biblical culture. Ravi Zecharias and Vishal Mangalwadi are two former Hindus, and among the most articulate Christians alive today.\(^\text{43}\) Also, Summit Ministries conducts regular seminars on worldview issues equipping young people to meet the acid impact of our disintegrating culture.\(^\text{44}\)

c. On a Level Playing Field

One hopes that secular and pagan people will rejoice, not fear, that Christians are beginning to recover their intellectual credibility. Truth-seekers will always rejoice when others become truth-seekers also, whether or not they agree on other specific issues. Truth-seekers of all persuasions will make common cause in the defense of the mutually supportive pursuit of truth (i.e., of science) on a level playing field. If parties differing on even deep and fundamental issues, such as religion and politics, can form that first and fundamental common cause -- pursuit of truth on a level playing field -- then, and then only, is there hope of peaceful co-existence, i.e., an honest pluralism. Legislatures, governments, and international peace organizations fail because that initial covenant is rarely made -- and most often subverted in the name of control.

So, our primary aim in working together ought to be to preserve and enhance the arena of open, honest public discussion of the great issues of life, not to shut it down with coercion, mind-control, or delusionary “relative” truth and pseudo-pluralism. Only the powers of darkness profit from our fear of discussing “religion” and “politics” among ourselves. It is time we grew up. Objective truth is the only possible level playing field on which any two persons can communicate. Any other ground means the subversion of truth and therefore of communication and communion.

Jews and Christians believe (or should believe) that God Himself has created this level playing field and is inviting His creatures onto it, as in “Come, let us reason together...” (Isaiah 1:18)

The contest is vigorous. Secular materialism, or naturalism, wants the world to believe that it has both a moral and ontological foundation, an order discoverable by unaided reason. But, I think it can be shown, secular materialism has no capacity to explain the original beginnings of all things, and thus no capacity to explain why inductive reasoning, the very foundation of empirical

\(^{42}\) See, for example, The Discovery Institute at http://www.discovery.org/
Also, Volume XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX

\(^{43}\) Ravi Zecharias at http://www.rzim.org/; and,

\(^{44}\) Summit Ministries, POB 207, Manitou Springs, CO 80829. www.summit.org
science, works -- a fatal flaw.

The secular world, in short, cannot deal with singularities and contingencies (which is what the empirical world is all about) to make them orderly. When it is not busy denying, it must assume, because it cannot explain, all the metaphysical realities of life in order to get on with its chosen business of discovering the truth about the empirical world.

By *singularities*, I mean things which just seem to be there on their own, not logically necessary and not necessarily deducible from other things or conditions.

And *contingencies* are, similarly, those things which have no ontological stability of their own, and thus require ontological explanation. They could have been other than they are because their very being (the Greek *ontos*) comes from something outside of themselves.

A world full of singularities and contingencies which have no ontological basis is an irrational world, a world in which no predictions can be made, a world in which no explanations can be made about why things are the way they are. And thus, as Stark so starkly points out, no science.

d. Contingency: Positive & Negative

Being contingent, of course, is the very nature of a “creation”, which by definition receives its being from something other than itself. But creatures are not merely contingent, they are contingent “on” something -- which can give them ontological and moral order. That is a *positive* contingency.(45)

Such is not the nature of a cosmos “evolved” in the contemporary, random, reasonless, sense of the word. It is contingent (not self-explainable) to a fare-thee-well, but not “on” anything. That is a *negative* contingency.

This difference is at the very bottom of one’s ability or inability to provide a basis for science. Or, to put it another way, the basis for science will always have a metaphysical nature. But secular empiricists have a hard time with metaphysics, often, as already suggested, ignoring or denying its reality, thus resting their world on a negative contingency. But it is logical nonsense to say that a negative contingency “explains” anything. A negative contingency is, by definition, the lack of causal explanation.

Secularism is the least stable of worldviews (as we in our once secular West found out in the 1960’s, with its rejection of the Western secularism and its New Age embracing of neo-paganism). A secular cosmos is simply too impersonal for contingent (and therefore needy) persons to feel at home -- perhaps the best explanation of why most of Europe and many other Western societies have not chosen to repopulate themselves, choosing rather to “feel good” (the modern version of “eat, drink, and be merry”, for tomorrow we...) and let the rest go to hell in their different, pluralistic hand baskets. They appear to have given up on life.

That does not prove secularism wrong. We might just be out of luck. But

45. See below, “Contingency: Positive & Negative” on page xxxii.
it does suggest that we would do well to look at alternative worldviews. Neo-pagans are now having their shot at it. We here wish to provide foundation for another Judeo-Christian go at the matter.

The astonishing (to this author, at least) return to paganism has come about because paganism has the good sense to personalize the world, at least on the surface. Hugging a tree may not be exactly like hugging your spouse, but it does imply a certain kind of (somewhat mystical) comfort. You can imagine a sort of “someone” out there somewhere rather than just an infinite (or finite) void, empty of personal relationship -- like watching a video of a fractal unfold and unfold and unfold..... to Erewhon (the New Age mystical ‘nowhere’-spelled-backwards).(46)

Move to next section???

B. The Fatal Collapse of Ontology into Epistemology

B-1. Two Necessary Distinctions

If you can make it through the next few pages, you will probably not have a terrible time with the rest of the book. It takes time and practice to master some ideas, and metaphysics is by nature full of difficult ideas. So begin cutting your metaphysical teeth here. Learning the two distinctions (1) between being and knowing and (2) between being and doing is crucial to everything that follows. Some lessons you just have to live with for a while before they sink in and become clear.

The problem before us is the collapse of ontology (the study of being) into epistemology (the study of how we know what we know). When we lose sight of ontology, we try to make epistemology stand in for it.

Besides this collapse of the distinction between being and knowing, there is also a parallel collapse of the difference between our being and our doing, almost universal in the non-Biblical world.

a. Being vs. Knowing.

There is a difference between the object “out there” which we come to know and the process by which we come to know it. The real object we be-

46. I have a video of fractals, called Nothing but Zooms, from the Cornell Theory Center. Fractals are apparently visual representations of mathematical formulae, showing patterns developing in space, endlessly developing with the appearance of never arriving. The view keeps zooming in more and more deeply into the scene, but is met always by another horizon with the hope of “something meaningful”, like the carrot on the stick, always out of (in this case) sight -- over the next horizon.

One almost expects (or hopes) to see a scene develop, a landing on a foreign beach where one might meet intelligent life, a relationship. But it never happens. Just endless, barren, and impersonal panoramas. My personal experience of these fractals is of formal beauty with personal emptiness and loneliness.
lieve to be in some sense “out there” whether we perceive it or not. The “whether we perceive it or not” part is the meaning of its “objectivity”. It was most likely there before we knew it, and will be there after we forget about it. It has an “object-ivity” to it.

But we can make mistakes about its identity (Is that shape ahead on the path a boulder or a bear?), so we study the process about getting to know it in order to get to know it more accurately. We figure out a test to see which it is (throw rocks at it, see if it growls...). That process of figuring out how to decide is what is called epistemology, and goes generally under the name of “science”. Science is about how we get to know truth (see below, “What is Science?” on page xlv), and also Volume III, Chapter I, Science - What is It?

This distinction has to do with our knowledge of the object “out there”.

b. Being vs. Doing

The distinction between being and doing has to do with ourselves, our own being and doing, not objects “out there”.

If we do not have a clear sense of our own being, then we tend to define ourselves in terms of our doing -- behavior. Who I am is what I do. Homosexual persons, for example, have typically been saying this, defining their behavior as their identity.(47)

The loss of a clear sense of being standing on its own feet apart from knowing, leads to a loss of a sense of one’s own personal being, and hence a compulsive relying on doing to establish one’s being.

That is what the Bible calls salvation by works, trying to be me by what I do rather than by what God, my creator, is doing. And in such a world, we soon begin treating ourselves and others as mere phenomena (conveniences or problems), not as real persons (objects of love and devotion). A culture with power struggle rather than objective morality at its center begins the erosion with the most vulnerable -- babies, the sick, and the elderly. Ideas have consequences -- moral consequences, relationship consequences.

Almost everywhere as the Biblical worldview has eroded, we have come to define our own being mostly in terms of what we can accomplish, our doing. If you ask a westerner “What are you?”, he will almost always reply with a job description -- what he does is who he is. That implies that he is self-created, which is nonsense. And if you press for a deeper answer than his job, you will probably have a puzzled person.

A secure sense of being is thus necessary for human life to be rationally sustained. It matters whether we can explain to ourselves and others who we are and what other things are with some reasonable clarity.

Our primary focus in this book will be on the first collapse -- ontology

47. The reasons are largely political, as there is no objective evidence for saying that homosexuality is inborn or innate or otherwise determined by ‘nature’ rather than “nurture”. But convincing the public that homosexual behavior is part of one’s being makes the public more receptive to homosexual behavior. For more on sexuality issues, see Bibliography for Homosexuality: Good & Right in the Eyes of God? the Wedding of Truth to Compassion & Reason to Revelation.
(what a thing is) leaning lamely on epistemology (how we know a thing).

**B-2. Ontological & Operational Definitions**

We Westerners have lost our grip on ontology, the only substantial basis for a worldview, and so have come to define external being, reality “out there”, in terms of how we come to know it, that is, from within our own consciousness.

The worldview which gave us our rational approach to life was built on the Biblical doctrine of creation, with a Creator who made the cosmos, and then declared the cosmos to be both good and orderly. But Westerners have pretty much given up on that as mere myth, believing, falsely, that science arose out of the secular Enlightenment inspired by the late Middle Ages resurgence of Greek learning.\(^{(48)}\)

Probably every culture has its “creation myth”, its story of how things came to be what they are. Every culture has an innate sense, it seems, that one’s origin determines the rules of the game of life. The original conditions of life set the rules of interaction. That is why the current contest between Biblical creation theology and secular evolution is so important.

If we began with an intelligent design by an Intelligent Designer, then human life can go in a very person-friendly direction. But if life began in total chaos out of which the order which we perceive developed by totally random chance, then the ontological and moral order (such as they exist at all) are not person-friendly. Life is power struggle, the devil take the hindmost. And, as he eats up the hindmost, then the foremost as well.\(^{(49)}\)

A price paid for the erosion of the Biblical creation ontology over the last several centuries has been the growing inability to distinguish between being and knowing, ontology and epistemology.

We try to patch up this failing sense of being through the mechanism of “operational” definitions. When we do not know what a thing-in-itself might be, we tend to define it in terms of the operations by which we think we come to know it, thus we tend to make epistemology do the work of ontology -- a self-defeating task.

**Ontological** definitions give us the being of a thing, its essence, and are generally what we have, or at least aim at, in dictionaries. A Christian or Jew can say, “I am a creature of God,” a perfectly rational statement (if there is such a God) of one’s being.

**Operational** definitions tell us what to do in order to bump into (come to know) the item in question. We mean by a certain word that which you bump into when you do certain activities.


\(^{(49)}\) Bertrand Russell thought he could tough it out. See *A Free Man’s Worship* at http://www.theroadtoemmaus.org/RdlB/11Phl/FreeMnWorshp-BRssl.htm
For example, an ontological definition of New York City might be ‘the city in America, in New York State, at latitude X and longitude Y with \(<\text{a certain specific history} >\)’. This definition does not give you a process to follow, though you might infer a process from the definition. It gives the meaning of being New York City.

An operational definition, on the other hand, might be, ‘the city at which you arrive when you use an airline ticket to La Guardia Airport’. When you use a ticket to La Guardia airport, you bump into, arrive at, get to know, New York City -- which is indeed at the above latitude and longitude.

We use operational definitions in practice all the time.

This failure in our understanding of the proper usage between epistemology and ontology has abetted the collapse of Western Civilization, which was built on the Biblical notion of creation and on the moral order arising out of that creative act. Your moral order will always depend on the kind of cosmos you believe yourself to inhabit.

A Biblical worldview is capable of sustaining the distinction between our being and our doing. It is not at all clear that any other worldview can maintain that distinction. Despite the pundits of our current multiculturalism, neither all cosmoi nor their moralities are created equal.(50)

A Biblical world will thus produce one kind of personhood, and thus also of morality and political order. A pagan or secular world will produce quite another sense of personhood, and thus also of morality and political order.

**B-3. De-Ontologising & Operationalizing**

So the reasons for choosing a topic such as empiricism and religion to write about are no doubt evident to anyone even remotely familiar with philosophical and theological debates of the last two centuries. Empirical science is triumphant, a fact which is taken by most Westerners, even Christians, to mean that religion is one of the things over which science is most triumphant.

Some have taken quite another view, trying to alter religion to fit the empirical attitude as put forth by most commentators on those tumultuous 1960’s. R. B. Braithwaite in *An Empiricist's View of Religious Belief* saw Christianity solely in terms of morality rather than as a description of the universe. The current secular worldview, dominated by Darwinian evolution, did not allow for the God which Christians and Jews worshipped. But Braithwaite perhaps did not know that morality, law, and politics itself had already a century earlier also been de-ontologised, i.e., set free from any specific ontological foundation -- thus leaving the new “liberalized” Christianity with neither cosmos nor morality, i.e., no substantial foundation whatsoever. (51)

Then Paul Van Buren in *The Secular Meaning of the Gospel* advocated that Christians abandon their cognitive view of a transcendent God. Religion was

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50. For a discussion of the connection between creation and morality, see Bibliography for *Defining ‘Oughtness’ and ‘Love’*. 
being de-intellectualized and de-ontologised. Like de-ontologised morality, it was supposed to float somehow in the atmosphere and be “known” by all with no basis in hard reality. So, we heard, “You cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’.” The acceptance of that aphorism, leaving ethics and morality subjectively defined, helped lead directly to the collapse of morality into subjectivism, which means no morality at all, and the triumph of power over righteousness. Might makes right, even if the might is disguised under a cloak of mind-control, yet again disguised, often, as public education.

In a more popular vein, J.A.T. Robinson wrote *Honest to God* to help convert an allegedly naive view of God being “up” or “out” to a view of God somehow in the “depths” of one’s life.

Theologians have tried to counter this collapse of western theology, Harvey Cox, for example, first by embracing secularization and then with an “absurd” Christ, Christ the harlequin. There are theologies of hope, theologies of social change, theologies of fun and games -- none of which succeed in touching the deep problems of our lives. There are liberation theologies, most of which do little liberating -- because the Liberator is gone. The old view of God as a particular person, Creator of all that is, King of kings and Lord of lords, we are told, must be replaced. So we have the unlikely task of liberating ourselves.

These writers were all deontologizing morality and religion, i.e., removing them from any foundation in being, from any foundation in the substance of the cosmos. Morality and religion were to be independent of worldview, which means an anti-intellectual return to the worst aspects of paganism and the collapse of a search for truth.

On the scientific and philosophical side, there are close parallels, which have in fact inspired these movements in theology. Some say, “Evolution has put God out of a job.” Many of the old metaphysical notions such as inert substance and active causation have been abandoned in favor of notions which, it is felt, have greater empirical verifiability.

Oxford scholar, A. J. Ayer, at one time in *Language, Truth, and Logic*, eschewed metaphysics altogether (the study of being, and of what, if anything, lies behind phenomena) in favor of a certain brand of phenomenalism, concluding that theology, for example, was nonsense since, on his view, talk about God had no possible empirical verification. Anthony Flew used the famous (among philosophers) “parable of the garden” by John Wisdom to prove the

51. This new wisdom was begun during the 1800’s and developed, for example, by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes during the early 1900’s, who supported the “positivist” notion of law, that law did not depend on any values or obligations coming from above human law, but simply from the accumulation of “positive” law over time. As one justice was heard to say in the 1960’s, “The Constitution means what the Supreme Court says it means.” The Court, he thought, was beholden to no obligations superior to itself. It was in fact God. It was the supreme judge of right and wrong for the American people. Ethics, law, obligation were all “deontologized”, disengaged from their traditional foundation in the structure and meaning of the cosmos. We just make them up as we go.

There is no substantial difference between that and tyranny. Under such a system, there is no possibility of the self-government instituted by the American revolution. The effect on life in America and the West has been devastating. (Ask nearly 50,000,000 little American babies.) Ideas have consequences.
point.\(^{(52)}\)

Some philosophers of science have likewise de-ontologised science by abandoning Newtonian inert substance and more or less replacing it, as does Heisenberg, \textit{et al}, with logical and mathematical constructs, resulting in an “operational” ontology.

As we have seen, an operational ontology does not define a thing in terms of itself, i.e., its being, but rather in terms of the “operations” by which one comes to know it. Being, or reality, is what you bump into when you \textit{do} x, y, and z. Generally, x, y, and z refer to some process (operation) of scientific method.

But again, epistemology is made to do double duty, both as epistemology and ontology. Ontology is the science of reality, of what it means to exist, or of what it would mean to be real or a fact. Epistemology is the science of knowledge, of how we come to know reality and facts.

\section*{B-4. Fatal Flaws}

Certain fatal problems arise, however, when epistemology and ontology are merged -- such as the drift toward solipsism, the belief that I am the only existing entity. There arises a systematic doubt about the significance of the “not-self” because the self has become defined increasingly in terms of private experience, the necessarily-private act of knowing.

Another problem is the difficulty of giving an account of the difference between true and illusory perception, or an account of what it would \textit{mean} to make an error. In order to be able to make an error, there must be a difference between what a thing is and how we come to know what it is. It is just this difference which an operational ontology blurs.

Einstein, on the scientific side, defined simultaneity in terms of the method of judging events to be simultaneous -- an operational definition. The Berkeleyan “to be is to be perceived” is thus taken in a quite literal sense, for reality is defined in terms of perception. Phenomena, in other words, \textit{are} the basic reality. Ontology merges with epistemology, resulting in a drastic watering down of the sense in which any two observers can be said to perceive the “same” objective event, or even the possibility of objectivity at all.

Ironically, secular empirical scientists are committing the same error as many of their opposites in the religious end of the discussion.

On the other hand, many Christians, especially since the Reformation, have asserted the infallibility of the Bible, hoping to rescue the Bible from


Flew, a few decades later, recanted much of his doubt under pressure of evidence for an Intelligent Designer, asserting that there is at least some kind of Designer to this thing we call the cosmos.” It is just too complicated and delicately formed to have happened by chance. It looks like it was designed for human life -- the “anthropic” principle.
what they perceived to be the acid effects of scientific assessment of Christian claims. The effect of that was to take what is a means of knowing the Christian faith (the Bible) as the faith itself. The Bible was thus put in a position of getting in its own way. And so Christian spirituality often focussed more on the Bible and Biblical texts than on the God which the Bible was supposed to reveal, leading to yet one more version of legalism.

Christians should have known that a credible Bible requires a cosmos, a metaphysical undergirding in which such a book would make sense, that is, a cosmos created by a personal God. If there is no such God, if the doctrine of creation is not true, then Biblical religion is obviously false. But one cannot know there to be in fact the required kind of cosmos by reading the Bible itself. We do not know that God exists and created the cosmos “because” the Bible says so. Such knowledge comes only by natural theology and metaphysics. The metaphysical doctrine of creation is the necessary pre-Bible teaching, without which the whole of Biblical religion drifts toward collapse into a pile of dust. This what St. Paul refers to in Romans 1:18-20. There are things about God which can be known apart from revelation. The Bible testifies to the creation event, but but does not prove its truth. The Bible without the creation story is false, and so is the religion based upon it. Proof of the fact of creation comes from outside the Bible, through such works as this present attempt to rewrite the cosmological argument for the existence of God so as to meet current and past objections.

But if it can be shown that the doctrine of creation has a secure logical foundation, that it is rational to talk about such a creator, then it makes sense to find out whether there might indeed be empirical, historical evidence (maybe even a 2000-year history book) telling of such a creator communicating with us.\(^{53}\)

But --on the other hand, the same is true of empirical science. If there is no metaphysical foundation for science, then science is just as much a myth as would be Biblical religion without it metaphysical base. A theory of cosmic evolution is trying hard to supplant Biblical creation as the relevant undergirding. A cosmic disorder, random evolution, is trying to pass itself off as the Source of Order. If there is no justification for believing that the cosmos is indeed both orderly and good, then there is no justification for spending the enormous time and resources required by empirical science.\(^{54}\)

So, I hope to show that behaviorism and operationalism give us at best a lame ontology, and that epistemology cannot bear the double burden placed upon it. Epistemology works only as epistemology, not as ontology.

Empiricism, if it is to function as empiricists would have it function, must have an ontology which stands on its own feet. We must have some notion of what a thing “is” in order to have a realistic theory of how to come to know what it is. That is not to say that what a thing “really” is can be unrelated to how we come to know it, but rather that it’s being cannot be exhaustively de-

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53. See Bibliography for The Authority of the Bible in a Scientific World, for my case on these issues.
54. See Part II, Chapter XXXXXXX on Intelligent Design vs. Evolution.
fined in terms of how we know it.

B-5. The Biblical Ontology

The ontology I put in place of the old inert substance on the one hand and the new operationalism or phenomenalism on the other, is that of active agency.

Persons as causes are the basic substances of the universe, primarily God as the first cause. The cosmological argument to be developed will be metaphysical -- an elucidation of what is necessarily presupposed by there being an intelligible empirical world at all -- and with it, the possibility of natural science.

Philosophically or scientifically, then, this is a metaphysical essay which supports an active agent or slightly modified Berkeleian ontology over against either inert substance (Newtonian) or phenomenalism (post-Newtonian). All to be explained....

Theologically this might be thought of as an essay on the doctrine of creation. And this will be the central theme -- that the empirical world is most intelligible if understood as the meeting place between persons, that is, between and among God and His creatures.

It is commonly believed that the Bible does not have a philosophy of its own. That is badly mistaken. The Bible is not a book on philosophy, but it does have a clearly articulable philosophy unique to itself which can stand in the public arena with any contender. This essay is intended, at least, to be philosophical in this most rigorous sense. Let the reader judge.

The dearth of serious philosophical theology today is due largely to the collapse of natural theology beginning in the late Middle Ages. Theology became progressively less and less creation-centered and more and more salvation centered. The doctrine of creation was starting to be replaced, rather than be supplemented by, doctrines of atonement as the foundation stone of Christian thought even before the Reformation. The steady collapse of the creation-foundation left the Christian community vulnerable to the acid erosion of the new secularism, so that eventually in the public mind evolutionism replaced the Biblical doctrine of creation. The movement toward religious subjectivism was on, and there has been no successfully sustained theological development since that time to counter that movement.

That is the problem before us.

That fact has now, at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries, led Western Civilization to the near total loss of meaning, purpose, personal strength, and courage to sustain a free society. Cosmology determines the possibilities of those personal qualities. It may be indeed that we are just stuck with such a terrible condition and must make the best of it.

But the facts, I think, are substantially otherwise. A Biblical cosmology and worldview are the only logically and empirically sustainable way of looking at life, and they do indeed provide those qualities of existence which sup-
port and sustain meaning, purpose, and courage. That is a large, some would say absurd, claim.

A word of warning. The biggest hurdle for most readers will probably be Bishop Berkeley's notion that “to be is to be perceived”, with its wrongly interpreted suggestion that the world is not real. Such a position would only the more quickly land us in subjectivism, not save us from it.

The paradox is that persons who object to Berkeley often do not see that their objections are more properly lodged against contemporary phenomenalists, for many of whom “to be is to be perceived” is accepted as true in a far more subjective and potentially solipsistic sense than Berkeley would ever have dreamed. The error, I think, demonstrates the grip of the prejudice supporting Newtonian inert substance as the basic reality of the universe and militating against any notion of active substance.

It will be rightly objected that we have long since surpassed Newtonian physics, trading it in for relativity, and then quantum mechanics.

But quantum mechanics, wandering in a welter of mathematical (rather than physical, Newtonian) entities, has never resolved the solipsism problem associated with “to be is to be perceived”. A sturdy Biblical ontology can do just that.

Nevertheless, the arguments must stand on their own. Successful or not, the intent of a Berkeleian-Biblical approach is to discover whether one can save one's person-hood (and the rest of the world), on one hand, from being reduced to atoms in motion (or more currently, deductive relations among empirical laws) or, on the other hand, from being dissolved in the mists of post-modern relativism and subjectivity.

My prediction is that the reader who persists through these pages will come to discover -- “This works!”

C. Three Definitions

But before we proceed, more on a few definitions. Whole libraries have been written about these definitions, and we will be looking much more deeply at all three later on, but I want to point the reader in the right direction for my usage here. This is especially important in a book which hopes to unite science and Biblical faith.

C-1. What is Metaphysics?

a. The Basics

The world ‘metaphysics’ comes from the Greek ‘meta’ (behind or beside) and ‘physics’, denoting the study of that which is behind the visible, physical, or phenomenal world. Generally this is thought of as the study of being itself, which has been carried on in the West largely in the standard Greek tradi-
However, I would rather define ‘metaphysics’ (and will use it to mean) the study of that which is of logical necessity presupposed behind the phenomenal world of space and time in order to make sense of it.

That gives us a broader framework within which to work. It might turn out that the standard definition of ‘metaphysics’ as the study of pure “being” is indeed the best one, but if the thrust of this present work is on target, then changes need to be made.

A successful metaphysical argument does not prove the existence of God, only that without God the world is utterly chaotic, unreasonable, and thus incapable of science. The world of the five senses (which is claimed by naturalists and secularists as their own self-sufficient turf) thus requires something other than itself to be rationally understandable (their turf is not just “theirs”, and is not as self-sufficient as they think).

We have a given and obvious world of the five senses, but that world is clearly contingent, not self-sufficient or self-explanatory, and therefore demanding of further and necessarily non-physical (metaphysical) explanation.

In their critique of Darwinian evolution, for example, supporters of Intelligent Design point out that secular folks have their own metaphysical presuppositions -- to which they are often not owning up. Secularists or naturalists are assuming, not proving, some things behind the scenes which give unjustified support to their secular way of interpreting things.

Metaphysics has been on hard times for at least two centuries, but especially in the 20th because it was thought that the rising positivist and behaviorist empirical way of understanding things could operate on its own. Secularists asserted that we needed no more than the five senses to tell us all we needed to know. But they seriously under-estimated the power of the world’s contiguity, and equally over-estimated their own capacity to make rational sense of this contingent, radically dependent world.

This book is about the necessary recovery of metaphysics for our understanding of science and cosmology.

b. Two Ways of Being a Metaphysician: Philosophical & Childhood

Philosophical metaphysics in the West seems to have come into its own with the Greek philosophers, with no doubt similar examples in other cultures, especially the eastern religions. The Greeks thought that “being” was the basic concept, the most abstract, that to which particular characteristics could be applied. An apple has its “being” in which many disparate characteristics could reside. The apple could be red or green, and could even change color over

55. For a good summary of the influence of Greek philosophy on Western Christian thought, see Total Truth, by Nancy Pearcey, and also Must the Sun Set on the West? From Michelangelo to Freud - the Devolution of Human Dignity, by Vishal Mangalwadi. See also The Great Chain of Being by Arthur O. Lovejoy on the Hellenic/Platonic view often embraced by Christians and Jews, which is, I believe, antithetical to the Judeo-Christian tradition.
time. But it was still an apple. It had the being of an apple, “applehood”. Apples could have widely differing characteristics without losing their applehood. One could still recognize the differing apples as apples.

Children, however, go about this business of metaphysics, discovering what is “behind” the phenomena, in a quite differing way, and are, I think, decidedly more on target than the philosophers. If you want to observe metaphysics happening in the raw, observe the smallest children growing through their first seven or so years.

Children are naturally empiricists. They are born into a world about which they know almost nothing, and then at an astonishing rate and with a voracious curiosity come to know about that world in detail so that they can function intelligently in it. Most of the foundation for this is accomplished before about seven years old. As the Jesuits were known for saying, “Give us a child until he is seven, and he is ours for life.” They knew that the basic worldview of a child is formed by about seven, before the skills for abstract thinking can develop, beginning about eight years old.

During those first seven years the child is learning metaphysical lessons. The very recognition of mother is a metaphysical event. The child does not reason from empirical data (this being is feeding me, keeping me clean and comfortable, she must be my mother). The child does not see empirical data in the raw sense suggested by contemporary empiricists, the child sees mother, a person, a someone who loves me.

That was demonstrated in orphanages in Germany in the late 1800’s, where, using the new “science” of child-raising, the orphanages took very good care of the children. They were fed, kept clean and warm, etc. But many of them died, for no discoverable reason. Then some observant person noted that the children whom a villager came in to hug, cuddle, and hold, like a mama, did not die. The mechanical, “scientific” caring for the child was not enough. The child had to connect with a someone, a person, know that it was loved. So, one now finds signs posted in nurseries, “Don’t waste a trip through the nursery, pick up and hug a child...”

In other words, there is an ability beginning in the smallest infants to “see” a person beyond the sense-data of the person’s body, to distinguish a person from an object, and to connect with that person in a way that cannot be done with crib, blankets, bottles of milk, or even scientifically (mechanically) behaving nurses and doctors. We all, at any age, need to know that we are loved, important to someone.

Life is about relationship with persons, not with bare sense-data. And persons are metaphysical entities, “behind” the sense-data. The Biblical view says that the physical world reveals the spiritual world of persons, that the physical world is good, not evil, and that spirit and flesh are complementary parts of the same cosmos. That healthy view of the cosmos deteriorated among Christians as certainty about the doctrine of creation deteriorated.

That is the view for which we will be developing a metaphysical justification. Persons, not things, are the primary entities of the cosmos.
C-2. What is Epistemology?

Epistemology is

the study of how we know what we know.

How we know what we know is important because, in a community of truth-seekers, how-we-know is the major thing giving credibility to our knowledge. “How do you know that Jesus was raised from the dead?” is the kind of challenge before which Christians have come to quiver.

One might respond ordinarily to such a question, “Because I was there and saw it happen...” or, “I have studied the writings of those who are competent in that area...” or, “It has been a generally accepted fact...” There are many ways we think we justify our beliefs. The question is whether our assertions and our justifications can survive an open, honest public debate. Christians have long done poorly in that department.

So, how do Christians pursue truth? I have written on this subject in *The Authority of the Bible in a Scientific Age*, and we will spend much more time on epistemology in Part III of this book, but we must take a brief look here at the matter before going on. In short, Christians have largely lost, and must recover, their intellectual credibility if they expect to recover their moral and spiritual credibility in the public arena. And that means coming to terms with epistemology and science. We must learn how to explain how we know what we know.

Many writers have wrestled with these issues, but most, including many who still called themselves Christian, have concluded that traditional Judeo-Christian faith must give way to an intellectually superior “Enlightenment”, meaning secularism.

Few believe today that Christians are on the verge of recovering their intellectual credibility or worldview. That, I believe, is a mistake.

The Bible has its own epistemology and worldview which are second to none, and there are growing signs that God is raising up a new kind of spiritual warrior, for whom wielding the Sword of the Spirit entails the most rigorous kind of intellectual discipline.

That is the sort of language which sets many secular folks on edge, anticipating another Inquisition in the wings, or at the very least, a compromise of scientific credibility. My intent and hope is to show that science and Biblical religion need not be separated, and that indeed, there is no possibility of separating them. As Rodney Stark recently affirmed, and others have long ago shown, science as we know it arose, and could have arisen, only out of the Biblical worldview.

It was Christians themselves who torpedoed the intent of God to strengthen the intellectual backbone of His Church through the rise of science,

56. See Bibliography.
57. In Bibliography, see books by Rodney Stark, sociologist, on the cultural impact of Christianity in Western culture, such as the rise of science, including *The Rise of Christianity; For the Glory of God*; and; *One True God*. 
largely, one must assume, because they so often feared risking the open engagement of ideas which science implies. “What if the argument goes against us!!??” The Godly answer: “We might learn something.”

Many Christian writers, from the early Church fathers to the present, have asserted that a true Christian need fear no open intellectual inquiry, and indeed, should be actively encouraging such. This book is written in that tradition, come what may. One must follow the first rule of spiritual warfare: be a truth-seeker -- at any cost to oneself. One cannot be a follower of Jesus Christ and avoid honest debate. The Kingdom of God is built on truth, or it is not built at all.

Christians who are deeply involved in both politics and science are usually reticent about expressing their faith, let alone making their faith a basic part of their work in those fields. That is largely because Christians had lost their intellectual credibility through the collapse of Christian unity resulting from the corruption of the Medieval Church, the Reformation, and the terrible religious wars following.

Common sense dictated the quieting, if not removal, of the religious voices if they could do no better than that. And rightly so. We Christians got pretty much what we deserved.

But not what God deserved, not God as revealed in the Bible, and in the character and message of Jesus, the Son of God.

C-3. What is Science?

The definition of ‘science’ which I will be using is quite simple:

We have a science when we have a set of rules of evidence in a given field which can be used in public debate, which are administered neutrally, i.e., even-handedly among participants, and which are agreed to lead to the truth in that field.

I was once discussing this at lunch, using the rules of football to illustrate the neutrality principle. The rules of football apply equally, neutrally, to each team and player, I said, and the referees who apply the rules are not allowed to throw blocks, catch passes, etc. They may not play in the game because they must remain neutral with respect to the teams. Just so with the rules of a science.

A person at that lunch asked whether, then, the rules of football were a science. I, somewhat surprised, replied, yes, they are indeed the science for determining the best team in the league. The rules of football turned out to be an excellent illustration of what a science is. You cannot tell the best league by reading the rules, you have to put the rules to work on the field. Likewise, you cannot tell that water freezes at 32 degrees Farenheit by reading the rules of science, you have to put the rules to work in the laboratory.

Second only to the occasional decision to use force to convert people to Christ or to retain them in the fold, the Christian self-imposed alienation from science has been the worst strategic error in the whole history of the Church, leading, more than anything else, to the present collapse of Western culture and
the horrendous political and military debacle of the 20th century. The resort to coercion, of course, follows on the incapacity to reasonably defend the truth of one’s beliefs, so the two failures fed on each other.

Christians have almost universally (at least in principle) renounced coercion as a means of evangelism, and there are as well and fortunately, signs of recovery of Christian intellectual credibility in the making.

Theology used to be called the Queen of Sciences. It will one day again become evident that theology is as much a science as physics or chemistry, that theology has its own rules of evidence which can be used to determine the truth of matters about God. We hope to help show that here.

The relation between science and metaphysics is not, as assumed, that science, or the scientific worldview, has shown metaphysics to be irrelevant or a pseudo-science. Metaphysics provides the basis which undergirds and makes rational all scientific pronouncements.

Just as, for the Bible to be a legitimate source of inspiration, we must live in a cosmos in which such a thing as a Bible would make sense, so also, in order to explain the possibility of science, we must live in a cosmos in which science could possibly make sense. Just as some cosmoi do not allow for a Bible, so also some do not allow for science. But the ultimate nature of the cosmos is not an empirical issue, it is meta-physical. It is our contention that the Biblical worldview explains and supports science and no other worldview can do that, or at least no currently live option to the Biblical view.

We will be saying more about the nature of science in Part II, The Substance of Natural Science.

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D. Why this Matters

D-1. Reason

The above are all primary concerns of “reason”.

Reasonable debate seems often abstract and irrelevant to the more passionate aspects of our lives. Philosophers are typically not much concerned about messy politics, and politicians are not much concerned about the abstractions of philosophy. That is partly because most Western philosophy has been embedded in the Hellenic mode in which the cosmos is irreducibly impersonal. In such a world, academic discussions seem far removed from the concerns of daily life: commerce, government, family raising. And indeed, they often are.

The Biblical cosmos, on the other hand, is fundamentally personal and relationship oriented -- the creation by a Someone, not an emanation of a something, and not a machine. The highest laws in the universe are the two laws of love because the Biblical goal of life is a community of persons. Persons, not atoms or quarks or mathematical entities, are the fundamental ontological objects in the cosmos. The Biblical cosmos is personalist, not reducible to impersonal essences or entities.
In that kind of cosmos, the affairs of Ultimate Reality are not abstract, they are very concrete and can be directly related to human welfare. God both creates us and calls us into our life mission, our purpose for being which is life with Him and one another. Our ontological and moral stability are personal events with a personal Source which are relevant to any and all aspects of our political, social, family, and, yes, scientific lives.

But the Biblical view has been discarded in favor of materialism in which the fundamental entities are things. Whatever is the smallest entity which cannot be split, the ultimate atom, is expected to be the explanation for all other things built out of it -- despite the fact that the latest smallest item always seems to be made up of yet smaller items. There seems no way to predict an end to the division process. One just hopes. But much depends, as we shall see, on there being an end to the infinite regress of causal explanation.

And such an impersonal world is not person-friendly. It is imagined that the rules governing this smallest entity will give us the clue to the rest of life, how we got here, and perhaps where we are going. Or so seemed to think Carl Sagan as he taught in his *Cosmos* TV series and book. Sagan, however, apparently sensed the unfriendly impersonal drift of his secular cosmos, and at the end of his book adopted, like Carl Jung, a Hindu worldview.\(^{(58)}\)

Objections come also from the “believer” side of the issue. Philosophical discussion is considered by many Christians to be “just a head trip”, distracting from the real issues of spirituality and morality, and maybe even a sell-out to secularism (assuming the opposition between reason and revelation). It is certainly true that we can “live in our heads”, fail to make realistic connections between what we think and what we do and how we relate. And, Biblical religion is all about relationship.

D-2. Post-Modern Despair, Apathy, ...& Standing for Truth

*But why reason at all?* we hear from post-moderns (po-mo’s) and other believers in relative truth. Does not reasoning lead to arguing, and is that not counter-productive?

The short answer is that *ideas have consequences*. It makes a life-and-death difference as to which religion, which philosophy, which worldview, is the truth of the matter. Either we find out or continue in our self-destructive confusion. And, no, reasoning does not need to lead to hostile confrontation.

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58. Jung’s interest in Hinduism is fairly well known. For an indication of Carl Sagan’s Hindu bent, read the final chapters of his work, *Cosmos*, either video or printed.

Hinduism is not a religion built on persons or personal relationships, but it does have a deeply embedded personal culture, with rules for family and social life. And this is itself embedded in a host of gods and goddesses which give at least a semblance of personal relationship. But in the end, Hinduism drifts off into a kind of cosmic consciousness which is absolutely impersonal.

Every religion of any cultural size will develop ways of adapting the religion to helping make society work better. We often have to learn to live above what we say we believe. We are compelled into it by our own personhood and the demands of personal relationships.
The hostility does not come from reasoning, it comes from resistance to reasoning, resistance to being open to correction by truths. Truth (reality) does not get out of the road for anybody, truth is the road. So we had better learn how reasonably to navigate it.

The attack on reason is no longer so much from a rigidly fundamentalist Christian point of view as from post-modernism having wafted into the life of Western Civilization. If secular science has failed us, then it must be because reason itself is not a valid tool for resolving vital issues --- or so we have concluded. But science is different from secularized science.

Some post-modernists are sincere, reacting to the obvious and massive failure of secularized science and reason over the 20th century. But science and secularized science/reasoning are two quite different things. Secularization is a metaphysical decision, though seldom recognized as such (didn’t secular folks reject metaphysics??). And the option least imaginable by almost anyone is that reason is God’s way, and that it ought to be the Judeo-Christian way. Almost no one thinks of God as being reasonable, let alone holding the intellectual high ground.

The fate of those who believe truth to be relative, however, is to become the victims of every charlatan and manipulator pedaling down the road.

Advertisers, media people, lawyers, politicians, and spiritual leaders are taught how to influence persons through fundamentally dishonest means, through emotional appeal, shame, guilt by association, etc.(59) Fact and logic are intentionally and selectively factored out of the discussion. Students in captive audience classes (mandatory and coercively enforced school attendance) are taught that truth and morality are relative -- and are behaving with appropriately disastrous consequences.

We must cut to the chase, and force the issue before especially the young: For what are you willing to die? For what are you willing to dedicate and sacrifice your life, your fortune, and your sacred honor..., if not for the truth? Are you willing to stand, come what may, to defend the open arena of honest public discussion and truth-testing? What do you want to pass on to your children and grandchildren...., if not a respect for truth, righteousness, and love?

Loss of truth has led directly to the lethal malaise in dying Europe. With no truth, there is nothing much left to live for, except “feeling good”, and that, after a while, gets boring. Europe is dying of boredom.

The trashing of truth comes from two sources: (1) deep despair about life, and (2) willful intent to manipulate the public. In the end, it comes from the fa-

59. Read, for example, After the Ball, by Marshall Kirk and Hunter Madsen, one an expert in intelligence testing, the other an expert in advertising, both well equipped to mount their self-styled “propaganda” program to convert America to acceptance of homosexuality.

The Episcopal “liberal” program of the 1990’s to do the same thing in the Episcopal Church was (for anyone who had eyes to see) a blatant mind-control program. But Episcopal conservative leadership was either too ignorant, prudish, or cowardly to stand up to the nonsense. And worse, they did not want to be told how they might win the struggle for sexual sanity. They had no concept of marshalling evidence and presenting a compelling case. They had been “post-modern-ized”, and so were out-debated, out-flanken, and out-maneuvered by persons who had no intention of allowing any thing so dangerous to their program as honesty.
ther of lies. Only dishonest persons can benefit from the trashing of truth.

And furthermore, manipulators do not really believe truth to be relative even though naive and gullible folks can be suckered in for a while. No one can live by relative truth in actual practice. At already noted, promoters of it want the rest of us to believe truth to be relative, and hence not defend our truth, only so that they can insert their version of objective truth unopposed.

That is betrayal of the most profound sort, and should be firmly treated as such.

But there is a relatively easy way to find out who is and is not sincere: Ask (yourself first, then the other): *If you were wrong, would you want to know? And are you willing to work together to find ways to test between our opposing views to see which is right?*

If there is no reasonable and honest response, you know that you are not in an honest conversation. You are in spiritual warfare.

As John Macmurray told us, *all thought is for the sake of action, and all action is for the sake of relationship.* There is no escaping the intimate connection between what we think and how we relate. Ideas have relationship consequences. If you want your relationships to go well, as many po-mo’s do, you must clarify your ideas and commitments.

**D-3. Learning to Think**

We all begin with the first peep of consciousness to develop in our minds a roadmap of reality, a picture of life as we think it to be, developing into a distinction between real and unreal, true and false, what-is vs. what-is-not. Up to about eight years old, we rely mostly on our intuitive-emotional-relational capacities to construct this map.

Then along about eight we begin learning to think abstractly, and that we can analyze for their truth-value those beliefs picked up earlier. We had already, early on, understood the difference between true and false, but our intellect now gives us the capacity to refine that distinction and submit our beliefs to far more precise truth-testing. Our intellect does not so much give us new knowledge, but it is an amazing tool for cross-checking the knowledge we gain in other ways.

“Head trip” warnings might be accurate in any given case, but we must not therefore throw the baby out with the bathwater. Any person growing up in an intellectually active culture will be strongly affected by intellectual pursuits. It is in the air. We breathe it all the time, and it affects how we see our own beliefs. Like it or not, we give “experts” (scientists) enormous authority over our lives.

Many, if not most, Christians today are practicing secularists, seldom relying on their available spiritual capacities and tools for their conclusions, so that most Christians are trying to paste their Christian beliefs over a more or less

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60. See his two books, *Persons in Relation* and *The Self as Agent.*
unconscious secular foundation -- governed today largely by the rules of Darwinian evolutionism.

The obvious result is an incapacitated and mostly irrelevant Christian community so far as the public arena is concerned. And ill at ease even within the Christian community and within one’s own soul. The thought that I just might be praying to an illusion, to my father-figure projected on the cosmos, haunts a large number of Christians. Seldom to be seen is a Christian, clergy or lay, who can stand up in public and declare with truth and grace the distinguishing belief of the Christian faith, that “Jesus is Lord and Savior...”

So believers of a Biblical stripe are increasingly being driven from the public arena -- sometimes because people do not want to hear the Christian message, but also often because so few Christians deliver the message with truth and grace. Christians are almost always on the defensive, having no offensive strategy at hand. That will not change until Judeo-Christians regain their intellectual credibility and become known as truth-seekers at any cost to themselves -- i.e., become honest scientists.

When it is shown, as I am convinced it will be, that God does indeed hold the intellectual, along with the moral and spiritual, high ground, we will see a different picture.

| D-4. The Fall, Mutual Slaughter... & Spiritual Warfare |
| a. The Fall |

The Fall was the departure from that common ground of open meeting in Eden, where Adam and Eve were free, presumably, to converse with God about anything -- into a cosmos increasingly devoid of epistemological (we no longer knew how to pursue truth, or much wanted to), ontological (we lost touch with the ground of our being), or moral stability (we no longer knew where we were going) -- and thus slid inexorably into self-destruction.(61) We needed a Savior.

As the early chapters of Genesis indicate, the fallen people of this fallen world, from Cain on, quickly separated their concerns from reason and common sense, and increasingly ran their lives with passion full bore, self-centered and ungoverned by reason. The Incarnation is the ultimate invitation by God to the rest of us to participate again in that “Come, let us reason together...”, so that we might be saved from the consequences of our passions ungoverned by the more-than-reasonable law and grace of God.

61. I do not believe the Bible to be either infallible or inerrant, nor do I believe that the historicity of the Bible need be taken always literally (see Bibliography for The Authority of the Bible in a Scientific Age). But I do believe the Bible to give us the only logically and empirically credible worldview, with credibility in both its ontological and moral foundations -- giving strong support for the credibility of the salvation message.

This book will give my case for the ontological credibility.

The third volume, Yahweh or the Great Mother? will continue the ontological case and help develop the moral case.

See Defining ‘Oughtness’ & ‘Love’ in Bibliography for the logical foundation of the morality issue.

As these matters are advanced, it will become strikingly clear as to why the Gospel of Jesus Christ is in fact a clear explanation of our spiritual and other needs, and of the solution to those needs.
That does not sound very philosophical as most people understand the term, but it does, perhaps, ring true with the tradition of Socrates, who seemed to have some faint glimmerings of the Way of the Cross, and who, had he known the King of kings, might, in his pursuit of truth, have sat at His feet, maybe even picked up his cross daily and followed Him (see John 8:31 ff.).

And many Christians have sensed something of the presence of God in Plato’s myth of the cave.

Western Christians during the late Middle Ages invented science, the epitome of reason as we know it, beginning substantially with that uniquely Christian invention, the university. But many in Christian spiritual leadership became increasingly fearful of the intellectual freedom of such a venture, fearful that an open honest examination of the facts might disprove their Biblical case. So in essential areas they disengaged from the public pursuit of truth. That open, common ground was a bit too risky, suggesting that either they were not following God in the first place, only pretending, or that they feared God himself could not survive honest discussion.

In the aftermath of the Reformation, Christians slaughtered each other in religious wars, not because God said to, but because they had abandoned reason (and therefore love), as though reason and revelation were enemies.

The result of that intellectual and spiritual cowardice and consequent tragedy has been the collapse in the West of the Biblical worldview, morality, and political vision of freedom -- which had been gestating in Christian Europe through English common law, the Calvinist respect for the sovereignty of God, and then in the American democratic republic under God. Both personal and political freedom were given a new start in America.

But the tragedy caught up with American Christians in the 1800’s, so the erosion of Christian civilization continues almost unabated, with the Church anywhere mostly incompetent to raise a standard to which truth-seekers can repair, trapped in a defensive, very narrow and unBiblical biblicism.

b. Spiritual Warfare

The culture war emerging out of this seemingly abstract intellectual contest is about the foundation of all the rest of our lives -- science, politics, sovereignty, commerce, morality, education, religion, world affairs, local affairs, sex, family life.... The list goes on. The stakes are everything. All of reality, all of legitimacy and authority are at stake. No quarter is asked or given. Winner takes all. Either God rules, or the Tower of Babel rules. Either Jesus is Lord, or globalist government will be lord. One view will lose, the other will die. These issues are (often sub rosa) engaged in the creation/evolution con-

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63. I am not a Calvinist, I am an Anglican. But I do have a great respect for the Calvinist upholding of the sovereignty of God over all things, especially over civil government, and especially during our war with King George III. In that sense, all Christians are Calvinists (or should be).

64. See bibliography for *The Authority of the Bible in a Scientific Age*, my understanding of the Bible as the basis for, not the enemy of, intellectual (as well as moral and spiritual) integrity.
Europe is depopulating itself, dying by its own hand, with America maybe fifty to seventy-five years behind. A dysfunctional (because post-Christian) Western “liberal democracy” is losing to political globalism and to radical Islam -- in both cases, intellectually and morally dysfunctional, and totalitarian societies. Amidst all of this, Christians have been effectively sidelined, mostly by their own apathy and incompetence.\(^{65}\)

Whittaker Chambers, a Communist spy who about 1938 had converted to Christianity, said to his wife, “You know, we are leaving the winning world for the losing world.”\(^{66}\) His comment was, I suppose, about the state of the Western leadership and of the institutional Church, not of God, or he would hardly have converted.

The title, “Witness”, of his autobiography, is meant in its deepest sense, standing for what one believes to be right, at any cost to oneself -- “Men must act on what they believe right, not on what they believe probable”.

Whittaker Chambers is one of the great (but ignored, and/or despised) heroes of the 20th century. He came to understand the deep nature of spiritual warfare, and what was at stake in world civilization. But he saw little hope that Western leadership could, or would, deal with the realities, that it had bought too far into a compromise-and-get-along mentality to stand up against Communism, mortal enemy of everything for which Western Civilization had stood. Chambers understood that without God, we have no hope against the enemy, and that the beauty of Western Civilization had arisen out of Biblical faith.

Chambers describes in detail Communist strategy, using local small groups of utterly committed persons, who were knit together in a vast and secret network, infiltrating the institutions of a given society to undermine and erode local tradition and belief, rendering them susceptible to Communist mind-control.

It has become a platitude that a society can be changed by just such a dedicated minority. Everyone seems to recognize it but Christians -- who continue on their self-absorbed, institutionalized way, forgetting that it was small, local groups of Christians who won the Roman empire because they knew how to die well, who would not hold back their lives, if required, for their witness to Jesus as Savior and Lord, including over Caesar. It was a small group of mostly Christian patriots who won their freedom from mighty Great Britain. And, it was a small group of mostly Christians who won the war in England against slavery.

\(^{65}\) It is this author’s belief that both Islam and the homosexual population are being used by international globalist forces to subvert what is left of Biblical civilization, the target being primarily America because of its Biblical foundations.

In asserting that Islam is morally dysfunctional, I do not mean that all Muslims are so. But any religion which attributes what would in normal discussion be called criminal behavior to God (such as wholesale destruction of innocent bystanders) is committing blasphemy. For Muslims to stand on the moral high ground, they must renounce such beliefs and behavior, and stand publicly against those who do them.

\(^{66}\) See Witness, by Whittaker Chambers, page one of chapter I, “Flight”
In quite a different setting, Whittaker Chambers was fighting the same battle, which can be summed up as: *Either Jesus is Lord, or civil government will be lord. Either God will rule, or we will be ruled from the Tower of Babel. We will be ruled by God or by the bayonet.*

That is the apocalyptic stuff of Armageddon, whether seen as a continuing and on-going battle between freedom and totalitarianism, or the final denouement anticipated by Christians at the return of the King. It is the stuff of J. R. R. Tolkien’s *The Lord of the Rings*. Indeed, much of *Witness* reads like *The Lord of the Rings*, only in real time.

Many of us here today (2011) lived through those episodes. The drama continues, not on continental fields of battle, but in the comparatively muffled, hushed, but unabated halls of politics and commerce. The Church is mostly oblivious, but there are happy signs of an awakening.

The whole of Biblical spiritual life is built on and for freedom. The law of God itself is meant to produce a free people. The Tower of Babel knows nothing of freedom except that self-worship which a tyrant keeps for himself.

The winner in this struggle for world authority will be whichever worldview can continue to stand in the open, honest contest of ideas in the public square. The winner will be whichever view, whichever community representing that view, can do so with truth, righteousness, and love, the community which can hold the intellectual, moral, and spiritual high ground.

Or, more accurately, the winner will be whoever can *restore* that open, honest arena of public debate, the high ground which has been so badly compromised and contaminated by cowardice, power struggle, and mind-control throughout Western culture. It hardly exists in politics, education, the media, or the Church, and is badly beleaguered within the scientific community.

Yet the Church and scientific communities have common interests. They both are based on a common Biblical source, and (in their better moments) both rest their cases on objective truth.

But -- there will be no secure winning on the side of freedom, truth, or righteousness if the Biblical worldview cannot be defended, and that rests on evidence for the existence of God. The Tower of Babel, which rests on one or another theory of evolution, cannot consistently produce any of those values.

Ideas have consequences. (67)

Those small groups of dedicated warriors who will restore sanity to Western Civilization must know and believe that truth and righteousness are their foundation, that they can enter the public contest with intellectual, moral, and spiritual integrity -- or they will be made to look and feel like fools. At bottom that means being able to explain why they believe in God. The best way to convince others that you stand on the intellectual, moral, and spiritual high ground is to be in demonstrable fact standing there. Helping honest persons do that is our task in these pages.

On the Biblical view, the level playing field is where God conducts His

67. See below on the two fundamental worldviews, XXXXXXXXXXXXX
campaign to convert the world back to Himself. God has created the world as
the common ground upon which He will meet the rest of us, an open, level
playing field, where, in an astonishing act of grace, He invites, “Come, let us
reason together...” to form a freewill covenant (Isaiah 1:18). God does not tilt
the ground in His own favor, He meets us where we are, and engages us in hon-
est dialogue, setting us free to make an honest choice for or against His cove-
nant.

Most people, including most Christians, today believe that religion is in-
herently inaccessible to the processes of reason, that religious claims can by
nature be neither proven nor disproven. This alleged conflict between the phi-
losophy of Athens and the revelation of Jerusalem was experienced early in
Christian history, some Christians rejecting any attempt to explain the Christ-
ian faith reasonably.

Their fear was wrongly conceived. The danger was not philosophy or rea-
son per se, it was the inherently abstract, impersonal, (and unproven) presup-
positions of Greek philosophy entrenched in the impersonal Greek worldview.
Again, “One false premise, and logic does the rest...” False ideas have conse-
quences.

Moreover, much of Christian resistance to seeing God as reasonable is, I
think, inspired by hidden motives to protect from the exposure of one’s own
misdeeds. A first item on God’s agenda is always the integrity of our relation-
ship to Him. If we do not want to face that honestly, we do not show up for the
discussion, or we immerse ourselves in a pretend religion.

On the theological side, much of the tragedy of Christian history can be
traced to the failure of Christians to distinguish between the philosophical tools
of thinking, which the Greeks pioneered, from their worldview.(68) And so ele-
ments of the erroneous worldview were imported, along with their very legiti-
mate intellectual tools, into Christian theology. The unBiblical results of such
reasoning led many Christians to reject reason because the Greeks were
thought to own the intellectual high ground.

But it may be that Christians are on the brink of rectifying their error and
becoming able again to pursue clear thinking about matters of religion. Some
very competent Christian apologists have been, and are currently, on the
scene.(69)

Christian truth-seekers have a potentially instant alliance with other truth-
seekers of all persuasions to defend the common ground, the level playing field
of public debate. And believers in relative truth are seriously vulnerable to
anyone with a bit of common sense and courage. The phrase, “believers in rel-
ative truth” is, after all, an oxymoron. If truth is relative, there is no truth left in
which to believe. Instant chaos is implied, even if not understood.

The first rule of spiritual warfare is thus the preservation of that open, level

68. See Nancy Pearcey’s book, Total Truth, for a good summary of how the adoption of the Hellenic worldview by
way of its philosophy compromised Biblical thinking.
69. One might point, for example, to C. S. Lewis, Francis Schaeffer, Peter Kreeft, John Rankin, Vishal Mangal-
wadi, and Ravi Zacharias.
playing field, where all views are welcome, but each view is open to challenge by others to determine whether it is indeed the truth (“Come, let us reason together...”). The rule can be expressed as: Thou shalt be a truth-seeker -- at any cost to thyself. This level playing field is the foundation of all honest pluralism, and of the American Constitutional order.

The subversion of truth is therefore the first sign of spiritual warfare (see Genesis 2-3, John 8:31 ff., and Romans 1:18 ff.). God is a God of truth. He has nothing to offer but truth, and certainly nothing to fear from truth. Truth-seeking, from God’s point of view, is the royal road to finding Him. So He insists on truth.

As its name suggests, the Tower of Babel is not a tower of truth. It is a Tower of unity by mind-control and coercion, the only options left in a cosmos without moral order.

So truth-seeking and truth-speaking are the first and fundamental obligations of the people of God -- at any cost to themselves. Without that prior obligation to truth, none of the law or grace of God has substance or meaning. The true God, by Biblical test, is the one who can show up and prove His own case, the one who can keep his promises. Truth in the Bible, including theological truth, is an essentially personal and relational thing, not abstract. Jesus can say with a straight face, “I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life” (John 14).

Being relational is no excuse for intellectual sloppiness. It is precisely relationship above all else which compels intellectual honesty. When we are less than clear, when we are less than consistent, our relationships fall apart. And when our relationships fall apart, so do we. Truth-seeking is the Biblical way of doing things.

Only when Christians and Jews, the Biblical community, begin again to conduct their religion, both personally and publicly, God’s way, will they find themselves respected again in the public arena. Public respect will be costly. The Judeo-Christian view will begin to win public acceptance, and it will bring down persecution from those who think that truth does not serve their interests. Christians have been their own worst enemies in this regard.

That self-destructive behavior has, of course, been abetted with the gleeful cooperation, sometimes, of secularists and pagans.

So why reason at all? Because there is no other way to unite freedom, truth, and the discipline required for community survival. The only alternatives to reasoning together are chaos and totalitarianism of one brand or an-

70. “Bab-el’ in Hebrew means ‘gate of the gods’, referring to the temple at the top of Babylonian ziggurats, pyramid-like structures for worshipping the sky deities, and for holding “hieros gamos” (sacred marriage) ceremonies, where the priest or king would copulate with a female figure as symbolic of the union between heaven and earth.

71. See I Kings 18, Elijah’s contest with the prophets of Baal on Mount Carmel.

72. See below, Chapter II-E-3, “I AM & Mystery” on page 54 on the nature of “I AM”.

D-5. Passion

There is a common misperception abroad that one cannot be firm or passionate about his beliefs and at the same time be objective, that commitment to a position automatically denotes a closed mind, and that such persons should be excused from debate about public policy and law. That pressure is being applied to keep Christians from expressing their faith, and is becoming increasingly hostile and coercive under civil and criminal law. And, Western Christians are commonly cowed by it all.

The prejudice against firm conviction is false and deeply destructive of social and political life. There is no person currently espousing or enforcing such a hostile view who does not himself have firm, and often passionate, beliefs. We all do. The very enforcement of such a view by law (as in so-called hate-crime laws) is proof of holding a firm position. What is more “firm” than enforcement? So the misleading assumption is either ignorant or dishonest.

Much of this book is about the objectivity of truth and of life, and about how we know and find objective truth. The question is not whether I or any author or speaker has passionate views, the question is whether we are open to honest discussion about those views, whether, if we were wrong, we would want to know, whether our passion is open to correction by fact and logic.

A football team is normally (i.e., expected to be) passionate about wanting to win. But most of the time, such passion is under the discipline of the rules of the game (also expected). They play honestly, and would rather lose than cheat. No one suggests throwing out teams or team members who are passionate about winning. It would ruin the game.

The same is true of politics, religion, and life in general. To proscribe passion is to kill life. To ask that passion be guided by reason is obligatory common sense. Not until Western civilization recovers its passion for both life and reason, learns again how to wed the two, will there be any hope of finding unity on the deep issues which we will raise here.

Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. That applies not only to the Pope (about whom Lord Acton, a Roman Catholic, apparently directed the original comment) and to religion. It applies across the board. It applies especially to politics and government -- both of which are about coercive power.

It applies to science. Science has come to replace the Church as the (yes, “infallible”) Voice to whom we listen for truth. Paradoxically, as we shall see, however, that is quite consistent with the Biblical view. There is indeed a connection between science and infallibility, but in cooperation with religion, not opposed to it.

74. Lord Acton may have been reacting to the news in 1870 that the Pope had been, or was about to be, declared infallible, a matter very relevant to an honest Biblical epistemology.
Truth-seeking is the first obligation of all Biblical religion, and theology itself a science. But the (now secularized) scientific community has inherited much of the authority previously given to the Church. “Science says,” (almost always meaning secularized science) has more authority for most Westerners than “The Pope says,” even for many Roman Catholics.

But power corrupts nevertheless, and the history of science is just as replete with corruption, skewing of evidence, power struggle, etc., as has been the history of the Church or of the State. The scientific community (which is not the same as science per se) has donned the robe of infallibility, with the same consequences -- that the power-oriented gravitate there for their own ends.

The collusion of scientists with government (e.g., what President Eisenhower called the “military-industrial complex”) through government research university grants, corporate grants, and through grossly misnamed “free trade” politics, has been just as lethal to the human race as the similar wrongful collusion of religious leaders with government -- attempting to enlist the coercive force of civil government into their service, such as raising taxes for their benefit.

The use Stalin made of Pavlov, essentially imprisoning him in his laboratory to produce a brainwashing program, is a case in point. One might object that that is not real science. Indeed so. But then burnings at the stake for heresy were not real Christianity either.

The problem is not politics, religion, or science per se, the problem is the possession of power and decision-making authority over the lives of others. When we get such power, we tend to subvert commitment to open, honest discussion of the real issues of life. We want to defend our turf and have our way without the risk of truth intruding. Excepting where that “eternal vigilance” which is the price of liberty heads it off, such will be the drift of probably every human institution.

Honest truth-seeking in public discussion is the key to resolving any issue before us. So there is no aspect of life, whether religious, political, academic, scientific, or otherwise, which should not be invited into the debate -- with the requirement to each honor the obligation both for truth and for respect for one another -- at any cost to ourselves.

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**E. Which Will Survive - Science or Religion?**

**E-1. Science, Religion, & a Prediction**

Purveyors of religion amidst scientific issues are often told that religious

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75. See below, Volume II, Part II, on epistemology. See also Bibliography for The Authority of the Bible in a Scientific World.


theories are “not scientific” because they do not yield testable hypotheses. That is not true. They might not always yield the kind of empirically testable hypotheses with which most natural scientists busy themselves. But they do yield expectations and hypotheses which are testable in theological and metaphysical terms, and sometimes historically. Theology and metaphysics are not realms of opaque untestability -- as assumed by many. At least not metaphysics as defined in these pages.(77)

It might be predicted, for example, that a society in which God is imagined to speak to the people by a written word would become a literate society. The Jews are clearly at the top of the list of literate peoples, and were historically the first reasonably literate society -- for exactly that reason, they wanted to know what God had said to them in a written word.

The Christian civilization established in America had the best educated populace in the world, astonishing visitors from Europe (such as Alexis D’Toqueville in Democracy in America). The literacy rate surpassed the rest of the world until Americans began to believe (beginning in the 1830-50’s with Horace Mann) that government schools could do a better job than parents who had a freemarket, personal responsibility system.

From then on, education slid gently downhill, until 1962, the year God was dismissed and the decade in which the Federal Department of Secular Education took charge, when education (as measured by SAT scores) took a disastrous 16-year downhill plunge.(78) It is now 2012, and no recovery in sight.

Since Engel v. Vitale in 1962, in which the Supreme Court told God and our students that they were no longer permitted to talk with each other on government school time, SAT scores have plummeted, crime has escalated, and morality has been declared “relative”.(79) Those are typically secular positions, but not the conditions under which science flourishes.

It might be predicted that, if the Biblical worldview is indeed the foundation of science as produced by Western Civilization, then a scuttling of that worldview might endanger the progress of science. We are currently witnessing exactly that all through Western culture. As we are scuttling our Biblical heritage, we are also becoming a less and less literate society, less and less able to reason even with plain old common sense, let alone scientific precision.

Science loses its intellectual integrity when it loses its moral consensus and commitment to truth-seeking. The demise of the Biblical worldview in the West has led to precisely that moral collapse. Without the Biblical God, morality collapses.(80)

We have seen the trashing of science in the bogus “global warming” episode, which went on for well over a decade before being exposed by an adven-

77. See “What is Metaphysics?” on page xli.
78. See David Barton, The Myth of Separation, p. 212 (http://www.wallbuilders.com). The Myth of Separation has been replaced by Original Intent. This information is also available in more detailed and dramatic form in Wall Builders’ video, America’s Godly Heritage.
79. Ibid.
80. See Bibliography for The Law & the Grace of God on the foundations of morality.
turous internet hacker. And it is often pointed out that science is perverted by the intrusion of civil government into funding various scientific projects, creating a serious conflict of interests between politicians, vested interests, and scientific integrity.

American students, once the best educated on planet earth, have become notoriously poor at reading, math, and consistent logical thinking, thanks to a government run education system which is drifting strongly toward totalitarian control and rejection of our Judeo-Christian heritage, much of that through its near (and wrongful) monopoly on education. Students are being taught that truth is “relative” rather than objective, a bit of nonsense which probably no one believes in practice because it is impossible consistently to live as though truth had no objective content.

Science, in a sense, continues, of course, because it “works”, that is, it produces increasing understanding of that to which it is applied. But the vision which first drove science, of truth, beauty, and goodness, the vision of progress toward the “good” society, is in deep trouble.

And the moral commitment to truth is being abandoned wholesale. The pseudo-scientific depersonalization of the cosmos is failing -- as the hippies and the New Agers of the 1960’s already knew, rebelling against it, but with nothing by which to replace it, other than the terribly destructive, chaos-creating “do your own thing....”

And, secularized science still has no rational explanation as to why science works other than David Hume’s “habits of the mind”.

What is left of science is being increasingly coopted into the only thing left to an amoral society -- power struggle and pleasure seeking. We are becoming very good at controlling other people and pleasing ourselves -- until, as Mr. Faust discovered, the bill falls due. (81)

Western Civilization, consistent with the alleged relative truth, is now “multicultural”, which in practice means (1) not much real culture at all, and (2) a populace which can no longer maintain either its intellectual or political freedom.

The rise of science, of due process in civil law, and of freemarket capitalism have been the three defining characteristics of Western Civilization. Without the Biblical basis, it can be predicted, none will survive in a healthy state. (82)

Why are these non-scientific and non-philosophical issues being addressed? Because the continuing erosion of Western culture would not have happened had the Christian community shown an adequate response in the 1800’s to the secular Enlightenment and to what became its cosmological foundation -- namely, Darwinian evolution transmogrified from biology to the cos-

81. See C. S. Lewis for the Third Millennium, by Peter Kreeft for a superb discussion of the collapse of morality in our modern and post-modern age.

82. On the claim that due process in civil law and a limited government for free people come from the Bible, see Bibliography for both The Law & the Grace of God and The Theology of Civil Government - Why Government Requires God.
mos as a whole, thus replacing the Biblical doctrine of creation.


Do you realize what the implications of this are? Do you really understand that the biblical view of man and the secularist view are a total antithesis -- and as such, they result in a totally conflicting view of human life, with totally different consequences?

p. 105

Ideas have consequences.

**E-2. Methodological (vs. Ontological) Naturalism --& Prediction**

Many natural scientists are occupied with cosmology, trying to explain how the cosmos got here, how it developed into what it is, and what its end will be.

Some of those believe that the strategy of methodological naturalism (limiting scientific efforts to what the five senses can measure, quantify, and subject to mathematical formulae) is not just an honestly helpful way of limiting the scope of investigation to keep it manageable, but even more, a statement about the nature of reality, a declaration that the only real knowledge is through the five senses, and a rejection of theology and metaphysics as non-rational.

The latter kind of naturalism is not just “methodological”, it is ontological and metaphysical. It means to encompass absolutely everything, right down to the nature of being itself. Nevermind that that statement itself is not knowable through the five senses, and so is a self-contradictory metaphysical claim.

In any event, we are in this book taking a different course with a “personalist” view of the cosmos. So we make another prediction, that the secular, materialist search for the smallest item, the primal stuff of existence, and its earliest history, beginning (as currently thought) some 14 or so billion years ago, will not lead to the meaning of life, that it will not explain either why or how things are as they are, and that, in the end, it will turn out to be, as Plato occasionally noted, only a wind egg.

That is not to say that natural science or cosmology are bad ideas. They are very good ideas. But natural science is not the only science (certainly not “science itself”), and must share the stage with many others -- such as metaphysics and theology -- to be itself complete.

The real meaning of the beginning of all things will not become evident until all these enormous researches are seen, as the first scientists of the late Middle Ages almost universally thought, to be researches into the mind of God. If E really does =mc², that is because God has a reason for that in line with His purpose for creating the cosmos.

The cosmos is the stage upon which His community of those who love Him and one another can take place. Indeed, increasingly over the last several decades, philosophers of science have come (many grudgingly) to conclude that the cosmos appears to have been fine-tuned for life as we humans know it
on earth -- the anthropic principle.

So, another prediction: As we continue to dig deeper into the origins of the cosmos and see the unity of science and Biblical religion, we will discover how the cosmos is designed for a freedom ordered by the grace and law of God, and how the very nature of cosmic reality continually forces us toward that choice -- to be a truth-seeker or not, and to serve the Lord of truth, or not, and how we are constrained by the very nature of free choice to judge ourselves, and so, as is it were, send ourselves to heaven or hell. (83)

The Biblical freedom ordered by the law and grace of God is a freedom “for”, not only a freedom “from”, not just lack of any restraint to my self-centered willfulness. Biblical freedom is (1) freedom to be a seeker of truth, (2) freedom to find my own ontological stability, (3) freedom to be an open, free-spoken person, living “in the light”, (4) freedom to seek and pursue my reason for existence, and (5) freedom to do all these things with a faithful, loving, and hopeful spirit. (84) Such a freedom would make a magnificent capstone to the anthropic principle.

Many decline to speculate on who the designer indicated by the anthropic principle might be, and many bend over backwards to keep from suggesting that it might have been the historically and logically most obvious candidate, the God of the Bible -- who alone has bothered to introduce Himself in history, over time, with reason, and with graceful relevance to every possible human situation.

E-3. Morality - the Real Target of Relativity

If the basic entities of the cosmos are persons, not things, not atoms, quarks, or some other latest smallest being, not electromagnetism or gravity, not cosmological constants, then the investigation of how persons, not things, begin will yield more information on the meaning of life, and put scientific research into the beginnings of nature in its proper and most fruitful perspective. We will occasionally be looking at how immature persons develop into mature persons to make a point about logic, meaning, and how we know what we know.

We are not taught any more in most schools, though we ought to be, how humble grammar-school grammar is the way any language formulates logic and meaning. The lesson was implicit in the “trivium” which we inherited from that benighted Middle Ages. (85) To learn grammar is to learn logic. As my (public) high school English teacher in 1952 strictly informed us, “If you cannot say it in good English (or whatever your language), you don’t know it

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83. This is part of the message of The Great Divorce, by C. S. Lewis. Some people prefer hell over heaven.
84. More will be said about these freedoms in Yahweh or the Great Mother? And they are discussed at length in my book, Biblical Inner Healing, on the Biblical understanding of psychology and emotional healing.

It is no secret to anyone familiar with the history of American education that children of the 1800’s still received an education intellectually far more competent than the self-centering, non-directive froth of today.
yet.” (Emphasis strongly hers.)

Today in some schools, she would be fired for saying such a thing. Competent science will not long survive that kind of treatment.

The real target of our cultural “relativity” has not been truth. Everyone needs some bits and pieces of truth just to survive. The target has been moral truth, a casualty of our drive for moral autonomy, our drive to be independent, autonomous decision-makers, to be “as God”, as the serpent in the Garden of Eden promised Eve. Even the teenage street urchins understood the 1962 Engel v. Vitale decision to be the end of moral responsibility. They understood the power of the big “SEZ WHO???” If there is no God, or if He can be successfully dismissed by the Supreme Court, then (as Ivan responds to Alyosha in The Brothers Karamazov) nothing can be forbidden.

And the statistics show it. We now have, for surely the first time in human history, school children taking deadly weapons to each other — for fun! That alone should scare the reader into asking how we got to this state of affairs. This book is part of my answer to the big “SEZ WHO???” which is part of my answer to the science-vs.-religion “problem”.

Science itself does not require morality. Any adequately trained criminal can follow scientific procedure, just as any criminal can train a football team by the rules of football.

But the scientific community and its place in society does require moral responsibility for its declarations and predictions to be believable — a passionate moral commitment for getting at the truth of a matter. That is so, just as a sports league requires morally responsible trainers, players, and referees for the results of contests to be believable. The enormous intellectual authority accorded by the public to the scientific community rests (or should rest) solidly on an earned (as in healthy track-record) reputation for honesty.

In other words, truth and morality each depend on the other. Neither will long survive without the other. And the authority which science bears in society depends fully on the commitment of the scientific community to being truth-seekers, to protecting and defending the common public ground of truth-seeking — at any cost to themselves.

If that is the case, it is worth noting that both the ontological and the moral foundations of Western science are the result largely of the Biblical worldview, and will not survive without it.

86. Again, see Original Intent by David Barton. www.wallbuilders.com
87. For the case that only the Biblical worldview supplies a foundation for morality, see my article, “Defining ‘Oughtness’ & ‘Love’”, Journal of Religion, July 1959.
   Or, go to http://thereadtoemmua.org/RdLb/21PbAr/Eth/00Eth.htm
   (This present book is my case to show that the Biblical worldview is the foundation for science.)

This is not, of course, to imply that only Biblical people are moral, or that Biblical people are always moral. That is clearly not the case. It does imply, however, that only the Biblical worldview can explain from where morality comes, just as only the Biblical worldview can explain from where the cosmos (and therefore science) comes. Giving evidence for the Biblical origins of the cosmos is the burden of this volume.

The connection between the origin of the cosmos and morality will be further explored in Yahweh or the Great Mother? — Vol. II of A Personalist Cosmology in Imago Dei,
Just for good measure, I will venture another prediction, that, again, as we begin to see the essential unity of science and Biblical religion, we will discover with it the essential naturalness of what we commonly call miracles, that miracles appear “miraculous” (strange, astonishing, foreign) only from the fallen world’s point of view. If the Biblical worldview, along with the extraordinary gracefulness of the Biblical God, is true, then one might not be surprised to find that the closer one moves toward a relationship with this gracious God, sovereign over all, that the forces of nature might well obey the commands of those who have this kind of close relationship with this Creator of all things.

And in all of that, science, truth-seeking, will be fulfilled, not compromised. So, my answer to the title question of this section is that science and Biblical religion both logically and practically require each other, and that neither will survive in any very helpful manner without the other.

**E-4. Ontological, Epistemological, & Moral Stability**

If persons are the fundamental building blocks, the fundamental entities of the cosmos, then just as there are fundamental forces determining all physical reality, just so we can look for fundamental principles in the personal realm as well. They will not be deterministic in the same sense because they define the boundaries and structure of created beings with freewill.

Created persons, who are inherently dependent and therefore vulnerable, have a nature which can be healthy or unhealthy, functional or dysfunctional, whole or broken. They thus require (as the anthropic principle implies) circumstances to be of a certain sort for them to flourish. They require ontological, epistemological, and moral stability. They will need a reasonable stability of being and personhood, of knowledge and certainty, and of direction and purpose. Probably every human being strives for these three stabilities. We give up only when the incoming outrageous slings and arrows overwhelm our capacity to stay on track.

Instead of a list of forces, as appropriate to natural law, I propose a list of five decisions, generic decisions which every person will make, for good or for ill, just because they are alive. If they make these decisions well, they will flourish, if not, not. We have already mentioned them above in the previous section as the content of the Biblical understanding of freedom.

I discuss these five decisions in detail in *Biblical Inner Healing*, but we review them briefly here.\(^8\)

1. To be a truth-seeker;
2. To rest the weight of my being on the most dependable source of my being that I can find, which, if the Bible be true, means resting on the Hand of God;
3. To be open and honest in my report of myself and my relationships, liv-

\(^8\) See Bibliography. *Biblical Inner Healing* is my version of what psychology should look like, based on some of the same Biblical principles as are discussed in this book.
ing in the light;

4. To find and be obedient to whatever might be the moral law of the cosmos, to pursue my reason for existence, which means to obey the law of God;

5. To do all of the above with a faithful, loving, and hopeful spirit, which, if the Bible be true, are the enduring aspects of the cosmos.(89)

If the Biblical cosmos be not the truth, then the denizens of whatever cosmos is real will have to answer these decisions as best they can for their own survival.

Numbers 1 and 3 have to do with epistemological stability -- to be a truth seeker and a truth-speaker.

Number 2 is our quest for ontological stability.

Number 4 is our moral stability;

Number 5 is the union of the above, hopefully in a community of lovers of God and one another.

Putting them together is our life quest, the quest for the best of all possible worlds. No small task. All of these decisions are of the sort to which one adds: ...at any cost to myself. We will not finish the course except we are willing to spend, exhaust our lives on it.

The success of this journey depends on the kind of cosmos in which we live. If we live in a fundamentally impersonal cosmos, we will find that cosmos not friendly, not even neutral, to our quest, but rather, in the end if not sooner, hostile, indeed, lethal. The five decisions aim at person and community-building. If the fundamental forces and laws of the cosmos do not also aim that way, person and community-building will be only a stop-gap to hold off the inevitable descent into darkness and death.

On the other hand, if the cosmos is fundamentally personal, because the creation of the fundamental Person, who Himself is building a community, then the rules of the game are all different, and the “best of all possible...” is no longer a delusion, or as Freud said, a “wunschwesen”, a wish-being, constructed to make ourselves feel good in the face of the background rumble of overwhelming defeat. The Friend and the friendly cosmos just might be reality.

Though we will not be discussing the issue until Vol. II, Yahweh or the Great Mother?, we will here be laying foundations, hopefully, for an understanding of the Holy Trinity, emerging from the metaphysical nature of God.

So, a lot depends on the answers to the questions raised in this book.

I am aware that others have proposed, and will continue to propose, other entities than the Biblical Creator God as the original cause of all else. However, though there will be occasional sidelong glances that way, I am not here primarily contending against those various contrary proposals, but rather for the most part trying to get the Biblical view back into the public fray, from which it has been so long absent. We will not primarily be discussing the spe-

89. See 1 Corinthians 13:13.
cific merits of other contenders.

**E-5. The Road to Emmaus Project**

But this present *Personality, Empiricism, & God* is part of a much larger Christian apologetics project on The Road to Emmaus.\(^{(90)}\) That includes not only the two other volumes of

The object is to provide first, a Biblical worldview, and second, a Good News, a Gospel message, both of which are logically consistent and empirically accurate and relevant. Success in the project will go a long way towards overcoming the destructive isolation of the various areas of life, and toward finding ourselves living indeed in a *uni*verse, rather than a fractured and atomized cosmos.

The project thus ranges over metaphysics, cosmology, worldview, Biblical theology, psychology, politics, and other areas of human interest.

This project, *A Personalist Cosmology in Imago Dei*, a three volume series, seeks to lay the metaphysical foundations for the Biblical worldview, that is, a Biblical philosophy.

On top of that, hopefully, we will be able to build a whole worldview framework with the details being painted in for the various other aspects of life. It is my conviction that there is no serious issue in human life in which doing it God’s way does not lead to clearly, evidently, and happily -- better results. We build from the ground up (logically speaking), from the deep foundations of metaphysics, epistemology, and a Biblical philosophy -- to atonement theology, politics, education, economics, and the everyday aspects of life. Only in the Biblical worldview, so I believe, can that successfully be done. I urge the reader to visit www.theRoadtoEmmaus.org for an introduction to a possibly new way of looking at life: Biblically, logically, and empirically -- all in one.

The Bibliography will indicate the range of issues covered, substantially, I think, not lightly. Only the Biblical worldview and Good News can unite the cosmos and all personal life together in a living whole because only the Biblical cosmos is essentially and inherently personal, with *persons*, not things or abstractions, as the foundation of reality.

References in the footnotes will often direct the reader to other facets of this project for support of a point being made.

\[ * \; * \; * \]

So, the reader is directed to *The Road to Emmaus* website, a school of Christian apologetics, for further information on how Christians can not only survive, but successfully take the offensive in the spiritual/cultural war in which we are engaged. The survival of Western Civilization (including most assuredly science itself, due process in civil law, and a free-market economy)

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\(^{(90)}\) Go to www.theRoadtoEmmaus.org for several essays on Christian apologetics. See especially, the Road Master Plans 1, 2, and 3.
depends, in major part, on whether Christians can sustain their claim that Jesus is Lord with an intellectually credible cosmology and with the Good News from and about the Intelligent Designer.

So, though many fundamental issues have an academic side, the stakes really are everything.

This Preface gives some of my personal and cultural reasons for writing such a book. Chapter I begins the book by setting the problem in historical perspective. The succeeding chapters build the ontological framework of active agency which is applied in Vol. III (The Substance of Natural Science & Epistemology), to themes of modern science, notably sub-microscopic particles, inductive reasoning, and relativity, and to epistemology, how we know what we know, the relation between faith and reason, and between theology and science. Volume III (Yahweh or the Great Mother?) expands on the notions of personhood and community, and how those are governed by the Image of God in a Biblical worldview as contrasted to the secular/pagan worldview.

Volumes I and II explore what is called general revelation, those areas which can be known about reality by reasoning on our own from our experiences of life without specific input from God.

On the Biblical view, God has freewill. Therefore His purposes cannot be derived from His nature, His being, and only partially from His activity. Thus we cannot know His purposes (as in any personal relationship) unless He reveals them. The “Word of God” becomes vital, necessary, and life-giving. Volume III therefore brings us into specific revelation, about those things concerning which we must be told in order to understand about God and His purposes for us.

I have deliberately taken a broad perspective to examine. We shall pursue the notion of active agency through philosophy, science, theology, and to some extent, psychology. Hence there will be some omission of detail which a more narrowly directed essay might include. We shall make occasional sorties into theology and the spiritual life to illustrate how cosmology and worldview affect those areas. Ideas do have consequences.

Our aim on this score will be something sorely needed in an age of splintering specialization -- to show the broad explanatory power of the concept of active agency and its ability to bring together diverse subjects into one comprehensive picture.

Maybe even in Vol. II, Epistemology & the Substance of Science, a “unified field” theory.

F. Earle Fox,
La Habra, California, XXXXX, 2012
http://theRoadtoEmmaus.org

NOTE: The reader in search of a glossary is directed to the index instead.
Many words are defined in the text, and most of such definitions are noted in the index. Look also in the table of contents, as many title concepts are discussed in detail in the various sections.
Study Guide for Preface

These study guides can be used for individual or group study to help the reader focus on key issues. The reader who follows through with each question will build a solid understanding of the issues, chapter by chapter.

I. Summary:
In your own words, write a summary of the theme of this Preface, and make a personal application as is appropriate.

A - Introduction
1. Do you agree with the aims of the author?
2. What is meant by "Intellectual atoms"?
3. What is a paradigm shift and how does that apply to the issues at hand?
4. In what sense was Hebrew culture unique in all the world?
5. Comment on the different ideas of history between the pagan and Biblical worldviews.
6. How does the author see reason related to revelation?
7. What is the new "Dark Age" to which the author points?
8. How does the author understand the loss of creation-centered theology?
9. What were the two worst mistakes of Western Christianity?
10. How is dispersion of political power related to the pursuit of truth?
11. Is there a connection between moral and intellectual credibility?
12. Why does the author perceive intellectual credibility essential to the Judeo-Christian cause?
13. What has that to do with moral credibility?
14. What two "what if" challenges, ontological and epistemological, does the author throw out, not only to the secular and pagan worlds, but to the Judeo-Christian world as well?
15. What happened to the three crown-jewels of Western Civilization which ensure its corrosion and demise?
16. Describe the difference between positive and negative contingency.
17. Why does the author think secularism to be the least stabile of worldviews?
18. What about paganism makes it more attractive than secularism to many people.

B - The Fatal Collapse of Ontology into Epistemology
19. Describe the two "necessary distinctions" the author proposes and their importance for the topic of this book.
20. What are ontological and operational definitions? and why is this distinction important?
21. What is "deontologizing", and what is its importance?
22. How does epistemology do double-duty, replacing ontology?
23. Describe some of the fatal flaws caused by deontologizing.
24. How is there need for both a pre-Biblical and a pre-science metaphysical foundation?
25. What is the main thrust of the author's work, what task does he set himself?
26. How did theology begin to shift its focus during the late Middle Ages according to the author?

C - Three Definitions
27. Give the author's definition of 'metaphysics'.
28. Define 'epistemology'.
29. Do you agree with the author's view of the unity between Biblical religion
and an intellectual freemarket of ideas?

30. Discuss the author’s definition of ‘science’, and how it is related to football.

D - Why This Matters

31. Why might a Biblical “personalist” worldview, more than an abstract Hellenic worldview, provide philosophical discussion more likely to interest the man on the street?

32. What easy way is there to test whether you are engaged in an honest conversation?

33. Discuss John Macmurray’s dictum that, “All thought is for the sake of action, and all action is for the sake of relationship.”

34. What does development of the intellect and of abstract thinking do for the growing child?

35. What three stabilities does the author see as having disintegrated in Western Christendom?

36. What attitude among many Christians ensured their alienation from science?

37. How does the author see spiritual warfare as behind much of our philosophical debate? Is he correct?

38. What relation does the author see between Biblical faith and a free-market of ideas, i.e., a level public playing field?

39. In what way is Greek philosophy seen by the author as having been a severe problem for Christians?

40. What is the author’s first rule of spiritual warfare? Does this make sense with your notion of spiritual warfare?

41. What is the connection between healthy relationship and intellectual integrity (or sloppiness)?

42. How does the author see passion and reason connected?

43. What has replaced the “infallible” Voice of the Church? and why?

44. What does the author see as the real and substantial problem regarding religion, science, and politics?

E - Which Will Survive: Science or Religion?

45. Religion is criticized as offering no reasonable predictions based on its theory of life. The author offers some predictions. Do these meet the test as reasonable response to the critics? Are these the kinds of predictions which might suggest theology to be a science?

46. How is the vision which drives science “in deep trouble”, as the author asserts?

47. Why does the author address so vigorously moral, cultural, political, and spiritual issues?

48. Describe the meaning and possible uses of “methodological naturalism”.

49. The author asserts that neither truth nor morality will survive without each other. Do you believe that to be so? How would that be connected to science?

50. Do you agree with the author’s assertion that science and religion require each other? And why?

51. What three stabilities do created persons require? How is that related to the meaning and purpose of science?

52. How does the success of our life journey depend on the kind of cosmos in which we live?

Chapter Reflections:

In your own words, relate your new insights from reading and meditating on the information contained within this Preface. What difference would it make to you personally whether the claims and assertions of this chapter were true or not?
Dedicated

to those many teachers who nurtured me in honest intellectual engagement, especially....

The Rev. Dr. John Skinner, curate at All Saints Episcopal Church, Wynnewood, Pennsylvania, when I was in high school, who first drew me into the realms of philosophy, and later joined me for encouragement at the oral exam on my thesis for my D. Phil. degree, upon which this book is based;

Dr. Paul Kurtz, staunch atheist who taught good courses in Plato and Aristotle at Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut, and gracefully encouraged my thinking;

The Rt. Rev. Ian T. Ramsey, who, prior to being consecrated Bishop of Durham, England, was Nolloth Professor of Theology at Oriel College, Oxford University, where he led me through the writing of my D. Phil. thesis, into the (what I then thought) strange realm of Berkeleian philosophy and theology.
a Personalist Cosmology in *Imago Dei*

Volume I
PERSONALITY, EMPIRICISM, & GOD

**The Substance**

of

**Persons & Community**
Chapter I

Historical Introduction

A. Metaphysics & Absurdity

It is not always clear why metaphysical problems such as those revolving about the notions of cause, substance, the subject-object gap, body-mind interaction, etc., need to be discussed. The practical man has little interest in such matters, and, it may appear, can conduct his economics or politics or family life equally well without having to bother his mind about them.

That, I think, is not the case. Whether or not they are explicitly elaborated, every culture has presuppositions on these matters upon which it relies for its understanding of how to conduct just such affairs as economics, politics, and family life. These presuppositions are working in the background, unconsciously to most of us most of the time.

The Broken Image by Floyd Matson portrays this fact with respect to the earth-moving adjustments that have come about in the shift from 19th to 20th century views on such metaphysical matters.

Regardless of whether one metaphysical view can be proven over another, which one a person believes does make a difference in how he lives and relates to other persons. Cultures, like individuals, have their "unconscious" minds, that is, the generally accepted assumptions about the universe which are relied upon (hence not always consciously focused upon) in order to conduct the ordinary affairs of life (upon which we focus).(91)

The task of the theologian and philosopher, like that of the psychotherapist, is to be sensitive to these largely unaware-beliefs of the culture and bring them into light for critical examination. Few question that our culture is sick and in need of therapy and, some of us would add, repentance. As with psychotherapy, it sometimes helps to rehearse the historical development of the disease.

As I think can be shown, and as we intend to help show here, a healthy culture is one whose relied-upon images of reality are those of the Biblical doctrine of creation.(92) Any culture

91. For an explanation of the "unconscious" and how it functions, see Bibliography for Biblical Inner Healing, Chapter IV, The Warp in the Unconscious.
which departs from these images is liable to serious distortion and disablement of its human relationships, whether economic, political, or romantic. The point of this introduction is to trace the philosophical undergirding (or dis-undergirding) of these disablements.

The name of the disease is "radical contingency", that is, lacking self-sufficiency, yet no ability to discover from where one's sufficiency does come, or even whether there is a source for it at all. This disease of culture, from a Biblical point of view, is none other than the "death of God." Since the late Middle Ages, Western culture has found itself increasingly unable to take consistently and seriously as a basic relied-upon belief the Biblical doctrine of creation.

The death of God is (in one of its aspects) the death of the Creator, for God in the Bible is above all else the creator of heaven and earth. Medieval man, insofar as he was Christian, perceived his essential relation with God to be that of creaturehood. The legacy of meaning, sense of fulfillment, direction in history, and morality which were founded on that vision of God began to die the moment the doctrine of creation began to give way by the late Middle Ages, slowly and incrementally, as the ultimate foundation stone of Western culture. Christian thought and practice became increasingly atonement rather than creation centered, leaving atonement only a partial explanation.

It is believed by many and perhaps most people today that the development of science and technology has been, more than anything else, responsible for the "death" of God. Man now appeals to technology to do that for which he once prayed. The "God of the gaps" charge against believers relies upon the apparent steady devouring by the natural sciences of the ground previously occupied by religion as an explanation for the way things are. God, it is felt, remains only in those gaps not yet explained by science.

And it is felt, as Dietrich Bonhoeffer said, that man is coming of age, or, as per Freud, that man has abandoned the pleasure/comfort principle upon which religion was allegedly founded for the (for him) mechanistic, “drive” oriented reality principle upon which he thought science to be founded.

There is a curious contradiction, however, seldom noticed, between on one hand, the assertion that man is coming of age, which suggests that man is becoming more and more self-sufficient, and, on the other hand, the notion elaborated by the empirical tradition from David Hume to A. J. Ayer, and notably, by existentialists such as Sartre and Camus, that man is a radically contingent being. The first asserts that man is learning to get along by himself, the latter that man is inherently incomplete and inexplicable by himself. Absurd, as Camus says.

Furthermore, one asks just what "coming of age" might mean, having just finished the century in which we "mature" human beings, by the 1950’s, only half way through, savagely destroyed a greater percentage of the human race than any other whole century. And further, by the end of the century, we had destroyed more persons than had previously ex-

92. More on this in Volume II, Yahweh or the Great Mother?
listed in all prior centuries. This was done in almost every case by avow-
edly atheist/secular forces, and stopped by societies which still had at least a modicum of Biblical morality in their blood streams.

Bonhoeffer’s view is partly true. We were, in a sense, coming of age. The rise of science and the democratiza-
tion of education and literacy had led to a kind of teen-age time of the human race, a leaving behind of the “parental” authority structures of State and Church to strike out on our own.

But though it progressed with confidant predictions of human trium-
ph over the troubles of life, peaking around the end of the 19th century, it ran aground in the unparalleled human carnage of the 20th century. And, contra Freud, Western culture has em-
braced again the pleasure principle -- with (what used to be called) “gay abandon”, and is steadily deteriorating in its scientific prowess.

The Church has, in large measure, lost it intellectual, moral, and spiritual way, and the power- and control-
minded have gravitated toward the State to exert control over We, the People. The more we have “taken over” from God, the more we are los-
ing control of our own freedom.

Hence the increasingly devastat-
ing absurd world of Albert Camus:

I said that the world is absurd, but I was too hasty. The world in itself is only not rea-
sonable, that is all that can be said. But what is absurd is the confrontation of this irrational and the wild longing for clarity whose call echoes in the human heart. The absurd depends as much on man as on the world.(93)


Intellectual, moral, and spiritual clarity are gone. There is little re-
maining public consensus in the West, intellectual, moral, or spiritual, and we are cast onto our waning personal re-
sources.

So, the world may be indeed be inherently unreasonable. But in any case, it is certainly worth discovering what has made so many people like Camus think so, and whether that view might not after all be a tragic mistake. Maybe it is we ourselves who are unreasonable -- in the very reject-
ing of our Biblical roots and consen-
sus.

The collapse of the Biblical worldview in the West signaled retreat from our march into human adulthood. It is a principle of spiritual growth in Biblical religion that one can be an adult in the world only to the degree that he is first a child in God.(94) But we are (wrongly) convinced that childhood is something we grow out of, not into. We do not like being de-
pendent and/or obedient, not even, maybe especially, on God.

Augustine replied to the pagans who blamed Christianity for the fall of Rome, that not so, that any nation which refused to submit to the pur-
poses of God would sooner or later go under. It cannot perdure.(95)

So we are discovering, yet once again, that ideas have consequences. What one believes on the metaphysi-
cal and cosmic level has enormous personal and social consequences in ordinary daily life.

If it is true that the smallest parti-

94. That I take to be the meaning of Jesus’ words to Nicodemus in John 3:1-11 about being “born again”.
95. In Augustine’s *The City of God*, arguably the first philosophy of history written.
cles and the most primitive forces define the nature of the cosmos in which we live (as contemporary secularized science is telling us), or if it is true rather that the nature of God defines the boundaries of our lives and meaning of our existence (as Judeo-Christians are telling us), then, either way, it would be good for us to know which of the two might be the truth, and just what those boundaries and rules might be.

Is there a way of making a rational decision between the two?

B. The Biblical Undergirding for Science

The disintegration of the doctrine of creation can be seen in the history of the "subject-object gap," that is, the gap which separates man as an observing subject from the object of his attempted knowledge, the world "out there."

The most important thing "out there" which man has attempted to know is ultimate reality, traditionally God according to one or another religion. The next most important thing man has attempted to know "out there" is material substance, nature, the world. And thirdly, but not "out there," man himself. All of these can be incorporated under the term "substance" in one form or another.

Christianity, for example, speaks of Christ being of one substance with the Father. Descartes speaks of two fundamental substances after God, mind and matter. It is the definition of the not-self, primarily God or the world, with which we are concerned, and the relation of the self with these as objects of knowledge. (96)

Let us set the stage. By the high Middle Ages, Western thought had become a semi-stable amalgam of Platonic other-worldly essences plus Hebrew creation-"ex nihilo." (97) Then Thomas Aquinas had made it seem as though Greek and Hebraic thought could be securely wedded through his grand synthesis of Aristotle and the Bible.

One of the peculiarly significant (and increasingly acknowledged) contributions of Biblical thought to Western culture was to provide the necessary ingredients for the foundation of natural science. More often than not, historians of philosophy look to Greece for the roots of science, but it remains that certain key notions about the universe, without which there could be no such project as science, originated in chapter one, verse one of Genesis: "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth."

Or, more accurately, they originated in the culture that could formulate and believe such a thought. While it might seem that any culture could do so, none in the ancient world outside of the Hebrew culture took such a notion seriously and made it determi-

96. For more on the definition of "man", see Biblical Inner Healing in the Bibliography, a book on the nature of being a person. Also, much more will be said on that subject in Volume II of this series, Yahweh or the Great Mother?

97. See below, Chapter II-E-5, “Ex Nihilo” on page 58
native for their notion of ultimate reality.

Empirical science, as we know it, requires as a pre-condition of ever getting started at least three beliefs about the natural world with both logical and psychological import:

1) that it is reasonably stable,
2) that it is fundamentally good, i.e., human-friendly and to be desired, and
3) that it can be improved upon, that human progress is possible.

Without these three foundation stones, no one would ever have bothered to go through the unremitting drudgery which scientific exploration requires.

And almost no one did. In any culture where Genesis 1:1 had no fundamental impact, scientific empiricism fails to establish a foothold. The invention of gunpowder (used, apparently, only for fireworks, not warfare, as there were no guns yet) and movable type in China or the construction of machines by Archimedes only prove the point, for in neither case did these developments issue in a sustained attack culturally supported on man's ignorance of the empirical realm.

The empirical realm was not thought to be the sort of place which would yield consistent results. Furthermore, empirical nature and the knowledge thereof was for most non-Biblical religions and philosophies, if not evil, at least very inferior to intellectual or spiritual knowledge, and hence not worth bothering about any more than one had to.

The consequence was that space and time were not thought of as the arena in which anything could progress significantly for human welfare.

On the other hand, it is no accident that each of the three points necessary for the development of empirical science were already being nourished early in Old Testament times.\textsuperscript{98}

And the prior belief that engendered these three was that of a cause of the world who was Himself

(1) stable,
(2) good, and
(3) one with whom relations could be improved.

A significant fourth element simmering in medieval culture was the priority placed by Biblical thought on community, which for both Old and New Testaments was the final goal of history, the Kingdom of God. Science itself is not the happenstance collection of thoughts and experiments of rugged individualists. It is the deliberate cooperation for a common truth-seeking goal of persons under the discipline of a common methodology.\textsuperscript{99}

God (to use the Kantian definition) was the objective unifier ofapperception, that which brought the world together as \textit{one} world which could \textit{therefore} be treated as comprehended by a single system of laws. Thus the necessary furniture was on stage for the late Middle Ages drama of the emerging empirical attitude in the form of Western science.

There were some serious ambiguities remaining, however, which Aquinas had not resolved, between Greek and Hebraic thought. The triumph of nominalism (with its preference for the particular) over realism

\textsuperscript{98} For further background on these matters, see Christianity in World History by A. T. van Leeuwen, and The Old Testament Against Its Environment by G. E. Wright.

\textsuperscript{99} Cf. William Pollard, Physicist and Christian, esp. chapters 1 and 2.
(with its preference for the abstract and universal) in the late Middle Ages only accentuated these ambiguities. They revolved around the attempt to bridge the subject-object gap in order to attain reliable knowledge.

C. The Emergence of Inert Substance

C-1. The Search for Substance

a. ‘Substance’ - a Definition

For our purposes, I will define the term ‘substance’ to mean ‘the locus of reliability (of classes of objects) and durability (of individual objects) though change of time, place, and circumstance’ -- i.e., that which is the most dependable, and in terms of which other things in the universe can be explained and measured.

In order for science to be a rational study, classes of objects need to be reliable in the sense that their qualities remain predictable over changes of time and space, that is, the laws of nature, given standard conditions, must be stable for any time and place. Water must consistently freeze at 32 degrees Farenheit.

Individual objects likewise need to be similarly durable and predictable as they change in time and place. Even though, for example, I have evolved over time from one year old to seventy-seven years old, I am the same person. Rivers change shape, but we can identify them through their changes as the same river. Heraclitus was wrong, we can step meaningfully into the same river twice.

Prior to the advent of secularized science, insofar as matter had these qualities, as the creation of God, it depended for them on God.

If the new empirical attitude emerging in the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries longed for anything, it was for certainty. And the quest for certainty took the form, quite naturally, of a quest for the nature of substance. What in the universe could one depend upon to remain the same through time and change? What was the basic model by which the universe could be interpreted?

b. Greek vs. Hebrew “Knowing”

We must at this point clarify the issue at stake between the Greek and Hebraic tradition. It is increasingly recognized, at least among philosophers of science, that the great event of the 16th and 17th centuries was the development of an epistemology or a methodology for knowing, which far overshadowed (because it made possible) other scientific events of the Renaissance and Reformation. It is precisely over the issue of "knowing" that the Greeks and Hebrews parted company most sharply, and thus a dimension along which the departure can be clearly delineated.

The Perennial Philosophy by Aldous Huxley elaborates the end of the spectrum that might appropriately be called "mystical," limiting (for our purposes) that term to any view which says that ultimate reality is inherently incomprehensible to human cognitive capabilities and categories.

It is a "perennial" philosophy because it springs up in perhaps every culture known to man. In the west it has generally gone under the flag of
Platonism or neo-Platonism. Ultimate Reality is the realm of the One, the All, the Coincidentia Oppositorum, the Undifferentiated Whole -- in which none of the normal cognitive distinctions of the human mind are meaningful, ultimately not even those between true and false or good and evil.

The Hebrews, at the other end of the spectrum, did not bother to define ultimate reality in any systematic manner. But the philosophical assumption which nevertheless lies behind both Old and New Testaments, and without which they become idle tales, is that ultimate reality is a Primordial Individual, an Agent who calls the universe into being. In the beginning there was not chaos, nor a cosmic egg, nor the back of a turtle on which the world rode (a picturesque Hindu way of saying, perhaps with a shrug, “Who knows what the Source of all things might be?”), nor an undifferentiated whole out of which all else evolved, there was Yahweh -- I AM (See Genesis 1 and Exodus 3). Period.

c. Hebrew Empiricism

The epistemological consequence of this view is that as an active individual, God is in principle knowable to His creation through His activity and through His self-revelation. Human intellect properly used, therefore is appropriate for dealing with man's relation with ultimate reality. "Properly used" does not mean a blind leap sort of “faith”, but simply being open to the truth about what is, however unexpected it may be.  

Ultimate Reality for the mystical view is ineffable, by definition beyond cognition, not get-at-able by the human intellect. It is unrelatable to time and space -- even though time and space are supposed to have emanated or evolved from it.

Ultimate Reality for the Hebrews was essentially what we mean today by the term "person," namely an agent, a being which is creative, free, and purposive. And thus man, made in the image of God, could be co-creator with God of concrete and particular history.

The development of nominalism is longer and more complex than can be elaborated here, but it can be said that the Renaissance and Reformation were largely children of nominalism, a fact true also of the scientific revolution.

For many Christians, nominalism is the bogey man, the cause of the erosion of the Biblical worldview because it appeared to undermine objective moral and spiritual realities in favor of a radical, disconnected, atomized individualism. But it is only secularized nominalism which does so.

As we shall see, the very pinnacle of nominalism and positivist philosophy such as illustrated by A. J. Ayer (Language, Truth, & Logic) or by behaviorist B. F. Skinner (Beyond Freedom & Dignity) liberated Western philosophy, not, as many think, from the Biblical view (though they tried hard), but from the remains of Hellenic Perennial philosophy insofar as it was incompatible with the Biblical worldview.

Historically there was an alliance between nominalism and the Biblical worldview leading to the emergence of the empirical attitude of the scientific revolution. Nominalism and the
Biblical worldview are by no means identical, and secularized nominalism is indeed destructive to the Biblical view, but both do give individuality a significant ontological status. It may be that nominalism would never have gained a secure foothold against the Perennial view but for the supportive influence of the Bible.

Just as the Hebraic cosmos had made empirical investigation plausible on a large cultural scale, the very development of that empiricism and its obvious philosophical and technological successes would in turn serve to strengthen man’s sense of the reality of that world view which spawned empiricism in the first place.

Or so it would have seemed.

Contradictions remained within the theological fold, however, for the Christian God at that time was too closely identified with the Perennial epistemology for theologians to remain at ease with the empirical attitude. Many Christians wrote vigorously against the alleged corrosiveness of nominalism, its growing focus on the particular, on the “temporal” world, and its rejection of Platonic realism, that is to say, the fundamental reality of Ideas and abstractions, especially of the moral and spiritual sort. Man’s concern for the here-and-now was at the very least distracting to a “wholly other” view of God which medieval thinkers were far from rejecting. (101)

To complicate matters, something odd was happening to the concept of material substance.

**C-2. Time & Substance**

The quest for certainty is always a quest for the locus of reliability and durability. The invention of such pedestrian (to us) items such as the pendulum clock, the compass, and other far more accurate than previous measuring and quantifying devices led man to shift his mental focus more sharply onto space and time.

Consider, for example, what must have been the long run emotional and intellectual (and therefore spiritual) impact of the simple (to us) placement of clocks on town halls during the 13th and 14th centuries:

“The effect of placing them in public places was to bring about the complete replacement of the seven variable liturgical hours by the 24 equal hours of the clock.” (102)

Time was being mechanically quantified and hence somewhat divorced from the more personal rhythms of worship and of nature.

But quantified time, if more regimented and less poetic, gave the appearance (at least) of being more reliable in the daily practical affairs in the world. And, increasingly, this reliability was explained in terms of forces and stabilities inherent in matter itself. In an age when matter did not seem particularly stable and consistent, it was quite plausible to appeal to a God who kept it in order by imposition of His law.

But as matter itself seemed to exhibit stability and precision beyond the bounds of primitive imagination, limited only by man’s ability to develop more accurate measuring devices, it seemed that one did not need

101. See Nancy Pearcey, Total Truth, for more on the negative Hellenic influence on Biblical thinking.

to appeal to God at all. Matter itself would soon become the locus of reliability and durability. Its very de-animation, and thus depersonalization, seemed only to make it the more reliable. And, as demonstrated by the behavior of both human history and pagan pantheons, persons in charge of things seemed to be the source of most unreliability.

So, if one could say that the world was reliable because God made it so, why could not one omit the now apparently superfluous theological step and say simply that the world was reliable in its own right -- and thus cease having to depend on unreliable persons at all, especially at that all-important cosmic level?

The Christian compromise of their own theology toward Hellenic models conspired to prevent them from seeing the Biblical answer to this problem.

C-3. A New Kind of Authority

The trend to shift attention from God to material substance as the locus of reliability and durability was abetted by another consequence of empirical successes, namely the growth of a new concept of intellectual (and thus, moral and spiritual) authority.

Whereas in primitive culture authority is overwhelmingly invested in tradition, (the painfully accumulated results of intuition, trial, and error), the development of an empirical methodology in any culture begins to free tradition from much of that burden. (103)

When methods for discovering historical or astronomical or physical truth are developed, they are in principle open to anybody who wishes to apply them. One can check the truth for himself without asking Aristotle or the Pope.

The institutional Church often took the less intelligent of the options open to it, and instead of seeing the emerging empiricism as an elaboration of the Biblical doctrine of creation, choose to see it as a threat to its own traditional authority, and in doing so tried to enlist God against science, leading eventually to mandatory theories of infallibility. (104) The consequences were inevitable.

God went one way, and material substance as the object of empirical investigation went another, as elaborated by Descartes, Locke, and Newton, Hume, etc. Descartes in effect gave western philosophy two options: mind and body. Continental philosophers tended to take the mental side, relying more strongly on realism and the Platonic tradition. The English chose the body and nominalist empiricism, and in doing so, have provided most of our philosophy of science.

Material substance for John Locke was modeled on that of Descartes. Every material substance had a "real" and a "nominal" essence, the real essence being the thing-in-itself which was the subject of the empirical predicates, and the nominal essence being the conjunction of the empirical

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104. In 1870, the Roman Catholic Church declared the Pope to be infallible, and the evangelical wing of Christendom began to see the infallibility of the Bible as the only fortress behind which it could survive the erosion of the so-called Enlightenment. See *The Authority of the Bible in a Scientific Age* in Bibliography for my response to the issue of faith and science, revelation and reason.
Locke further distinguished between primary and secondary qualities, primary being those "out there" in the actual substance itself, and secondary being those only in the sensorium of the observer. Locke did not think, for example, that smell or color actually existed in the real objective rose. The actual substance itself could have only solidity, extension, figure, motion, and number. These primary qualities had the power of causing our perception of themselves and of the secondary qualities also.

Locke's choice of primary qualities coincides, hardly by accident and no surprise, with those qualities which science had found it most easy to quantify -- strong indication that one's personal notion of substance means (is defined by) the place where he locates reliability and durability.

Locke was well aware of the difficulties of actually describing substance in general. But he seemed certain enough that substance had first, the primary qualities, secondly, causal properties which produced perceptions in observers, and thirdly, causal properties which produces changes among objects themselves, such as fire melting wax.

Newton refined the scheme for scientific purposes, defining bodies as masses, "meaning that in addition to its geometrical properties each possesses a vis-inertiae or force of inertia, measurable by the acceleration which a given external force imparts to the body."\(^{(106)}\)

Inertia here means just what it says. No body of its own accord initiates motion. It is inert. A body can be moved if, and only if, moved by an external force, otherwise it continues at rest or in straight-line motion as before.

The goal of this scheme was to explain all motion, all change, all natural law in terms of bodies interacting inertially -- the great Newtonian world-machine. The goal was unfortunately complicated (for starters) by the phenomena of gravity and electromagnetic forces which clearly do not operate by the rules of mass and inertial forces.

Newton was by confession a Christian, owning a large library of Bibles and other theological materials. Indeed, he thought God was needed to correct certain imperfections in this world-machine to keep it on its course. But the notion of inert substance was beginning to solidify by this time to such an extent that, as Berkeley warned, it might interpose itself as a buffer between God and man, rather than as a revealer of God.

If nature was so stable and consistent as many believed (despite the imperfections of Newton's system), it was not at all clear to many why one needed to appeal to God as the locus of reliability and durability. The world would do just as well, and, they were convinced, was far more amenable to examination and prediction than God. Inert substance was replacing God and the Biblical doctrine of creation.

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105. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2, 23, 2

Having lost its secure grounding in creation, theology was becoming more and more salvation and atonement rather than creation centered. The very foundations of Biblical theology were being lifted out from under Christians, but they persisted with their increasingly “deontologized” theology.

G. E. Lessing (1729-81) lived during the long aftermath of the horrific 30 Years War and the disillusioning, chilling effect of that war on the Christian Churches in Europe. He wrote *The Proof of Spirit & Power*, pointing out the decay of Christendom from a religion of spiritual power to one of formality.

God seemed more and more to be existing only in the shrinking “gaps” not yet interpreted by empirical science. Bultmann, existential Christianity, and finally the "death of God" non-theology of the 1960’s were only a matter of time.

Ideas have consequences.

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**D. The Disintegration of Objectivity**

**D-1. Certainty & Objectivity**

The quest for certainty drives our passion for truth. We want to know what life is about with certainty. Certainty cannot be had unless there is objectivity. If there is no objective truth, then there can be no certainty about any knowledge, no certainty about any decision we make, or goal we pursue. We all rely, like it or not, on some things being objectively true.

We can all tolerate a small amount of uncertainty. The odds against our getting hit by a car crossing a city street are never zero, but if we are careful to wait for the green light and look both ways, we assume that the chances of getting across safely are sufficient, and we do. If we did not have that much confidence in our ability to make safe and successful choices, we would be paralyzed.

The quest for certainty relies on the success of finding what in the world of our experience is objective and trustworthy. We begin with our parents, the two early God-like figures in our lives, who, hopefully, are trustworthy enough to inspire trust in us as we learn from them how to navigate life.

As we grow, we might be taught that the world is like a machine, absolutely and irreducibly impersonal and reliable. We might be taught that persons are not so dependable as machines, and that the cosmic machine, the cosmos as a whole, is absolutely dependable, that it operates according to immutable laws which science discovers for us.

We are rarely told that that cosmic machine has had severe critiques made against it over the years, and that contemporary science, which many of us thought would be immune to the rank subjectivity infecting the humanities in the academic world, was itself suffering badly from a case of failed objectivity and descent into subjectivity.\(^{(107)}\)

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107. See www.CommonSenseScience.org for some of the story on this descent of science.
The problem has not been merely monumental frauds among scientists, and that science is just as vulnerable an plagued with such nonsense as is religion or commerce.\(^{(108)}\) The problem is that many who call themselves scientists are calling “science” principles which are the precise contrary of science.\(^{(109)}\)

Science is being culturally rejected by those who want a more “person-friendly” society, feeling that science is much too academically lock-step, and out of touch with persons and relationships. The drift in the West away from science back into paganism has been remarkable.

The academic learning by students in government-controlled public schools hardly mentions the word “truth” except as downgraded to “relative”, and focuses on feelings and one’s own personal self-centered desires -- as the newly discovered epitome of life.

The academic powerhouse once represented by the American public has been all but destroyed.\(^{(110)}\) And with the public, science itself is eroding under pressures to be politically correct.

Conclusion: Science, which arose out of the Biblical worldview in the late Middle Ages out of the first-time fusion of Hellenic tools for abstract thinking with the Hebraic focus on the particular, empirical, and historical, cannot survive the erosion of that worldview.

Science, in its broadest sense as the systematic search for truth, was the answer which the West gave to the search for certainty.

It was interpreted, even by Christians who should have known better, as antagonistic to Biblical religion. Nothing could be further from the truth. Science as a search for truth is fundamental to the whole Biblical enterprise.\(^{(111)}\)

**D-2. Objectivity & Subjectivity**

These two words have at least two different meanings.

*First*, we use the word ‘objective’ normally to mean that it is really “out there”, not an illusion or a pretense. It is there whether or not I like it, agree with it, or know it. ‘Subjective’, on the other hand, means that its existence depends in some way on whether I agree with it, like it, or know it.

An objective obligation, in this case, means an obligation which has authority over me whether or not I like it, agree with it, or know it. ‘Subjective’, on the other hand, means that its existence depends in some way on whether I agree with it, like it, or know it.

An objective obligation, in this case, means an obligation which has authority over me whether or not I like it, agree with it, or know it. We say that “ignorance of the law is no excuse”, the law applies whether I know it or not. It is in that sense objective.

*Secondly*, in the Kantian sense we can have an *objective* or a *subjective* “unity of apperception” (which we will explore shortly).

A subjective unity of appercep-

\(^{(108)}\) Notably the so-called “Piltdown man” (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piltdown_Man, and the global warming scam which lasted nearly two decades before being exposed.

\(^{(109)}\) Go to www.CommonSenseScience.org, and read, for example, “Conflict of Atomism and Creation Science” by David L. Bergman.

\(^{(110)}\) Alexis d’Toqueville tells the story of the American education system in *Democracy in America*. For more on this subject, go to http://www.theroadtoemmaus.org/RdLb/21PbAr/Ed/BiblioEd.htm


The issue is dealt with also in
tion means simply that all my perceptions are unified by the fact that I am having them. They are my perceptions. No one can share my perceptions because my perceptions are within my own consciousness, not “out there” in public view. My perception of a horse is “in my head”, I being the subject doing the perceiving -- of the real horse which is “out there” in space and time, not “in my head”.

But subjective unity of apperception, the fact that I am having all my own perceptions, does not make them objective in the sense that is required to make scientific sense of the world “out there” -- in and by which we communicate with one another.

The parts of an automobile, or of a human body, have that kind of objective unity. They make a whole bigger than just the sum of the parts.

An objective unity of apperception would be a unity in all the things which I am perceiving which binds them together in an objective way, that is, which did not depend on whether I was perceiving them at any given moment, or never perceived them at all.

A range of mountains has a “unity” about them which is there even if no one is perceiving them. They are the same arrangement of mountains no matter who is or is not looking at them. I can look at them, then go away, know where they are, return, and look at the same range of mountains again. They have an identity which persists through time and through different observations of them.

Both of these objectivities have been subverted by the replacement of the Biblical worldview by the Newtonian worldview. The recovery may be on the horizon as Judeo-Christians recover their intellectual credibility.

### D-3. Locke & Newton vs. Berkeley, Hume, & Kant

What had begun as a quest for certainty by way of an empirical search for the true world-substance took some strange turns almost immediately upon the completion of the Newtonian-Lockian system.

The great value of the world-machine lay in both its objectivity and quantifiability. It was precise and determinate, and it was solid and objectively "out there" providing evidence upon which to base one's certainty (or, at least, that was the advertising under which it was sold to the public). To know the nature of material substance and the laws by which it operated was to know the essence of world-reality.

The project continued on its successful way from a practical point of view well into the 20th century, and dominated (read decimated) metaphysical and theological thinking into the present 21st century. There are, fortunately, signs of recovery.

But three philosophers in succession, George Berkeley, David Hume, and Emmanuel Kant, had offered such devastating critiques of the inert-substance machine as a metaphysical explanation of reality that it is a wonder that it survived with intellectual respectability at all.

The system “worked” in that it successfully undergirded the development of science, technology, and industry, but the whole enterprise was resting on the back of an invisible turtle. Nothing really explained how it worked because the back of the “turtle” did not provide an explanation of anything above itself. There were fun-
damental flaws which almost all sides chose to ignore.

Berkeley understood. He, for example, questioned the usefulness of Locke's inert substance as an explanation of anything at all -- on the rather substantial grounds that it did not explain anything at all. If Locke was going to say that secondary qualities did not inhere in substance, then on the same grounds he had no good reason for saying that primary qualities were there either. Inert substance was an "I know not what," and that was all it was. There was no way to move past one's perceptions of the object to the object itself to discover whether the perceived qualities were an accurate representation of the object out there.

Berkeley, in other words, saw that on the empiricist's own grounds, there is no public and perceptual world of evidence out there. One is locked into his own perceptions. One can never directly share perceptions of another person, nor can one compare one's perceptions of an alleged object with that object itself. The very meaning of objectivity was at stake.

For Berkeley, as we shall see, the situation was saved by the doctrine of creation. God was The Guarantor of objectivity.

David Hume pointed out that the very foundation stone of the empirical program, the notion of causality, was bogus. It was merely a "habit" one gets into because he consistently meets constant conjunctions of various phenomena. (112)

But the causal notion had provided the internal unity of the world which made scientific observation reasonable and possible. The causal notion also provided the observer with his objective unity of his subjective apperception. (113)

Nature, it was held, everywhere and at every time worked by the same inviolate causal principles. But if no causal principle was demonstrable, then the world's internal unity necessary for science was a rope of sand. Not only was man locked within his own private perceptual field, but, worse, he had no way of objectively unifying the various events he perceived within his own private sensory field. Reality was fundamentally disconnected, atomized, therefore leaving inductive reasoning with no justification. (114)

And finally Emmanuel Kant, working with the notion of "transcendence" as inherited from the Greeks, alleged that both for God and for material substance, man has no hope of knowing the reality.

Transcendence, recall, on the Greek view was ineffable, impassible, and unrelated. Whatever it was, it was thought to be essentially an intuition of the contemplative intellect. For Plato, the philosopher king had a direct vision of the Idea of the Good, as in the Myth of the Cave.

But Kant held, rightly, that there is no evidence of direct intuitions of intelligibilia, i.e., of abstract ideas (as per Plato and other "realists") which could be known as objects of intellectual perception. If there were such objects of the intellect, they were either categories inherent in the know-

112. See Hume's summary of his own view below in "Critique" on page 20
113. See page 7 for definition of "objective unity of apperception.
114. This issue will be discussed in detail in Volume II, Chapter on Inductive Reasoning.
They did not inform the observer of a world outside the mind and hence could not provide an objective unity of apperception.

D-4. The Disaster in Pictures

A series of simple diagrams will illustrate the magnitude of this disastrous loss of objectivity, and hence of the objective unity of apperception.

For the Middle Ages, and in the Biblical world generally, God was the ultimate objective unifier of all man’s perceptions. That is, God was the principle outside of man, the observing subject, which provided a unity to man’s perceptions simply by being the original cause of all perception. The unity was provided through the intermediary step of the physical world which was the immediate unifier.

For example, two men could say they saw the same sun by reference to the sun that God held in existence. Or the same man could say that the sun today was the same as the sun yesterday by reference to God’s continuing activity in sustaining the existence of the sun. This objective unifier of perception is at the same time the locus of reliability and durability.

John Locke’s development of the substance notion takes the medieval view and elaborates it in terms of a theory of perception, as in Figure I-D-1a.

The man’s head represents the subject’s total sensorium. The dotted lines represent causal activity, God creating the real horse, which then causes the appearance of an image-horse in the subject’s sensorium. The image-sense-data horse in the man’s head corresponded literally, or perhaps analogically, to the real horse only in primary qualities solidity, extension, figure, motion, and number). Secondary qualities (e.g., smell, taste, and...
color) were caused by, but were not in, the real horse.

The subject-object problem is evident since the subject has immediate and uninterpreted knowledge only of the image-horse in his sensorium, not of the real horse "out there", the existence of which is inferred. The problem, admitted by Locke, was that of assuring oneself that the image-horse, at least with respect to the primary qualities, actually "looked like" the real one.

Given the Newtonian interpretation, however, even more problems arise. For on one hand, the only causal powers of material substance are those of inertial force, yet on the other hand, substance must at least be able to initiate the activity of causing perceptions to appear in the subject. A theory of light reflecting from the object to the perceiving subject would only temporarily solve the problem -- which would re-emerge as the body-mind dualism at the point in the brain where electrical circuits (or whatever) "cause" a mental image. (115)

For Berkeley (Figure I-D-1b), the Cause (God) ensures that the different perceivers see the same thing, hence God is the direct objective unifier of apperception, there being no intermediate "physical" step between God and the perceiver.

But substance was becoming solidified into Newtonian hard massy objects so as to provide the locus of reliability and durability, hence replacing God as the metaphysical explanation of the world.

Hume (Figure I-D-1c) underlines Berkeley's criticism of Locke's substance by denying Locke's right to use the concept of causality as a connecting link between an unperceived sub-

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115. Those areas of the brain are apparently being rather precisely mapped out.
stance and the actual perception. For Hume, causes operate only within the phenomenal framework, and there only as a "habit" which arbitrarily connects sense data in patterns. Everything is in doubt except the experienced sense data and that which one can reasonably conclude from that data.

Emmanuel Kant (Figure I-D-1d) then reads Newton and Hume, accepts both the notion from Newton that the natural world really is causally determined, and the notion from Hume that the causal concept cannot be used "transcendently," that is to connect phenomena with a trans-phenomenal being as the ground of phenomena.

"Transcendental" is not limited to God, it applies to anything beyond the phenomena. Kant’s restriction is, at least, an honest recognition that Newton’s hard, massey atoms were just as "metaphysical" as God might be, and therefore, in his sense, "transcendental". Despite the embracing of the Newtonian world by empiricists, the Newtonian physical world is "metaphysical" in the most basic sense of the word -- beyond the empirical data.

Hence the subject-object gap is infinitely wide so far as man's knowledge about the noumena or the "thing-in-itself" is concerned, whether that be a horse or God. Man has direct intuition neither of physical externals nor of intelligibles, such as God, spirits, or Platonic Ideas.

For Kant, the actual nature, therefore, of both horse and of God, are totally in question. Man "knows" only what has been transformed into a possible object of knowledge for him by the category-filtration process (eyeglasses), which automatically provides the framework notions of space, time, and causality.

Knowledge of God or of the universe as a unity is therefore limited to
speculation and (for Kant) to its practical thought-regulating function. The definition of 'God' is a useful fiction. Even if there is no God, the concept still provides a way in practice (says Kant) of talking about an objective unity of apperception, though unverifiable in principle. However, the logical (and therefore also the practical) consistency of such a claim can readily be questioned.

D-5. Critique

It cannot be said that Kant was successful in defending the objectivity of the causal notion against Hume any more than Locke was impervious to Berkeley's critique. For the knowing subject can no more "get at" the categories to verify them as legitimate than he can Locke's Newtonian substance. We have no way of knowing whether they are in the object itself, built into man's perceiving mind, or we just make them up.

Furthermore, the real repository of objectivity, the thing-in-itself, is as much a mystery as it ever was. The point that does emerge is the metaphysical question, that if one is to make rational sense of the empirical world, he must interpret it in causal terms. Neither Hume nor Kant succeeded in eliminating the transcendental use of "cause" which both in principle rejected.

Hume claims to have rejected the transcendental use of the causal notion, but his very argument explaining how man comes to have a causal notion (i.e., as a habit) implies it nevertheless. He summarizes his view:

Before we are reconciled to this doctrine, how often must we repeat to ourselves, that the simple view of any two objects or actions, however related, can never give us any idea of power, or of a connection betwixt them; that this idea arises from the repetition of their union; that the repetition
neither discovers nor causes anything in the objects, but has an influence only on the mind, by that customary transition it produces; that this customary transition is therefore the same with the power and necessity; which are consequently qualities of perceptions, not of objects, and are internally felt by the soul, and not perceived externally in bodies?\textsuperscript{116}

We see that Hume has denied causality to inter-phenomenal relations, as did Berkeley. But he, without naming it, re-attributes causality to the relation between the phenomena and the mind. What else could be the sense of “influence on the mind” above? Or, in his attempt to explain the common distinction between perceptions and thoughts or memories of the perceptions:

The first circumstance that strikes my eye, is the great resemblance betwixt our impressions [sense data] and ideas [concepts, memories, images] in every other particular, except their degree of force or vivacity.\textsuperscript{117}

What can be the meaning of ‘force’ or ‘vivacity’ if not to suggest that the perceiving subject has the intuition, direct and uninterpreted, that to have a perception at all is to have an external cause acting upon one? It may be a puzzle how external substance can work upon the subject, but it is more of a puzzle to explain how mere phenomena (if that is all that is left of substance) can act upon the subject.

Kant struggles to maintain some semblance of objectivity by insisting on the reality of the noumenon, the objective “thing in itself”. But if he is to have a noumenon, and the noumenon is to have any relation to its phenomenon, then it must be a causal relation. Filtering the object through the category-creating process does not change that since the filtering process itself demands a causal explanation. As we will try to show, the filtering process must have some initiator, some efficient cause -- this application of the principle of sufficient cause is part of the meaning of it being a rational process.

\section*{D-6. A Metaphysical Issue}

The place and meaning of cause is thus a metaphysical beginning point, not a fact discovered by empirical investigation. It is a logical fact, about the meaning of ‘rationality’, discovered by an investigation of the nature of the empirical process itself.

The consequence would seem to be that, while Hume was right in denying causality to inter-phenomenal relations, it cannot be denied to transcendental relations, that is, relations between the subject and object.

It is the meaning of being an object and of being transcendental that must be clarified.

Causality, in other words, is not something one could arrive at through an empirical examination (as per Hume's empirical "disproof" of causality), it is something which is logically prior, and which thus one must have before getting started in order to make any empirical examination, proof or disproof, meaningful in the first place.

There is a curious, but hardly noticed, correspondence between the perennial philosopher's notion of transcendence on one hand, and the Lockian empiricist's notion of inert

\textsuperscript{116}. A Treatise of Human Nature, I, III, XIV. Everyman's Library, p. 165
substance on the other. In both cases, substance (divine or material) is essentially inert.

One tends to dress up the concept when applied to God to appear as "in-effable," "unrelated," or "unmoved mover," variations on the similar themes of "self-sufficient," "wholly other," and "transcendent." The effect is all the same -- it becomes impossible to talk rationally of God initiating anything towards us or we toward Him -- Descartes' mind-body interaction problem in an earlier guise.

It is felt better in the cases of both divine and material substance to eradicate all notions of active agency, usually on the grounds that such notions compromise the goal of objectivity and universality in the direction of anthropo-morphism and the pathetic fallacy -- attributing human feelings and characteristics to inanimate objects.

The rational procedure in a philosophical discussion, when one finds his argument running aground and producing nonsense, is to re-examine one's premises and find out which one is faulty. But currently the choice offered by many contemporary philosophers (wittingly or not) is the choice between total uncertainty about the not-self and objectivity versus total but solipsistic certainty.

The Kantian realist-rationalist cannot bridge the subject-object gap because the object is defined so as to be cognitively unknowable. Hence he is forced back upon himself and his interpretive "glasses" to solve the problem. Or when, in the tradition of the "perennial" philosopher, he does bridge the gap, it is in a non-cognitive manner such that the distinction between subject and object is itself obliterated, a form of existence in the end indistinguishable from solipsism, the view that only I exist, and that I am "the All".

There is a prejudice operating which systematically pushes one's notion of the ultimately real always beyond one's grasp. Small wonder that if one begins with a definition of reality as ineffable, that he finally, after great labor, concludes that he cannot have any knowledge of it.

And the Lockian-Humean nominalist-empiricist is in no better situation. If he insists that whatever is out there must be depersonalized in such manner that it cannot initiate activities of its own, and further that the causal concept is illegitimate on the grounds that it is not found as the conclusion of an empirical demonstration, then he is forever doomed to phenomenalism drifting into solipsism.

Fortunately, like Hume, who played Backgammon when he got depressed from his philosophical enterprises, most people have the common sense to live above their philosophies - - i.e., stay in touch with personal relationship reality.

In our secular-dominated era, we hear that God is the great illusive entity, and probably (it is often hoped) illusory. At best irrelevant.

But the "illusory" problem is not God, but with the world itself. We have phenomena, that is not in question. But where is the world as a stable, reasonable, dependable, and good entity -- the kind of cosmos required by the rise of science?

Most of the world's religions, philosophies, and cultures have not believed there was such a world. Only the Biblical cosmos, I think we shall see, supplies ontological and moral stability, both necessary for a culture...
Secularism would like to assert that its world is the one compatible with science, but it cannot show from where its ontological security comes, nor its moral foundations. It has borrowed both from the Biblical world which it so assiduously attacks.

E. God or Solipsism?

E-1. Berkeley vs. Solipsism

There was a young man who said, "God Must think it exceedingly odd If he finds that this tree Continues to be When there’s no one about in the Quad." Reply: “Dear Sir, Your astonishment’s odd: I am always about in the Quad. And that’s why this tree Will continue to be, Since observed by Yours faithfully, God.”

The above limerick by Ronald Knox, English theologian and priest, is quoted by David Aikman in The Delusion of Disbelief as summing up the philosophy of Berkeley. Aikman’s otherwise excellent book makes a blunder here. Berkeley, he rightly reports, was "known for the theory of 'immaterialism' which holds that there are no material objects, only the mind and ideas. Others have called this view 'subjective idealism'.”

The limerick suggests the almost universal misunderstanding of Berkeley’s philosophy, that “to be is to be perceived”, which echoes one view of modern indeterminacy, that the observation of an electron somehow creates it.

That is not at all what Berkeley thought. He understood the reality of personal beings such as God and ourselves, and that these are more than just mind and ideas. He understood the reality of persons as agents living in community as the essence of the created order.

Both immaterialism and subjective idealism tend to be just a hop, skip, and a jump from solipsism, the view that only I exist, that the world of my experience is wholly my own creation. In most minds, “immaterialism” means something insubstantial, the opposite of how people (mistakenly, says Berkeley) understood Newtonian materialism -- as solid and substantial. Solipsism is the ultimate subjectivism.

The insinuation that Berkeley was engaging in subjectivism is wide of the mark because his whole purpose was to rescue the world from a failed Newtonian objectivism, i.e., from the acid critiques of himself and Hume, and then later, Kant. His point was to locate objectivity in God Himself, not to leave the objectivity of the world floating in the mists of either a failed Newtonianism or subjective idealism.

Berkeley did not talk in terms of a “personalist” cosmos, but he was setting things up for just such a notion.
Subjective idealism does not describe Berkeley’s philosophy. Objective personalism would fit well.

The tree does not persist in the quad because God “observes” it, but because God is intentionally creating it in the perceptions of relevant created observers as part of a perceptual world framework which can be rationally used among His creatures as a common ground for communicating.

E-2. Down the Slippery Slope

Western philosophical history could be written in terms of the concept of substance. Roughly sketched, it might look something like the following.

Greek philosophers are the inheritors of a mythological, non-historical mode of thought which does not do justice to historical, geographical, moral, and spiritual reality slowly emerging and being discovered from the sixth to the fourth centuries B.C. They also inherit a world full of change, decay, impermanence, and instability in every area of human life.

The nature religions of their forefathers are allegorized and abstracted in an attempt to deal with the two inheritances. Rational, linear thought is begun and some of the tools of logic developed. The new realm of rational contemplation seems a clear winner over the empirical realm in terms of permanence, stability, and meaning.

Having no clear cut ontology, the Greeks then enlist what should have been “merely” an epistemology to perform as an ontology also; hence, to be is to be known. Reality is defined conceptually and contemplatively, and therefore statically, rather than actively or personally.

Thus we have Plato’s theory of the Ideas as ultimate reality. For Platonists, the apparent stability of Ideas trumped any possible stability of personal relationship or of the physical world, and so the wiseman pursued his own being in those Ideas.

Enter the Judeo-Christian tradition which refuses to allegorize its historical base, insisting upon a doctrine of creation with an active, loving Creator. Christians carry this worldview with them out into the Hellenic world now ruled by Rome.

Yet, even given that personalist ontological foundation, for many reasons, cultural and philosophical, Christians fell into compromising the doctrine of their Creator God in the direction of static abstractions (such as Goodness-Itself, Being-Itself, etc.).

Christian theologians wanted to attribute to God the most honorific terms possible. There seemed to be greater honor in being Goodness Itself than in being a good Person. The philosophical absurdity of such depersonalizing attributions were not always immediately evident.

The Hebraic insistence on the goodness and orderliness of nature

120. Rodney Stark draws some fascinating conclusions in his book, Discovering God, in which he explores how the sixth century BC, the so-called Axial Age, was a turning point for religion in almost every culture, including the Biblical world. It was a century abounding in religious leaders founding new religions. He asks whether we were discovering a God who was already there, or were we inventing Him as we went? Was God revealing Himself, or were we making Him up?

121. Again, see Bibliography for Total Truth, by Nancy Pearcey, an excellent summary of the negative effects of Hellenic philosophy upon Christian theology.
and on the importance of individuality (abetted by the small Hellenistic quasi-nominalist tradition represented by Democritus, Lucretius, and some of Aristotle) eventually issued in the empirical revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries.

The Judeo-Christians had the only reliable ontology going (see following chapters). But they too often bartered their active agency ontology, on the rationalist side for either an intellectual system or a mystical experience, and on the empiricist side for a materialized version of Greek transcendence, namely Newtonian inert substance.

A direct line of descent from Greek notions of transcendence to Newton's material substance can be traced. Certain key assumptions about the impersonal and abstract nature of the not-self dominated both. In a word, inert substance is the materialized corpse of Greek transcendentalism. It is no accident that for all their apparent opposition, they lead to similar conclusions about man's relation to the not-self, namely that he ends up in total blind ignorance of it but is eventually (and ironically) absorbed into it.

The corpse was duly buried by Messrs. Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, with the funeral oration chanted by Nietzsche in *The Gay Science*. Yet the ghost of that Newtonian machine still lies unquietly in its grave even with the advent of post-Newtonian (relativity and quantum) physics and the successes of post-modern phenomenalism.

In the popular mind, it needs to be said, Newton's world lives on in uneasy awareness of relativity and indeterminacy.

However, both phenomenalism and the new science are a long way from solving the problem of objectivity, that is, discovering how to make objectivity an intelligible subject for discussion. But it does at least provide the platform from which the problem can be intelligibly stated.

The knowing subject, that is to say, must not, in the process of his philosophizing, explain himself out of existence as a knowing subject -- as do behaviorists. Destroying the subject does nothing to rescue objectivity. It is precisely the subject which is in need of objectivity. So he cannot reasonably reduce himself to a bunch of inert atoms. Such a conclusion is nonsense, and demonstrates that the philosopher in question is wrong, not that he has discovered some profound and, some would say, tragic aspect of life. (122)

Western civilization has been spared most of the consequences of the death of objectivity for so long because it has been able to live off the subterranean ontological and moral capital generated by nearly three millennia of consciously Biblical culture. We have had some lingering sense of whom to trust and obey. The relied upon beliefs mentioned at the beginning of this introduction die slowly, particularly when longed for. But that is fast eroding.

It is no longer only an academic issue (it never was, but now it is obvious), for the loss of objectivity is having profoundly destructive effects in every quarter of western culture. On either a traditional rationalist or a traditional empiricist view, the objective unity of apperception is gone upon

122. Yet, writers such as XXXXX (behaviorist -- beyond freedom, etc. seemed to think the demise of personhood and freedom was an event in which to rejoice -- if ???'s title is any indication.
which depend the two essential unities of practical life -- ontological and moral stability. Political and personal power struggle inherit the leftovers, now blessed with new weapons of mind-control, and a kissin' cousin, hate crime laws - which forbid the seeking of truth in a given area.(123)

Western civilization leaped off the Biblical worldcliff onto the Newtonian world. But we have also now leaped off the Newtonian worldcliff... onto what? Post-Newtonian physics/cosmology is an epistemologically relativized substitute for ontological stability. Wandering in existential angst and now post-modern relativism, we have yet to find secure ground on which to land.

The reasons for leaping have been epistemological. The reasons for landing must be ontological. Truth-seeking has led beyond Newton, but to where?

It may (I think must) lead back to the Biblical worldview.

Gone since Hume's time is the internal unity of nature upon which inductive reasoning and empirical science are based. People generally ignore that fact, and continue doing science anyhow because it "works". But they have lost the capacity to explain why and how it works because there has been no viable successor to the Lockian-Newtonian inert substance as a ground (objective unity of apperception) for the inductive leap.

Gone at least since Dostoyevski's time is the objective moral unity. Dostoyevski pointed out, in the words of Ivan in The Brothers Karamzov, that if there is no God, then all things are permitted (or, more accurately, nothing is forbidden). This disunity has been further underlined by the language analysts and cultural anthropologists with their discussions of moral and cultural relativity.

And with the arrival of Freud (who pointed out in a letter to Marie Bonaparte that "The moment a man questions the meaning and value of life, he is sick, since objectivity neither has any existence.") clearly gone is the sense of philosophical, psychological, or historical unity to life, the sense in which I can say that "life is good" (or "bad" for that matter).(124) For there is no "life" objectively integrated by meaning at all, good or bad in any moral sense, just bits and pieces of experiences which are unified only by the mere happenstance that I (or, somebody) am experiencing them.

As one needs an actor to subjectively unify a series of activities, so also one needs a creator (a cause) to objectively unify a series of experi-

123. As for example with the current crop of hate-crime laws alleged to protect homosexual persons. They do exactly the opposite. The effect of such laws is to forbid persons from expressing an opposing view. Nevermind that the opposing view just might be the truth, that homosexual activity is inherently self-destructive. In which case, those most in need of that information, homosexual persons themselves, will be denied the medical, psychological, and spiritual help they desperately need.

Hate-crime laws target opinions and ideas and values, giving a free pass to one set of ideas over all others. That is systematic subversion of the truth-seeking process, i.e., of science. It is, as St. Paul notes in Romans 1:18 & following, the first of three steps in the Fall. Subversion of truth leads to confusion about who God is, i.e., idolatry, which then leads to compulsive, self-destructive behavior. The progression is inevitable.

Systematic subversion of truth is a sign of evil, not protection of a needy population.

ences. Without that, we have left only a very tenuous hold on our own subjectivity by which to unify anything at all.

A recent TV interview went something like this: A. We have been debating this issue, I by presenting facts. What have you to offer to counter my view? B. I have no need of your facts. I have my feelings. (125)

The interviewer had, apparently, no idea on how to answer that inane response -- which is just that hop, skip, and a jump from solipsism, the view that only I exist.

The subject will always (at least so long as sane) have his subjective unity of apperception. He will know that he is having his experiences. But that is to state the problem, not the answer: How do I get beyond my subjective awareness to objective knowledge?

Such seems to have been the "message" of authors such as Samuel Beckett, that within any possible subject's purview, nothing has very much to do with anything else. The surro-

gate gods have died, the emperor has been shown denuded. Indeed, along with his clothes, he has vanished altogether.

The Freudian oriented critic is likely to hint that this may be the case, but a mature man must not harken back to his childhood crutches to restore an illusion of objectivity. To which one can only respond: the question is not whether God is a crutch, but whether God exists. The "crutch" question can be answered intelligently only after the existence question has been decided.

For Freud, of course, it had already been decided, he being a willing heir to Nietzsche's alleged death of God.

E-3. Thank You! - Behaviorism & Logical Positivism!

The destruction of a falsehood is sometimes necessary to the revival of a truth. Judeo-Christians have been intellectually inept at unseating the pagan impersonalist views of the Cosmos. And so God has called secular neo-Assyrians and Babylonians into service.

The gods who have died (as per Nietzsche et al) are the impersonalist deities of paganism. The metaphysical view destroyed by behaviorism and logical positivism was the ancient pagan view of Perennialism, the unknowable womb of all life. Secularists, however, did not realize that their acid approach was also destroying their own viability as knowing subjects.

Biblical personalism was untouched by the neo-barbarians, it was hardly even a target because Judeo-Christians (with exceptions notable

\footnote{125. The "feeling" response suggests that those who stand on fact are being "unpluralistic" and thus, with their objective truth, "oppressive" against those who have other viewpoints.}

The pro-feeling - anti-fact response leads to the destruction of all declarative sentences, which by their nature assert truths. They compose the great majority of all spoken and written language, which presents a problem for the relative truth defenders.

Furthermore, in a conflict of opinions, without an appeal to fact and logic (i.e., evidence), there is no way to moderate the disagreement. We are left with power struggle and deception as the only ways of deciding the issue. An appeal to feelings leaves no room for a loyal opposition, which means that the appeal to feelings is inherently authoritarian and tyrannical.

Neither science nor political freedom can survive the subversion of truth. As Jesus noted, it is indeed the truth which sets us free (John 8:31 ff.). Feelings without truth will enslave us all.
for their sparseness) were unable to market their view so as to make it a target. Western Christendom has been an unhappy and unsteady amalgam of Biblical principle with an unhealthy sprinkle of Hellenic intrusion.

The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, I AM, nevertheless remains in the field. Some of his followers are even beginning to articulate a defense, and give a credible witness in the public arena.

To be fair to Christians, there have been those in every age who knew how to live like Christ, how to pick up their crosses daily and follow Jesus, to love their neighbors at any cost to themselves. And in recent years, there have now also come on the scene Christians who exhibit the long scarce intellectual integrity which is becoming increasingly formidable.

But we have the clarity of behaviorists and logical positivists, and other seeming enemies of religious faith to thank for their systematic exposure of the Perennial worldview’s ineffable and unknowable divinity. For that we can be grateful.

E-4. Bridging the Subject-Object Gap

Subjectivity cannot be reduced to anything other than itself, neither abstractions nor atoms in motion. It is primitive. But it might well be found to be compatible with, and even fulfilled by, objectivity, if the prime objects are themselves subjects.

The problem for the knowing subject is not how to explain his own existence in depersonalized, "objectified" terminology, but rather, given his experience and his reasoning about his experience, what can he conclude about his relation to the not-self.

When Nietzsche announced the death of God, he would more accurately have stated his case had he referred to the death of objectivity conceived in Hellenic terms.

The Hebraic ontology was not dead. But it has seldom been elaborated as a possible philosophical position. Those who sat on the bar of philosophical judgement would not hear its case on the grounds that it did not have the proper credentials -- that is, was not sufficiently abstract and depersonalized, i.e., not Hellenic. It was, alas, anthropomorphic.

Contingency is the problem. Modern man is discovering in his own bones what Aquinas and a host of other Biblical theologians have said: Man is neither self-sufficient nor self-explanatory; he needs something outside of himself to complete himself.

Dostoyevski's "underground man" was an accurate precursor of Camus's "absurd" man.

I do not know of any way that solipsism can be shown to be logically untenable. After all, one might just be God with no other agents created, and thus the cause of all of His own perceptions. But the unpopularity of the view suggests that the experiential evidence against it, the perceived existence of persons other than oneself and of objects not caused by oneself, is overwhelming.

On the other hand, the efforts of most philosophers to avoid the trap of ultimate subjectivism also have had a hard time holding their ground. Without a secure hold on objectivity, solipsism haunts quietly in the wings.

awaiting its cue.

It seems fair to suggest, therefore, that alternatives to the notion about ultimate reality being inert, ineffable, or in any other way depersonalized need to be examined for their philosophical plausibility. Charles Hartshorne has made such a venture in his *Natural Theology for Our Time*. George Berkeley made such a venture years before.

If fundamental reality (substance, the locus of reliability and durability) is not inert, then it must be active, able to initiate change. If that is true, then it is not the case that one must at every turn squeeze out whatever he can of personal action and intelligent design from his notion of ultimate reality.

It becomes plausible then to suggest that the reason the subject-object gap has not been bridged is that the subject (e.g. the philosopher) has been biased to think that it had to be bridged from his side alone (since the other side was inert). But if the object itself is of the nature of an agent, then the gap is not bridged by the subject alone, but also by the activity of the object upon the subject, that is, from the other side.

The essential nature, then, of our needed object also includes being a subject. And further, empirical knowledge might well be essentially and literally (not merely poetically and metaphorically) in the form of revelation and dialogue between persons.

Again, such will be the burden of the following chapters.

At any rate, we cannot have it both ways. If Nietzsche was right that God is dead, then there can be no objectivity either. Or at least, no very strong case has yet been put forth for it.

If one is in doubt on the matter, he must then decide where he will put his energies: accepting the judgement of the culture on the identity of the deceased, or re-examining the assumptions on which the coroner's inquest was held.

If the deceased was indeed Yahweh, then we are all in trouble. No exceptions.

If the deceased was the ineffable, transcendent, unknowable deity of an infinite number of names, then we had better get back to our drawing boards, for Western culture, built on the Biblical worldview, is fast collapsing around us back into yet one more rendition of the cosmology of the deceased -- namely paganism.

So that is where we now head, back to the drawing boards, and hopefully a reformulation of the Biblical worldview and cosmology which, *Deo gratia*, can stand in the public arena with truth and grace.
Study Guide for Chapter I

Historical Introduction

These study guides can be used for individual or group study to help the reader focus on key issues. The reader who follows through with each question will build a solid understanding of the issues, chapter by chapter.

I. Summary:
In your own words, write a summary of the theme of this chapter, and make a personal application as is appropriate.

II. Questions on Chapter One:

A - Metaphysics & Absurdity
1. Why should “metaphysical” problems be discussed?
2. How is the task of the theologian and philosopher similar to that of a psychologist?
3. What does the author mean by “relied upon” images?
4. Describe the disease of Fallen culture.
5. Describe and discuss the “God of the Gaps” charge.
6. Describe a contradiction built into the secular program.
7. In what sense was Bonhoeffer correct according to the author?
8. Put Albert Camus’ statement of the absurd into your own words.

B - The Biblical Undergirding for Science
9. What is the “Subject-Object” gap?
10. What “substances” has man striven to understand?
11. Discuss the three beliefs necessary for the founding of science, why the pagan world failed, and why the Biblical world succeeded.
12. Why was the Biblical emphasis on Community so important for the founding of science?

C - The Emergence of Inert Substance
13. Define the term ‘substance’ as given by the author, and how that is important for a discussion of science and religion.
14. Describe how the pagan and Hebrew views of reality conflicted on the knowledge of Ultimate Reality.
15. How does the author think positivist and behaviorist writers helped the Biblical cause?
16. What contradictions does the author see as impeding the development of Christian theology and understanding of science?
17. What sorts of inventions increased Western man’s focus on time and space? and why? Discuss whether this was good for Biblical religion.
18. Describe the “new kind of authority” arising in Europe. And what wrong, even disastrous, response did the Church officials and others often make? What would have been an appropriate response, and in what sense would that response be “Biblical”?
19. How did Descartes and Locke influence the development of the notion of substance “out there”?
20. Describe Newton’s refinement on the issue of physical substance, and the two problems which stood in the way.
21. How did the “solidity” of material substance become a block to thinking Biblically?
22. What then happened to Christian theology as a result of matter getting in the way of God?
D - The Disintegration of Objectivity

23. Describe the perceived profound value of the Locke-Newtonian world-system.

24. How did Berkeley, Hume, and Kant then pull the rug out from under the objectivity of the Locke-Newtonian worldview?

25. Describe Locke’s attempt to bridge the subject-object gap, and the problems which remained.

26. Describe how Berkeley saw God as the solution to Locke’s unsolved problem.

27. Describe Hume’s and Kant’s attempts to resolve Locke’s unsolved problem.

28. How did both Hume and Kant, according to the author, fail to protect the subject-object relation and the objectivity of our knowledge of the physical world?

29. Why does the author say that the issue of objectivity is a metaphysical, not an empirical, issue?

E - God or Solipsism?

30. Describe the common misperception of George Berkeley’s “immaterialism”.

31. Describe the author’s notion of how Greek thought developed, and the consequences of the intrusion of the Judeo-Christian worldview into the Graeco-Roman world.

32. What are some ways Christian thinkers were drawn back into the pagan way of thinking?

33. Why does the author think there is a direct line of descent from Greek notions of transcendence to Newton’s material substance?

34. In what sense might a behaviorist explain himself out of existence as a knowing subject?

35. How have the reasons for leaping off the Newtonian world cliff been epistemologically forced? And why must the landing be ontologically based?

36. Describe the collapse of that unity in life which would permit us to talk about life as a meaningful whole.

37. Discuss the need for an actor to subjectively unify a series of activities, and for a cause to objectively unify a series of experiences.

38. In what sense might have behaviorists and logical positivists done Biblical folks a favor?

39. How might Nietzsche have better stated his case?

40. Do you think solipsism can be shown to be logically untenable?

41. Why must the needed object “out there” be also a subject?

Chapter Reflections:

In your own words, relate your new insights from reading and meditating on the information contained within this chapter. What difference would it make to you personally whether the claims and assertions of this chapter were true or not?
Chapter II

The Concept of Substance & the Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God

In a cosmos with persons as the primary ontological entities, relationship and community become paramount. That cuts right across the tradition of Western philosophy which, as secular, has held ultimate reality to be impersonal, either by being hard matter or as philosophical in the Hellenic tradition, by being in some sense abstract -- intellectually and/or spiritually.

Nevertheless, we are a community, a family, children and parents, before we are philosophers or theologians. Philosophers (and most other “modern” people) have treated that fact as an aspect of our immaturity - out of which we hopefully grow, the goal of life being our own autonomous, and sometimes impersonal, selfhood.

The intent of this essay, however, is to explore what the world would look like if the implications of the Biblical worldview were true, that life is the creature of an eternal Person who has called other persons into being with whom He wants to have fellowship. Suppose this is the basic ontological reality of the cosmos. What would that look like philosophically? Could such a view hope to have philosophical integrity? Or will it sink back into mythology, anthropomorphism, the pathetic fallacy, and wishful thinking. Or can it help resolve the immense difficulties we encountered in above in chapter 1?

As my college religion professor, Edmund Cherbonnier, told us, the Biblical worldview is the only logically consistent worldview, and all other attempts to picture and explain the world fall into contradiction and/or fail to do justice to the empirical evidence. That was a tall claim for me to swallow, majoring in philosophy, but I took all his courses, and thought he proved his case. I have seen no reason over the intervening half-century to change my mind.

We have already in the first chapter begun our metaphysical quest by rehearsing some of the dilemmas encountered in the problem of matter or substance, and the difficulty in finding grounds for the distinction most of us like to make between real and hallucinatory. We continue here looking more deeply into the abyss of our current chaos.

Most of us still value the distinction in our sense perceptions between that which we in some way find or is
given to us, that which we bump into when we get up in the morning, external objective fact -- as against that which we ourselves produce, our private, inner, and perhaps subjective experiences. The question is whether an examination of experience will support such a distinction between subjective and objective, and if so, what it might tell us about the world in which we live.

This problem is used as a means of leading into a more abstract discussion of the four foundational concepts of possibility, causality, existence, and perception (or epistemology), showing their interlocking relationship, at the same time building up a cosmological argument for the existence of God as the first cause.

Because the basic ontological category is an active cause, we conclude the chapter with a discussion of time and eternity.

Chapter III then unfolds this basic pattern by suggesting how the universe of perceptual objects can be thought of as a causal and purposive dialogue between the first cause and us other, created agents.

Chapter IV carries this further into the more specifically human community, Chapter V looks into the issue of freewill, and Chapter VI concludes Part One by summing up the notion of personhood as far as we have developed it.

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A. The Problem of Sameness.

A-1. Phenomenalism & Inert Substance

The unphilosophical man in the street is likely to look at the world before his eyes as the world. What he sees and touches and hears is as real as it can get, the glove which he sees on the hand with which he feels is the "real" glove, and he is perhaps not likely to bother beyond that about the problem of reality.

The fellow who has read about light theory or the transmission of sound waves does not get off so easily. If he is curious, he must wonder what possible connection there can be, for example, between, on the one hand, an account of light waves/particles bouncing off his table, proceeding to his eye and causing certain complex reactions on the retina, through the nerve fibers, and supposedly terminating in the brain, and, on the other hand, what he sees when he sees the table. My table does not look like the end of such a chain reaction in the brain. So what guarantee is there that the table from which the light originally bounced is anything like the table I see, the sense data which I call the table?

Our venture into science seems to leave us with two worlds, the world of immediate sense perception, and the physical world of material substance about which our sense perceptions supposedly tell us. The question is, what do they tell us, and how do we know?

No philosopher today, I suppose,

would maintain that the physical world is an exact duplicate of our perceptual world, and many would say that such talk makes no sense because, they will say, the physical world is the world we see.

Phenomenalists, for example, would like to do away with the material substance world “out there” altogether and content themselves simply with the perceptual world. For phenomenalists, perceptual data become the basic substance of the world.

Some, however, hold that there is a sort of isomorphic relation between what is and what we perceive, partly on the (I think false) grounds that the perceptual effect must resemble the physical cause in some more or less obvious respect.\(^{128}\)

If one does do away with the inert non-perceptual world, he has the task of discovering what is performing certain functions which this non-perceptual matter was thought to have been performing, not the least of which is providing grounds for the distinction between real and hallucinatory, or between true and false perceptions, or whether these functions are being performed at all.

On the inert material substance theory, a true perception would be the one with the correct isomorphic or analogical relation to the real object "out there", and an hallucination, illusion, or error would be some deviation from this. If there is no inert substance out there, then against what indeed are we to test the truth of our perceptions? When is a table brown, and when does the table only "look" brown but is in fact green?

A phenomenalist might first either distinguish true from false perceptions on the grounds of consistency of behavior, saying that perceptions and behavior patterns which we find to be consistent not only within our own experience but with others as well are the more likely to be true. Or, alternatively, he might say that such consistency is what we mean by true experience.

If he takes the first alternative, then he is still in need of a meaning for the word ‘true’ which these consistent perceptions are likely to be. What, in such a case, would be the difference between true and false?

And if he takes the second alternative, he has a meaning for ‘true’ (= ‘consistency’), but he has wedded ontology (being) with epistemology (how we know being) so that, as we shall shortly see, he has no way in principle of judging between two mutually conflicting but each internally consistent observations.

A-2. George Berkeley & Inert Substance

At this point, I would (again) introduce George Berkeley, Bishop of Clony, Ireland, of the 1700’s, who, it seems to me, has pioneered in the only direction this discussion can fruitfully take.

Berkeley, with great rigor employing Occam's razor, points out that there is no use trying to test the truth of our statements against a world "out there", since our only evidence for what it might be like out there is what we have already been looking at "in here". Our perceptions always stand

Chap. II - The Concept of Substance

between us and that world which we are trying to compare with our perceptions. We can never know if our alleged isomorphic relation is correct or not. We can never reach the alleged inert substance since by definition the substance is what is beyond whatever perception we have. It is, in the quite literal sense, meta-(beyond) physical (i.e., in this case, beyond perception). Trying to bring inert substance into view is to pick a fight with a definition, a losing battle.

In a nutshell:

If there were external bodies, it is impossible we should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we would have the very same reasons to think there were that we have now. (129)

One objector to Berkeley's phenomenalism, which apparently to him implied total subjectivity, retorted, as he pounded his fist on a nearby stone post, "Thus I refute him!" (130)

It was no refutation, of course, because the feeling of hitting the post was just one more phenomena, behind which he could not penetrate to see if a real hand was hitting a real post. But the objector was pointing to what he understood as objectivity, the felt resistance of the wall against his fist, and, in a sense, rightly so. Nevertheless, he misunderstood from where the real objectivity came. In Berkeley's view, the objectivity was in God, not a physical post.

The phenomenalist would largely agree with Berkeley since there is nothing in Berkeley's argument that precludes any experience or sense data. Berkeley allows all the empirical evidence to be had. Thus no appeal to particular experience can count against his view.

But most contemporary phenomenalism is perched on the slippery slope to solipsism and prevents the descent only by clinging to roots and shrubs along the way. It has a problem, as the objector above suggested, in providing an explanation for objectivity. Thus phenomenalism has difficulty in giving grounds for any distinction between true and false empirical statements since the phenomenon or perception is the real, and thus there is nothing else against which to check it except perhaps other people's phenomena. But then truth tends to dissolve into a majority vote.

One feels driven back further and further "in here" the harder he tries to find what is "out there."

Berkeley's point was that the missing objectivity did not, because it could not, lie in an inert substance entity "out there".

A-3. Breakdown of Coherence

A coherence or consistency theory of reality might suggest that, for example, if two persons should report the same spatio-temporal event in conflicting ways, and if one of these reports should turn out to be internally inconsistent then the other would hold the field. Or if one observer found he could not act consistently with his perceptions, he could conclude that he was mistaken or having hallucinations.

But the coherence theory breaks down, for a view which provides no reference transcending phenomena, such as phenomenalism, is logically incapable of deciding between either

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130. Attributed to Samuel Johnson.
of two internally consistent but mutually exclusive reports about what purport to be the same spatio-temporal situation.

A coherence theory would be of no help at a trial in which the plaintiff and the accused each had internally consistent stories to tell.

If A should meet B on the street and ask him why he is wearing his raincoat on a sunny day, and B should answer "Don't be funny, you are dripping wet yourself", and if A and B can each within his own perceptual world perceive a consistent picture, then there is no principle by which either story could be validated over the other. One says it is raining, the other says it is sunny.

If we elaborate the story far enough, communication simply breaks down. B might perceive a flood coming down the street, sweeping both he and A away, while in A's perceptual world, both are still talking on a dry street. A would see B standing dry on the street, but hear him talking about the flood. He could conclude that B was insane. Similarly, B would see A being swept along with him, but hear him insisting on the bright sun. He too would conclude that A was insane.

Within either perceptual world, the other fellow was reporting inconsistently with the first one's perceptions. But the trouble is that there is no principle for saying that one is more right than the other. A and B each think that they are both talking about the same spatio-temporal situation, but in fact phenomenalism does not provide any sense in which they are "the same" other than the fact that most observers do agree on most matters. Perceptual worlds are private worlds. And thus when a head-on collision of perception occurs, a coherence theory breaks down, for both reports may be fully coherent.

On the strict phenomenalist view, then, there is no reason why A and B should be seriously upset about their different reports, for there is no reason why they must be the same. Where there is no principle for asserting sameness, there ought to be no great surprise about finding difference. A and B simply have to conclude that their worlds have gone separate ways, unfortunate though that may be.

One wonders what we are to do with general relativity which predicts that things moving at near the speed of light will age at different rates from those at rest. Would such a world still be coherent, or would different people end up having contradictory descriptions of reality -- and both be right? Is such a world rational?\(^\text{131}\)

Sameness ultimately presupposes numerical identity. We might say that two people's perceptual worlds are the same in that they have numerically identical sense data, a thesis which few if any have ever maintained. Or we might say they are perceiving the same world in the sense that their phenomena are caused by a numerically identical cause. This cause would provide a reference transcending both phenomenal worlds by which they could be united and be said to be perceptions of the same world.

The alternative is to have perceptual worlds which are only accidentally alike, and which therefore ought to cause no metaphysical surprise when they are different. "Real" becomes "real-for-me", with the implica-

131. We will try to tackle some of these issues below in Part II.
tion of "...but not necessarily for the other fellow".

This will always be the case for any ontology which defines reality in terms of an essentially private sort of experience such as sense data. One would simply have to conclude that the world can rain for some and shine for others at the "same" time and place, with "same" having only a rather odd, accidental sort of sense.

The sense in which the two observers would be said to be observing the "same" spatio-temporal situation would progressively disintegrate as their report of their perceptions diverged. "Sameness" would depend on the accident of agreement. The major source of the phenomenalist's dilemma, as we shall see, lies in implicitly accepting an epistemological notion of 'to exist' in place of an ontological notion.

A-4. Berkeley Again

Hume and Kant lead inevitably to phenomenalism with their systematic critique of what then was passing for metaphysics. Berkeley and phenomenalists have much in common, both believing that we must begin with what we have, namely the phenomena. But Berkeley insists on the metaphysical as logically necessary to the phenomenal.

Berkeley says that the trouble with inert substance being "out there" is precisely that it is inert, and therefore, ipso facto, could not be the cause of our perceptions. The attempt then to find some analogical or isomorphic relation between an inert substance and our perceptions is doomed before it starts because being "inert" and being substance only raises insoluble problems about interaction between mind and body and gives the study of metaphysics a bad reputation.

If we are going to have a substance, but one which is not inert, then we are left with a choice between theism or animism. Hence it comes about that Berkeley's solution to the dilemma is God. Hume and Kant had to reject metaphysics because the only metaphysical entity they were considering was either physical or abstract, both impersonal and inert, and hence incapable of explaining the occurrence of phenomena.

If there is something other than ourselves and our perceptions, then it must be causative or active enough to account for our perceptions. The only such producing sort of cause with which we have any experiential knowledge is the sort which we experience in our own actions.

Thus the analogy, for Berkeley, is not to be drawn between our perceptions and an unperceived world, but between ourselves as causes and an external agent as a cause. The only thing on the "other side" of our perceptions is an active God, not an inert world in some sense "like" the one we perceive. The perceptual world is the physical world, and there is no other physical world beside that. The perceptual or empirical world turns out to be a kind of causal dialogue between God and created agents.

The grounds for a distinction between true and false perceptions is provided by the external causing of the perceptions and the possibility of the perceiver distorting or misunderstanding them. And solipsism is im-

mediately ruled out by the existence of more than one agent, since it is another agent that is causing the perception. But this is to anticipate Chapters III and IV.

Objections are then raised to having God as the solution to this problem, such as that to import God to solve a philosophical tangle of this sort is purely ad hoc and scientifically unfruitful. If inert substance cannot explain anything, God can explain everything -- too easily. To say that God is behind our perceptions does not help us to deal with the world or to organize our knowledge, as scientists do, into inductively constructed deductive system.

Berkeley would answer that statements about God are not meant to compete against scientific endeavor or to undermine scientific laws. On the contrary, it is the doctrine of creation in Berkeleian terms that provides the undergirding for science and is the logical presupposition of empirical methods being fruitful at all.

If it is objected that God is just as much beyond our perceptions as inert substance and therefore an equally meaningless entity, Berkeley would rejoin that he allows two reasons for asserting the existence of an entity or faculty, and in this anticipated long ago contemporary trends in philosophy. Either the entity must be directly perceived (scientific domain) or the entity must be the logical presupposition of perception and the way we deal with perception (metaphysical domain).

Inert substance fails on both counts. God, however, comes under the latter category and therefore is inextricably related to the very existence of scientific enterprises. God is not in the former category and therefore empirical science cannot compete against metaphysical theology (atheists have commented that astronauts have found no God in the sky).

On the other hand, metaphysical theology cannot compete with empirical science either (theologians have on occasion insisted that the universe was centered on the earth since the earth was the scene of the Incarnation). If science is to be science and natural theology to be natural theology, there can be, as we shall see, only one relation between the two, and that is that natural theology must provide the metaphysical presuppositions of empirical science.

`God', it might be said, is the primary synthetic-apriori category, not in the Kantian sense of a hybrid between synthetic and apriori, but in the sense of “that which apriori is required for the understanding of synthetic knowledge”. (135)

134. See Chapter VI below on induction.
135. ‘Synthetic’ means empirical, look-see, sensory, hands-on. ‘Apriori’ means logically deduced, with no empirical, sensory input.

B. Cause, Law, & Volition

B-1. The Meaning of ‘Cause’

It is perhaps evident, however, that we are using the word ‘cause’ in a sense which most contemporary phi-
losophers of science have seen fit to relegate to the dust bin of the primitive, anthropomorphic, and animistic. It might be pointed out that ‘cause’ in present day scientific discourse makes no reference to any kind of “pushing” force, such as one billiard ball might be thought to “push” another. And indeed this is the case.

Bertrand Russell defines ‘causal law’ in terms almost literally echoing the critique made by David Hume.\(^{(136)}\)

Scientific law is not much more than a “habit”:

’a general principle in virtue of which, given sufficient data about certain regions of space-time, it is possible to infer something about certain other regions of space-time’.\(^{(137)}\) (1)

The reference to something active producing something else is missing. The relation is held to be one of inference rather than one of generation or production between two different states of the universe, thus enabling us to predict a later state from knowledge about an earlier state, or, Russell would have it, any total state of the universe from any other total state, the Laplacian ideal in modern dress.

Russell again:

A cause, considered scientifically, has none of that analogy with volition which makes us imagine that the effect is compelled by it. A cause is an event or group of events of some known general character, and having a known relation to some other event, called the effect; the relation being of such a kind that only one event, or at any rate only one well-defined sort of event, can have the relation to a given cause. ...nothing of any scientific importance depends upon [the effect's] being after the cause.

What is actually known, as a matter of empirical science, is that certain constant relations are observed to hold between the members of a group of events at certain times, and that when such relations fall, as they sometimes do, it is usually possible to discover a new, more constant relation by enlarging the group. Any such constant relation between events of specific kinds with given intervals of time between them is a ‘causal law’.\(^{(138)}\)

There is disagreement over whether there is more to causal laws than simply constant relations or constant conjunctions to events, and concerning just what this "more" might be. But it is generally agreed that the additional element is not volition, and that the more scientific we become, the more abstract we become and the less we include volition in our concept of cause.

**B-2. Volition & Cause**

This might seem the obvious position to take at first glance, but examination of the reasons given for leaving volition out of the causal picture suggests they are not so respectable, and that the critique by Hume still stands. The question has not been successfully answered as to what justifies the “inference” from one state of the universe to another.

An association of volition with primitive thought, which happened to be animistic, might lead one to think that volition in the causal notion was simply an anthropomorphic left-over, a reading into the external world of our own active nature.

But it does not follow from a rejection of animism, which was histori-
cally associated with volition and a primitive world view, either that volition is primitive (in a bad sense), that volition is tied to an animistic view of the world, or that volition ought to be rejected. Nor does it follow from the fact that man usually thinks of himself as having volition that thinking of the world in terms of volition is therefore illegitimate. It may be illegitimate, but man’s having volition is not sufficient grounds for saying so.

The more logical factor which has been involved in the rejection of volition is the undoubtedly greater success man has had in understanding the world since he began to exchange an obviously personal notion of cause for a depersonalized notion. The world was no longer thought of as alive, but inert, and quite determined in behavior patterns. An animistic world could be capricious and therefore unpredictable.

Inert substance was thus thought to provide a more satisfactory framework for science since it seemed far more trustworthy and seemed to be the logical inference from the amazing growth and success of inductive reasoning. The scientist in his inductive workshop formulates laws which are notably impartial and make exceptions for no one. The world seemed modeled more on this rigorously impersonal and impartial pattern than on the pattern of volition which can “bend” natural law and make exceptions for individuals.\(^{(139)}\)

But the non-sequitur remains, for, as we shall see, impartiality, trustworthiness, reliability, etc., can be qualities of persons far more readily than of an inherently undetectable inert substance.\(^{(140)}\)

Indeed one of the tasks of this essay is to show that the personal, volitional concept of cause is always presupposed by the impersonal and abstract notion of law, and that inert substance, a pseudo-concept, lurks in disguise to plague philosophy of science and raise between science and theology barriers that ought never to have existed. As Berkeley asserted, a notion of inert substance leads to atheism.\(^{(141)}\)

From henceforth, I will use ‘cause’ or ‘causal relation’ to refer to the volitional, generative notion. For the scientific notion (secular version) involving inductive generalization, prediction, and deductive systems, I shall use the term ‘law’ or ‘law relation’. What scientists discover and correlate, using this terminology, is not causal relations but law relations between events.

Having whetted the reader’s appetite with problems only hinted at and certainly as yet unsolved, we devote the remaining pages of Part I to filling out the account of the empirical world as the meeting ground between created persons and God. The thesis will be that life is fundamentally empirical and experiential, and that for empiricism to be understandable, substance or matter or ontological substratum must be personal and active in the Berkeleian sense, not impersonal or inert.

Now we bring on stage our basic cosmological furniture.

\(^{139}\) A. Munn discusses the development of the causal concept in *Freewill and Determinism*, chapter I.

\(^{140}\) See below, IV-A-5, “Ascribing Personhood” on page 125

C. `Possible', `Cause', `Exist', `Perceive'... & the Cosmological Argument

C-1. The Building Blocks of Experience

In this section we shall concentrate on the relationship between the four title concepts above to formulate a set of definitions fundamental to the rest of our cosmology.

The first three concepts are basic building blocks of experience. We are at the bottom level of investigation, the foundation upon which all else stands, and hence the definitions are not definable in the normal sense of being taken apart to show the contents. In other words, 'possible', 'cause' and 'exist' (and its cousins, 'be' and 'is') are not definable, or pieced together, out of meanings other than their own interlocking relationship to each other. So the only way to define them is to show how they give meaning to each other through their ontological inter-relationship.

The basic understanding of them must come through experience, for they outline the very structure of experience, that is, of the empirical world. These definitions are, as it were, the indivisible philosophical "atoms" of all experience and meaning.

'Perceive' then introduces epistemology into this ontological structure. The distinction between ontology and epistemology will be expanded as we go along.

The definitions are not offered as descriptions of how these words are in fact always used, but rather to clear up the logic implicit in the way they are normally used. If the words are ultimately to make any sense at all, then, I think, they must have the meanings defined here.

C-2. Two Arguments for the Existence of God

We will be making reference to the ontological argument for God, which reasons (unsuccessfully, I think) from the definition or "essence" of God to His existence. The reasoning goes something like the following:

God is perfection. The fullness of perfection includes the existence of that perfection, so the very meaning of 'God' requires that He exist.

The error lies first in attributing causal power to a formal concept, and secondly, in seeing perfection as an ontological quasi-moral category which can generate existence. But morality itself must be preceded by an act of creation, and is dependent on the creator/creature relationship.

The same theme (and error) comes up in other interesting ways, as we shall see.

We will, however, be aiming at building a cosmological argument for the existence of God, which reasons, not from a definition of God to His existence, but from the existence of the contingent world to the logical neces-

142. Cf. Chapter III, Section 1

143. See Bibliography for Defining 'Oughtness' & "Love" for the case that morality rests on the will of God.
sity for the existence of an uncaused cause of the contingent world.

The necessity of such an argument does not apply to the existence of God, but rather to the necessity for the conclusion that such a cause exists. The necessity is not such as to make God exist, but rather to say that, if the cosmos is rational, then logically there must be such a God. (144) Or the obverse, that if there is no creator God, then the cosmos is not rational.

The cosmos may indeed, as some existentialists have thought, be irrational. It is a rather odd and unexpected fact, for example, as many have pointed out, that the natural world yields to mathematical processes and predictions. The contingency of the world lies, in part, in the fact that it is not logically required to do so, and thus the fact of correspondence between mathematics and the world needs a causal explanation.

But if the world were irrational, none of us would be writing books about it or doing science concerning it.

A successful cosmological argument does not produce God, but it does make belief in Him logically reasonable (an acceptable theory), and thus supports relationship with Him as worth investigating. (145)

C-3. A Kantian Puzzle

Let us begin with a puzzle proposed by Emmanuel Kant. If we look at all that exists and all that is possible, how are we to distinguish between the two?

In Figure II-D-3, we see in picture #1 two circles. The larger circle contains X, Y, and Z, representing all that is logically possible (the total list of all those things whose existence would not violate the law of non-contradiction).

The law of non-contradiction states that “a thing cannot both be and not be at the same time, place, and respect”. It states the fundamental contradiction between being and non-being upon which all logic and reason is based. The larger circle is thus all those things imaginable which do not violate the law of non-contradiction -- which is to say -- all those things imaginable. That is the only qualification for being in that larger circle.

The smaller circle contains all that does in fact exist, A, B, and C.

“Ah, but,” you say, “this violates the law of non-contradiction. You must put the circle of existence within the circle of the possible, not outside of it.” So we draw picture #2 to make that point -- which then raises more issues.

If the large circle represents the class of all that is possible, containing items from A to Z, i.e., everything, and the solid small circle represents all those things within the realm of possibility that in fact do exist, what then explains to us the fact that the smaller solid circle is where it is? Why is it not including X, Y, and Z as well? Or, why are the two solid circles not co-extensive? Or why does the smaller circle not include just B, C, and X? What is it that decides what is to exist and what is possible but is not to exist? Why is there a smaller circle at all? Why does anything exist at all since existence does not seem to be a logical necessity and is therefore

144. See below, section
145. See below, section F-4, “Finding I AM - the God Who Exists” on page 65, for more on the empirical discovery of God.
not deducible from mere possibility?

All that exists is obviously possible, i.e., not self-contradictory. But can we say also the reverse that all that is possible exists? It would seem on one hand that certainly many things are possible that do not exist.

On the other hand, muses Kant, if there is something that is possible but does not exist, then to make it exist, since possibility by itself does not entail existence, something would have to be added both to the possible and to existence. Something would have to happen which would come neither out of possibility nor out of existence. This something would not already be in the class of the possible, and would thus be not-possible -- which is impossible.

Therefore, according to Kant, we are driven to conclude that since noth-
ing can be added to the possible from outside the possible (i.e., from the impossible), what is possible and what exists must be co-extensive. This, at least, I take to be the meaning of the following from Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*:

Everything actual is possible; from this proposition there naturally follows, in accordance with the logical rules of conversion, the merely particular proposition, that some possible is actual; and this would seem to mean that much is possible which is not actual. It does indeed seem as if we were justified in extending the number of possible things beyond that of the actual, on the ground that something must be added to the possible to constitute the actual. But this [alleged] process of adding to the possible I refuse to allow. For that which would have to be added to the possible, over and above the possible, would be impossible. What can be added is only a relation to my understanding, namely that in addition to agreement with the formal conditions of experience, there should be connection with some perception.\(^\text{146}\)

But, if we untangle certain ambiguities in the two concepts of possibility and existence, we can resolve the puzzle.

**C-4. Two Kinds of Possibility**

**a. Logical Possibility**

The first ambiguity: Does "the possible" to which something must be added mean the logically possible or the empirically possible?

Logical possibility would be the broader category, meaning ‘all that is not self-contradictory’. Empirical possibility would have limiting conditions relating to the nature of causality and experience.

If we are to mean the logically possible (i.e. that something must be added to the logically possible rather than to the empirically possible), we would have to agree with Kant that all that is is analytically true, i.e., true by logical necessity. For, there is nothing outside of the logically possible that could intelligibly be added to it. Everything outside of the possible is, by definition, self-contradictory, and thus impossible and not addable to the possible.

We would be left to say that possibility and existence would be co-extensive and thus that existence could be deduced a priori -- a kind of ontological argument for the existence of everything -- something no empiricist would admit.

**b. Empirical=Causal Possibility**

But if we are to mean that it is the empirically possible to which we are adding something, we have a different situation. What is added would not violate logical possibility, since it would not come from outside that limit, i.e., from the self-contradictory. What is added can be neither something existing nor something purely and only possible, since it is precisely for what distinguishes these two that we search. What distinguishes them from each other cannot be either of themselves. It must be something different from, but not contradictory -- both to what is existing and to pure possibility.

If there is such a category or entity or being, then it would not follow, in Kant’s words, that "that which would have to be added to the possible...would be impossible," i.e., impossible in the sense of logically con-

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tradictory. For ‘impossible’ here would now assume the empirical sense rather than the logical sense.

This thing in question would have to be neither pure logical possibility, nor something that was merely existing. It would have to be logically possible, not self-contradictory (thus within the big circle), and yet it would have to stand outside of the small circle of contingent existence in some sense that allowed it to account for contingent existence. That is the sense in which it would have to be "empirically impossible".

It could not itself be "made" to exist because then it would itself need to be accounted for -- leading once more to the destructive infinite regression. On the other hand, it could not be merely possible (i.e., not existing), it would have to exist in some sense that would account for existence in a manner different from that which logical possibility already does. There must be an existence which is not contingent, but which accounts for contingent existence.

Kant ruled out anything outside of the two categories of existence and logical possibility which might be added to possibility to create existence, on the grounds that being outside of possibility it would be impossible. He is thus led to say that possibility and existence must be identical in content, for there would then be no rational way to distinguish between possibility and existence.

C-5. Yin-Yang & Pure Possibility

Chinese philosophy rested largely on the notion of an eternal balance between the apparent opposites of life (light/dark, hot/cold, up/down, etc.). Yin was generally the quiet, dark, and feminine side, and Yang the active, light, and masculine side. But the ultimate opposition is between anything and its logical opposite, not hot versus cold or dark versus light, but dark versus not-dark, light versus not-light, cold versus not-cold etc. Everything and its exact logical opposite.

So conceived, Yin-Yang might be seen as a symbol for the ultimate Mother of all existence, that from which all else emerges, the Great Mother of ancient pagan mythology.
The Great Mother of mythology becomes the more sophisticated “cosmic consciousness” of Eastern philosophies, that ineffable stuff or situation out of which we emerge and that to which we ultimately return.

The Chinese yin-yang at first seems totally incompatible with a Biblically based cosmology. But on further inspection, the notion of everything and its exact logical opposite turns out to be precisely the notion of pure possibility.

Possibility, devoid of existence, is indeed everything and its exact logical opposite, precisely because it is devoid of existence. Possibility is that state of affairs where there can be either “red” or “not-red”, but there is neither at the present time. It is the state of non-existence which allows the (only apparent) “contradiction”.

The contradiction comes only when the logical opposition is applied to existence. It is not a contradiction when applied to possibility because the opposition is a statement precisely of the possibility. The possibility is for either x or not-x.

The Biblical view says that God brings existence out of nothing, creation ex nihilo. But that “nothing” means “no existence”, “no thing”, not “no possibility”. Pure possibility is all the material that God needs for His creating.

Probably all pagan and secular cosmology imagines the present world to have evolved (not be created) out of some version this original state of pure possibility. But for that to happen reasonably, one of two things must be true.

Either (1) there must be that causal entity existing which can bring existence out of the original pure possibility, or (2) the state of pure possibility is actually an existing something which can itself produce the evolutionary process. But it is inadequate and logically confusing to attribute to pure possibility itself a causal force which can initiate an evolutionary process.

The first choice above is the Biblical option, and the second choice corresponds to the notion that the cosmos is itself the eternal existing entity.

But more must be said.

C-6. Two Kinds of Existence

a. Existence - Epistemological Definition

We still have an ambiguity with ‘existence’. There must thus be two kinds of existence, to discover which -- we must further sort out the meaning of ‘empirically (im)possible’.

The “noumenon” for Kant was the “thing in itself” or “ding an sich”, as opposed to “phenomenon”, the perception of the thing-in-itself.

As we think of actual existence (in contrast to the possible), are we thinking of Kant’s noumenal thing-in-itself which we can never perceive, or are we thinking of the phenomenal world which we always perceive? Does ‘existence’ refer to substantial noumena, or to transitory phenomena?

When using ‘exist’ with reference to sense experience, we might adopt Berkeley’s definition: to be is to be perceived. But as it stands, it hints at solipsism, that when I perceive, I am creating my own perceptions.(147)

To give a measure of objectivity to

147. See Chapter VI ????? Sec. 3, for a discussion of the solipsistic tendencies of operationalism.
what is perceived we can say, ‘to exist’ means ‘to be in principle perceivable’. (148)

By tying existence to perception-in-principle, we are kept from talking about entities beyond all hope of experience or testing -- such as inert substance, Platonic Ideas, or Kant’s noumena. But it also puts a limitation on the concept of existence by relating it to a perceiver. It is in fact ‘existence-for-a-perceiver’ or ‘existence-for-me’ or ‘existence-for-a-species’.

It is an epistemological definition of existence which rules out the phrase ‘existence beyond experience’ simply by providing no such language, and hence no means for incorporating such a “beyond”.

But if the conclusion above is correct, that ‘cause’ is what gives us a distinction between ‘possible’ and ‘exist’, then we must relate ‘cause’ and ‘possible’ to our epistemological concept of ‘exist’.

b. Existence - Ontological Definition

So we carry out the logic of the situation, giving an ontological definition of ‘exist’ as ‘to be caused’.

The ontological ‘exist’ is free of reference to any particular perceiver, and thus allows for entities to exist which some observer might not be able to perceive even in principle. That is, entities might be caused which I cannot in principle perceive and which have therefore no direct relevance to me. They might exist in the ontological sense of being caused without existing in the more restricted epistemological sense of being perceivable by me, or even by humans at all, or a subset of humans who are color blind, tone deaf, etc.

c. Substantial Existence

The other half of the ambiguity with ‘exist’ remains. If we can define ‘existence’ both epistemologically and ontologically for perceptual objects, in what sense can we talk of substance existing?

The answer lies in the concept of substance itself. If substance is inert, then there is not much point in talking about its existence. Or, at least, we have no access to it. Inert substance is an epistemological and metaphysical cul de sac -- looking in a dark alley for a black cat that isn’t there.

But if we adopt Berkeley’s suggestion that the only real substance is active and causative, i.e. agency, then in the sense of being experienceable, substance as agency does exist. An agent is perceivable in its activity. It is perceived by being what it is, an agent, a doer, a causer, one who causes effects experienceable by others. Thus to perceive an agent is to have a cause-effect relation with that agent.

A cause, then, is that which differentiates between being merely possible versus existing empirically and contingently.

How this works out with God and in the context of community relations will be the topic of Chapter III, Cre-
d. Definitions: Preliminary

Our almost complete list of definitions runs thus:

'logically possible for existence' -- given negatively as 'not self contradictory'.
'causally possible for existence' -- 'not self-contradictory and in a universe with a cause sufficient to bring a thing from a state of logical or pure possibility into existence'.
'cause' -- 'the logical and dynamic differentiator between possibility and existence'.
'to exist' -- (epistemological) 'to be perceivable in principle'.
'to exist' -- (ontological) 'to be caused' or 'to be an effect'.
'to perceive' -- 'to be caused to perceive' or 'to be caused to experience'.

The ontological definition of 'to exist' will be reformulated in section E-3, "I AM & Mystery", beginning on page 54, but we begin with this list.

The first, logical possibility, might be called pure possibility, since it makes no reference to anything existing. The empirical parallels to pure possibility would be spatially a vacuum, visually absolute black, and so on. G. E. M. Anscombe, in her Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, writes (p. 160):

To regard to tautologies (logically necessary propositions) as descriptions is as if one were to regard the empty space where the mechanism was to go as itself a model - for all possible mechanisms.

Causal possibility is simply pure possibility with the addition of a cause sufficient to produce the entity in question ex nihilo, i.e., out of only pure possibility.

The two definitions for 'exist' give us a clue as to why phenomenalism runs aground. It accepts the epistemological definition of 'exist' but omits the ontological definition. It must therefore attribute the dynamic suffix `-able' in 'perceivable' to the perception itself rather than to some other cause. It makes perceptions the basic substance of the world. Thus we are led to talk of objective sense data as a defense against solipsism.(149)

But it is difficult to see in what sense power or ability can be attributed to anything so changing and transitory as our perceptions. To attribute such a power to perceptions presupposes that these phenomena are already either pre-existing or else internally related to each other. But we have no more reason for believing in their pre-existence than believing in inert substance. And to suppose their internal unity is to argue in a circle, since it is just this unity which is being questioned because of the loss of inert substance.

e. The Biblical Doctrine of Creation

The puzzle with which we began can be solved. That which is added to the possible to create the actual is the causal activity of the agent. But this is added to causal possibility, not only to logical possibility. In the notion of causal possibility we have, already given, the cause which differentiates between the possible and the actual.

While in a sense we may speak of this cause as "impossible", it is only causally impossible, not logically impossible. This is to say that if there is to be a distinction between the possible and the actual, there must be a

149. See Ewing, Idealism, chapter 7, p. 290 ff.
cause which is not itself causable, which is thus a “first cause”.

To return to our circles, there must be some agent standing outside the circle of existence-in-need-of-explanation, yet within the circle of logical possibility. This agent must be of the sort to which that ontological explanation does not apply, or we would be back in Kant’s dilemma again.

God is logically possible, but does not receive His ability to be from being so. That would imply the ontological argument for the existence of God. God has His ability to be inherently in Himself with no need from anything else. That is the meaning of ontological self-sufficiency. And that is the cosmological argument.

f. Omnipotence

In Figure II-D-5, the line curving down from G to ABC represents the cause-effect relation which G, God, the self-sufficient One, has with ABC, the world of contingent beings. The Biblical image would be the hand of God undergirding the existence of the cosmos.

The “omnipotence” of God is His ability to create or uncreate, to bring into the circle of existence anything at all from the larger circle of the logically possible, or to remove it from the circle of existence back to the merely possible. The causal capacity of God can produce any and all logically possible arrangements. God could eliminate all contingent existence and be alone with pure possibility. The realm of logical possibility is His causal and
purposive playground. He can do anything He wants with it, and for any reason.

That is the Biblical doctrine of creation.

In this present work, we will not be dealing with opposing creation stories in paganism, though we will make extended comments about the chief current rival to the Biblical view, materialism and evolution as the explanation for contingent existence.(150)

For a detailed assessment of pagan views of the cosmos and for the Islamic view, see Volume II, Yahweh or the Great Mother?(151)

D. ‘God’, Contingency, & the Spring Board Bounce-Back

D-1. Infinite Regress & a Logically First Cause

This is, of course, the old cosmological argument for an uncaused cause. There seem to have been two chief stumbling blocks to this argument in the past.

First, the fact that denying it led to an infinite regress of causes did not seem to either disturb or impress very many people. EXPLAIN MORE FULLY.....

And second, while perhaps few have doubted seriously that phenomena and earthly human life are contingent, it has seemed open to doubt as to whether the physical substance of the world was itself contingent. eg NEWTONIAN WORLD

But now there is some additional material to bring to the discussion. The denial of an uncaused cause not only leads to an infinite regress of causes to explain the present existence, but also to an infinite regress in the form of circularity in the definition of 'causally possible'.

If one is not bowled over by the first regress, in the second, he finds that without an uncaused cause, he can give no meaning to 'causally possible' and thus cannot legitimately use the concept. This leads back to Kant’s dilemma, and, as we shall see, to difficulty with the concept of contingency and induction.(152)

'Causally possible' is made distinct from 'logically possible' only by the addition of a cause which must be uncaused. For, a definition of 'causally possible' must refer to some cause. If it does not refer to an uncaused cause, it must refer to the only alternative, a caused cause. CLARIFY TWO PROBLEMS

But this would be to propose a circular definition since causal possibility is already presupposed by the word 'caused'.

It would be well to note that the regress entailed by this circularity is a logical regress, not a spatial or temporal regress. The latter would not necessarily get in the way of our thought

150. See Volume III, The Substance of Science & Epistemology, the Chapter on intelligent design & evolution.
151. Yahweh or the Great Mother? is projected for 2013.
152. See Part II, Chapter XXXXX
or action in the present, whereas a logical regress would put a glitch in causal thought at all.

The cosmological argument does not carry much weight if God is only a temporal first cause in the manner of the deist EXPLAIN God. It carries more weight if God must be logically first, and if He is responsible for making things exist right now, not only responsible for having gotten them started in some distant past.

One can see how the concept of material substance short circuited the doctrine of creation by relegating God's essential activity to the musty past -- if recognized at all.

**CLARIFY UNCAUSED CAUSE**

It might be objected that 'uncaused' equally well presupposes a meaning for 'causal possibility', and so it does. But 'uncaused' is not operating in a normal fashion here. The definition of 'causally possible' in its purity ought to mention a cause without any reference to whether this cause is itself caused or not, for the definition of the active sense would be prior to any passive causal language. This distinction between caused and uncaused follows after the notion of first cause. The active 'cause' is logically prior to his action.

For example, it is not possible to think of a race "being run" apart from an agent capable of running it, but we can quite easily think of a runner who is in fact not running. That is, we can think of a runner who is not causing a race to "be run", yet on whom the notion of a race "being run" depends. The runner is simply a special case of the more general cause. We can think of a cause who is not in fact causing anything, but we cannot think of any

thing being caused without a cause doing it.(153)

Thus the distinction between the passive caused and uncaused can arise only after there is a concept of an active cause. Then having this distinction, we are tempted to go back to our original cause and apply the distinction to it also. But to do so is to commit a category mistake and thereby undermine the whole language of causality and possibility by making it logically impossible to complete a definition for 'causal possibility'.

The First Cause is in a category by Himself, disallowing attribution of the passive voice of 'cause'. To avoid an infinite regress or circularity, this *first cause must remain unqualified by the language derived from it*.

That is signified in Figure II-D-5 by God standing outside the circle of existence, but still within the circle of possibility. The circle of existence is the circle of *contingent* existence.

Or, conversely, if we are to use the language of possibility and causality, we must admit a cause to which the language of causal possibility does not apply. To assert this is the function of 'uncaused' as applied to a cause.

This does not mean that all causes are uncaused, that there are no created agents, but only that if there are any causes, then one must be "uncaused" in the sense explained.

It also follows necessarily that if anything exists then there exists an "uncaused" cause, for the ontological meaning of 'exist' is 'to be caused'.

153. This distinction between what (or who) I am and what I do, between being and doing, is foundational for our later discussions of community, all personal relationships, the nature of the Kingdom of God, salvation, etc.
We shall refer from now on to a "first" cause rather than an "uncaused" cause, noting again that this means logically first, not temporally (though, as the cause of all other causes, it would necessarily also be temporally prior to all else).

Note also that a first cause is not self-caused, but rather we simply have no language for talking about God's "beginning". God, like Melchizedek, has no genealogy.

D-2. Contingency: Negative Flop & Positive Bounce

We come then to contingency, the second block over which an argument for a first cause has stumbled.

One might think that we can just as easily imagine the basic stuff of the world to have existed for ever as we can imagine God or a personal first cause to have existed for ever. And the world seems often to be much more in evidence than God. If there is neither an apriori reason nor empirical evidence for suggesting that the basic substance of the world, whatever it might be, has not existed forever in one form or another, then it seems far simpler to opt for the world substance as the eternal being rather than God. Often, however, the whole question is felt to be out of date, and thus ignored.

But there are at least two strong reasons for again looking into the matter. The first is the disappearance (or in some cases disguising) of the concept of inert substance from contemporary discussion.

In the secularized Newtonian scheme, it had been inert substance in which the attributes of permanence and duration had been thought to exist. This was somehow the enduring thing itself, the basic reality, of which our transitory sense perceptions gave us a changing, and not always reliable, view. Now the disappearance of inert substance seems to drop us into the lap of phenomenalism, certain aspects of which are the second strong reason for re-examining our thinking about contingency and a first cause.

Phenomenalism holds that our world of objects and the coordination of various sense data are contingent. That is, there is no logically necessary reason why we must perceive things as we do.

The foundation of empirical science is inductive reasoning, observing the world to discern what its laws might be, the method used precisely because we cannot apriori reason out the manner in which the world will behave. Its behavior is contingent, not logically necessary, and therefore we must experience it to discover it.

On the level of phenomenalism, this presents a severe problem. One could imagine inert substance enduring behind all this changing phenomena, and one had something to which to assign laws of nature.

But the crucial question for phenomenalism is, How does one now...
form an internal relation among phenomena without inert substance as the uniting factor between various experiences of an object; and if we cannot form this internal relation, what basis have we for assigning laws at all to phenomena?

If the stream of phenomena we perceive is merely a series of chance occurrences whose only unity is something we project onto them, then my different views of what I think is a single object is not of a single object at all. And in that case, Heraclitus was right, we cannot observe the same river twice.

An accidental series does not give information about a single entity or object, neither physical nor mental. When we see a monkey accidently typing out the *Iliad*, we cannot say that there is any law or any intention being followed here such as we might ascribe to Homer as he types, or that this series of experiences is in any sense an indication for the future. If the monkey's *Iliad* is truly an accident, then it gives us no reason to expect the *Odyssey* to follow.

When we say that the world is contingent, we are asserting that a state of pure possibility (with no intruding existence) is not a self-contradictory state of reality, or its equivalent, that existence is not logically necessary. The world, like the monkey’s typing, is quite open to having been otherwise than it is, and might not have been at all.

It is tempting to rest content with the negative ‘not logically necessary’ notion of contingency. But this is what our experience leads us not to do, for the way in which inductive reasoning uses the term ‘not logically necessary’, it assumes a distinction between logical possibility and some other sort of possibility.

That is, the world not only *is* logically possible, it also is *not* logically necessary. And there is therefore, as nearly everyone agrees, a difference between logical necessity and logical possibility. But if the list of all logically *possible* situations is different from (i.e. larger than) the list of all logically *necessary* situations, then there is another sort of possibility which makes this difference itself intelligible.

We have already suggested that this other possibility must be causal possibility. Without this, logical possibility is, as Kant held, co-extensive with logical necessity, just what inductive reasoning assumes is not the case.

Thus, if the world is contingent in the negative sense, as is generally agreed, then we cannot rest content with only a negative contingency, but must go on to ask “contingent on what?” The negative contingency logically implies a more positive notion, for there can be no ‘not logically necessary’ unless there is a distinction between ‘logically necessary’ and ‘logically possible’ -- which entails the causal concept. It is this cause “on” which things and events are contingent.

And it is the cause on which things and events depend which constitutes the causal explanation. No cause, no explanation.

Trying to make sense of a negative contingency free-floating all by itself is like trying to spring from a diving board which breaks. The height of a dive comes partly from the spring

[156. See “A Kantian Puzzle” on page 42.]
given by the board to the diver who jumps on the board. To the weight of the diver coming down, the board must at some point respond with a spring and a bounce back up and out.

Just so, a negatively contingent entity with no ontological resting place, i.e., no positive contingency, has no bounce. So as one descends down the ladder of exploration to find the original source, the final atom, the ultimate explanation, one descends into a free-floating infinite regress. There is no point of springing back with an explanation. One descends forever with one’s question never answered. An answer requires a stopping point and a bounce back upwards.

So, as we noted above, denying a first cause prevents us from using the concept of causal possibility by creating a circular definition and free-floating contingency. Causal possibility, and thus the first cause, are necessary adjuncts to a rational contingency, and thus to empirical science.

And hence we can conclude that the two stumbling blocks to the first cause notion, infinite regress and irrational contingency, are put to rest.\(^{(157)}\)

**D-3. I AM & Mystery**

**a. I AM**

Centuries ago, around 12-1400 BC, a fugitive from Egypt experienced the sort of event typical in Biblical history. Archetypal reality mixes familiarly with the mundane, space-time world -- in this case, with a shepherd who had fled for his life from Pharaoh, leaving behind his family and people.

Moses was wandering with the sheep of his father-in-law, Jethro, on a local mountain in southern Arabia, an area called Midian, and noticed a bush on fire but not being consumed. He, as chapter 3 of Exodus relates, was being approached by God with a request to return to Egypt and lead the Hebrew people out of Egypt back to Canaan.\(^{(158)}\)

Moses, an escaped felon, not surprisingly, felt unequal to the task. That did not stop God, who, when Moses asked, who should he say to the Israelites was sending him, replied:

\[\ldots\text{“I AM who I am.” And he said, “Say this to the people of Israel, ‘I AM has sent me to you.’” God also said to Moses, “Say this to the people of Israel, ‘The Lord, the God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, has sent me to you’: this is my name for ever, and thus I am to be remembered throughout all generations.”}\]

Exodus 3:4 ff.

The name, I AM, or Yahweh in Hebrew, has been interpreted by both Jews and Christians to be a claim of absolute, unqualified existence, precisely our First Cause, He Who Is.

Considering that this burning bush event took place perhaps eight centuries before any philosophers showed up in Greece, and that Moses’ education (good as it may have been, being raised by Pharaoh’s daughter) would have given him no access to any such thoughts as an uncreated First Cause of all things, one asks, “From where did Moses get this knowledge? Could he have conjured this up himself?” There is no parallel to this Exodus passage anywhere in

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157. We will carry out this argument in more detail in Vol. III, Epistemology & the Substance of Natural Sciences.

158. We are here anticipating Volume II, Yahweh or the Great Mother?, and some of the practical and theological implications of a personalist cosmos.
pagan religious or philosophical literature.

We read in Genesis:

In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth.

Genesis 1:1 is the beginning and very bottom level foundation of the only Scripture in history which has taken seriously the notion that the cosmos was created, and is sustained, by a personal First Cause, by Him Who Is, to whom the language of being caused does not apply.

b. The Hebrew Mode of Thought

If the story in Exodus be true, I AM, the creator of heaven and earth, was addressing Moses. God was saying to Moses that Pharaoh, whom Moses feared, was not the I AM of the cosmos, that He, God, was, and that, if Moses would obey God, God would show Pharaoh who was I AM -- through Moses.

The Hebrews did not have a philosophical notion about contingency such as we developed in the preceding section, but long before the 6th century BC 70-year exile into Babylon, they were coming to understand that the God who had led them out of Egypt was indeed the creator of heaven and earth. And they were hearing a law given to them which was indeed unique in all of history. They were either inventing or being given -- ethical monotheism. (159)

All this took place in the face of a surrounding pagan culture which was consistently, directly, and aggressively opposed to everything for which they stood. Such a contrary and unlikely culture demands, as we have said, an explanation. (160) The Hebrew understanding could not have evolved naturally out of the primordial pagan soup. It requires an intrusion from the outside to be rationally understood. Something or someone seemed to be forcing the issue, creating a confrontation against the pagan way of doing things. (161)

The Hebrew understanding was that such claims as made by Yahweh were to be proven, not by logical reasoning from premise to conclusion, but by watching to see whether the alleged God could keep his promises. A true God could keep His promises, a false God could not (that, of course, being the unspoken first premise...). The Hebrews were logical (in their best moments) because honest relationships compel logic, but the Hebrews did not, as did the Greeks, study logic. (162)

c. Absolute Existence

However, this event on Mount Sinai, and the name, I AM, overthrows our earlier proposed definition of ‘exist’.

If the ontological definition of

159. Some scholars have suggested that the Babylonian Exile was when the Hebrews became full-fledged monotheists. I believe monotheism was a strong element earlier in prophetic circles.


161. See G. E. Wright, The Old Testament Against Its Environment for information on the distinctiveness of Hebrew religion which prevents it from being interpreted as evolving out of the surrounding pagan culture.

162. Rodney Stark, in The Victory of Reason: How Christianity Let to Freedom, Capitalism, and Western Success, gives a superb description of the differences between “Jerusalem” and “Athens”, maintaining rightly that, despite the growth of the tools of reason in Greece, the roots of science lay much more in the Biblical than the Hellenic worldview. See especially pages 6 to 22 -- the first 16 pages of text. (2006 Random House Trade Paperback edition.)
'exist' is ‘to be caused’, then existence does not apply to God, and God cannot properly name Himself ‘I AM’, nor we name Him “He Who Is”, because the proposed definition of ‘exist’ could apply only to contingent beings.

That forces us to say something about the nature of mystery, and how it applies to existence. No matter what view of the cosmos one has, we always come to this point, the mystery of existence at all.

Hindus sometimes express this mystery as the back of the cosmic Turtle on which all else rests. Pagan philosophy generally draws this conclusion because it believes ultimate reality to be opaque to the human mind. It must nevertheless provide some “existence” which just is, from which all other things can be explained.

Even if the steady-state theory of the cosmos (which is currently, 2007 AD, in trouble) improves its chances of acceptance, and if we are no longer forced to deal with a beginning of the cosmos due to background radiation, etc., and if the Big Bang theory, with its perplexing beginning point, collapses, nevertheless, existence will still remain a mystery in the sense of itself having “no genealogy”.

Existence, in its bare and original form (if we are to avoid the infinite causal regress), steady state, Big Bang, or otherwise, just is -- in the form of a cause of all contingent existence. There is nothing behind it, no smaller, more fundamental parts out of which it is made -- an absolute beginning, the singularity of all singularities.

And thus it cannot be defined in the normal sense of defining. At the bottom of the pile of existence, there are no other parts around by which it can be defined. It is not itself observable, but it is that by which the observations of all contingent things can be reasonably understood, the Kantian objective unifier of apperception.

All attempts to explain the rationality of the cosmos are saddled with that beginning point. So our task is to see whether one of the candidates for the Beginning Point is a better contender for the job than the others.

But the back of a quizzical Turtle does not provide the required spring back up with a causal explanation. And neither does a Big Bang which appears out of nowhere.

Given the Biblical picture, however, we have “in the beginning”, two things: pure possibility and I AM or absolute existence -- which puts the threatening regress on a different footing, with the required stopping point and explanatory bounce back up.\(^{163}\)
If we are to explain the existence of a contingent reality, which would be a third item, we can do so only by beginning with the first two: I AM and pure possibility.\(^{164}\)

In this case, the I AM must be the First Cause which is able to explain the rest of reality, the contingent part. So, I AM is the only real “exister”. The rest of us exist only on His coat-tails. We are hangers-on, willingly dependent (if we are wise...).

Absolute existence, then, is an extraordinarily personal, individual

163. This is not to suggest that the writer of Genesis 1:1 had philosophical categories such as "contingent" or "necessary" existence in mind, but rather that God who spoke to the Hebrews understood all of this.

164. We shall be dealing with the personality of I AM more extensively in Yahweh or the Great Mother? See Bibliography.
thing, not an abstract essence or Platonic Idea. I AM is the most concrete, individual being of all, and we created beings are intelligently designed to partake of that personal individuality. We are because He Is.

d. ‘Exist’ Defined - & the Mystery of God

Beginning our metaphysical queries from within our contingent world, we tend to frame the questions and answers from that viewpoint, describing our source in terms of ourselves. But to get a proper understanding of the matter, we must take the First Cause’s naming of Himself, I AM, with its logical implications as the proper viewpoint. God exists, and all other existence is to be understood in terms of the prior and absolute existence.

The two questions we must ask of such an alleged beginning are (1) whether this First Cause is logically consistent and thus within the circle of the possible, and (2) whether it is capable of keeping its “promise” of adequately explaining the rest of what is -- the contingent order.

There can be no direct empirical evidence for such a First Cause other than (1) the contingent empirical world itself, and, if the Cause is a Person, then (2) one’s experiences of that Person intervening in one’s life, such as at the burning bush, the crossing of the Red Sea, the Incarnation, etc. -- in short, revelation.

So we now tailor our ontological definition of ‘to exist’ as follows:

‘to exist’ -- (contingent-ontological) ‘to be caused’ or ‘to be an effect’.

‘to exist’ -- (first cause) a mystery.

The existence of the First Cause cannot be defined, for there are no ontologically prior or parallel concepts by which to define it. It is either experienced, perceived as a presence, or known by logical conclusion from one’s own contingent existence -- the cosmological argument for God. That is the mystery from which all contingent existence is generated.

It is not just Biblical folks who are saddled with that mystery. Everyone who deals with metaphysics is. I.e., everyone. (Even presidents of the United States have pondered on the definition of ‘is’.)

If the logical conclusion for the existence of such a personal first cause is valid, then one can rightly look around for possible interventions, excursions, or intrusions of a personal first cause into one’s own contingent sphere of life -- i.e., again, for revelation. God shows up.

We hope to show that the personal understanding of such a First Cause is the rational view to take. Biblical people claim, “We know the name of the Turtle...!” Except that in the Biblical cosmos, the world rests on the hand of God, not the back of a turtle.

D-4. ‘god’ - A Definition

Let us now venture a definition of the term ‘god’ as a class concept and not a proper name (God), to wit:

‘god’ means ‘first cause of contingent existence’, or ‘the being responsible for creation’.

Taken in this manner, the concepts of ‘god’ and ‘first cause’ are nearly, but not quite, identical. ‘First cause’ is defined with respect to its being, while ‘god’ is defined with respect to

165. For a discussion of ‘god’ as a class term from an ethical approach, see bibliography under Fox, Defining ‘Oughtness’ and ‘Love’.
the relationship of the god with his creation. Thus ‘first cause’ is the logically prior of the two.

A first cause without a creation is, in this usage, a potential god. This is simply to say that a first cause is not dependent on his creation for his own existence. Or as more usually put, God (proper name of a particular first cause) is not dependent on His creation.\(^{166}\) He will be fully Himself with or without the creation.

The “omni-” words are not central to Biblical theology as they are to Hellenic philosophy, though they can be used in a derivative sense. ‘Creator’ and ‘sovereign’ are relational words, whereas the “omni-” words describe God in isolation. What makes God God in the Bible is His being creator and sovereign, which can then be described as omnipotent, omniscient, etc.

Monotheism asserts that there is only one god. In that framework it has made sense for people to capitalize the class name, ‘god’, and use it as a proper name, ‘God’.

The gods of polytheism were not first causes, they were simply powerful beings within the circle of contingent existence with whom it behooved one to be on good terms. Eric Mascall notes:

“The definition of a Greek god”, Gilson says, “should run thus: a god, to any living being, is any other living being whom he knows as lording it over his own life.”\(^{167}\)

Caesar, in claiming to be a god, never imagined himself to be the creator of heaven and earth in the Hebrew sense, but rather to be invested with the numinous power of the divine in the typical pagan sense, and therefore worthy of worship. But, as all tyrants, he demanded worship, obedience, and a right to control, which compromised the Judeo-Christian loyalty to God. Such a god is far, however, from providing a principle of philosophical explanation for the contingent cosmos.

The pagan world was built on power struggle, and on the notion that the strong had the right, even duty, to rule the weak -- abundantly illustrated by their divinities, and supported by such worthies as Plato and Aristotle.\(^{168}\) That was necessitated by the fact that the pagan cosmos provided no inherent order, so that the only order available was that imposed by the strong man -- an early rendition of survival of the fittest. The notion of a first cause outside the circle of contingent existence or a creator \textit{ex nihilo} was not central to Hellenic or any other pagan philosophy.\(^{169}\)

\textbf{D-5. “Ex Nihilo”}

I was asked recently why the notion of “\textit{ex nihilo}” is so important to the Biblical view of things -- since some theologians are willing to interpret Genesis 1:1 as saying that God created out of a pre-existing chaos.

Creation \textit{ex nihilo}, however, is the very foundation, without which there could be no Biblical cosmos. God creates out of nothing, thus owing

\begin{footnotes}
\item[166.] Ibid.
\item[167.] \textit{Existence & Analogy}, p. 2.
\item[168.] This is aptly illustrated in two college course DVD series by The Teaching Company: \textit{Ancient Greek Civilization}, and \textit{The History of Ancient Rome}. Go to http://www.teach12.com.
\end{footnotes}
nothing to anything outside of Himself for the existence of the world. That is what gives Him full title to ownership and hence to sovereignty. In a limited way, we honor that principle with our patent and copyright laws.\(^{(170)}\)

Secular and pagan worlds have no such consistent concept as creation \textit{ex nihilo}. Or where they do have some hints of \textit{ex nihilo}, it is buried in their almost forgotten past.\(^{(171)}\) The gods and goddesses emerge (evolve) out of a primal "stuff" of the cosmos, known in early myths as the Great Mother, the womb of existence, the yin-yang of Chinese philosophy. But there is no rationality to it, it is chaos, random, accidental, going nowhere but back to itself in the original womb. Hence no principle of objective morality, obligation, or authority.

Pagan creation stories are thus really construction (not creation) stories, making something out of stuff that was already there. The Babylonian \textit{Enuma Elish} tells the story of the rising hero, Marduk, who, in an act of cosmic rebellion, creates the world out of Tiamat, the original Great Mother. In such a cosmos, "ownership" is by power and control. It has no moral aspect, a fact almost universally reflected in the political life of pagan and secular societies.\(^{(172)}\)

The creation \textit{ex nihilo} point is made by the story of Satan challenging God, saying that he, too, can make a man out of dust of the earth. God accepts the challenge. Satan picks up some dirt and begins to breathe his spirit into it, but God interrupts and says, "Sorry, Satan, get your own dirt."

These pagan divinities and demons are perhaps the "elemental spirits of the universe" to which Paul refers in Col. 2:8 ff. They have a certain power, but they are dependent on God for what He has already created -- including their own existence.

"\textit{Ex nihilo}" is the continental divide between the Biblical cosmos and all secular and pagan philosophy and theology.

Creating out of chaos can be taken as a Biblical notion only if chaos is the "pure possibility" described above, with no admixture of existence, i.e., not a material stuff already lying around.

\(^{(170)}\) If I create something new or write a book, I am given the legal right to determine how that item shall be used for a period of time. God has an eternal patent and copyright on the cosmos and everything in it.

That is the point of my article "Defining 'Oughtness' and 'Love'" at http://www.theroadtoem-maus.org/RdLb/21PbAv/Eth/DefO&L.htm

God's ownership of the world is the basis of all objective morality (i.e., of all morality). It gives Him the ability to determine the reason for the existence of all of us -- which is what His laws are all about. The laws of God define our reason for existence, and hence define all morality.

\(^{(171)}\) Several authors have commented on how 19th century missionaries returned with stories from the most primitive of tribes who had memories of an almost forgotten High God who once ruled their tribe. But they offended Him, and He withdrew from contact with humanity. Some of these tribes had expectations of one day someone coming with a Book to reveal Him to them again.

Such stories, of course, reflect the Biblical situation of the Fall, which may be why they were rejected by so many scholars.

Rodney Stark, in \textit{Discovering God}, remarks on this pre-polytheistic monotheism, which was rejected by most contemporary late 19th century and early 20th century scholars because it did not fit the new science of the time which said that religion must begin in a primitive state and evolve upwards, not begin in a high monotheism and devolve downwards into polytheism.

\(^{(172)}\) That is not to say that there are no morally upright secular or pagan people. Clearly, and thankfully, there are. But it is to say that they have no secure explanation for the foundation of their morality.
God thus creates “out of” pure possibility, which is not a pre-existing "something", but simply the logical potential given by being not-self-contradictory in the context of a First Cause. That can make sense only if there is a being who necessarily exists, i.e., God, whose being is the very definition of ‘existence’, and therefore who is capable of creating beings ex nihilo, whose existence is thus totally dependent upon Him.

Figure 2-D-5 above illustrates that God is the original and primary “exister”, and that all other existence is dependent existence. Only God can say “I AM”. We creatures can claim existence only provisionally. We exist because God does, we stand on the hand of God, who is the necessary and sufficient explanation for our existence.

This view of the power of being and the ordering of the cosmos has, needless to say, profound implications for the intelligent design vs. evolution discussion.(173)

D-6. Submissive Pure Possibility

In the pagan world, matter and spirit are generally considered opposites in a contradictory way. When the spiritual/rational tries to bring order into the way things are, matter responds fractiously, not cooperatively. Tiamat, for example, the Great Mother of the ancient Babylonian myth, Enuma Elish, was slain by Marduk. Marduk was one of her rising star sons who championed the newly emerging masculine way of life over the traditional parental way. Marduk made one half of her body into the sky, and the other half into the earth.

But Tiamat did not always lie placidly. At one point she threatened to return as a flood, wiping all living beings away, including the rebellious gods. That was the nature of pagan matter. It did not submit readily to the dictates of reason or spirit. It majored in overwhelming, lumbering force as against masculine reason, strategy, and speed.

In the Biblical cosmos, pure possibility is the “matter” out of which He Who Is creates a cosmos. But pure possibility is not fractious toward God who gives it form and order. Rather, pure possibility is totally submissive and cooperative.

There is thus no residue of a matter which is evil or uncooperative toward the Creator who gives form to the matter. That means that the whole of creation can rightly be called “good” by the Creator. There is no part of it which stands against Him or His purposes for the matter.

There is, as it were, a marriage cooperation between masculine He Who Is and feminine pure possibility. God impregnates pure possibility with His word, and there springs forth existence, child of the two.

So evil does not happen as a matter of the nature of being. It will, or can, happen later as freewill brings with it that possibility of rebellious intent and evil behavior -- along with the possibility of cooperation and righteousness.(174)


174. See Bibliography for The Law & the Grace of God, especially Part I, Defining ‘Oughtness’ & ‘Love’ for explanation of the logical relation between causing and moral order.
E. The Meaning of ‘Explanation’

E-1. Non-Contradiction & Sufficient Cause

The principle of sufficient reason (or better, sufficient cause) receives little discussion in contemporary philosophy, yet it ranks with the law of non-contradiction as a *sine qua non* of intelligible thought about the world.

It is at the heart of any cosmological argument for the existence of God, and is akin to what we have been aiming at with “causal possibility”. The chief reason, no doubt, for its absence from discussion has been the submergence of the productive causal notion in favor of law relations -- Hume’s “habits of the mind”.

The principle of sufficient cause when used of empirical facts is about causal relations, stating that there must be a sufficient cause for any given event. And thus any explanation of an event must be causally sufficient to account for it.

When we ask about the cause of something, we are asking about the differentiator between its being merely possible and its actually existing.

We all have a common sense understanding of the principle. If a dump-truck driver sued a neighboring three-year old for wrecking his truck by crashing it with his tricycle, one would respond that the alleged cause is not sufficient to account for the effect. The collision at issue might account for a scratch in the paint, but not for the truck being tipped over on its side. Case dismissed.

The principle has a parallel in natural law relations, for one looks for a certain sufficiency in the preceding state of affairs to explain an existing event. For example, broken glass usually follow bricks being left unsupported above unbroken glass. The sufficiency would be traced to the relative thinness of the glass as against the weight of the brick.

But a Humean-Russellian phenomenalist would not say the brick *caused* the glass to break in the productive sense of cause any more than the image of the brick on a video screen *caused* the image of the glass to break. The video image of the brick and glass, and their interactions, were “caused by”, we now would say, carefully programmed electronic circuits, etc., behind the screen.

Likewise, phenomena, as sense data, do not react causally with each other. Rather Hume would say this was another example of a certain class of habitually constant conjunctions by which we relate groups of perceptual phenomena. Given the phenomena of dropping a brick on the glass, the phenomena of a broken glass “habitually” follows.

Most scientific laws, of course, would like to think themselves more sophisticated than this. But the lack of productive causal relation would be the same, and have the same negative effects.

If we turn the question a little, however, and instead of asking, "Why did the glass break?" we ask rather, "Why do I see a glass or a brick at all?", then the productive causal question again becomes relevant, and with
it the principle of sufficient cause. Instead of asking what laws relate different phenomena, we are asking what it is that produces phenomena to be related at all. Whatever produces the phenomena might be partially, perhaps wholly, responsible for the “habitual” constancy.

The principle that "every event must have a sufficient cause" looks like an indicative sentence which must be either true or false. How then are we to establish which it is? It is clearly not analytic (i.e., the denial of it would not lead to logical contradiction) unless one defines events as effects of causes. And there is no empirical experiment which could either prove or disprove it.

If it is to be a valid principle, it must therefore be metaphysical in the sense of being a presupposition of having rational empirical truth at all.

Without a principle of sufficient reason (i.e., sufficient cause), the concept of existence breaks down. We would have no ontology of existence, only an epistemology, for phenomenalism is not itself capable of supplying an adequate ontology or first cause principle.

Indeed, a strict phenomenalism might be thought of as the denial that events are caused (in the active sense) and therefore a denial also of the principle of sufficient cause. And conversely, the principle of sufficient cause is a statement that all events are caused, and therefore ultimately linked to a first cause.

The ‘must’, therefore, in the formulation that ‘every event must have a sufficient cause’, is the conditional ‘must’ prerequisite to making sense of existence. It is not logically necessary in an absolute sense, its denial is not self-contradictory. But if we are to make sense of the empirical world, then, logically, it is necessary.

Without the law of sufficient cause, the law of non-contradiction by itself gives us little useable knowledge of the cosmos.

E-2. A Set of Definitions & Three Options for Our Ontological Framework

The following list of dual concepts which operate within the ontological framework of possibility-cause-existence will assist the argument:

A. Two senses of ‘contingency’:
1. Negative - not logically necessary;
2. Positive - contingent on, i.e. causally dependent on.

B. Two senses of ‘chance’:
1. Ontological - dealing with the existence of single objects or events;
2. Epistemological - dealing with coincidences of two or more events or objects (175)

C. Two senses of ‘necessity’:
1. Logical implication;
2. Causal productive power.

D. Two senses of ‘rational’:
1. Non-contradictory (logical);
2. Having sufficient cause (empirical, causal).

With respect to the ontological framework, one has three options. First, one can take that recommended here, namely have a cause as the mediator between possibility and existence. In this case, both senses of ‘contingency’ apply. The world is not logically necessary and it is dependent on a cause.

Only the epistemological sense of

175. See Chapter VI, Sec. 3. CHECK THIS XXXXX
'chance' can apply, since every contingent existent is accounted for by a cause. For example, the existence of a die is not a chance affair, but its turning up a number 6 when I bet 6 is chance coincidence. Unless I knew that the die was unevenly weighted, I would have no reason to believe that my bet would win more than one out of six times.

Both senses of 'necessity' apply in separate but mutually complementary ways.

And both senses of 'rational' can apply.

Secondly, if one denies that there is a cause mediating between possibility and existence, then he has the option of denying the significance of causality altogether, in which case the empirical universe becomes a totally chance (and irrational) affair. The world then is contingent in the first sense only, but not the second. It has no "ground" of its being.

The ontological sense of 'chance' implies that objects pop into and/or out of existence with no causal explanation. They just do it. No explanation. The epistemological sense of 'chance' refers to the conjunction of two items, not the being of one item, such as a die landing on 6 when the bettor had predicted six.

In a rational world, the fall of the die would not be an irrational event, it would be determined by prior physical forces. But it would be in practice indeterminable by the bettor who has not the ability to sense the forces in order to make such predictions. It is a chance based on the bettor's inherent ignorance, not on a "chancy" physical process.

In a world with no causal explanation, both senses of 'chance' would apply, but the second becomes essentially meaningless, being, as it were, swallowed up by the first. If nothing exists except by chance, then clearly also no two things coincide except by chance.

The first sense of 'necessity' may apply but the second does not because there would be no cause at all, let alone a necessary one.

Only the first sense of 'rational' applies, for there can be no sufficient reason, indeed, no reason at all for anything existing, only for logical implication.

The third alternative is that taken by Leibniz, Hegel, and Spinoza, which conflates the two types of 'necessity' so that whatever is is because it is logically necessary that it be. Possibility and existence are co-extensive. The two meanings of 'contingency' are likewise conflated. Neither sense of 'chance' applies. And the two senses of 'rational' are conflated.

**E-3. Logical Inference & Sufficient Cause Define 'Explanation'**

To say that 'rational' has the two above possible meanings in the sense that all other meanings of 'rational' eventually track back to one or the other of these is *ipso facto* to assert also that 'explanation' likewise has these two basic meanings, and that all explanations also eventually track back to an explanation of logical inference or one of sufficient cause.

To put it another way, reason and experience are all we have (where experience includes every possible type of perception, sensation, feeling, notion, etc., and is not narrowed to include only the five-sense data). There
is no appeal beyond the two because there is no way of finding anything beyond them nor do they themselves lead us beyond themselves. As conjugate categories, they are total and self-sufficient.

The denial, then, of either the principle of non-contradiction upon which logic is founded, or the principle of sufficient cause upon which empirical understanding is founded, leads in the first case to total disablement of the intellect, and in the second case to the inability of the intellect to gear into activity or coherent relations with an objective not-self, the empirical world.

Such a world is a chance world, a world by definition without explanation, and hence not rational. (176)

Leibniz used the term "sufficient reason" in a rationalist sense which conflated logical with causal necessity, and so greatly muddied the real meaning of the "sufficiency" involved. Since 'reason' can have a logical or teleological as well as causal reference. (177) We shall use the term "sufficient cause" in place of "sufficient reason" to keep the matter clear.

The status of the principle of sufficient cause, therefore, (like the principle of non-contradiction) is like that of a geometrical axiom. Such axioms are not independently proven, they are rather the basis upon which all subsequent proof takes place. They define the meaning of ‘explanation’. If we are to explain anything at all, we must do it these ways.

Their proof consists in their ability to consistently carry out the task of ordering the material brought to them.

The principle of sufficient cause defines what one means when he asks for an explanation of an empirical event or for an empirical "proof". If that is not what one means, then it is up to him to explain the nature of his request. Otherwise, to ask for a rational explanation of the world and at the same time to deny the principle of sufficient cause is to contradict oneself.

If there is such a thing as a sufficient causal reason for the world, then by definition, the world is rational. The argument does not prove that there is such a sufficient cause, but it does define the relation between explanation, rationality, and causal language.

Like the cosmological constants of physical cosmology, we might consider the law of non-contradiction (logical possibility) and of sufficient cause (causal possibility) the two basic constants of epistemology and metaphysical cosmology.

Furthermore, if we do in fact have a rational world, a world ruled by the two basic laws of non-contradiction and sufficient cause, then there must be a first cause, a cause to which the language of being caused does not apply. The being of the first cause is not itself an effect. The “sufficient cause” must not itself be caused. That is the meaning of its being “first”.

176. This fact will play havoc with claims to random evolution as an explanation of the cosmos. See below, Volume II, chapter on Evolution and Intelligent Design.


As Gurr notes, the principle of sufficient reason, as we are using that concept, does indeed “become a doublet for the Principle of Causality” when taken out of the rationalist context. (P. 180.)
E-4. Finding I AM - the God Who Exists

We asserted above that necessity does not apply to God’s existence, but to the conclusion: "God exists." (178) That is, the necessity is a logical, inferential one. The inference does not produce God or an experience of God, only the conclusion about His existence. (179)

The information produced by a successful cosmological argument for the existence of God would support at least the following: (1) that the idea of God is not self-contradictory, (2) that it is necessary for rational thinking about empirical reality, and (3) that it is quite reasonable to go looking for experiential and empirical evidence for this God.

We will explore in Volume II, The Substance of Science and Epistemology, how the cosmological argument reveals a fatal collapse in the logical and causal structure of any theory of a random chance evolution explanation for cosmic reality.

A passionate-searcher-for-God might feel a let-down at this point, "Ho hum, another argument that fails." But the argument never purported to produce God, only to produce true information concerning God. To claim otherwise would be to conflate logical and causal necessity, and hence to have an ontological, not a cosmological, argument for God.

Still, there is an uneasy abyss between a logically coerced (on pain of losing the world’s rationality) assertion about God’s existence and knowing the true substance of God. One might feel he is being manipulated into a belief. The argument begins with experience, the fact of existence, and seems to end with a "merely" logical conclusion.

The ontological argument, on the other hand attempts to bridge the subject-object gap by a process of merger between subject and object through merging the two types of necessity, logical and causal. By thinking clearly and honestly the true thought “God”, one somehow has God. And indeed, that would follow if in some sense God's existence were contained in, or were identical with, His essence -- as the ontological argument posits. My contemplating His essence would be to contemplate Him, not merely an idea concerning Him. But, God would not be a “Him”, God would be an “It”.

This argument relies upon a realist notion of the cosmos, that abstractions have an objective sort of reality denied by nominalists, who think that those realist realities are names only, not objects in themselves.

The cosmological argument, on the other hand, accepts the subject-object gap but provides a framework within which it is intelligible to talk about bridging the gap between two separate personal beings, rather than merging the two sides.

If the work of Hume and Kant on the subject is conclusive (as I believe) concerning our inability to have knowledge about either abstract entities or about a trans-phenomenal physical world (i.e., an inert metaphysical world), then it is not intelligible to talk about bridging that gap relying on the assumption that the not-self is essen-

178. See above, Section D-2, “Two Arguments for the Existence of God” on page 41.
tially inert, passive, or unrelatable to the knowing subject. The gap can be bridged only with the cooperating and self-initiating activity of the object as agent or cause upon the subject who receives the effect.

Neither logic nor the cosmological argument, then, bridges the subject-object gap between man and God. Rather they show that it is intelligible to talk about relational experience bridging it. God (as the Bible would have it) bridges the gap -- i.e., with those who are interested in having it bridged. One must find God acting (causing) in his field of experience.

The further proof (after accepting the cosmological argument) of the existence of God, then, comes from further experience within the context of logical intelligibility. Reason does not operate on its own, but in conjunction with experience. Experience provides that material upon which reason busies itself.

This is not to suggest that there is such a thing as pure, uninterpreted experience upon which reason stumbles and then meditates. It means that the person, the knowing subject as a unified whole, reasons about his experiences in his attempt to relate to the not-self.

To elaborate the discovery of God existentially, we must have a phenomenology of objectivity, upon which we will continue to work in the following chapters.(180)

The argument becomes disjointed and unconvincing when one reifies reason and experience as separate "entities" and then tries to glue them back together. The two, however, are only abstractions from the original concrete reality, namely the reasoning and experiencing person.

Just as there is no reason totally devoid of experience, so there is no experience totally uninterpreted or without a context. That is, no person has ever reasoned without having had experience, and no person (excepting perhaps in the primitive stages of in-utero growth) has ever experienced without immediately putting it into the context of meaning for himself. Such seems to be the consensus of contemporary psychology.

If reason and experience are not separate entities but rather integral parts of personhood, then their mutual interaction is not a problem in the task of building a body of knowledge about an existing world.

While it seems to be the case that denial of the principle of sufficient cause does not lead to contradiction, neither does its assertion. Logic shows only that the principle is intelligible, and that it has a certain logically necessary relation to the meaning of ‘rational explanation’.

As to whether the world is in fact rationally explainable, one finds out only by further and always open-ended experiencing and reasoning. And it remains that it is both logically and psychologically impossible to take the not-self seriously in relation to the self without the principle of sufficient cause. Denial of the principle of sufficient cause leads to solipsism.

180. E. Husserl seems to mean much the same by his “transcendental phenomenology” as I would by “phenomenology of objectivity”, working from quite different presuppositions, however. (See Husserl’s summary article on phenomenology in Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. 17, p. 699 ff., 1950.)

R. D. Laing in Politics of Experience has made some interesting motions in the direction of a phenomenology of objectivity, though for Laing, objectivity appears eventually to disintegrate in a rather discouraging mystical abyss.
If one is looking for a possible disproof of the principle, it would lie in showing that the principle was self-contradictory or that human experience is essentially chaotic, disunified, and uncorrelatable, i.e., that no such principle is consistent with the amount of chaos abroad. Proving the negative, that there is no order in the cosmos seems an unlikely task.

Proof or disproof in such a context raises problems because experience is a non-communicable item in a way that logic or reason is not. Hence one must ultimately make his own decision on the matter on the basis of his own experience, hopefully, of course, in the context of reports from other persons and their reasoning.

One is not reduced to irrationality or arbitrariness, however. The inherent privacy of one's total experience does not make judgements about that experience less amenable to reason. Indeed, this is the primary task of reason, to unify one's total experience, or more accurately, to elucidate the categories by which it can be unified. If the categories are there and one's experience is amenable to them, then the arbitrary and irrational move is not to put reason and experience together, but to refuse to put them together.

These thoughts on knowing God suggest that our own originating experience of reality, as we are conceived and born into the world, is formed by a discovery of just these experiences of possibility and existence, and of cause and effect. We begin to learn the grammar of life early on, which is then harnessed to language as, in relationship, we grow and exchange thoughts about this life.

Abstract knowledge can be only about God, which may then inform one on how to go about meeting Him. What would it be like to meet the Sufficient Cause of myself?

I AM is thus Someone into whom we bump as we explore our relationships, aided, hopefully, by the rationality of our investigations. Knowing God is like a personal relationship. It is indeed THE personal relationship.

E-5. How Many Candidates Are There?

In world religious history, the number of candidates which would fit the above description of a first cause is not many. Rodney Stark in Discovering God and Don Richardson in Eternity in Their Hearts tell us that there appears to have been a kind of pre-pagan time when all or most of the world worshipped a "high god", one who created and ruled the whole cosmos, possibly reflecting a time before a Fall into polytheism.

In any event, world culture then everywhere appeared to devolve downward into what Stark calls a "lush polytheism", with hundreds of gods and goddesses in some cultures. The deities of these religions were not creators of the cosmos, but offspring of an original Great Mother Goddess, such as Gaia in the Hellenic world, or Tiamat in the Mesopotamian culture. Under the tutelage of the more sophisticated philosophers, the Great Mother becomes the eternal Original Stuff of the cosmos out of which all else evolves, or with the Greek Platonic tradition, the heavenly Ideas into which we are to spiritually migrate.

There were occasional driftings back toward monotheism (e.g., Ikнатон in Egypt and Zoroastrianism in
Persia. But the only religious tradition which seriously reversed this trend, planting a monotheistic approach, has been the Judeo-Christian, and, more recently, the Islamic, tradition.

This is not the place to decide which religion might tell us of a viable candidate, a logically and metaphysically valid first cause with sustainable empirical, historical evidence. But one might suggest, so far as empirical evidence is concerned, that we would do well to look for a candidate which bothered to reveal Himself over time, consistently and reasonably, in a manner relevant to the human situation.

**E-6. A “Theory of Everything”**

It has been popular among physicists over the last century to look for a "unified field theory", a theory which would unite the forces of nature under one law, or as some call it, a "theory of everything". Supposedly it would account for all that exists.

Contemporary secularized physics and cosmology, however, is running aground on its failure to produce (of all things) a notion of cause. That is a catastrophe for secular science.

Adamantly (i.e., irrationally) rejecting the kind of personal cause and effect given in these pages, that is, a personal God who is the cause of the world we inhabit, they have run out of other options, and seem to be relying on mathematics to produce for them the causal explanation for the world.(181)

But mathematical theories with no empirical data inserted are about abstractions, and purely mathematical theories cannot by themselves account for singularities such as the cosmological constants in the development of the cosmos or the development of life from a beginning to the present. Having a cosmic beginning is a problem, a primal singularity.

Mathematics cannot by itself produce a causal explanation any more than can the ontological argument for God -- and for the same reason: pure logic, pure possibility, cannot produce a causal explanation for anything at all. That is why Kant’s dilemma(182) remains unsolvable apart from a notion of causal possibility to work along side of logical possibility so as to explain the empirical world.(183)

But God can, and does, produce a causal explanation. In place of the "theory of everything", we have the law of God which expresses His purposes for the whole of creation, a "law of everything". God has an original purpose, expressed in the two highest commandments, to love God and one another, namely, with the entities to whom He has granted intelligent free-will, to build a community of love.(184)

That is the "unified field theory" in the Biblical cosmology, the principle in terms of which everything else is governed -- by Him who is the cause and therefore governor of all things.(185)

God, the Intelligent Designer, cre-

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181. Go to www.CommonSenseScience.org for a group of Christian physicists who are rewriting the book on science -- in a manner which avoids the anomalies of relativity and quantum mechanics, and brings physics back out of the welter of mathematics into the empirical world where it began and belongs.

182. See above, “A Kantian Puzzle” on page 42.

183. See above, “Two Kinds of Possibility” on page 44, and also Index for “causal possibility”.


185. See Bibliography for *The Law & the Grace of God*, making the case that only purpose for existence can be the foundation for objective morality.
states the world along the lines of the "anthropic principle", forced on secular science by the data they themselves discovered, that the cosmos, or at least our part of it, appears to be designed for habitation by we humans. They have a hard time getting the word "God" out of their mouths, but there is no other option.

That principle of love is itself a singularity. God chose the law of love, it is not emerging logically out of some prior and immutable principle. Only the existence of a personal Cause of All Things who can make such choices, and thus account for singularities, can produce a workable "Theory of Everything".

Pursuit of these issues, however, and why neither purely mathematical nor random chance explanations can work will be more appropriate for Volume III of *A Personalist Cosmology in Imago Dei*, namely, *The Substance of Science & Epistemology*.\(^{(186)}\)

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F. Time and Eternity

**F-1. Time: a Creature of Causes**

**a. Flowing Stream & Inert Substance vs. Clock Time**

Time, like an ever flowing stream bears all its sons away...

So sings the well known hymn, *O God, our Help in ages past...,* reflecting the inert substance view of time as *causing* change, pushing physical reality through its timely paces.

When asked what time was, a person responded, "Well, I knew until you asked me!" Few of us have any difficulty telling time. We know how to go about ordering our lives according to schedules. But when asked what it *is*, or even worse, to define it, we have a hard *time*.

So we will work toward a tentative definition, tentative not because I have a later one in mind, but rather because I suspect others will find it inadequate, as I may myself.

In a Biblical/Berkelian sort of metaphysics where active cause is the basic substance, one might expect that the concept of time will be different from that in a metaphysics where the basic substance was either inert matter or transient phenomena. We shall try to show later that the view of time being developed and the relativity view of time and space are tailor made for each other.\(^{(187)}\)

In this section, I shall try to show that a flowing stream view of time is allied to the inert substance view of the world and is equally useless, and that a measuring-of-change concept of time is empirically far more satisfactory. This is not a bitterly contested issue, but a discussion of it will help complete the picture, and, if successful, provide definitions of ‘past’,

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\(^{(186)}\) *Science & Epistemology* is scheduled, hopefully, for publication some time in 2014, to be preceded in 2013 by Vol. II, *Yahweh or the Great Mother?*


For the view of eternity as opposed to or wholly other than time, which I believe to be incompatible with the Biblical worldview and Good News, but which is often accepted and embraced by Christian and Jewish scholars, see *Time and Eternity*, by W. T. Stace.
'present', and 'future' in terms of causality or active substance, as well as a concept of eternity which is a presupposition of time, not antithetical to it.

A flowing stream concept of time is problematic because it is empirically unobservable. An unobservable flowing stream makes a poor clock for timing other events. Thus, if we are going to allow the existence of a flowing stream on the principles we have adopted, it must be something presupposed by our experience. If we can in practice get along without it, using Occam’s razor, we have grounds for supposing it to be a pseudo-entity.

Before proceeding, however, let us distinguish between (1) a precondition for change within which change must take place, and (2) a flowing stream as something that somehow carries things along with it, so that all things age or develop a history as it flows -- even if the cosmos is totally still (e.g., at absolute zero temperature) other than the supposed moving of time itself.

A state of pure possibility (with the existence of a cause) would qualify for the first sense, i.e. a purely passive logical precondition of change with the first cause able to act upon the pure possibility to bring something into existence.

It is the second sense over which we are now puzzling. In what sense can we conceive of a flowing something by which the age of things or the time of events could be measured? And the answer surely is, in no sense at all other than the normal way of measuring one change against a second change which becomes the "clock". But then both changes, the clock and the event being clocked, would have to be empirically observable. When talking about time, we need make no reference to something flowing other than to two observable series of changes with a cause behind the changes.

It is helpful, of course, if the clock is cyclic, for then one can substitute a simple operation such as counting cycles in place of memorizing an ever growing series with which to correlate the series being timed.

For example, it is much simpler to date events by counting the revolutions of the earth around its axis, or about the sun, than by correlating events with whatever king happened to be reigning (e.g., "...in the 5th year of the reign of King So-and-So...", as was common in ancient times). B.C. and A.D time is correlated by the King of kings, only one to remember.

But in neither case do we need to refer to a something inexorably flowing. What we do need, among other things, would be a concept of past, present, and future.

b. The Term “Outside the Series”

John Ellis McTaggart points out that any series from the past through the present to the future, or vice versa "depends on relations to a term outside the ...series." (188)

It is difficult indeed to see what empirical meaning could be given to ‘temporal series’ unless one could in principle imagine a single being persisting throughout the series or at least through a finite part of it.

A physical inert substance object "out there" somewhere seemed to

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work as that term outside the series, both for the object being observed and for the observer.

But, this being out there would have to be an observer for whom the series could have meaning, a conscious subject, not merely a physical inert substance body — such as convinced behaviorists might imagine. To suppose otherwise would be either to return to the flowing stream concept, which flows with or without events taking place, or to suppose that events can take place without any consciousness whatsoever.

But again, a time that flows without necessary reference to events is empirically void. And if our rejection of both inert substance and objective sense data as self-existing entities is correct, then it would seem that the only alternative left is the Berkeleian assertion that all events are caused by a conscious agent.

If one looks for a reason for having ever talked of a flowing stream, we may find it right in the concept of inert substance. Nothing inert can account for change, thus there was a need to posit an active something to push inert substance through its paces. But, if we begin by defining time in terms of events, we can discard the flowing stream concept and inert substance as well.

Let us see, then, if we can construct a notion of time which is empirically useful and which provides McTaggart’s necessary "term outside the series", yet not so far out as to be inaccessible and irrelevant.

With a flowing stream time notion, it is difficult to avoid the impression that time is something like a film with the past, present, and future equally and already real, excepting that where the projector shutter of consciousness happened to be opened would be called the present. And one could easily imagine that it was the moving time-stream that pushed the events along rather than time being a relation perceived among events. Things would have a history whether or not there was any empirical change in the universe. The film would continue rolling, even though blank, and the shutter would continue blinking.

But if we take a clue already glimpsed in the structure developed above, we can reverse the situation. The something that events take place "in" is not a something at all, but the negative precondition, the state of pure possibility, given simply as the non-contradictory. That which flows or moves is not time as a something in itself, but events. And the term outside the series then is "the logical and dynamic differentiator between possibility and existence", the cause or agent, our First Cause.

c. Clock Time & Agents

It is the agent, or self, or creator that literally makes time and creates history ipso facto by causing. History is the result of causing. Clock time is simply the correlating of one series of causing with another series of causing.

Since the action is by, not on, the agent, the agent cannot be said to be a different agent because of the change. There is a fundamental, ontological difference between “who I am” and “what I do”, built into the very meaning of being an agent and a creator, i.e., a person. The agent is numerically the same agent all through his actions. I am numerically the same person from conception to death, and if all goes well, into eternity.
Thus to be precise, we must say that "events are changed", not that "events change" -- if we mean by ‘events’ the observable empirical world.

The logic of active change being presupposed by the passive distinction between changed and unchanged is parallel to the logic of cause being presupposed by the caused-uncaused distinction. The agent changes in the active sense, not the passive. The agent initiates the change, it is not enacted upon him. Events are changed in the passive sense, not the active.

This is just what is implied in any concept of memory or in calling certain memories or expectations "mine". Proper names ("Jack") and personal pronouns ("you") have no meaning unless they refer to an individual that perdures through change. (189)

Thus a person is outside the series from past to future precisely because, either he is the cause of the series, or he is the observer of the series upon whom the agent is causing the effects (events) to be observed and experienced.

The cause is "outside" of time in the sense that he is outside the series that is changed; but the cause is "in" time in the sense that he has a history, a changing relation to change. History is the activity of causes.

There is a relativity here curiously like the relativity of velocity. When we talk about a velocity of an object, we are not saying anything about that object per se, but about a relation the object has with another object or point of reference. To talk of an object having a history is similarly a relational matter.

We can, for instance, imagine a clock coming to a complete stop, molecules, atoms, quarks, and all. If that clock were the only object in the universe, we might well say that time has stopped. The clock would in that sense not be in time, it would have no history.

We can then imagine the same clock in our own changing world, though itself still stopped. We would have done nothing to the clock, but now it would be said to have a history because it could be related to such changes as the revolutions of the earth about the sun, etc.

Time is relational, not singular, not a thing-in-itself. In other words, to be "in" time, or to have a history, is not a property of a thing in vacuo, but rather to exist in a universe where there is some change or causing, however small or distantly related. We can talk about our stopped clock existing before, during, or after any change whatsoever.

That would imply that if anything exists, there is at least one other thing existing, if there is change with either of the entities, both have a history.

d. God - In and Out of Time

In this sense, it would be proper to say that a first cause existed "in" time, that it had a history if there were some change occurring in the universe, e.g. the work of Himself or of some created agent. The First Cause would have a series of changing relations with the events occurring.

The hesitation of so many theologians to ascribe such relations to God seem to me unwarranted, and results in a God who is irrelevant to any experience we might have (much in the

189. This point is developed by P. F. Strawson in Individuals, his chapter on “Persons”.
manner of inert substance or Platonic Ideas).

To say that God is in time in this sense is not to "subject" God to time, for it is God (with other created agents) who creates time by His causing, it is not time that carries God with it. God is the actor, not time. If time is the measuring of change, and if change is produced by causing, then time is simply the measuring of causing, taking a convenient series of causing for a measuring clock. And only intelligent causes can measure time.

Bertrand Russell has pointed out that "if time is to be defined in terms of events, it must be impossible for the universe to be unchanging for more than an instant." That is, it would be meaningless for us to inquire as to what happened while our clock stopped if it were the only object, or to suggest that the universe might totally stop for five minutes. Phrases such as 'happened while' or 'for five minutes' presuppose that something has not stopped. Thus to talk about time "while" the universe was stopped would presuppose some non-empirical motion, again our metaphysically useless flowing stream.

**e. Past, Present, & Future**

The present then is composed of all agents, plus the totality of causing, the contents of memory (our access to the past), the contents of intention and expectation (our access to the future), all in the context of pure possibility.

Pure possibility is in the present not as an object existing, but as a negative precondition (non-contradiction) for the present or for causing. Pure possibility itself makes no reference to time except as an aspect of the possible, and in that sense might be called "timeless."

A concept of cause is essential to a distinction between past, present, and future, since the distinction involves changes which must be caused, and hence a cause, the term outside the time series which McTaggart mentioned. P. W. Bridgman (rightly, I think) suggests that "... by definition, forward is the direction in which time flows." Thus "it is meaningless to talk about time moving backward."(191)

In our terms, this would read: "the future" (or "forward") is what we mean by the direction of causing. While a series of events could conceivably be reversed, the effect would not be to erase the past or to roll back through it, but rather, while moving forward, to duplicate it backwards. Or, as an encircled commander is said to have retorted: "Retreat, hell! We're just attacking in the opposite direction!"

Thus, the direction of causing is by definition into the future, and thus the future is composed of the array of causal possibilities before the universe of agents.(192) The past is the succession of already caused possibilities, i.e., existences, or more accurately, the succession of caused possible states of the universe. If there would be no succession, no change or causing, then there would be no past, only a static and timeless present. But there would always be a possible future so long as there were causal possibility. The present is the latest caused state of the

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universe. Past, present, and future must all thus be analyzed in terms of causality.

"Now", "before", and "after" are intuitive, not learned in the normal way of learning by practice or teaching, and in that sense, self-evident. This triad is a necessity for rational thinking and acting, in tandem with the principle of persons being eternal as identically the same through any relevant series of change. Created persons thus participate in the eternity of God through being caused by Him. Created persons have no independent eternity -- which is to say that the human soul is not inherently, in its own self, eternal. It is eternal only by gift of the Creator.

F-2. Eternity - Being vs. Doing

a. Inconceivable Eternity

Theologians and mystical philosophers might wonder where, if at all, eternity fits into this scheme. The traditional view has been to isolate eternity from time by a substantial metaphysical barrier. The two are thought to be incompatible.

But Thomas Aquinas' Biblical view of God as creator of all things forced him to move (somewhat hedgingly) in the direction we have suggested:

Since God is outside the whole scheme of creatures, though all of them are ordered to him, and not conversely, it is clear that while creatures are really related to God, in God there is no real relation to creatures, but only a logical one. However, there is nothing to prevent the attribution to God of terms implying relationship in time. They denote a change in his creatures, not in him...[(193)]

The Greek bias is illustrated by the puzzling "non-real relation which is only logical." No one to my knowledge has yet illustrated how a relation can intelligibly be said to be real, existing in one direction and only logical in the other. Being one's creator cannot be an only logical relation. If I am related to God, then God is ipso facto related to me in existence. God has a causal relation to the creation, which is about as real and "existential" as a relation can get. Nothing in the Biblical worldview says otherwise.

But when Aquinas grants that we can attribute to God terms implying relationship in time, even though they denote changes only in the creatures, not in God Himself, he is at least leaning toward the point for which we are arguing, namely that there is an intelligible relation which God has to events of history. This relation, however, must be real, existential, and causal, not merely logical.

Gerard Smith in his Natural Theology states the commonly held view more strongly:

God is eternal. To say that God is immutable is to say that there is no stretch in the duration of His being which is bounded either by a "before" or "after." In fact, there is not even a stretch in the duration of His being. Any "before" or "after", any interval, even, between a before and after, would imply succession or change, and God is unchangeable.[(194)]

If God has a real, existential relation to existing creatures, as indeed He must, being their creator, then it must necessarily follow that God has a "duration" in the sense that God can be said to exist before, during, or after

[(194) p. 189, Macmillan, 1951.]
any event or creature.

But Smith says in the very next sentence: "We cannot of course conceive eternity." Why "of course" -- as though it were a foregone conclusion? Better to admit that such a conception of eternity as inherited from the Greeks is bad philosophy and be done with it, as one would with any other "inconceivable" concept.

In what sense can an inconceivable concept be a concept at all? It might be called an unclear concept, a concept-in-the-making. But it cannot be in principle inconceivable and still reasonably useful.

Yet paradoxically, if we use the notion of active substance and time we have elaborated above, what Smith says about God above could be said about any agent in the sense illustrated by the "stopped clock" above. That is, it can be said of any agent that he has no duration in and of himself, but only as a relation to changing events.

Duration is not the sort of thing that one can have in quiet isolation. Duration is a consequence of activity, and is meaningless otherwise. There must be something moving, if only the "clock".

b. Being, Doing, & a Conceivable ‘Eternity’

The distinction between the being of God and His doing is fundamental to Biblical cosmology, and to a workable definition of ‘eternity’.

It is the being of God which is outside the flow of time and the world of change. That is the meaning of God being identically the same being through time and change. The doer remains the same doer through his own doing, or that of any other agent. It is His doing which is within the stream of time by its very nature. The doing of God, like the doing of any agent, is changing as it does. But the identity of the person remains the same.

We thus arrive at a definition of ‘eternity’:

...the ability to remain identically the same through time and change.

God is eternal in the sense that He remains unsurpassably and identically the same through all time and change, including His own doings. Eternity is a quality which is ascribed primarily to persons, those entities to which both cause and effect can be ascribed.(195)

The distinction between being and doing is necessary for our understanding of time and eternity. My being, not my behavior, is that which can have the quality of eternity. The being of God is in its essence eternal. He is the same God perduiring through all time and change of any sort whatsoever. The activities of God are His creations and are not eternal in that same unconditional sense. They are “in time” by the very nature of doing, which is always a change.

But those creations of God which are persons made in His image do share a kind of eternity, namely that they are substantial beings who endure as numerically the same persons through at least some time and change. I am today numerically the same person that I was at birth.

This distinction between the being of an agent (person) and his doing is essential to understanding all aspects of the Biblical framework -- very im-

195. For persons and ascription of cause and effect, see Chapter IV-A-4, “A Definition of ‘Person’” on page 122.
portantly the issues of human growth and maturation, of the Fall, and of salvation and atonement.\(^{196}\)

It is also a distinction which, outside of the Biblical framework, tends to collapse. A cosmos in which everything must be explained by impersonal forces has a hard time accounting for activity at all, let alone that of freewill persons, and a hard time showing that I am not what I do, that my doings are my creations, not my essence.\(^{197}\)

Eternity is thus not “outside” of, in the sense of being unrelated to, time, but only as the metaphysical presupposition of time -- He Who Is, the absolutely existing one, that by which time is measured, i.e., He who does the measuring. God is “outside of” time only in the sense that He is not changed by time or events, not in the sense that He is unrelated to time.

Time without persons is meaningless because it presupposes a cause-effect relationship, precisely that which defines personhood.\(^{198}\) Eternity is thus appropriately a quality of persons, not of impersonal things. All persons participate in the eternity of God as creatures of perdurable substance.

c. ‘Time’ & God

One’s view of time and eternity substantially changes when one sees persons as the fundamental entities.

My promised tentative definition of ‘time’:

Time is the measure of a sequence of change as judged from eternity, using some accepted standard change as the clock.

Time is a creature of agents, doers, a clocking of the actions of eternal beings. Beings with eternity, i.e., persons, create time.

Only a being who possesses some degree of eternity, the capacity to be identically the same being through change, can judge time. That is the perdurability of persons.

Attributing a history to God is therefore metaphysically innocuous so far as putting God “under the thumb” of time is concerned. God, the numerically same God, has a history of relationships with His creatures, and is, in that sense, “in” time. God is under the thumb only of His own activities, which is to say that He must suffer the logical consequences of His own activities, one of which is to have real relations with His changing creation.

But that is the nature of a “living God”. If that is “suffering” in some sense demeaning to the divine dignity, it has yet to be shown on Biblical terms to be the case. The indignity occurs only if one has apriori judged time to be unworthily related to eternity, which most, if not all, pagan cosmologies do.

Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover was alleged to be unmoved (unchanged) by any awareness of the world of time, space, and change because such awareness would distract his contemplation from his own perfection. The being of the Unmoved Mover was unaffected by any of our human doings. And thus it had no activities directed toward us, such as creating or judging. It is not clear that it “did” anything at all -- as that would interrupt its perfect and eternal quiescence and peace.

\(^{196}\) To be discussed in Yahweh or the Great Mother?

\(^{197}\) This distinction between being and doing will be further elucidated in Vol. II, Yahweh or the Great Mother? See Bibliography.

The Biblical worldview makes quite the opposite stipulation. God is pictured as intensely aware of, concerned about, and involved with His creation -- tragically and rebelliously fallen as it may be -- in a manner with no parallel in the pagan or secular worldview. God shows passionate interest in the world, creating the world in order to woo it. The Son of God, as Christian theology says, was seeking a Bride.

The Biblical God is happily invested in time, time is God’s story, the story of His causings and relatings. Time can become our stories only because it is first His story.

Time and eternity are thus complementaries, not contraries. Time is the measure of eternity in action. God is not “in” time in the sense of entrapment. Time is God expressing His liberty, the same being true for all creature with freewill.

The Biblical view of time is thus not opposed to eternity, it is, on the contrary, a necessary complement to it. Eternity is the anchor of time. Time is eternity at work. Time is the measure of those changes caused by eternity.

A Biblical cosmology puts the focus of causality in the Eternal Now, not on an inertial series moving from past through present to future. History is of active persons, not of inertial things.

What, then, is the meaning of cosmic history? What is the meaning of our 14 billion years or so of pre-human cosmic existence? We will raise this question again in Volume II.

d. Does God Know the Future?

According to our ontology, God has a history -- a past, present, and future. That is not to anthropomorphize God. Rather that is to recognize how fully we are made in the Image of God. It is rather “deifying” man.

God has a past and a memory of that past. God exists in the now. God obviously then has a present. But God also has a future, He has intentions which He plans to bring into being but are not yet. They do not yet exist.

Few question that He knows the past and the present perfectly. Philosophers have, however, debated the sense in which God can know the future because knowing the future seems to imply that the future is already there to know, and that freewill is therefore an illusion. Life would be the already made film for which the present is the frame where the projector shutter is open with light shining through onto the screen of consciousness.

It would be reasonable to assume that God could know all the future with such a scheme, much like the materialist dream of being able to predict the state of the universe at any given time if one knew at least one total state of the universe -- on the grounds that there is no freewill, that we are all causally determined according to the laws of nature.\(^{(199)}\)

But there is no rational way of preserving the freewill so central to the Biblical cosmology with a view implying that the future is knowable in that manner. Or, if there is, it is a well-kept secret. Attempts to solve the problem by putting God “outside of” time so as to be able to survey it all in one glance, it seems to me, merely restate the problem. In order to be thusly surveyable, the future must ex-
ist in a sense which precludes free will.

A better answer to the problem would be to say of the future that it does not yet exist (that, of course, being the very meaning of the future), and that it can be known only by projecting forth a trajectory from the past which did exist and is unchangeable, through the present which does now exist. Such a trajectory into the future could be known only by way of the laws of nature and/or by way of knowing intentions.

Since the present on the Biblical view includes freewill actions on the part of both God and human beings, the logical implication is that events decided by such choices are not fully knowable until they happen or, at least, the relevant decisions are made and known. If we accurately know a person’s intentions, we can predict much of his future.

Some will object that this wrongly diminishes God’s omniscience. But omniscience must itself operate within the constraints of logical possibility, i.e., non-contradiction, and of causal possibility. Without doing damage to the verbs both ‘to know’ and ‘to be’, one can know only what is, not what is not. Without doing total damage to the rationality of the created order, just as God cannot change the past, which has already existed, so also it is reasonable to say that God can know only some of the future -- that part not without the necessary determinatives to be known.

As warned in the investment industry concerning a seller’s claims for prospective share purchases: “forward looking statements that are not historical facts are forward looking statements that are subject to risks and uncertainties.” Precisely.

Omniscience, properly defined, would mean an ability to know all things which are candidates for being known.

A future which does not yet exist, and which is not yet predictable by either natural law or intention, is not logically a candidate for being known. There is no sense in which it either exists or can be predicted from what does exist. But there is no demeaning of the omniscience of God to say that He cannot know things which are logically not candidates for being known.

And you shall remember all the way which the LORD your God has led you these forty years in the wilderness, that he might humble you, testing you to know what was in your heart, whether you would keep his commandments, or not.

Deuteronomy 8:2.

According to Deuteronomy 8:1-5, God needed to find out whether the Hebrews would obey His commands. So He put them out on the back side of the desert to test them. Could God have known without testing? Apparently not.

The Deuteronomy passage implies that the law of the excluded-middle does not apply in this case. The law of the excluded-middle would, in this case, assert that a statement about the future is either true or false, and that there is nothing in between, a clear either/or situation. If the law of the excluded middle did not apply in our case, there would be a third possibility, which is what we are arguing.

200. The law of non-contradiction (a thing cannot both be and not be in the same time, place, and respect) implies that a statement is either true or false. The law of the excluded middle says that there is no third position between true and false. It is an either/or situation. If the law of the excluded middle did not apply in our case, there would be a third possibility, which is what we are arguing.

201. I am told that Aristotle supports this view, but I do not have a reference.
But the analysis given here would say instead that a statement about the future such as that the Hebrews would or would not obey, is neither true nor false, but rather possible. The truth being assessed does not yet exist, and so is not a candidate for being known, and thus not a candidate for being called either true or false. It is logically (and perhaps causally) possible, but not yet existing. (1) No cause has brought that state of affairs into existence (it is in the future), (2) given the free will of the Hebrews, it cannot be predicted by natural law, and (3) no free agent (as apparently the Lord saw, looking into their hearts) has as of yet intended that result in a firm enough manner to make it the basis of prediction, although some agent might. So it cannot yet be predicted, not even by God.

Thus God can know all the past and present, but only some of the future. The record of fulfilled Biblical prophecies implies that God knows a significant amount of it, and that His overall purpose, the calling back of His fallen world into obedient and healthy participation in His created order, will indeed happen -- even though some (unrepentant rebels) will not be there.

Certain passages in the Bible often interpreted as “anthropomorphic” or “metaphorical” might thus turn out to be more literally accurate than even many believers had thought:

If God could know all the future, including our choices, He would not need to test His people. We do honor to neither God nor His sovereignty by pinning on Him the logical absurdity of knowing the unknowable.

Some will feel that the future has been rendered totally unpredictable by such a view, that God will be unsure even of establishing His kingdom at all. He will have to wait and see whether anyone will show up.

But that is an unrealistic fear. We are constantly predicting things about each other with only a small part of the knowledge which God has of each of us (“I will meet my wife down town”, “I will go to work tomorrow”). We do not need to wait until all of one’s choices are made to predict. We need to know whether only certain fundamental choices have been made.

Is this an honest person? Has he chosen to be faithful to his word? Does this person care about other persons? Is he a loving person? If we know those two aspects of a person’s life (a truthful and a loving spirit), we can predict a whole host of things about that person, knowing his present circumstances and intentions. If we know that he obeys the 10 Commandments, we have a good prospect of being correct in assuming that he will be a good neighbor.

God had some forty years before given the 10 Commandments, and had used the back side of the desert as a testing ground for His people to be His neighbors. God knows that persons who are truth-seekers and who are loving will end up in His neighborly kingdom. God (and the rest of us) need only to know certain basic decisions of our hearts to trust us, we do not need to have ready at hand all the choices already made in the past or yet to be made in the future.

**e. God as Affected by Creatures**

Charles Hartshorne, working in *A Natural Theology for Our Time* from a Whiteheadian rather than either a Thomistic or Berkeleian framework,
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wholeheartedly embraces the notion that God, though only in an "unsurpassable" manner, can be affected by His creatures.\(^{202}\) That is, the contents of God's consciousness are partially contingent upon what His creatures are doing, though not in a way that anything in the creation could outrun (surpass) God. To deny that the world has an effect on God is to leave God knowing only abstractions, formalities, and His own activities.

It is vain to interact universally and always, but with nonentity, or to have unsurpassable knowledge, but of no other individual than self. But this emptiness is precisely what classical theism spoke of as God when it declared him absolutely and in all respects immutable and independent of the world. If love of the highest kind is ultimate, then so is the social interdependence of which it is the ideal form.\(^{203}\)[8]

Hartshorne rightly sees the communal aspect of the Kingdom of God as indicative of the whole of creation, and especially of the nature of God Himself. His one significant failure, it appears to me, is an ambiguity concerning God's individuality -- which he seems to cloud:

Perception, human or divine, is the only avenue to particular actuality. But in one unique case, it is not the avenue to existence or individual identity. Rather, conceptual, or if you prefer, spiritual, insight is this avenue, for the reason that this individuality is specifiable only apriori or non-sensuously. Whereas empirically individuated entities must exist, if at all, empirically, the entity individuated apriori cannot exist empirically.\(^{204}\)[9]

If by "empirical" he means "limited to sense data," then his argument has plausibility. His "empirically individuated entities" could be what we have called created entities who discover and express their individuality in the empirical world.

However, his "individual individuated apriori" sounds like an echo of the ontological argument for the existence of God -- in which the existence of God would be inferred from His essence. On the other hand, it may refer to a cosmological argument such as we have developed, that, given the empirical world, apriori we must conclude that some cause exists necessarily.

One wonders if his near identification of "conceptual" with "spiritual" does not land him back in the Greek camp from which he is struggling to extricate theology. If God is individuated only apriori and conceptually, then where is individuality? Where is concreteness?

If I have called God an 'individual,' this is with the understanding that, as the unique because unsurpassable individual, he is also absolutely cosmic or universal in his capacities, interacting with all contexts, and in this sense absolutely universal -- the only strictly universal individual, or individual universal. (This is by no means Hegel's 'concrete universal,' for God as concrete is unimaginably more than God in his bare individuality. The concrete is God as in some contingent actual state related to some actual state of the world.)\(^{205}\)[10]

\(^{202}\) The "unsurpassability" has for Hartshorne, I assume, a dynamic, not a static, sense. That is, none of God's creatures can out run God, none can get a leg up on God in any circumstance whatsoever.

That I would take to be the meaning of the "infinity" of God as well. The power of God is always superior to any of His creatures. God is thus "unbounded", not as an existing infinity, but as having no limits applicable to the exercise of His power and authority. God can do anything within the realm of pure possibility.

\(^{203}\) A Natural Theology for Our Time, p. 45. Open Court Paperback, 1967.

\(^{204}\) Ibid., p. 77.

\(^{205}\) Ibid., p. 136.
Hartshorne rightly sees the universality of God not being obtained through abstract ideas and concepts, as per Greek philosophy, but rather in His universal activity of creating, in His being universally present to all of creation, and, no doubt, in the universal applicability of His law and grace to all circumstances.

But he seems still to be partially hung on the horns of the old dilemma -- individuality as bare abstraction (cf. Locke's substance) vs. concreteness as the directly experienced phenomena.\(^{(206)}\)

With a Berkeleian ontology, however, the distinction between God's individuality and God's concreteness (if I understand Hartshorne’s usage of these terms) is simply the distinction between God doing nothing vs. God relating to His creatures. Or, the God who is doing the something vs. that which He is doing (i.e. the effect perceived by the creature). It is important here to focus on God's individuality, His being, for that is the locus of durability, and therefore of eternity.

\section*{F-3. The Eternal “Now” of All Time}

But where is eternity? It can be only in the cause, the basic substantial being.

If the cause is the same cause numerically throughout its own causing, then it is eternal in the sense suggested by W. Kneale of not being conditioned by time.\(^{(207)}\) God is “conditioned” by human activities in the sense of knowing about them (contra Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover), but He is eternally and numerically the same God no matter what events happen in the creation or between Himself and the creation. His being is secure no matter the doings of anyone else or His knowledge of them.

To have one’s being, one’s essence, one’s core identity, in this manner unconditioned by causing or change is the required sense of being unconditioned by time, and this is just what McTaggart’s term outside the series, in our case the eternal agent, would be. That would be true supremely and unsurpassably of God, and it would be true conditionally and limitedly of created persons.

The relations of the cause with other causes or events might change, but the agent itself would remain numerically the same agent. Thus to have a history is not exclusive of being eternal. Indeed, it is only as eternal that an agent can act at all.

‘Eternal’, then, means, again, the ability to remain numerically and identically the same through time and change.

If to be eternal is simply to remain the same in substance, that is, in one’s being, through change and time, it would not necessarily mean to last “for ever and ever”. A first cause would be eternal in the "for ever and ever" sense, i.e., through all change in a kind of endless present (unsurpassably the same, in Hartshorne's terms). We would have no language for its "beginning" or "ending."

“Say this to the people of Israel, ‘I AM has sent me to you.’” “Before Abraham was, I am.”\(^{(208)}\) No genealogy.

\begin{flushright}
\textbf{206. REF TO LOCKE’S SUBSTANCE ???}
\textbf{208. Exodus 3:14 and John 8:58.}
\end{flushright}
God is then the eternal Now of all time and the Now for all possible observers.

Because He holds all things in existence and gives them their reason for being, all things are always contemporaneous with Him. All things are ontologically and morally ordered to Him. Our human “now” is anchored in Him and His eternity. By our creaturehood, our time is ordered to the Now of God. The “eternal now” is whenever God IS, as in “I AM”.

Eternity is the quality of being able to do that. This is eternity in a personalist, dynamic cosmos — as distinct from a cosmos in which the static and abstract trump the active and personal. And thus the cosmic and archetypal mixes freely with the historical and particular.

The Christian community understands time to be sanctified by the presence of God in history. The Church calendar is divided by the Incarnation into Before Christ (BC) and In the Year of our Lord (Anno Domini - AD). “Now” is always at the present “time” of our Lord, God being the Eternal Now of all time.

A created agent could be said to be eternal in a sense lesser than God in that so long as it existed, it would be the same agent. But a created agent is part of the time series in that its coming into being and/or annihilation would be events and therefore datable.

Heraclitus thought that one could not step into the same river twice because it was always changing, and thus never “the same” river. But perceptual objects can be assigned an even lesser eternity than created persons insofar as they could be called the same object through a duration of time. We shall discuss this further in the next chapter as the "intentional" sense in which an impersonal object remains the same, such as, for example, a river or a sock that has been darned so many times that nothing of the original remains.209

The important point is that eternity is neither simply everlasting time (and still less an existing infinite time) nor is it the negation of time. Rather it is the presupposition in which time is anchored and by reference to which it is ordered, and that by which past, present, and future are meaningful. Or, as we shall see in Chapter VII, the first cause is that which gives unity, and hence "absoluteness", to local or relative times. God is the eternal “now” of all time.

If one wishes to have a sense of eternity more compatible with the classical tradition, he is welcome to it, but he is also burdened with the task of showing how this concept is conceivable, not romancing on how it is inconceivable.

**F-4. The Providence of God**

The word ‘providence’ comes from the Latin, ‘providens’ or ‘pro’ + ‘video’, meaning to see before, to foresee. It is used of God who foresees events and can provide ahead of time. George Washington often used the word ‘Providence’ to refer to God who had provided for his army in unexpected and unpredictable ways.

The providence of God in the here and now is rooted in eternity, emerging out of eternity, just as time itself is rooted in and emerges out of eternity.

Just so, the Biblical process of sal-
vation re-roots us back into the ontological stability of eternity, where we can indeed function as eternal beings, where our being is secure precisely as we go about our doing and relating in the midst of time and change. From such a place of stability in, and cooperation with, God, we can provide for our own future.

**F-5. Our Consciousness of Time**

Our consciousness of time is created, one must suppose, by a clock built into our system. Something is “going” all the time in us which creates our inner sense of time even when we see little or nothing happening on the outside. We can usually judge on our own with useful accuracy when 20 minutes is up.

Our “present” is ordered to God’s time because we, being His creatures, can exist only simultaneously with Him. His “now” will always be our “now”. We live in God’s present, that knife-edge of existence between the extensions of past and future. We are also meant to live in His presence.

For God the past is everything which has ever been done, the present is the totality of “now”, and the future is the realm of pure possibility, bounded only by the law of non-contradiction and by His plans for the future. The future of God includes also our plans insofar as we are able to accomplish them.

Time is thus not something to which either we or God are “subjected”. Time does not control us. Time is the freedom to act, to change, to do, to carry out intentions. To intend is to intend into the future. Intending creates the future. If, as St. Paul says, hope endures (I Corinthians 13), then intending must also endure, and so must the future. For us and for God.

Does consciousness require time, i.e., some change, however small? Can consciousness be meaningful without time and change? Eastern religions seem to think so, except that their version of ‘meaningful’ is suspect due to their allegedly having “transcended” meaning of any logical or factual sort.

**F-6. The Stability of Personhood**

Philosophers have tended to seek for stability in abstractions such as Plato’s Ideas. They were eternal and stable, and thus contrasted favorably to this unpredictably changing and chaotic world.

But the Biblical world sees stability in the law and grace of God, that is, in His faithfulness to His word and promises. The result is an entirely different focus on the meaning and potential of life in this supposedly too, too solid flesh.

The Idea of apple is not “faithful and true” in the personal sense often said of God. Appleness just is. And ideas just are in a rather peculiar sense which seems unrelatable to apples here on earth for which they are supposed to be the model, as Permenides, in Plato’s book by that name explains.\(^{210}\)

But in God’s world, persons, not things, are the locus of stability. The object of the law of God is precisely that stability. Moral stability is the basis of all relational stability. The only practical answer the pagan and secular

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\(^{210}\) See subsection, “Particularity & Generality” on page 101 ff.
worlds have for producing relational stability is tenuous agreement enforced by power struggle.

Personal stability has to do with time, because it is only in time that reliability has any meaning or can be measured. Reliability requires a track record, even for God. We learn that He is reliable the same way we learn about any other person. A person without past or future is not a candidate for being reliable, stable, trustworthy, or faithful.

We cannot see God as reliable by freeze-framing Him into a Platonic Idea. We thereby make Him as irrelevant to our need for stability as is inert substance, and for the same reasons. As Plato points out in _Parmenides_, such entities have no practical or relational significance for us.

In the Bible, God provides that stability by first committing Himself to the very law and grace which He is expecting and commanding of us. He loves His neighbors with all His heart, mind, soul, and strength.

And, to that end, He intelligently designs a set of dependable natural laws.

G. Two Worldviews: Open & Closed Circles

G-1. The Biblical Personalist Open Circle

It is perhaps evident that we are emerging with two distinct classes of worldview, the personalist (in which the basic entities of the cosmos are persons) and the impersonalist (in which the basic entities are impersonal -- physical things, abstract ideas, or essences).

Earlier we drew circles to indicate the distinction between the realms of possibility and existence. The circle of existence indicated the realm, not of all existence, but only of ontologically dependent existence -- because outside the circle of contingent existence was I AM, the One Who Is, the being to whom the passive voice of being caused does not apply.

The First Cause must be logically possible, and thus existing in the wide circle of possibility, but not in the smaller circle of contingent being. In the beginning was God and possibility, He Who Exists and possibility. And then, by His choice, comes created, contingent existence. So both possibility and existence are part of His sovereign domain, His playground.

The circle of existence, in the Biblical order of things, thus indicates all that is totally dependent upon God, the First Cause.

That dependency creates an open system with an open circle, that is, an open border through which passes energy, activity, information, all things which are necessary to personal relationship. God exists, uncaused, and has active relationships with all caused beings within the circle.

211. See figures above: “Fig. II-D-3. Possibility & Existence” on page 43, and “Fig. II-D-5. The First Cause” on page 49.

212. These worldviews will be discussed in more detail in _Yahweh or the Great Mother?_, Volume III of this series. See also www.thRoadtoEmmaus.org, the Worldview Library for information.
The whole of the Biblical story flows from this view of creation. History, sin, the Fall, and salvation are all uniquely given meaning by this original beginning of all things. Everything proceeds from this “Original Goodness” of all creation.

The cosmological argument for God, the relation between ‘possible’, ‘exist’, ‘cause’, and ‘know’, all set the stage for the very meaning of personhood and growth into mature persons. That is true of individual persons, as well as of cultures. Without this ontological beginning, as Rodney Stark noted, there would never have been generated what we know as Western Civilization, including science and morally accountable due process in civil law as we have in English Common Law and the American constitutional republic. (213)

G-2. The “Perennial” Impersonalist Closed Circle

Aldous Huxley’s book, The Perennial Philosophy, maintains that there is only one ultimate worldview, that all the worldviews we discuss and believe are really instances of this mountain top worldview. They may appear conflicting, as explorers on different sides of a mountain might describe the mountain differently. But when they reach the top, they understand that it was all one mountain. Huxley called it “perennial” because it seemed to pop up everywhere.

Huxley did not understand the Biblical view, and thought it, too, could be subsumed under the Perennial tent. To be fair to Huxley, he had strong support from the more mystically inclined Christians, and from the strong Hellenic tradition as adopted by Christian thinkers almost right out of the Hebrew cradle. It apparently did not occur to Huxley (or to many other thinkers) to take seriously persons as ultimate beings, not evolving out of a prior impersonal substrate, or that persons just might be the fundamental building blocks of the cosmos, and that the impersonal emerges out of the prior personal, not the personal out of the prior impersonal. The Perennial view is inherently impersonal, in absolute contrast to the Biblical view.

In an impersonalist worldview, that circle surrounding the dependent order is a closed circle. There is no God out there, nothing at all. So there can be no communication between those entities within the circle and the nothingness outside of it. The impersonalist temporal world is, in that sense, an absolute closed system. There is no passage of information, energy, or anything else between within and without.

The impersonalist world has its own circle, but the symbol for that is not at the periphery, it is at the center, as in the eastern mandala, a series of symbolic concentric circles with the “self” at the center, the self being the godhead, the origin of oneself in the mystical essence behind all things.

In pagan mythology the circle is illustrated by the Chinese yin-yang, the coincidence of all opposites, everything and its exact contrary -- good and not good, light and not light, etc. Or, by the Great Mother figure, the original womb of existence, out of which all other things evolved, generally beginning with the primal masculine deities, such as Uranus, Chronos, and Zeus in Greek mythology. (214)
Temporal beings have no personal relationship with this inner essence, rather it is a relationship of identity. That inner essence is one’s real self, not someone else whom one gets to know. The goal of life, such as there is any goal, is generally to merge and disperse one’s individuality back into that original Oneness, lose all goal-directedness (which implies individuality), and thereby attain peace.

In one sense, the relation between the temporal bodily self and the inner self would be an open circle because I am, one would assume, open to myself. But that relationship has no cognitive content. It is opaque to the mind since it defies all categories of reason. In that sense, a rather serious one, the circle is closed.

Moreover, the extent to which it is open is of little help because the beyond-rational beginning is indistinguishable from the irrational. It is not metaphysical in the sense used in this book, it is not that which is logically implied in order to make sense of the phenomenal world all about us. It is irrational from the start, and can lead therefore to no rationality down the line.

The temporal self, the self experienced commonly in time and space, is, from that point of view, the problem, not the solution, for it is inherently antithetical to the alleged eternal and true self. Most spiritual effort in such religions and worldviews is bent on overcoming the self of space and time so as to ascend to the allegedly higher self of total cosmic oneness.

Thus the relation between the temporal self and the divine self is on every point contrary between the Biblical personalist and the secular/pagan impersonalist understandings of life.

The identity of oneself with the inner cosmic essence of life means that the circle between my conscious self and my inner mystical self indicates a barrier, not of rebellion against my Sovereign, but only of ignorance of my own true nature -- for which the cure is education, mental self-discipline, and meditation.

On the Biblical view, there is no identity relation between me and the divine, there is an ontological distinction. We are separate persons, and the primary barrier is that of rebellion and sin, which then creates ignorance. The cure for this is truth, as in revelation and personal relationship, repentance, forgiveness, and healing of brokenness -- all of which does indeed includes education of a very rational order.

We will continue to build the metaphysical foundation for this two-kinds-of-worldview-circles understanding of the issues before us. Our primary focus in this volume is to help rebuild Biblical metaphysics and theology so that it can stand with intellectual, moral, and spiritual credibility in the public arena in the face of stunning but tragic successes by the impersonalist view.

We will examine these differences in detail in Volume II, Yahweh or the

214. On the “Great Mother” image, see the book by that title by Erich Neumann, a superb Jungian study of archetypal images. Bollingen Series XLVII, Pantheon.


216. See Romans 1:18 ff. for St. Paul’s description of the fall -- moving from subversion of truth, to confusion between God and the creation, to falling into compulsive, self-destructive behavior.
Great Mother? focusing on their practical here-and-now manifestations of life.
Study Guide for Chapter II
The Concept of Substance

I. Summary:
In your own words, write a summary of the theme of this chapter, and make a personal application as is appropriate.

II. Questions on Chapter II:

A - The Problem of Sameness
1. How does the transmission of light and sound complicate life for the philosophical inquirer?
2. Describe “phenomenalism”.
3. What functions was the non-perceptual world “out there” thought to be performing that have come into question?
4. How would the inert material substance world judge true from false perceptions?
5. What dilemma does the phenomenalist run into in trying to distinguish true from false perceptions?
6. How did Berkeley employ Occam’s Razor? Do you think his analysis was correct? Explain.
7. Why does Samuel Johnson’s “hitting the post” not refute Berkeley’s case?
8. Why is there no possible empirical evidence against Berkeley’s view?
9. Why does the “coherence” theory of truth break down?
10. Describe why being both “substance” and “inert” raises insoluble problems about mind-body interaction.
11. Why did Hume and Kant think they had to reject metaphysics.
12. How does Berkeley see God as the solution to the phenomenalist’s dead end?
13. How does Berkeley respond to critiques against his God theory?
14. How does the author understand the relation between metaphysics or theology vis-a-vis empirical science?

B - Cause, Volition, & Law
15. How do Berkeley and contemporary science seem to agree on the meaning of ‘cause’?
16. Why is there still a legitimate Humean critique of the Russellian kind of cause?
17. Describe some fallacious critiques that have been directed at a volitional idea of cause, and also the “more logical” factor in depersonalizing cause.
18. How does the author distinguish ‘cause’ from ‘law’?

C - ‘Possible’, ‘Cause’, ‘Exist’, & ‘Perceive’
19. What does the author mean by calling ‘possible’, ‘cause’, and ‘exist’ the building blocks, the atoms, of reality?
20. Describe the two arguments for the existence of God to which the author refers, and how they are different.
21. Describe the puzzle which the author presents from Kant.
22. Discuss the author’s distinction between logically vs. empirically possible.
23. Describe how the author arrives at “causal” possibility as the only rational way to distinguish between possibility and existence.
24. Describe the author’s epistemological definition of existence.
25. How does the ontological definition of existence differ from the above epistemological definition?
26. Describe how substantial existence differs from both epistemological and contingent existence.
27. Do you think the author’s list of definitions is valid?
28. How do the two definitions of ‘exist’ help explain the failure of phenomenalism?
29. What is added to the possible to create the actual. Discuss possible
D. ‘God’ & Contingency

30. To what stumbling blocks to the cosmological argument for God does the author point?
31. And what additional stumbling blocks seem apparent?
32. Describe the distinction between logical regress vs. the spatio-temporal regress, and why this is significant.
33. Describe two reasons for looking again into the matter of negative and positive contingency.
34. Describe the difference between negative and positive contingency.
35. Why is this distinction necessary for a meaningful causal explanation?
36. How does Moses at the Burning Bush fit into the cosmological argument for God?
37. Describe how the Biblical I AM is radically different from pagan and secular attempts to discern the Source of the cosmos.
38. What are the two test questions which we can ask to discern whether an alleged candidate for being God really is.
39. Why cannot the existence of God be defined? and why is this a universal situation, no matter what one’s view of life might be?
40. How does a successful cosmological argument for God provide realistic encouragement for practicing believers?
41. Distinguish between “first cause” and “god”.
42. Describe the difference between the Biblical and pagan notions of who the divinities are.
43. Why is the notion of ex nihilo important to Biblical theology?
44. What is the significance of the difference between pagan construction stories vs. the Biblical creation story?

E. The Meaning of “Explanation”

45. Show why the principle of Sufficient Cause ranks with the principle of Non-Contradiction in epistemological importance.
46. How do phenomenalism and the principle of Sufficient Cause work together? And why must they?
47. How do we know that the principle of Sufficient Cause is metaphysical and neither empirical nor analytical? In what sense is it then metaphysical?
48. Why does phenomenalism need a law of Sufficient Cause?
49. Describe the three choices one has regarding one’s ontological framework, which one you would defend, and why.
50. Do you think that the author’s explanation of explanation works?
51. Discuss how logical investigations such as metaphysics can tie into empirical investigations to produce reliable knowledge of God.

F. Time & Eternity

52. Describe the difference between a flowing stream and pure possibility as contrasting pre-conditions for time.
53. Why is the “term outside the series” necessary for a concept of time?
54. Why does the image of time as a film going past the shutter of the present not work?
55. In what sense is God “in” time. Describe the relation of God to time in the author’s view.
56. Why would proper names and pronouns have no meaning without an individual who perdures as identically the same person through change?
57. In what sense can one be outside of time and yet in time?
58. Describe past, present, and future according to the author.
59. Show how past, present, and future (or before, now, and after) must be analysed in terms of causality.
60. Do you think Thomas Aquinas or the author is correct concerning God having no real, existential relation to His
creatures?
   61. In what sense can any agent be said to have, like God, no duration in and of himself?
   62. Why are “being” and “doing” necessarily distinct?
   63. Do you think that the author’s definition of ‘eternity’ works?
   64. Show how eternity is the metaphysical presupposition of time.
   65. Can time exist without persons?
   66. Why does any one who perceives time need to be “eternal”?
   67. Show how God is “in” time.
   68. Compare and contrast Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover with Yahweh, the Biblical Creator God, with respect to time.
   69. Does the author’s contention that God cannot necessarily know all the future make sense? Does it demean God?
   70. Discuss the definition of ‘omniscience’.
   71. Do you agree with the author’s critique of Hartshorne?
   72. How are time and eternity interwoven?
   73. How does the author contrast pagan and secular vs. the Biblical way of creating social, communal, and relational stability?

G. Two Worldviews: Open & Closed Circles

74. Describe the essential differences between the open-circle cosmos and the closed-circle cosmos.

Chapter Reflections:

In your own words, relate your new insights from reading and meditating on the information contained within this chapter. What difference would it make to you personally whether the claims and assertions of this chapter were true or not?
Chapter III

Creation: a Dialogue with God

A. The Dialogue

A-1. How God Replaces Physical Substance

In this chapter we shall develop the active agent ontology toward understanding the world of perceptual objects as a dialogue between the first cause and created causes. If all goes well, we shall find an alternative to both phenomenalism and material substance which will provide us with further answers to such questions as:

1. in what sense two people see the same object,
2. how to account for error and illusion,
3. how to account for distinctions between general and particular, and
4. what the origin is of internal relations in the world of perceptual objects.

Such an ontology will, I hope, provide another layer for the foundation of an empirical faith by providing a context which could naturally be taken as the meeting ground between God and man.

If we were talking in terms of inert substance, it would make sense to discuss the physical world in at least academic isolation from the observers in it. Physical matter would on that hypothesis exist in its own right and so could be talked about as a something in itself apart from observers.

But, as we have seen, this advantage is precisely its disadvantage. Inert substance is in principle beyond any observation. It would not solve the problem to say that God created inert matter, thus making God rather than material substance the eternal being, for it is not the eternity of material substance that is its downfall, but its inertia and hence its inability to account for perception. To think of God as creating material substance (unless this substance is itself active) is to make God a useless decoration on an equally useless concept of substance.

To make sense of the situation, we must take the Berkeleian option and say that if God causes anything, it is not a substance which we in turn per-
ceive, but our perceptions themselves. It is the perceptions that are inert, their cause that is active. The three basic elements of the universe are then the cause, the perceiver, and the perception. We need no inert substance between the cause and the perceived, only the perceptions given by the cause.

Thus perceptions are not perceptions of anything other than the activity of the cause, God. We perceive chairs, books, tables, and sunsets. But the chairs we perceive are not replicas of physical chairs beyond the perceptions themselves, they are “replicas” instead of what is in the mind of God, and of what other observers see also.

The distinction between physical and perceptual is a misleading one if it leads us to think of two numerically different chairs as Eddington was led to think of two different tables, the perceptual one being an only partially reliable copy of the "real" physical one.  

This perceptual-physical dualism is by no means unanimously held among scientists themselves, but the questions then still remain: If there is no physical world beyond our perceptions (phenomenalism), then how do we account for error? Indeed, what could the word ‘error’ mean? And in what sense can we talk about two people seeing the same object, or one person seeing the same object at different times? Was Heraclitus right, that we cannot see the same river twice?

We have met the first question before, and decided that the concept of cause could give us a principle for distinguishing between true and false perceptions. The true perception would be the perception which is the successful effect of the causing. We shall return to this in the next section, but first let us expand the problem given to us by phenomenalists.

These philosophers try to deal with the problem of how it is that we come to form a united and consistent perceptual field from all our bits and pieces of perception. For example, there are within my visual field alone innumerable shades of colors and patterns which could conceivably be formed into different sorts of wholes. Why is it then that I come to understand certain brown patches as rocks and others as bears? Or why do I understand the copper colored disc to be the same penny even though at one moment it may be a circular patch and the next it may be elliptical or a thin rectangle in my field of vision?

On the inert substance theory we might imagine there to be something like an absolute space “in” which the real physical penny existed, space which was something like a box into which objects might be put. Our bodies and sense organs then would be among the objects in this "box". Somehow our psyches would be connected to these bodies (the ghost in a machine) and thus linked to the processes going on among the bodies.

But since few philosophers of science think any longer in terms either of inert substance or absolute space, how then do we provide a principle for maintaining the individuality and identity of objects, either as the same object seen by two different people, or

218. Heraclitus was a pre-Socratic Hellenic philosopher.
219. See Chapter II.
as the same object perceived by one person at different times? How do we form objects out of phenomena?

A. J. Ayer has suggested in *Language Truth and Logic*:

Logical analysis shows that what makes these "appearances" the "appearances of" the same thing is not their relationship to an entity other than themselves, but their relationship to one another.\(^{220}\)

And I affirm the necessity of this "inter-phenomenal" relationship also. But this is an epistemological criterion for "sameness" and does not suffice to bring together the two tables I see before and after blinking my eyes. One could say that the two tables held reasonably similar places in my visual field before and after blinking. But to say that these are the same tables supposes that the visual field itself is of the same world before and after blinking. We still need ontological stability, a sense of being which persists through time and change.

P. F. Strawson insists in *Individuals* that permanent physical bodies are necessary for identifying and re-identifying objects, and that sense perceptions alone will not suffice.\(^{221}\) We can agree on the need for a reference transcending the phenomena, but hold that non-perceptual physical bodies cannot help in this matter.

Bertrand Russell in *Human Knowledge* wishes to identify objects by way of "causal lines" which resolve into "laws".\(^{222}\) But if the Berkeleian/Biblical view is correct, then such laws will still presuppose an active agency.\(^{223}\)

The solution here proposed makes a radical departure consistent with the notion of active substance or agents as the basic stuff of the universe. Scrapping our "box" of absolute space in which inert bodies reside, which only presents us with insoluble problems of mind and body communication, we begin simply with a plurality of consciousnesses, at least one a first cause, and the others created by the first cause.

The picture may be reminiscent of Leibniz's system of monads, but only in part.\(^{224}\) A Berkeleian view would have nothing to do with a pre-established harmony which eliminated freewill, for the essence of at least higher conscious creatures, such as we humans, would be a freedom to act with purpose.

God, then, causes the perceptions of all the individuals in His creation but in a way which does not preclude, but rather promotes, human freedom.\(^{225}\)

The harmony instead of being pre-established is immediately established, that is, due to the immediate and simultaneous presence of God with all agents.\(^{226}\) Or, it is pre-established only in the sense of being in accord with the natural law already established by God. The colors I see, the sounds I hear, the tastes I have, etc., are caused directly by God, not by a mechanical system of causal links.

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221. *Individuals*, chapter 1. See also R. Harre, *Theories & Things*, p. 109 ff.
224. REF TO LEIBNITZ XXXXXXXXX
225. See Chapter V, *Freewill & Causality*,
226. Remember that an objective "now" is established by God who unites all the scattered (and seemingly relative) "nows" of created agents by the fact of their dependence on His own universal presence. See Chapter II-G-3, "The Eternal "Now" of All Time" on page 81.
between the object I sense and my sensing of it. The table, the taste, the sound, are data given directly to my consciousness, and there is no other direct object than these.

One might object that if that is so, then what of all the tables in other people's perception? There appears to be as many tables as observers, -- indeed, observers of what? It seems we cannot say that they are observing the "same" table. And just such is the case so long as we are limited to phenomenalism.

But we now have something with which to replace the defunct inert substance, to wit, active substance. The substance "behind" the table is God since each of our tables is the activity of God.

There is then only one place to which we can trace the unity of our various tables such that we might call them the same table. Each of our different tables are the "same" table in the sense that they are the same tables in the intention of the being that causes them -- who coordinates all of our space-time worlds. The causal and intentional unity suffices for us to say we are all perceiving the same table.

On this view, your table and my table are not the results of a single physical table making certain impressions on our brains by way of a physical causal chain, but the results of a single agent with a single intention for both of our perceptions. The same table represents the same relative object within each of our perceptual fields. The reliable intention of God ensures that we can rationally identify ourselves, one another, and other objects, and can thus communicate among ourselves.

A-2. The Dialogue

Two questions (at least) arise. (1) If God is doing all the causing, then in what sense can human activity be free? And, (2) in what manner can humans communicate with each other if our bodies are God's activity rather than our own?

We shall come to the latter question in the next chapter, the former concerns us more closely now.

If we are going to say that God causes all our perceptions, then we must follow to its logical conclusion and say that God also causes our perceptions, of not only the bodies of other people, but of our own bodies as well.

This would seem to lead us into a rigid "Calvinistic" determinism beyond escape. But such would not necessarily be the case for two reasons:

(1) God's causing our perceptions need not thereby determine our willing or purposing except insofar as God might be said to supply the "material" to which our purposes are applied.

The "matter" which is necessary for human causing is sometimes referred to as a "material cause". It is a cause by reason of supplying the necessary prequisite "stuff" with which we can work to do our causing. To make concrete sidewalks, we need sand, water, and cement -- which are the material cause of the concrete sidewalk. That material which God provides, the realities of our lives, supplies the realm of both logical and material possibility for created agents.

Material cause is to be distin-

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227. See Index for further examples of material and efficient cause.
guished from efficient cause, which is the sort of cause with which we are primarily dealing and most familiar, the cause that brings a thing about, the “pushing” cause, the cause which expends effort, the actively creating cause, the personal cause.

And (2), the perceiving agent contributes to the understanding of the perception (see next section).

To expand on the first case, let us ask ourselves what it is that God might be thought to perceive. He would not perceive books, tables, and sunsets, for God is causing these, which puts Him on the opposite end of the process from perceiving. CLARIFY

But God would clearly have these things “in mind” because His causing is intentional, and would know what the creature was perceiving.

What God would perceive would be the causing or the willing of the created agents coming back to Him as effects. The point is that the causing or willing of created agents is not directly related to the perceptual changes that result from such willing. CLARIFY

God is a link between my willing to stand up and my body actually doing so.

SENSE OF MY BODY MOVING -- UNITY OF MY BODY FOR ME 6TH SENSE.

The process would run something like this:
1. our willing --
2. God's perception of our willing --
3. God's willing the appropriate perceptual change --
4. our perception of God's willing (my body physically moving).

The first two terms and the last two terms of this series are each one act seen from opposite (cause-effect) ends. Our willing, for example, to move a leg and our seeing or feeling it move are two separate but reciprocal acts by two separate agents.

Man's (and presumably every active agent's) ability to cause is then an analogue of God's ability to cause. We are made in His Image. God causes perceptions in the consciousness of His agents, and His agents cause perceptions in His consciousness.\(^\text{228}\)

In this sense, all agents are first causes with respect to their own acts of will. An act of will is to some extent a creation \textit{ex nihilo}.\(^\text{229}\) Something new is made real which need not have been, but comes to be. The willing of created agents can be a “sufficient cause” for new realities to come into being. But with respect to their own being, created agents are secondary causes.

Thus it is that the creation, the physical world, is a continuing dialogue between God and His created agents. Because it is a genuine dialogue, there is room for genuine freedom. Man's ability to carry out his freedom, e.g. to move his leg, to affect the course of history or of personal relations, depends on God's faithfulness in ordering our perceptions according to the rules of natural law He has set up, and which we learn to depend on so heavily. If the system is to work, then appropriate changes in our perceptual fields would have to be guaranteed to follow certain willings by us.

\(^\text{228}\) Hartshorne affirms the same principle of interaction with God in \textit{A Natural Theology for Our Time}, p. 9-12 \textit{et al}. Open Court, 1967.

\(^\text{229}\) See Chapter V, \textit{Freewill & Causality}. 

B. Object-hood: Sense Data & Interaction

B-1. The Contribution of the Creature/Perceiver

The second reason that our view does not lead to determinism is not one that provides so much for freedom per se as for a contribution from the perceiver in the process of building up the perceptual world.\(^{230}\) It is in this contribution that error could occur. Phenomenalists and gestaltists have done most of the spade work here, in discovering the role of projection in image formation and how closely one's understanding of a perception is tied to his past experience, his purpose, and his expectations.

We can compare God presenting us with a perception as analogous to a psychologist presenting a patient with a Rorschach ink blot. The patient, however, is not permitted to interact with the ink blot except visually, giving him a rather restricted set of concrete clues, thus allowing his imagination free play to express itself -- which is, of course, the purpose of the Rorschach test.

With the normal perceptual world, however, the essence of learning is interaction -- so that we do not dictate to what we perceive but rather allow reality, i.e. whatever God is causing us to perceive, to dictate to us.

I call certain brown spots rocks and others bears because of the difference in the way in which I (i.e., my perceptual body) can interact with the two. The more intimately I interact with perceptual images, the more clearly perceptual clues force me to distinguish between different perceptual objects.

Objecthood, then, can be understood (in a Humean kind of way) chiefly in terms of continuity of behavior in conjunction with similarity of perceptual appearance. The infant comes to distinguish objects by interacting with them, not by simply passively observing them.\(^{231}\)

Among the first perceptual objects he comes to distinguish, of course, would be his own body and that of his mother, from there adding gradually to his self-image and world-image. As his needs, interests, and abilities grow, his perception and understanding of perceptual images grows, and he becomes better able to manipulate them and co-exist in the community of the perceptual world.

Certain types of perceptual errors can now be understood as a wrong assignment of types of behavior to a perceptual object. When an image is caused to appear in my consciousness, there is not also automatically given the understanding of the image, how it will behave, or its relevance to my body, purposes, etc. That is why children ask so many questions. The area of understanding which we gain through interaction then gives us a large area in which error can be made.

\(^{230}\) ...the first reason being covered above in section “The Dialogue” on page 95

\(^{231}\) John Macmurray, The Self as Agent, and Persons in Relation, passim.
B-2. "Pure" Sense Data vs. Objecthood

Philosophers of Humean persuasion have talked about uninterpreted or "bare" sense data, i.e., sense data prior to any learning or interaction. One might attempt to remove from his mind the layers of learning and interpretation in order to get back to this pure sense data.\(^\text{232}\)

Success in this venture would lead one back to an infant state where one could not only have pure sense data, but presumably also the infants mentality for examining this sense data. A rather self-defeating and no doubt impossible enterprise, one suspects, for to undo the learning would be to undo the experiences by which one learned, which would then also undo the experiences by which one would have learned to assess the sought for data.\(^\text{233}\)

In order to assess this data, one would have to go again through the same experience that he had just erased by his reduction process, i.e. the learning by interaction, for sense data cannot be fully assessed except by interaction.

A "pure" sense datum is simply a perceptual object before the perceiver's having been taught about it or having interacted with it; or conversely, a perceptual object is a sense datum understood in terms of teaching and interaction. Sense data do not really become more pure by the above reduction, just less understood. They become more themselves, more what they really are, or are meant to be, by the more critical interaction, as the Hebraic way of thinking implies.\(^\text{234}\)

Sense data and perceptual objects are then the same activity of God, the latter being the former more completely understood by the perceiver. If perception involves necessarily the activity of God, then the meaning of perceptual objects can be found only by interacting with this activity, and by understanding His purpose for the object as well as our own interest in it.

Thus a penny at an angle will appear elliptical if only passively observed. The meaning, then, of nevertheless calling it round is contained, not in a notion of another inert substance penny of which this copper ellipse is only an approximation, but in the experience of interaction with the copper ellipse and our expectation of how it will behave under certain more or less standard conditions, and, of course, in the context of touch or other relevant perceptions.

For accurate perception, the expectation which the observer has for the object needs to correspond with the intention of the cause of the per-

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232. The "reduction" process is something quite different from that which we have described. E. Husserl has an excellent summary in his article, "Phenomenology", Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. 17, 1950, p. 699 ff.

233. In therapy, of course, the therapist hopes to capitalize in the "adult" side of the patient not disappearing as he tries to get in touch with his inner childhood experiences.

But in many cases, the person may have to be led back through the learning process because it itself was misleading and self-destructive, often subject to authoritarian and/or libertine authority figures. A major part of inner healing can be learning how to become free to be a truth-seeker.

234. See next section: "Perceptual Object-hood: General & Particular in Hebrew vs. European Languages" on page 100
ception. Our expectations concerning the reliability of the table when we leave the room and return do not require an inert substance table but they do require consistent intentions on the part of the cause of the table.

**B-3. Bits & Pieces vs. Original Whole**

Phenomenalists have asked how it is that we come to form the world we do form out of the bits and pieces of sense data with which we seem to begin. Part of the answer would be, by interacting with these bits and pieces.

But there is a misleading element in the suggestion of "bits and pieces". The infant is not conscious of bits and pieces to be made into a whole so much as an undifferentiated mass in which the number of particulars of which he is aware is very small to begin with. The great number of objects in one's world view would not be bits and pieces either interesting or relevant to the inexperienced consciousness -- any more than scenery or machinery appears as bits and pieces to a causal passer-by. A machine is "a thing", an entity, a unit, however vaguely understood. The bits and pieces appear only when interest is focused, or one is motivated to understand, or forced to grapple with the environment. (235)

So the infant's problem would not be a case of putting together many pieces as one might assemble a jigsaw puzzle. It would rather be a case of an essentially dynamic perceptual world intruding itself progressively into the consciousness as the infant becomes more and more capable of assimilating different aspects and thus better able to learn from interaction.

Presumably the whole perceptual world is there for the infant, but his ability to interact and to assimilate the consequences of such interaction, i.e. to understand his perceptions, comes gradually. And thus the bits and pieces we are aware of at a later stage only gradually become important factors in his awareness.

The notion of sense data, we can be sure, is, like inert substance, not anything any infant ever began with. These are concepts one arrives at through sophisticated questioning, not something one meets as a primitive given.

Again, among the first objects that would most likely intrude upon the infant's consciousness would be his own and his mother's bodies, since they are most directly involved in his first interests and constitute the scene of his first communications within the perceptual world.

It is therefore not a case of explaining how an infant gets started in a largely passive and inert perceptual world, or how he begins to take interest in the world and learns to deal with it, for the receiving of perception itself involves an activity intruding itself into the consciousness of the infant. The helpless infant does not have to begin the dialogue of creation. God begins it for him, or with him, the only conditions, apparently, being that the baby be alive, his sense organs functioning, and some, however primitive, desire to be alive and to relate personally.

And, there appears to be a well-developed sense at least by birth of one's own vulnerability and need for TLC -- tender, loving care. Many

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235. James Ward expresses a similar view, Psychological Principles, Chapter IV, Sec. 2.
studies indicate that that awareness of vulnerability and desire to relate begins a significant time before birth.\(^{(236)}\)

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**C. Perceptual Object-\-hood: General & Particular in Hebrew vs. European Languages**

**C-1. The Hebrew General & Particular**

**a. An Odd Grammar**

At this point, we make a digression into language, specifically a comparison of certain forms in Hebrew with their parallels in Graeco-Roman languages.

While in seminary, 1957-60, I took a course in Hebrew. Hebrew language is quite different from English. It not only goes across the page from right to left, the very structure of Hebrew grammar is different.

In any society, grammar is one of the most important ways the culture structures its perception of reality. Grammar is logic in the trenches. As noted in the Preface, my high school English teacher used to pound into our heads, “If you cannot write it in good English, you don’t know it yet.” I learned to pay attention to grammar.

Hebrew grammar gives us a strikingly different and very helpful insight into the nature of metaphysical reality. Given the radically different nature of the Biblical worldview from the secular/pagan views, this should perhaps not be a surprise. Ideas have consequences. Some of them grammatical.

A few of those differences between Hebrew and European Romance languages stuck in my mind as quite curious, and surfaced a few years later while at Oxford writing my D. Phil. thesis, which is the basis for this book.

Some have argued that the parallels between language and metaphysics are small and over-rated, and that one ought not try to make too much metaphysical hay over the differences between the concrete and dynamic Hebrew versus the abstract and static Greek. J. Barr in *The Semantics of Biblical Language* takes such a view. Thorlief Boman takes the other side, attempting in *Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek* to show that differences in language structure reflect differences in how the two traditions look at the world and what they find important in it.

Grammar is the primary way a culture formulates its notions both of logic and of individuality, of the abstract and the concrete, and how they are related.

The following is an example of Boman’s thesis that grammatical differences have closely related metaphysical parallels, and that in this case, at least, the metaphysical laurels fall decidedly on the side of the Hebrews. At the same time we shall add to the picture of the dialogue of creation and the metaphysical structure of perceptual objecthood.

We focus on the difference in the ways the two traditions indicate particularity and generality. For our pur-
Let us take the phrase, ‘the altar of stone’, which is a common type of phrase in the Old Testament using a genitive of description or of material (cf. Exodus 20: 24-5).

Languages with a Hellenic background (and perhaps others) would divide the phrase thusly: ‘(the altar) (of stone)’, combining the article with ‘altar’ and the preposition or genitive with ‘stone’. Hebrew reverses this in a way that at first might seem irrational to the western mind.

The genitive case in Hebrew is not indicated by a preposition but by a special form of the word in question called the construct form, generally a slightly shortened form of the word.

The curious point is that the word put into the construct form is not the word to which we would normally attach the preposition ‘of’. In the phrase, ‘altar of stone’, the word in the construct or genitive would be ‘altar’, not ‘stone’, as in Greek, Latin, or English. Thus it would be literally translated ‘altar of stone’ rather than ‘altar (of stone)’.

But there is another curious difference. The article in Hebrew does not go with ‘altar’, but with ‘stone’, again the opposite of English.

Thus instead of ‘(the altar) (of stone)’, we have something like ‘(altar of) (the stone)’, which appears to make even less sense. The genitive and the article seem to have gotten stuck on the wrong words.

b. Particularity & Generality

The reason for putting the article with ‘stone’ is that it was in the stone that particularity and givenness was invested for the Hebraic mind, not in the altar as for the Hellenic mind.

The article, as Bruno Snell shows in The Discovery of the Mind, was developed in primitive languages in order to single out particular instances from generalities. If it was the material, in this case the stone, that was the primary given, so then to make an altar out of it, something more had to be added.

Again Hebrew language structure is informative. The word for ‘altar’, , is formed by prefixing an ‘m’, , to , a verb meaning ‘to slaughter for sacrifice’. The ‘ול’ prefix is often used to give the sense of ‘place where ....’. Thus the word for ‘altar’ means literally, ‘place where one slaughters for sacrifice’.

Very significantly, the substantive noun in Greek, Latin, or English becomes in Hebrew a notion of activity. And this gives us what we need to add to the stone to make it an altar, the activity of the people using the stone.

To translate the Hebrew phrase into English accurately, we cannot use simply ‘the altar of stone’, but instead must use something like ‘the stone of altaring’, or ‘the stone of slaughtering for sacrifice’.

We can see now that, if for the Hebrews, particularity was invested in the given material, the stone, as indicated by the position of the article, then the generality was invested in the activity or use to which the stone was put, as indicated by the content of the word in the genitive. The same stone or different stones could be used for

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\(^{238}\) Modern Hebrew has small marks to indicate the vowels, but my software does not supply these, so we have just the consonants.
the same purpose at different times and by different people. The same-
ess or generality lay in the purpose or usage, it was inherent neither in the stone substance of the altar nor in a Platonic heavenly Idea.

If we look for the generality of the material of the stone itself, or “stone-
ess”, this too is traceable to an activity, this time of God.

The stone, the material of perception, is the activity of God working in the consciousness of His creatures. Different examples of stone, then, are simply different examples of the same activity of God, just as different altars, as altars, are different examples of similar activities of men. The meaning of generality is to be sought in similarity of activity and purpose, not in static abstractions.

Borrowing from Hellenic thought, the dialogue of creation can be described in terms of form and matter. The ultimate matter or substance is the will of God which takes form in perception. This then in turn becomes matter for the perceiver who bestows further form by his own activity on the matter presented to him. The matter provides the context for human action, both in terms of possibility and in terms of material determinacy. (239)

It is perfectly natural that perceptual objects should be known chiefly by their highest form, i.e., in terms of their most developed purpose. Even the Hebrew puts the word ‘altar’ first in order before ‘stone’. Objects are most precisely distinguished by reference to their most developed form.

Reading the Dialogues of Plato, one wonders just how “Platonic” Plato really was. He readily challenges his own pet ideas.

In the Parmenides, Parmenides, discussing with Socrates, makes the following rather Hebraic comments about “Ideas”, those heavenly metaphysical entities which are supposed to be the pattern for all lesser reality.

But there are problems:

I may illustrate my meaning in this way, said Parmenides. Suppose a man to be a master or a slave -- he is obviously not a slave of the abstract Idea of a master, or a master of the abstract Idea of a slave; the relation is one of man to man. The Idea of mastership in the abstract must be defined by relation to the Idea of slavery in the abstract, and vice versa. But the things familiar to us are not empowered to act on those Ideas, nor the Ideas to act upon familiar things....

The abstract “Ideas” are thus inert in much the same sense as Newtonian physical substance.

...the knowledge which we have, will answer to the truth which we have; and again, each kind of knowledge which we have, will be a knowledge of each kind of being which we have?

Certainly.

But the Ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and cannot have?

No, we cannot.

And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the absolute Idea of knowledge?

Yes.

And we have not got the Idea of knowledge?

No.

Then none of the Ideas are known, at least by us, because we have no share in absolute knowledge?

I suppose not.

Then the nature of the beautiful in itself, and of the good in itself, and all other Ideas

239. For the use of ‘material determinism’, see Chapter V-2 & 3 XXXXXXXXXXX
which we suppose to exist absolutely, are unknown to us?

It would seem so.\(^\text{240}\)

In this exchange between Socrates and Parmenides, we not only have presented more than two millennia prior to Kant that very same Kantian puzzle discussed above concerning the relation of substance (the enduring and reliable) to the transitory (phenomena, the “familiar”), and the relations between existence, causality, possibility, and perception, but also we have fore-shadowed the critique of Berkeley on the unknowability of inert substance (or inert ideas).\(^\text{241}\)

The problem is (as Kant saw) -- How to identify the differentiator between possibility and existence.

For Plato, as the continuation of the dialogue shows, God (or the Idea of the Good and the Source of all) could not be that differentiator, for He is swallowed up into the far side of that unbridgeable chasm between the Ideas and us mere mortals.

Had western philosophers caught onto the Hebrew method of indicating particularity and generality early on, the realist-nominalist discussion might have taken a much less conflicting and more fruitful path.

C-2. Substance -- Two Worldviews

a. There is... There is Not

But the Hebrew language has further differences from European languages.

None of the words translated ‘substance’ in the Old Testament have any resemblance to the Greek philosophical notion of ‘that predicate-less entity to which all predicates are attributed’, a necessarily non-empirical something. Rather, the notion of substance has the richly empirical meaning of wealth, something worthwhile, fullness, often referring to cattle or other property.\(^\text{242}\) We sometimes use the word in that manner today. “He is a man of substance” can refer to physical, emotional, financial, or other common forms of possession.

One of the words used for ‘substance’, \(\text{בּ} \), is the same word used for the expression, ‘there is …’, but is not itself a verb. Rather it is a noun meaning ‘existence’ which comes to have verbal significance in certain contexts, e.g. ‘there is <xyz>’

The negative, ‘there is not <xyz>’, \(\text{דָּא} \), is the construct of another noun which means ‘nothing’ or ‘nought’. Again, it is not a verb in itself.

Isaiah 47:10 reads: "No one sees me", literally, "nought of one seeing me", or "one seeing me (made) of nought". The word is used to deny substance to the activity and hence is the opposite of \(\text{בּ} \), the affirmation of substance.

The Hebrew notion of physical substance is not that predicateless something to which all predicates are ascribed, it is the conjunction, the fullness of relevant predicates, that is, of causal activities. The thing-in-itself is thus empirically the fullest and richest notion, not the emptiest.

\(^\text{241.} \) On Kant, see above, II-D-3, “A Kantian Puzzle” on page 42. GET SOURCE ON THIS QUOTE AND CHARACTERS IN DIALOGUE. On Berkeley, see II-B, “The Problem of Sameness.” on page 33

\(^\text{242.} \) Young’s Analytical Concordance to the Bible, Funk & Wagnalls.
The Hebrew “shalom”, meaning “peace”, is similarly the fullness of life, not an empty quietness. Shalom is also not a noisy, but a restful fullness, the fullness of persons who are faithful, loving, and hopeful (see I Corinthians 13:13), the peace of God which passes all understanding, passing, certainly, the understanding of the world fallen out of contact with its ontological and moral stability.

Shalom is the experiential and empirical fullness of substance, which means the fullness of helpful activity, as in “Love your neighbor just like you love yourself....” the second highest commandment in the cosmos. Peace and substance are relational, not abstract.

There is a similar word used in Eastern religions. T. S. Eliot ends his poem, Wasteland, with...

Shantih shantih shantih.

In the endnote explanation, Eliot remarks simply:

Repeated as here, a formal ending to an Upanishad. “The Peace which passeth understanding” is our equivalent to this word.²⁴³

But the peace of Eastern religions is precisely and diametrically the opposite of shalom, Biblical peace. Shantih is the peace of non-existence, of the annihilation of that individuality implied by existence in time and space.

There is no I AM in eastern religion, not because they are not smart enough to think of such an idea, but because their closed-circle worldview militates against it. It is precisely in our selves as individuals that we experience the intractible pain and sorrow of life -- for which the closed-circle cosmos provides no cure. So, Eastern religion generally seeks to annihilate (they would say transcend) the self, not fulfill it. The eastern sense of peace thus tends to be exactly the opposite of the Hebrew, which is the fullness of personhood in God-given space and time.

In Buddhism, for example, peace is the eradication of desire, deliberate disattaching of oneself by meditation from this chaotic world. And so it becomes, like the Hellenic notion of substance, the final predicateless state, Nirvana, the “place of no wind”, not a breath stirring, logically indistinguishable from nothing at all, emptiness, death. Shantih is life in a substance with no predicates.

Eastern religions do not value relationships in anything like the Judeo-Christian way, for the simple reason that, in the end, there is nothing to relate. All is One, and One is All. From that mindset, the Biblical insistence on a personal God is irrational.

The real Hebrew parallel to (or replacement for) the Greek metaphysical inert substance is thus an active God, ultimately the source of all activity, and thus that to which all predicates can ultimately be ascribed, allowing only for those creatures on whom freedom has been bestowed, who, to that extent, have predicates (their activity) ascribable to them.²⁴⁴ Just as predicates are rooted in purpose and activity, so all predicates are finally ascribed to an active being.

And so, when we read "No one sees me", we have a denial of sub-

²⁴³. Wasteland was written, apparently, before Eliot became a Christian, and reflects the spiritual wasteland he perceived around him, living in an increasingly depersonalized, not-human-friendly, self-destructing Western anti-culture. He did not yet know the difference between shantih and the peace of God which passes understanding.
stance to an activity. But substance is in the first instance perceptual matter, and then, behind that, the agent. In other words, "there is no altar" would be a denial of substance to the perceptual matter of an altar, "there is no material (stone, wood) here for sacrificing". And the material itself is the product of an activity. Thus we have behind it all, "God is not causing here a material for sacrificing."

The Hebrews had, of course, not thought things out step by step in this way, but the Old Testament culture, grammar included, already contained implicitly the heart of Bishop Berkeley's metaphysics.

It would be reasonable then to suggest that the Hebrews did not indulge in metaphysics as a past-time partly because their language and related world view did not trip them up with metaphysical snags. The tools of rational thought, such as logic, were a development of the Greek mind in part to get them out of a particular metaphysical labyrinth into which the Hebrew had not wandered (or from which they had been rescued). The Hebrews had troubles of a much different sort, as Biblical history shows.

b. How We Perceive Causal, Metaphysical Substance

Substance in the Biblical world-view applies to persons, not things or abstractions. The primary relationship of created persons to substance is that of being an effect of a cause, or, more commonly, a creature of a creator.

We do not perceive God, our cause, with any of the normal five perceptual senses (other than, as Christians would say, in the Incarnation).

But if we can sense ourselves as in need of explanation and substance, if we can sense our dependency, our vulnerability, our contingency (as we commonly do), then we might also expect to be able to sense the positive resolution of those depleted conditions (if that should happen), that we can be dependent on something both stable and good. We can identify and experience reliable security.

We might, that is, be able to sense our dependency on God, that we are indeed supported and sustained, as it were, by the Hand of God. Our dependency, then, is not a problem if we have someone dependable upon which to rest our dependency.

In that sense, we can perceive God causing us, and in that sense, causality becomes a fifth dimension, beyond space/time. And our perceiving of that personal reality becomes a sixth sense, beyond the normal five physical senses.(245)

Causing is a metaphysical reality, which, according to the cosmological argument, is observed in the percep-

244. It may seem ungracious to call the Hellenic Unmoved Mover "inert". It was imagined as the very highest perfection. But, with respect to the Unmoved Mover's relation to the world, that is exactly the case, in no respect different from Newton's inert substance. -- absolutely inaccessible, totally unconcerned about the world, and zero interaction with it. To be otherwise would have been thought to compromise its perfection.

The Hellenic and Hebraic minds worked from totally opposed first premises.

245. I am aware that some philosophers of science have already claimed the 5th through the 10th dimensions (and some far beyond) for their own cosmological purposes, especially in string theory. However, the order of these dimensions is not here an issue.

But in some reasonable sense, the Biblical world-view will lay claim to causality as a fundamental dimension of life. We can discuss who "gets dibbs" on which number in another venue.

See also below, Chapter IV-B-3, "Intuiting the Presence of Persons" on page 131.
tual world by the very existence of that world. Our capacity to experience being caused, as distinct from reasoning about it in cosmological arguments, is our irreducibly primary contact with metaphysical reality.(246)

Thus God, I AM, is, on the Biblical view, the source of my existence, a fact in which I can consciously live and act. Doing so means living in the Kingdom of God, and is the foundation for the Biblical understanding of salvation, and of worship, our rejoicing in being children of God.

We will further discuss in Volume III, Yahweh or the Great Mother? how salvation means the recovery of our perception of the Hand and Voice of God, the two essential stabilities lost in the Fall.

D. Internal and External Unity

D-1. The Problem of the One & the Many

Now, in our investigation of the nature of perceptual objects, we may be in a position to say something about the realist-nominalist controversy which divides itself partly over the issue of internal relations and how the world (with personal relationships) is put together. In what sense can we talk about the world as “one”, and at the same time live as individuals with our freedom? ...the problem of the “one and the many”.

The hard-boiled nominalist, who denies the objective reality of abstract universals, is likely to think that there are no internal relations, at least not inherent in nature. If they are there, we project them onto nature.

The realist, who affirms the objective reality of abstract universals, would assert that not only are there internal relations, but, some would have it, the whole universe is internally related. Realists have talked about the world as essentially one, nominalists as essentially plural. Neither side, I think, has been notably successful either in explaining away, or in appropriating the evidence for, the opposing point of view.

Perhaps the Biblical/Berkelian view can make a suitable case for resolving issues of the one and the many.

D-2. Defining ‘Internal’ & ‘External’ Relations

Let us first clarify the distinction between internal and external relations.(247)

An external relation would be any relation between two units which relation did not contribute toward a higher unity other than that relation itself. One stone might be on top of another, but the relation would be purely external unless the one’s being on top contributed toward some higher unity than simply that of "on-top-ness". This higher unity might be a wall, a house, etc.

An internal relation then would be any such relation between units which did so contribute, and thus

246. See Preface, “What is Metaphysics?” on page xli

247. For other uses of the distinction between 'internal' and 'external', see Ewing, Idealism, chapter IV, sec. 1, p. 117 ff. Methuen & Co., Ltd., London, 1934.
made that relation internal to the
higher unity. The “on topness” would
be internal to the larger wall or house.

**D-3. Unity in Simple Objects**

But further, we can talk of basic
units as those perceptual objects
which behave as units. These basic
units then form external relations
among themselves. This accounts for
the objectivity of the external relations
existing in the spatio-temporal frame-
work.

To this extent, nothing is pro-
jected upon the objects, and the basic
unities and external relations formed
are given in perception. Being exter-
nally related is a part of existing in the
spatio-temporal framework at all, and
so this provides the material possibil-
ity for further development through
the imposition of form on matter.

A thing can thus be said to have
internal relations if it has parts and to
the extent that these parts form a unity
in and of themselves. Thus the prob-
lem does not arise for simple units nor
for purely random groupings.

But most of life, at least the inter-
esting parts of life, come in between
these two extremes. Most of the per-
cptual objects we meet with we like
to think of as genuine units even
though they are clearly composed of
parts. Do not the parts of my car in
some reasonable sense form a unit?

Unity comes in degrees. We can
talk about a purely random scattering
of stones in a meadow, a chance pile
of stones, a heap of stones piled delib-
erately but randomly, a group of
stones purposely piled into a specific
shape such as a wall, and finally, care-
fully laid masonry.

The nominalist would tend to say
that so far as the groups of stones are
concerned, there would be no more in-
ternal unity in the last than in the first
example. That is, the stones in each
example would have only external re-
lations to each other, with no relation
among them which helped compose a
larger unity. A realist might suggest
that the purposiveness in the later
groups gave them an internal unity
which the earlier groups did not have.

Or we might think in terms of ma-
chines. We build complex machines
which seem to have a very real unity
of their own. Few would suggest that
the mainspring of a watch is related to
the stars with anything like the impor-
tance with which it is related to the
hands of the watch.

The nominalist would retort that
the "importance" of the mainspring to
the hands is not something internal to
the watch, but something given to the
watch by the person using it. After all,
most of the machines we use occur ac-
cidentally in nature in crude, acciden-
tal forms, such as the wedge, spring,
lever, etc. Our complex machines are
simply refinements of these attached
to each other in specific ways deter-
mined by the purpose of the one who
builds the machine. Purpose, it is said,
does not occur innately in nature.

The great problem for the nomi-
inalist is to explain, if there are no in-
ternal relations in these groups of
stones or in machines, why or in what
sense we talk of them as groups or
units at all.

His answer might be that such
unity as we find in nature we put there
ourselves. We put it into the pile of
stones or into the watch or steam en-
gine just as we put it into the stellar
constellations, such as Orion or the
Big Dipper. Internal unity is purely a
mental activity of the observer, not something that exists in nature or the perceptual world as such.

The hard-bitten nominalist might insist that even the stones can be divided easily enough with a sledge hammer, and perhaps infinitely far in theory if not in practice. Thus even in the stone we meet a multiplicity which seems to dissolve the ground of unity from under our feet.

But such an answer makes one vulnerable to the chaos of atomization, the world of Samuel Beckett where nothing is much connected to anything else.

The realist feels he has the answer to this atomization with his inherent internal relations via real universals, akin to Platonic heavenly Ideas. But, as Parmenides noted, the realist has the other difficulty, grappling with particulars and singularities. 248

What can we contribute to the discussion from a Berkeleian point of view?

We can indeed give stability to the notion of perceptual unity in nature with regard to the parts themselves, e.g. the individual stones.

The answer that we can contribute to halt this dissolution of our perceptual world is that we call the stone a unit, a stone, so long as it behaves as one stone. We have then a unity which is not projected upon the stone or its parts by the observer. It is a unity discovered by interaction with the stone and which is in that sense internal to the stone. It resides in how the stone behaves when we hold it, squeeze it, drop it, etc.

That it can be crushed into many parts is not relevant because the unity of a stone does not need to be “eternal”, only within a given set of empirical conditions. Short of disastrous conditions, stones are quite reliable.

And to search out the unity back into its metaphysical roots, the stone is one because, and to the degree that, the causal activity of God with respect to that stone is one. As a perceptual object caused in our consciousness, we can interact with it as one. The unity is caused by God and perceived by us. It is not random, fortuitous, and capricious.

Such is the case for simple objects such as stones, but the case is different with complex objects such as piles of stone and machines, let alone living beings. It is not quite so obvious that a stone wall, for example, is a unit since it is indeed made of many parts.

D-4. Form, Purpose, & Unity in Complicated Objects

To a certain extent form can be imposed by merely altering perceptual shape, as by shaping clay into a bowl. But more than just a new shape goes into making a bowl. The word 'bowl' means more than simply 'clay shaped into a hollow hemisphere with one side slightly flattened.' There is something added to the clay even before the potter begins to alter its perceptual form, namely its purpose. The potter has an idea of use which this object will be put, such as to hold liquids. This use governs both the selection of material and its shaping.

Certain shapes are deliberately ambiguous such as objects which in one position look like ashtrays, and when turned over look like candleholders. To ask, "But which is it re-
ally?" is to ask a pseudo-question rooted in the same sort of world view that would lead us to search for heavenly archetypes or a non-perceptual material substance which would tell us the "real" is-ness.

The being of all perceptual objects is thus to some extent ambiguous until nailed down by a specific purpose. The being is ambiguous to the extent that the purpose is ambiguous. Since the purpose of impersonal objects is always something bestowed from without, there will always be a latent element of ambiguity. This possible ambiguity will be just as wide as the range of purposes for which an object could reasonably be used.

The same reasoning can apply to complex objects. Objects with more than one part often have a kind of unity given by the fact that they are cemented, screwed, or nailed together, and thus tend to behave as one object. When I hand someone a clock, I do not usually hand him a dozen odd pieces. One act of handing over will normally suffice.

Just as with simple objects, what is added beyond the shaping and refining of the perceptual matter, is purpose, use, activity. It is the purpose which gives unity to the various parts of machines and other complex objects. To discover the "true being" of a perceptual object, we need only to (1) examine the character of its perceptual matter (laboratory analysis), and (2) find out its purpose (ask the person who made it).

If we wish to go beyond this empirical study, we are led overtly into metaphysics and the activity of God with His creatures. For, if this reasoning is correct, the empirical world is the activity of both God and His creatures.

As to who wins, realism or nominalism, neither side comes off unseathed or unconsolled. If it is true that internal relations are not in every case "out there" in the complex objects we perceive but are projected onto them by the perceiver, it must also be said that there is an objective unity of behavior in simple objects, and to that extent the hypothetically divisible parts of the units can form objective internal relations with each other.

Further it must be said that the internal relations projected onto objects as purpose (or perhaps aesthetically as symbolic or representative value) are not something superficially tacked onto otherwise unrelated "real" things. As the analysis of Hebrew above indicates, the projection of purpose is itself an integral part of the reality of the object, and an indispensable part of the dialogue of creation.

There could be no objects as we know them without projection of purpose onto perceptual material, which is to say that "reality" is partly determined by the relational nature of the cosmos. So, we have a fundamental ontological principle:

Reality is always real "for someone", never in total abstract independence.

"Projection" thus does not necessarily imply unreality in the Freudian sense. It is part of the nature of creation itself, drawing given material into the fine-tuning process of creating for the community of creation.

Thus the imposition of form by the perceiver on the perceptual material, not only by altering the perceptual material itself but also by bringing it to a special purpose or activity, is the creature's contribution to the dialogue of creation.
Man perceives the will of God at work giving him the material of perception. Man interacts with this material by expressing his own will which God in turn perceives. God carries out according to certain rules (natural law) the results of man's will within the perceptual field of man.

In this way God and man bring emotionally and personally “three dimensional” perceptual objects out of "flat" or obscure sense data. And man comes to understand at the same time the internal unity of simple objects and the significance of external relations between these units. From this understanding of the raw material of perception, he can proceed to form the more complex world of higher internal relations, shaping and giving it purpose.

At each step in the dialogue, man's freedom finds fuller scope so that often the final crown of form placed on any object is both the most completely man's own, the purpose for which the object is used, the name by which it is called, and also at the same time, as we obey the moral law of God, the fulfillment of God’s purpose for us and the world.

These are nothing less than the very processes of culture, science, and technology. In this manner, the Hebrew notion of substance adequately replaces the Newtonian notion of hard, massey objects inertially floating in space to make the objects we perceive -- without, in the manner of phenomenalism, leaving us devoid of objectivity.

We shall see more fully in Part II how God is necessary, not incidental, to science and technology, exploring ways in which we might connect the originating act of God with the explorations of empirical science, inductive reasoning, particle physics, etc.

**D-5. Heraclitus’s River**

We have mentioned Heraclitus’s remark that we cannot observe the same river twice because it is always changing. He is suggesting that the “being” of the river is changing so that the river could have no perduring identity. That claim makes sense of rivers in a way that it would not of persons because rivers have no self-identity, no continuing consciousness of self. So whatever identity they have inherently resides only in the phenomenal object before us, which is indeed changing all the time.

What was the Mississippi River before any human beings, or any sentient beings at all, observed and interacted with it? One could still identify it and study it cartographically and geologically. But it loses much of what we would call “importance”. Or, its importance would reside in what it was later to become for us humans. We study such things because they are our own background. But the longer we go back, the more tenuous becomes its identity, eventually trailing off into nothingness, like the wake of a boat.

If we insist that the identity of an object must reside in that object on its own, in total isolation from us and other events or beings, then there is probably little hope for Ol’ Miss. The more it is isolated from relationship to persons, the more its identity dissolves.

But if we take our cues from the nature of a personalist cosmos, it makes perfect sense to assert that the fundamental importance and identity of the Mississippi River rests on the
primordial intention of its Creator and on the uses to which it is put by persons living along with it, not on its own inherent identity.

We swim in it, fish in it, send commerce up and down it, and get flooded by it. That is the kind of identity which it has for most people. Except for Tom Sawyer, Huck Finn, and maybe Mark Twain, it has no identity which it is claiming for itself. Its identity, beyond its bare physical nature, is given from outside itself.

The fact is illustrated by a story from Africa. The son of a tribal chief had gotten what apparently turned out to be a very secular-scientific education at Oxford. When he returned home, he began telling his people how to chart the course of the river, drawing a map of it. His father told him that he had killed the river.

He had de-mythologized it, tamed it, dissected and exposed it, destroying its mystery and living identity for the tribe.

Heraclitus similarly was saying that the different temporal instances of the river have no internal unity, no sense in which they can be called objectively “one”. We cannot step into the same river twice. That is to destroy its individual identity.

But we humans, not to mention many animals, can meaningfully find the Mississippi, go away from it and then find it again. We can identify it and then reidentify it. In a perfectly meaningful sense, we “know” the Mississippi. We may add our own story-line to the river, but generations of people have known how to live with it.

Heraclitus had a problem with rivers (and thus with any physical object) because he was trying to locate its total identity within the object itself, presupposing some kind of physical (almost Newtonian) object “out there”, independently of observers.

But physical objects have identity and knowability largely invested in the use to which they are put. Their bare-bones physical structure and nature is only the start of their significance. Inanimate objects are put to use by higher order, sentient and purposeful beings, building on their original physical characteristics.

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**E. Berkeley, Virtual Reality..., & Stability - Ontological & Moral**

**E-1. Persons -- The Two-Stability Anchor Against Solipsism**

We have said enough about a Berkeleyan cosmology that the reader will now be familiar with the basic concepts, so it seems appropriate to address more deeply some responses which might be forthcoming about the good Bishop of Cloyne’s way of seeing things.

The term ‘virtual’ comes from the Latin ‘vir’, meaning man, from which we get ‘virtue’, or strength, manliness, etc.

Somehow ‘virtual’ has gotten translated into computerese, referring to a temporary kind of memory in
which programs can run temporarily. From there it has come to be used in “virtual space”, meaning cyber-space, a “virtual reality”.

The term which once meant strength and stability now implies something almost fake, but which has come to dominate the consciousness of Westerners as we spend more of our time enthralled by events in cyber-virtual-space. Virtual reality now suggests something in a “Let’s Pretend” world, but which has enormous effect, for many people, actually replacing more substantial reality.

For those very reasons, the virtual story becomes a parable for helping to explain a Berkeleian cosmology.

One one hand, it is disturbing to think that the “real” world of Newtonian atoms, mass, inertia, etc. is not, after all, a real and objective world. It seems, perhaps, as though substance has been drained of physical reality. How can we trust our changing senses if there is no permanent world behind them?

Yet we happily spend hours at a screen looking intently at a reality which is “virtual” in almost precisely that sense.

Events on a computer or TV screen are not causally connected to each other. The bat on the screen at the ball game does not hit the ball over the fence because phenomena (pictures on a screen, or in my sensorium) have no causal properties such that they can cause other phenomena to react. It just “looks like” that -- Hume’s habits of the mind. It is all caused by a cathode ray tube emitting electrons (or whatever) which hit a phosphorescent screen, creating the moving pictures we see. It is all caused by something behind the screen, not by causal interactions between phenomena on the screen.

We know that, but get drawn into the story-line nevertheless. It bothers us very little that we are watching only (literally) moving pictures, not a real ball game. We believe that there is (sometimes) a “real” game out there corresponding to what we see. The pictures are assumed to be giving us information about a real event out there.

But in increasing numbers of video games, for example, that reality contact is abandoned -- such as sometimes with Dungeons and Dragons. Persons have become so engrossed that they lost their sense of normal reality and were unable, without help, to leave their illusions.

Why, then, propose a cosmology which might seem to have much of that same ontological instability?

Part of the answer is that Western culture, so heavily based on de-ontologised, de-metaphysicalized, humanist science, has already long ago abandoned our presumed stable world of Newtonian atoms, etc., and certainly the moral world inherited from Biblical history.

Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, whether consciously or not, all drove us in a direction to doubt our perception of the Newtonian world of atoms. Newtonian atoms were “meta-”physical in exactly the same sense as was God. Secularists (and most of the rest of us) paid little attention to that problem because, whatever its theoretical difficulties, secular science seemed in practice to “work”, providing a stable foundation for understanding the world. And it was impersonal, thus ridding us of that pesky God “telling us what to do...”
But the erosion was taking place nevertheless, just as predicted by Berkeley. Relativity and quantum mechanics with its indeterminacy have put the seal on the grave of Newtonian inert substance.

So there is no point in blaming Berkeleian philosophy for its apparently odd character. We have been cast into phenomenalism by overwhelming evidence from all sides.

But the way we have done this has led to loss of the two primary stabilities of life -- ontological and moral. No civilization can withstand such loss. The Newtonian world undermined the moral and spiritual side with its secular-friendly implications and so was gleefully welcomed by atheists, but, by its very inertness, it also undermined its explanatory power for the physical world upon which atheism depended.

Darwinian evolution, relativity, Freudian psychology, quantum mechanics, two world wars, Engel vs. Vitale, Roe vs. Wade, non-directive education, and many other scientific, cultural, and political events have added to the impression that, at least so far as morality, truth, and religion go, the jig is up for most of Western Civilization.

But the hard sciences are equally at risk. If it is indeed the case that objective truth is gone, then we are left with only virtual reality. There is nothing else. It is all “virtual”. There is nothing but “Let’s Pretend”. Life, then, is only power struggle.

So there is no substance even to personal identity. As Oscar Wilde remarked, life is a pose. Or, again as an appropriately jaded youngster noted, “There is no right or wrong, only fun and boring.” That is not a foundation upon which science can be built or survive. It is the disintegration of all foundation and a prescription for disaster.

And that is no doubt why so many well-known philosophers have become systematic skeptics (seldom advertised to the public) about the possibility of knowledge and therefore of science itself.\(^{(249)}\)

The undermining of our sense of objectivity has been done quite handily with or without Berkeley. He just early saw it coming. The majority of Westerners, apparently, no longer believe in objective truth or objective morality. That means we no longer know how to have intelligent public discussion, including in science. It is increasingly manipulation and power struggle, with occasional interruptions of truth spoken.

Science goes on, of course, because it “works”, it gives power, if not wisdom, to those who use its techniques.

So a Biblical/Berkeleian cosmology, it would seem, is the only way we have of being intellectually responsible to the enormous legitimate advances of the natural sciences, and at the same time, recovering objectivity in truth, morality, and spirituality.

There is nothing in the impersonal worlds of either secularism or paganism which can rescue us from the collapse of objectivity. Only the personalist cosmos of the Bible can do that. Only a person at the other end of our perceptions and experiences can anchor down reality for us. Impersonal objects will not do. They have no anchoring or directing power. Only

\(^{(249)}\) See below, Chapter IV-F, “Behaviorism & Its Discontents” on page 142, especially subsection F-2, “Systematic Skepticism” on page 144
agents, other persons, can be the foundation for objectivity. Unless our world of space-time is anchored in personal relationships, it devolves into virtual reality -- relative truth, relative morality, and, finally, solipsism.\footnote{250} Or, short of that, some form of totalitarianism.

God, the personal cause and sustainer of created reality, can do the job which other ontologies cannot do -- provide both ontological and moral stability. And with moral and spiritual stability comes political stability.

E-2. Phenomena Can Be... Substantial & 4-Dimensional

So, in the Berkeleian world, God replaces the electron rays in the video tube because God causes the pictures we see. God also replaces the intelligent designs of those who built computers and who designed the software and our (routinely not-so-intelligent) TV programming.

How is God an improvement on anything? How is He a substantial answer to the demise of Western Civilization? Why is that not just a fairy tail to amuse or entrap us?

The response comes from several directions.

First, the deep, profound need for ontological and moral stability. No culture, no society, can long survive, sanity intact, without them. It is well worth our time to investigate, yes, even (or especially) in the “religious” direction, whether there might be a solution to these most basic of all human needs.

Secondly, the case for the reality of such a God is substantial, and will stand on its own feet. We have given some of that in the preceding pages, with more to come. There are good answers to the heart cries for help, for meaning and stability, from people all over the world.

Thirdly, the only alternative to the Biblical view is some form of cosmological evolution, whether pagan or secular. But even with the best of evidence and success, no case can be made that the Biblical view is false, only, at best, that there is a valid alternative to the Biblical view. The Biblical cosmology is more, not less comfortable with science than is the secular or pagan view.

Fourthly, the secular/pagan option is a disaster. Neither of them can actually make sense of life or of the world. The so-called Enlightenment was not that at all, it was a descent into a new Dark Age, leading to (among other things) the most brutal century in all human history -- the 20th.\footnote{251}

And fifthly, the Biblical cosmology and Good News are (1) logically compatible with science, (2) provide a better explanation for the rise of science, and (3) provide uniquely the (otherwise elusive) cosmic unity of apprehension upon which the logic of the empirical sciences depend.

250. C. S. Lewis’s story, The Great Divorce, describes hell as just such a place, where the inhabitants systematically distance themselves from each other so that finally they are all alone, living, one might imagine, in a silvered glass globe, surrounded only by the reflection of themselves. The ultimate self-centered world.

251. See the work of R. J. Rummel at www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/ where he documents the carnage wrought by government after government -- all through history the largest purveyor of tyranny and death. Centralization of power is a primary weapon of evil, and its greatest enemy is Judeo-Christian faith, whose God demands a limited government as given in the American Constitution.
The issue is: What creates the stability and reliability, both of our phenomena and of our own inner being? What gives us the objectivity of present perception and of reliability over time and space into future and far off places? Is the world a definable something with which we are dealing -- which we can trust and predict? a reliable pattern of behavior? Are we observing entities perduring over time in reasonable relationship to ourselves? Is science possible?

Berkeley’s view may seem unreal, it might seem to reduce the world -- cartoon-like -- to a flat screen with no depth.

But the phenomenal world does indeed have a third dimension, it is not “flat”. It has depth, meaning, substance, and objectivity quite independently of Newton’s atoms. One has only to look at his own world. There is no loss of empirical data in a Berkeleyian world. All the nuances of depth, light and shadow, poetry, drama, and life are there, life continues on. And the objects in the world change with time, giving them a meaningful fourth dimension.

On Berkeley’s view, we have what secular and pagan views lack, a substantial explanation for the orderliness and predictability of phenomena, that is, of the physical world.

So we can imagine a common sense phenomenal 4-D world which is reliable and predictable, the very one in which we live and function and relate -- if we understand that cause and effect is not attributable to an inert, un-get-at-able I-know-not-what, but to a true cause, a Person and persons.

Once we catch onto the truth that life is primarily about personal relationship, not about power, control, or feeling good, the loss of Newton’s atoms is seen to be no loss at all.

Only a personal Creator can supply these ontological and moral needs. That is the claim made in these pages, which will be proven or disproved in public debate -- which itself, perhaps, will be restored to some semblance of rationality and hope. We Christians have, on occasion, been instrumental in subverting the quest for truth, we might now be instrumental in restoring it.

God, surely, will not have it any other way.
Study Guide for Chapter III
Creation: a Dialogue with God

I. Summary:
In your own words, write a summary of the theme of this chapter, and make a personal application as is appropriate.

II. Questions on Chapter Three: A - The Dialogue
1. Explain the advantage of inert substance being at the same time its disadvantage.
2. What are the basic elements of the Berkeleian cosmos?
3. According to Berkeley, of what are our perceptions replicas, if not of some inert substance entity?
4. Discuss the big question put in the lap of phenomenalism by the loss of inert substance.
5. How does the author critique the notion of forming our worlds in infancy by putting together perceived bits and pieces?
6. Describe the problem of sameness of individuality between two people perceiving an object, and for one person seeing the same object twice.
7. What is the problem with A. J. Ayer’s notion of interphenomenal relationships?
8. How does a Berkeleian view establish harmony between views of the same object by different persons, and of objects seen by the same persons at different times?
9. Explain how freedom seems to be threatened, and how it is preserved in our dialogue with God.
10. What can we say that God perceives in the dialogue with His creatures?
11. How does man’s being made in the Image of God preserve our freedom in our dialogue with Him?

B. Object-hood: Sense Data & Interaction.
12. In what part of our dialogue with God might error occur in perception?
13. How might the Rorschach analogy help explain error in perception?
14. Why is the difference between passive observation and interaction so important in the child’s learning the meaning of object-hood?
15. Describe the unintended consequence which might happen if one were to go back to an infantile stage to understand his own perceptions. Discuss in terms of “pure sense data” and “less understood” sense data.
16. Describe the role of expectation and intention in the perception process.
17. Describe how infants discover the world of “bits and pieces”, ways they do not discover the world’s complexity, and how the role of interaction is fundamentally different from reasoning from passive observation.
18. What is a “material cause”?

C - Perceptual Objecthood: General & Particular
19. Explain how the Hebrew language shows particularity and generality differently from English.
20. Discuss how Parmenides raises at the dawn of western philosophy many of the problems being discussed here, for which the Bible and Bishop George Berkeley might have some answers.
21. How is grammar “logic in the trenches”?
22. Describe the differences between the Hebrew and pagan notions of “substance”.
23. How do these differences in “substance” apply to the relative notions of “peace”?
24. To what ultimately are all predicates applied in the pagan and Biblical
25. What is one reason suggested by the author for the Hebrews not having engaged in abstract philosophy?

26. In what sense can we perceive the fact of our being caused, our ontological stability or instability?

**D - Internal & External Unity**

27. What is the distinction between internal and external relations? Give examples.

28. How have nominalists differed from realists on the subject?

29. How does unity come “in degrees”? Give examples.

30. How is purpose always bestowed as a part of the being of any complicated object?

31. Does the author point to an adequate replacement for the Newtonian inert substance objects and also avoid the phenomenalist trap of subjectivity? Explain.

32. Was Heraclitus right about his river? Or was Huck Finn? And why so?

**E - Berkeley, Virtual Reality..., & Stability - Ontological & Moral.**

33. Discuss the way “virtual reality” can be used to pose the dilemma of lost objectivity.

34. Do you see any alternative to Berkeley’s proposal for the recovery of objectivity?

35. How did the Newtonian worldview subvert the very worldview which atheists adopted as their own?

36. Why are the hard sciences at risk?

37. Is there anything in the secular or pagan worlds which can rescue objectivity?

38. Do the author’s three responses to potential challenges seem to be credible?

39. Does the Berkeleian cosmos lose solidity, substance, and become “flat”, or can this objection be met?

**Chapter Reflections:**

In your own words, relate your new insights from reading and meditating on the information contained within this chapter. What difference would it make to you personally whether the claims and assertions of this chapter were true or not?
The Community of Creation

In the previous chapter, we were building up a picture of the material world as such, and of the way in which we come to form our notions of objects. We turn now to the material world as it provides a meeting ground, not only for oneself and God, but for oneself and other created agents. We live in a phenomenal world which is our interface primarily with other persons, not primarily with inert physical objects.

But, how do we know that there are other minds? And even if there are, how do we ever come to know and communicate with them? Are they somehow hidden from us by the veil of flesh?

I hope to show is that the problem has often been come at from the wrong end, that human beings do not begin with an impersonal view of the world and that therefore we do not have to look for evidence for ascribing personality.

Rather we do begin as children, and should begin philosophically, with an notion of an active world out of which later arises a personal-impersonal distinction in which even the impersonal is the activity of a personal agent.

This will lead us through the various problems currently discussed concerning deception, dispositions, and whether planning is a “ghostly” event, in short the problems which can arise out of behaviorist view of other minds.

Our conclusion will be that behaviorism, like methodological naturalism, can be a helpful methodology, but it fails as an ontology, in this case, of other minds.

A. Discovering the Personal “Other”

A-1. Infants and Mom

Let us begin at the beginning, that is, with a question: How is it that we ever come to think of the “other”, the not-self or any part thereof, as anything personal or as anything remotely resembling ourselves?

One might suppose that infants as they mature come to realize the similarity in shape between their own bodies and those of other people, that these bodies make some of the same
noises and do some of the same sorts of things as they do. And thus they conclude that those other things are conscious beings “like me”.

The fallacy of this supposition is that infants clearly come to have a personal notion of the “other” long before they could recognize the various empirical similarities between themselves and others, let alone draw conclusions about these similarities.\(^{(252)}\) In fact, if psychologists are generally correct, infants treat widely dissimilar objects as personal. Animism is closer to the mind of the infant than the world of inert substance or the un-deviating world of scientific law.

From where, then, does this idea of a personal world come? Is it simply a monstrous generalization from oneself, that the whole world is “like me”? But this is unlikely, since it appears that the infant comes to know what “me” is through interaction with the world. The infant's self-concept grows only slowly and often painfully into anything like what we would today call a mature notion of a person.

Nevertheless, it seems that the infant begins with a notion of the world as personal in the sense of being something that will respond to its needs, its crying, its laughing, etc., and the world as something to which it responds. The response of the infant to the world is by no means automatic but is a purposive response tied up with goals and possibility of attainment.

Such would seem to be the indication, for example, of the deaths of some infants who are well supplied with food and warmth in orphanages, but who are severely deprived of emotional affection, cuddling, fondling, etc. It would suggest that the infant finds some meaning, however crude, for its own existence, some sign of being in a friendly or unfriendly world.\(^{(253)}\)

If we are to track down the roots of the notion of personality, we must look into the logic of this first primitive experience, for there, if anywhere, is the ground of our notion of what it means to be a person.\(^{(254)}\)

### A-2. How Our Bodies Anchor Us in the Perceptual World

P. F. Strawson in *Individuals* traces the notion of being a person to a primal unity of body and mind:

> There would be no question of ascribing one's own states of consciousness, or experiences, to anything, unless one also ascribed, or were ready and able to ascribe, states of consciousness, or experiences, to

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\(^{(252)}\) Allan A. Munn makes the same point in *Free-will and Determinism*, chap. I, esp. p. 27 ff. One must, of course, recognize the problematic nature of knowing what infants experience.

A further fallacy might be mentioned, that of the “objective observer”. One, as an observer, might well compare two external things which look and behave alike, concluding that they are of the same species. But one does not experience himself in the same manner that he experiences other persons.

That is indeed the problem. One does not have a chance in infancy to see one’s own shape and compare it with other persons’s shapes, at least not as a whole. Comparison there must no doubt be, but it is not sufficient to explain the ascription of personality to the not-self. The comparison explanation tends to assume unawares notions appropriate only to an objective observer situation.

\(^{(253)}\) John Macmurray in *The Self as Agent*, esp. p. 38 and chap. 5, takes a somewhat similar view. Cf. also *Persons in Relation*, esp. chap. 2 & 3.

Asio, Preface, “What is Metaphysics?” on page xli

\(^{(254)}\) Similarly, D. Emmet, *The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking*, p. 63-4

See also Bibliography for a cassette tape, *The Expanding Circle of Mother and the Search for Father* by Earle Fox on how worldview and personal growth intersect.
other individual entities of the same logical type as that thing to which one ascribes one's own states of consciousness. The condition of reckoning oneself as a subject of such predicates is that one should also reckon others as subjects of such predicates. The condition, in turn, of this being possible, is that one should be able to distinguish from one another, to pick out or identify, different subjects of such predicates, i.e. different individuals of the type concerned. The condition, in turn, of this being possible is that the individuals concerned, including oneself, should be of a certain unique type: of a type, namely, such that to each individual of that type there must be ascribed, or ascribable, both states of consciousness and corporeal characteristics. (255) (Fox emphasis.)

This type to which both states of consciousness and corporeal characteristics are ascribable is what Strawson means by the word 'person', a concept which, he says, is primitive. (256) That is, it is not to be analyzed or broken down, e.g. in terms of an ego plus a body. Such an analysis would lead to the Cartesian dualism which makes the above quoted conditions impossible, and thus makes ascription either to oneself or to another of states of consciousness impossible or meaningless.

In the Berkeleian view that we are developing, however, this problem of ascription and of the unity of body and soul takes on a quite different character. On this view, we can no longer talk about those physical bodies "out there" which we feel, see, hear, smell, and taste with our own physical bodies. We can talk only of what we do perceive, i.e. the perceptions themselves, not of any physical thing beyond them which they are supposed to picture or smell like.

Our own bodies, moreover, are just as much perceptual events as the bodies of others, occurring within the same perceptual framework as the bodies of others; and therefore caused to appear in our consciousness by an external agent just as our other perceptions.

To drive the point home, in an important sense, we do not see with our eyes, for our eyes themselves are perceptual objects occurring in the perceptual field. This whole field of perception, including our eyes, is a given content of consciousness. Our bodies are, in that sense, part of the not-self equally with other perceptual objects.

The essential difference then between our bodies and other perceptual objects are the associations we come to make with this object we call our body, and the unique orientation it gives us with respect to all other perceptual objects.

We arrive at some seemingly strange conclusions, but which, once recognized, force their reality upon us.

For example, my body around my eyeball literally surrounds the rest of my visual field, so that I can always locate my body as distinct from someone else's.

The diagram used to illustrate Berkeley in the introduction (257) must therefore be revised to accommodate this fact -- that the perceiving subject exists as the periphery of his visual field, and that his notion of having his own position at the center of a circular horizon comes only after he begins to understand his visual field in three-di-

255. *Individuals*, p. 104.
257. See Introduction, "Fig. I-D-1b. George Berkeley" on page 18
A-3. Spatial Relations in a Berkeleian World

Space, then, is in this sense a construct, a kind of x-y-z mental metric, not an “out there” objective entity. The usual diagram of a subject-object gap, Figure IV-A-2a --, gives way to a more Berkeleian approach, Figure IV-A-2b:

Both figures IV-A-2a and IV-A-2b are diagrams of two persons looking at each other. In IV-A-2a, the bodies of the subject (S) and the object (O) exist in space “out there”, and the images each of the other exist in their respective sensoria -- i.e., “in” their heads.

In IV-A-2b, the empty space disappears, the visual sensorium is represented by S’s image of O surrounded by S’s own skin around his eye, which fades off into the black of his inner eye. Likewise for O's view of S. We (I, the writer, and you, the reader) are looking at O through S's eyes, not from the eyes of an imaginary objective third observer, as is the case in IV-A-2a. The empty space has collapsed, and there is simply a symbolic line between S and O.

The meaning of this is not that S and O have no spatial relation, but that their spatial relation has meaning only within their own personal perceptual framework, and none apart from it. As spiritual beings, as persons, they do not have a spatial relation. But their bodies have a spatial relation within the visual field which both

Fig. IV-A-2a. Space & the Visual Field: Traditional Newtonian
One cannot get lost in one’s own “world view” because the eye socket surrounds the whole visual field, and, paradoxically, puts one at the center of one’s own cosmos. By surrounding my visual field, I am at the center of it. I cannot be mistaken about who is having my perceptions, or where I am in the x-y-z coordinates. I am always at 0,0,0, the center of my own cosmos, always seeing things from my point of view. That is not self-centeredness in some pejorative sense -- it is necessary to making spatial communication possible. It locates other persons relative to me, and vice-versa. It is part of the definition of what it means to be ourselves.

The world is thus the framework within which spirits can communicate. Even angels, it seems, have bodies, as did the resurrected Jesus.

What is relied upon cannot be focused upon, in this case, the eye itself. As with a camera picture, the camera itself never appears, although the hands and feet of the picture taker could.

(Discerning how this might be worked out with touch, hearing, smell, and taste would make someone another interesting project.)

One might read Strawson’s *Individuals*, Part I, with the above points in mind as an exercise in understanding the Berkeleian framework.

**A-4. A Definition of ‘Person’**

The line, therefore, between the self and the non-self is not to be drawn between one’s own body and other bodies. We must retreat further back and draw the line between the subject and whatever it perceives, including its own body. The line must be drawn to distinguish the self as perceiver from God and His activity in causing...
perceptions. But this relation is reciprocal, the creation is a dialogue. Man is also a cause and God a perceiver.

We arrive thus at a new notion of the meaning of ‘person’, not as that to which both corporeal and mental predicates can be ascribed (as per Strawson), but as that to which both cause and effect can be ascribed.\(^{258}\)

This is a more general statement of Strawson's formulation, one which does not so much discard as rearrange his notion of person.

To illustrate, let us begin by limiting the world to two agents, God and one creature. On Strawson's view, the corporeal characteristics assignable to the person would be his body, and the assignable mental characteristics would be his thoughts, emotions, etc., and perhaps also his sense data.

On our present view, the corporeal characteristics, the body, are not different in kind from other sense data. The body is distinguished from other sense data by its unique relation to the self in the context of these other perceptual objects. All corporeality, including, but not only, one's body, is an effect perceived by the creature and caused by God.

Being an effect from without, corporeality can be called an objective state of consciousness because it is not dependent on the will of the self for its existence.

Mental states include also the subjective states of consciousness, i.e. purposes, desires, etc., which are caused by the creature and perceived by God. Also here we have feelings and emotions which are a combination of cause and effect involving the creature's relationship with the other. To be capable of cause and effect is to be capable of receiving perceptions (effect) and of having purposes (causing).

So long as we are careful to specify what we mean, then, we can agree with Berkeley who suggested that the world is God's body.\(^{259}\) That is, we ascribe the world, with all its corporeality, to the activity of God. And in some sense parallel to a human body, the world therefore reveals God to us.

Generally, one might say that a body is the corporeal object which uniquely reveals some agent. In that sense, the world uniquely reveals its creator. “The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament proclaims His handiwork...” Psalm 19:1.

It is clear then that the term ‘person’ applies to God as well as humans, for we ascribe both cause and effect to God primordially. He causes our phenomenal world, and perceives our willing.

Our bodies, then, as God “sees” them, are not the bodies we see. For God causes, not perceives the bodies we see. So far as God is concerned, our “bodies”, that which He perceives which uniquely individuates and reveals us to Him, would be the product of our willing, desires, purposes, etc. representing ourselves as we cause God to perceive them. To ask what this “looks like” to God is probably to ask a hopeless question, like asking whether two people “really” see the same thing when they both see green.

\(^{258}\) Compare Strawson above, page 120. See also, “Free Agent - a Definition” on page 161, for update on definition of a freewill person.

A-5. The Primitive Meaning of Person as Cause & Effect

Now let us return to Strawson's argument. He has raised two questions in the chapter, “Persons”. The first (Why are one's states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all?) he answers by showing that states of consciousness cannot be talked about at all as particular states of consciousness unless talked of as being “owned” by some being in a non-transferable sense.\(^{(260)}\)

The second question (Why are states of consciousness ascribed to the very same thing as certain corporeal characteristics, a certain physical situation, etc.?) he answers by saying that the word ‘person’ is a primitive unity such that both mental and corporeal characteristics are applicable.

The two characteristics I altered to cause and effect, remembering that we are still working on the hypothesis of only two agents, God and one creature.

In effect this would be the situation of the infant and mother since the “other” is not in the beginning for him distinguished into a meaningful plurality, and mother at that stage of life appears in the role of God as the all-encompassing source of one’s being.

So, let us unpack the sense in which ‘person’ is a primitive concept.

The problem of ascribing predicates cannot arise for a solipsist, for, as Strawson points out, ascription can be a problem only when there “could be a question of identifying that to which the ascription is made,” and this question can hardly arise when that is oneself.\(^{(261)}\)

Why then do so few infants grow up to be solipsists? The answer surely lies in the nature of the dialogue of creation itself. If ‘to perceive’ is in fact ‘to be caused to perceive’, then what the infant is presented with in its very first perceptions is activity intruding in up on its consciousness. We must have an innate ability to distinguish between what we cause, i.e., our own imaginings, and what is caused from an external source -- or we would have no capacity to distinguish at all between subjective and objective.

To have a perceptual framework at all, let alone a clear and distinct perception, implies meeting an agent other than oneself (except in the case of hallucinations which could be caused by oneself).

It seems fair to assume that even an infant has some crude realization that this world of perception is not of its own making, or at least that it will soon discover this when it finds that it cannot unmake or remake it after its own designs.

On the other hand, if the infant is in good care, it also finds sooner or later that it can produce certain effects, such as obtain food when hungry by crying. And so the dialogue proceeds.

It is in the dialogue between the self and the other that the concept of cause and effect comes to have meaning. One is not told about the meaning of being a cause or experiencing an effect, nor does one reason this out. There could not yet be any concepts or experiences known to the infant in terms of which cause and effect could be put together. They are the primitive concepts. One has this presented

\(^{260}\) Individuals, p. 94-8.

\(^{261}\) Ibid. p. 100.
in experience *as such*. To have an experience at all, i.e., to experience an event, is to be one term in a cause-effect relationship.

It is this experience, in which one learns the meaning of cause and effect, which provides the basis for all other concepts of empiricism, and by which the empirical or perceptual world is structured.

This, of course, fits with our explanation of ‘cause’, ‘exist’, and ‘possible’ in the previous chapters. They are the philosophical “atoms”, the unbreakable, irreducible primary meanings, of any possible experience. The very possibility of meaningful experience is wrapped up with and founded upon the notion of “sufficient cause”.

The verb ‘to happen’, insofar as it refers to a perception, is a reciprocal concept, implying a perceiving self and a causing other. Thus all more impersonal and abstract meanings for ‘event’, ‘happen’, ‘law’, ‘cause’, etc., as scientists use them, are derivatives from the primitive and personal meaning of cause and effect -- as is consistent with the Berkeleian view of the cosmos.(262)

A-6. Ascribing Personhood

As we said above, impartiality, trustworthiness, reliability, etc., can be qualities of persons far more readily than of an inherently undetectable inert substance, or of any other inherently impersonal thing.(263) The metaphysical reality of persons as the basic building blocks of the cosmos denies us the ability to ascribe reliability primarily to impersonal objects.

That being so, it is an error to believe that personal objects emerge out of the prior impersonal. Rather, the impersonal is a diminution of the original personal. We begin as persons, learning from our engagement with mother and father the very meaning of personhood, that is, of cause and effect. Even the most rudimentary experiences of life begin as relational and personal. The beginning glimmerings of life are not impersonality emerging into personality, but immature personality emerging into the fullness of personhood.

Impersonality begins, then, (1) by discerning the difference between persons such as parents, and objects such as one’s bed, (2) by learning abstract thinking, and (3) by retreat, defensiveness, and self-isolation. In the latter, we isolate ourselves from persons and personal relationships, thus depersonalizing our whole world experience, including ourselves.

The discovery of the personal other, we can fairly conclude, is not a case of beginning with impersonal experiences (such as sense data) and then ascribing some characteristic called ‘personal’ to them. The discovery of the other is both and at the same time the discovery of the self and of the meaning of personhood. It is in the discovery of the self and the other (reciprocal cause and effect) that the meaning of ‘person’ is given.

The best example is where it all begins making our first ascriptions of personhood, in infancy.

It was discovered in orphanages that babies who were perfectly healthy physically, well fed, etc., but not cuddled and held, would, with no understandable explanation, die. At a Ger-
man orphanage, a woman volunteer on her own came in, and went around holding and cuddling the babies. It was noticed that those children did not die.

Those children felt loved, they connected with “mother” in some personal way that inspired them to seek life, not death. They perceived a person, not just an impersonal orphanage health-machine. Even small babies know how to ascribe personhood, and know when they are being loved.

Mothers at home, of course, know this intuitively. The behaviorist notion that we are machines, and can be treated as such, is lethal to our health and welfare.

We are not discovering a “ghost in a machine”. We are already the ghost, the spirit, discovering the impersonal machine aspect by the three steps five paragraphs above.

This discovery and understanding of the personal and the impersonal is a slow process beginning with the first peep of a perception and perhaps not ending at all through the whole of one’s life.

We must begin with an original awareness of what I do as distinct from what is done to me -- the experience of cause and effect. The experience of being an effect creates its own awareness of vulnerability. We need certain effects (food, warmth, love) merely to continue surviving.(264)

The meaning of being a person grows, for example, as the child discovers that some events occur impersonally or indiscriminately while others, the more personal, occur discriminately with respect to persons involved.

Another leap in the discovery of personhood would be learning how to say “no”, often irritating to parents, the time of the “terrible two’s.” Learning to say “no” gracefully and truthfully is necessary to emerging personhood because one’s “yes” is meaningless until one has the option of saying “no”.

We learn about the self, the other, and the meaning of personal all in the same inextricable experience. The problem of ascription never arises; it is rather a problem of learning what will later be ascribed as one begins to discover a plurality of persons, and to distinguish between personal and impersonal objects.

The Biblical notion of the Fall can be described as partially the warping, or the failure to develop, of these personal notions of cause and effect, the confusion of personal and impersonal, and hence of personhood and personal relationships. The Image of God, in which we are made, cannot develop or be understood in such chaotic conditions.

Elaborate...... above Cause and effect first personal, not impersonal. WE are causes. Not inert matter

All causes are ultimately personal diff bertween law and cause.

If there can be no question of ascription of states of consciousness or of personality when the possessor of these states is oneself, there can also be no question of ascription of personality or agency when there are only two beings, that is, the self and the other. Or at least, under these condi-
tions the possibility of confusion is minimal.

The problem of ascription arises when the self begins to discriminate between a plurality of selves in the other, or between personal and impersonal beings in the other, or in deciding what sort of mental state should be ascribed to the other.

To these problems we now turn.

B. Body-Mind Ascription in a Plural “Other”

B-1. How My Body Reveals Uniquely Me

If we now complicate our world by adding more than one creature to it, body-mind ascription becomes a problem indeed. Not only must we find out in what sense mental activities can be associated with a given body, but what sort of mental activities they might be in any particular case.

I want to show that perception of another person by a creature is causally a co-operative venture between God and the other person, and from there proceed to elaborate the personal-impersonal distinction, leading to the problem of deception or error concerning particular mental states in particular persons.

First we must recognize that (according to the previous section) it is not a question of whether a mind or agent is involved. The fact of a perception presupposes that an agent is causing it. It is rather a question of the kind of relation the other agent might have to this body I see and whether this agent is distinct from other agents.

Secondly, it will help to clear the discussion if we keep in mind that since the agent is the basic substance, metaphysically it is the agent or cause to which things are ascribed. That is, we ascribe the body to the agent, not the agent or mind to the body.

Epistemologically the order may run in the opposite direction, since we often see the body first and then decide that this is a person rather than a robot or a statue. In that sense we might be said to be ascribing a mind or agent to the body. But the ontological priority of the agent remains.

The case would be otherwise if we were dealing with inert substance, for in that case the agent could claim no priority over the inert substance, and we would be again embroiled in trying to relate two unrelatable concepts.

In the case of the universe with only two agents, God and a creature, it is not hard to see in what sense we ascribe the perceptual world to God. We simply attribute the world to God’s creative activity. But if the bodies of other persons are part of the perceptual world and therefore to be attributed to God, we are left to find a sense in which they can also be attributed to John Jones or Amy Smith since neither Jones nor Smith can be said to cause their own bodies in the sense that God causes bodies.

What John Jones does cause in the dialogue of creation is God’s perception of his own will, his purposes, hopes, etc. That being the case, the dialogue of creation brings together a plurality of agent’s through God’s presenting (by way of the perceptual object which other agents come to know as Jones’s body) Jones’s purposes,
etc., to these other agents. Thus while we cannot ascribe Jones's body as perceptual object to Jones, yet we can ascribe to John Jones the purposes this body conveys, the relations it establishes, and the intent of many of the activities it performs within our perceptual framework. In that sense it is Jones' body.

Our bodies then are co-operative affairs. Jones's body, his means of communication with other agents, is a co-operative venture between himself and God.

On this Berkeleian view, the chief significance of bodies becomes that of individuation and communication. The individuation point is clearly brought home by Strawson in the first three chapters of *Individuals*. This becomes exceedingly relevant when John Jones falls in love with Amy Smith, for John and Amy are then not just two people who happened to meet, but they become God's special gift to each other in the dialogue of creation. It is crucial that they know whose body is whose.

Returning to the form and matter analysis, God contributes the perceptual matter, we contribute the form of activity and purpose, and so build relationships. To say that I have a body is to say that there is one perceptual object within the perceptual frameworks of at least certain agents which uniquely conveys my intentions to these agents, and by which I establish relations with them.

**B-2. Personal & Impersonal Bodies**

But how does a person come to distinguish between personal and impersonal bodies? Why do we ascribe minds to some objects and not to others?

The question is often put to suggest that the burden of proof lies on the person who does so ascribe personhood to objects such as human bodies. We are surrounded by a world of inert perceptual objects, but we cannot see, touch, or hear minds. And so, even if we are forced to admit a first cause behind the perceptual world as a whole, why must I conclude that there is any more to John Jones as a particular object than a certain body and its behavior?

But if the previous section was moving in the right direction, then some false assumptions are made when the question is put in this way, influenced largely, no doubt, by a lingering inert substance notion.

First of all, it does not appear true that a child understands himself to be in anything like a world of inert perceptual objects. He begins in a world which is one, the “other”, and which is personal, mother. Mother is personal in the sense of being a part of the infant's perceptual field, and the more so because within that field she represents not only the active, communicating aspect, but the comforting and life-sustaining aspect.\(^{265}\)

So the problem for the child is not picking out the personal from a welter of impersonal objects, but discovering that there are impersonal objects at all. Mother, it soon turns out, is only one of many objects, and not all of these are soft, warm, and bring food.

In this area, psychology and metaphysics are joined like Siamese twins, as was indeed true of almost all an-

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265. A superb book on these issues is *The Secret Life of the Unborn Child* by Thomas Verney.
cient philosophy. Only modern secularism separates them.

This primitive experience of the child is that of being a person and *ipso facto* elaborating the “self” concept and the “other” concept through interaction. As mother begins to stand out as one individual among many, so will other objects such as crib, clothes, etc., so that the child finds that he can have certain sorts of relationships with mother and other kinds of relationships with cribs and clothes. Certain objects will respond to crying and cooing. Others will not. Certain objects one can deal with, bargain with, obtain desired results from. Others behave in the same manner no matter how much you badger and coax.

In short, the distinction between personal and impersonal arises for the child as a distinction within the primitively personal “other” between objects which behave with partiality toward himself and objects which behave impartially and indiscriminately. (The child does not have the common secular insistence on an absolutely impartial-because-impersonal “other”. The child thrives on a personal other. Indeed, it retreats within itself and ultimately dies without one.)

The problem of ascription of minds to bodies is thus in the first instance not a problem at all. The distinction between some things being alive and others dead or inert would not have arisen for the infant until after having experienced the differing types of behavior that ‘living’ and ‘dead’ signify. The first knowledge of personality is non-inferential, it is given. There would at first be only the “other” which would be “alive” if only because it was there at all. And mother, being the chief factor in this primitive “other”, emerges as a kind of archetypal person representing the “other”.

All pagan cosmologies issue out of this relationship to *Magna Mater*, the Great Mother. The coming of the Biblical worldview ca. 1900 BC, and the experience of a personal and individual I AM source of all things led to a radically different notion of individuality and personal value. Because we are all born little pagans, worshipping our mothers and then our fathers, we needed, we are told (John 3:1-11), to be “born again”, to have a second birth into the family of the Creator/Sovereign of all things. (266)

Because the infant does not at first distinguish between mother, the person, and mother, the whole environment or the whole perceptual world, he already has everything necessary to see his particular mother as a person when the rest of the environment begins to settle into the background of the comparatively impersonal. (267)

The idea of the “other” already contains the personality which we, in our philosophical backwardness, have been trying to find how to ascribe.

**B-3. Discovering the “Atoms”**

Rather than ‘exist’, ‘cause’, ‘effect’, and ‘possibility’ being the atoms, the unsplittable elements of ideas, one almost wants to say that these concepts are so tied together that they are more like the protons, neutrons, and electrons which make up the basic

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266. This will be explained further in Vol. II, *Yahweh or the Great Mother?*

267. This original experience of “mother” as the archetypal whole cosmos is, I believe, the origin of the pagan notion of the earth as the Great Mother, the Gaia of ancient and neo-paganism. Mother was indeed the whole cosmos.
elements of the atom of meaning. We experience cause and effect, and as we develop expectations and desires, we discover the meaning of ‘possibility’.

We begin with experience, a perception of “something” which turns out to be mother. As events pass by, I discover sequence and time. That process is accelerated, no doubt, when mother does not respond as expected. I am not fed, cuddled, cleaned up, etc. The passage of time makes a difference. When satisfaction is long delayed, I begin to fear abandonment.

In all of that interchange, I discover possibilities and differences with the one other being in my universe. I discover myself as both cause and effect, and mother as cause and receiver of effects. I find that I can get my needs met by certain kinds of behavior, and thus cause mother to respond. I discover vulnerability and satisfaction -- and thus danger, fear, joy, desire, etc.

A further advance, then, is for the infant to discover that the “other” is a plurality, that there is more than one person and center of activity, and thence to discover that these many objects exhibit quite different types of behavior toward me. I learn to distinguish individuals, and to remember them when they disappear and return.

The notion of the impersonal is thus contained within and rises out of the notion of the personal. The problem of solipsism never arises, nor does the problem of how to get ghosts into or out of machines. The fact of the given activity (perception) is the evidence for the existence of some agent beyond oneself. And the inert substance machines never existed for the ghost to inhabit. There is only the perceptual object and the soul, the person.

B-4. Personal vs. Impersonal

Drawing now on our notion of the co-operative sense in which we can ascribe John Jones's body to John Jones, we have a basis in principle for the distinction between personal and impersonal perceptual objects.

Impersonal objects are those behaving according to definite rules under given conditions regardless of one's own purposes, desire, etc. Personal objects would be those which stand out among the impersonal in that one can influence their activity by communicating one's purposes, etc., to them. Human bodies present the purposive activity of agents in a way that bricks and stones do not.

Thus, though all perceptual objects are caused by one first cause, some of these objects can come to have a more specifically personal meaning than others since they present not only God's activity, but that of some created agent as well. The impersonal becomes the more or less neutral background or context within which the personal can operate, and provides the material with which created persons can work and communicate.

The first stage knowledge of mother is intuitive and immediate. But this second stage knowledge of persons in which the “other” has both become plural and divided into personal and impersonal is in part inferential knowledge. We infer from observation of behavior, in particular from response to our own activity, that an object is a statue or a person. (268)

The non-inferential knowledge of mother's personhood, is, we might say, borrowed from God, for whom we have the only totally non-inferential knowledge since God is the direct
cause of our perceptual field and hence the only agent directly affecting us.

This brings us right up face to face with the cosmological argument for God.

This would agree with St. Paul’s point that we are all without excuse for our dishonoring of God (Romans 1:18 ff.).

One might say, well and good, but we are still left with a problem of ascription as the behaviorist controversy shows. And true enough, we are. But it is not a problem of whether we have a basis in principle for ascribing a mind to a body. The problem is one of finding logically adequate grounds for saying whether any given body is a personal or impersonal object, and this can be done in practice.

The situation of a totally mindless perceptual event cannot arise since any perception we might have is the activity of some agent. The notion of an impersonal, mindless cosmos is something we learn, and then project back on the past, not a beginning perception of life.

We can distinguish then three senses in which ascription might need justification.

First we might ask, What is the basis for ascribing states of consciousness to any perceptual object at all? We begin by asserting that metaphysically the ascription is the other way, we must ascribe corporeal characteristics to agents, generally to God. Thus the “other” is basically personal, and the infant can come to know the meaning of self, other, and agent all in the same package.

Then secondly, having discovered the plurality of the world, and made a distinction between personal and impersonal, and having established a sense in which an object can present John Jones’s states of consciousness to Amy Smith, the problem of ascertaining whether or not this particular body does so can arise. The epistemological and inferential ascription of mental states to a body is the obverse of the metaphysical and non-inferential ascription of a body to some agent.

Thirdly we might ask for the logically adequate grounds for ascribing a particular mental state to a particular body. Granted that Jones has some thoughts and feelings, but how is Amy Smith ever to be sure his outward behavior reveals what they really are?

B-5. Intuiting the Presence of Persons

It might be suggested that all knowledge of persons is inferential, but that our knowledge of God is an inference from the existence of corporeal characteristics as such, whereas our knowledge of created agents is an inference from the behavior of certain particular bodies.

The former is a logically necessary inference if existence is to make any sense, and the latter is logically necessary if behavior within the world is to make sense.

There would seem then to be two primitive stages in learning what per-
sonhood meant, *first*, awareness of something at all, of the bare fact of something existing, and *secondly*, the attempt to engage with this something. For the infant to *do* anything about his perceptions, he would have to treat them as responsive to himself.

But one might well doubt that an infant could make such inferences.

One might also suggest, however, that the difference between nothing and then something is so obviously an activity that the inference gap disappears.

In any event, the inability of an infant to go through the inference process leads one to believe that there must be an inherent capacity to *intuit* between personal and impersonal objects. We in some sense “see” another person. We can be aware of the presence of a person, sometimes apart from a physical presence. This would qualify as a sixth sense, and a sixth dimension of reality.\(^{(269)}\)

It would be related to, but not the same as, sensing one’s own contingency on some cause outside of oneself. \(^{(270)}\) Sensing one’s cause is a relationship with God Himself. But we can sense the presence and reality of created persons as well.

Only with such a capacity to “see” other persons can we rise above inferred information about a person to direct personal relationships.

That difference is also the difference between formalized (and often “dead”) religion and personal relationship religion.

Likewise, John Jones does not fall in love with the sensory perception of Amy Smith or the history he knows about her, he falls in love with Amy Smith. Love is directed at persons, not their activities. Activities are properly the object of “liking”, not of loving.\(^{(271)}\)

Robots can probably be constructed to imitate any given behavior. But robots, as I. T. Ramsey notes, cannot own the behavior in a personal, self-conscious way. They can “fall in love with”, i.e., be programmed to imitate human loving behavior, but that is not loving another person in the human sense any more than a monkey (accidentally or programmed) typing out the *Iliad* is an intelligent act.

And, (unless we are very serious realists) we do not worship the logically or empirically derived idea of God, we worship God.

Neither falling in love nor worship make sense apart from a direct vision of Amy Smith or of God, some kind of unedited presence with each other.

Inferences do not produce God (unless the ontological argument for God is valid), rather they give one evidence to reasonably justify pursuit of personal relationship with such a deity.

### B-6. Some Wider Implications for Law, Grace, & Miracle

The metaphysical possibility of a vision of God, i.e., a sense of His personal presence, lies behind the common religious distinction between law

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269. The fifth dimension of reality (beyond the normal four) we have discussed as the dimension of causality. See above, III-D-2, “How We Perceive Causal, Metaphysical Substance” on page 105.

270. Ibid.

271. Lust might be considered Jones “falling in love” with his own feelings regarding Amy Smith, rather than with Amy Smith. Feelings then trump relationships.
and grace. If we have only a distant relation with God, receiving only letters from Him telling us “what to do” for that day, week, or year, we could not be said to have much personal relation or personal knowledge of Him. Where we are limited to an inferred relationship rather than personal acquaintance, we are also limited to a fairly rigid law relation because we can never know God Himself. We can know only the ideas and commands He communicates to us. We would be constantly guessing as to just how to interpret or enforce a given law.

But if we have a speaking acquaintance with Him, we can ask about how to use the law, which might allow for considerable freedom in tailoring the law to individual circumstances. Where we have a relationship of intimacy and personal communication, the law of love and grace at the top can reasonably override, govern, and enliven the impersonal limitations of all lower law.(272)

Grace and miracle then are not God playing favorites for His special people. They are in principle open to anyone who draw near to Him. Nor do miracles disrupt the steady and thus reliable nature of law so highly prized by secular scientists. Secular folks do need some foundation of reliability for their own security. If they cannot rely on a personal God, they must invent (or hope for) a platform of natural law which will not betray them into chaos.

One might reasonably imagine the Biblical world to be structured with three levels. At the top is the close relation with God and personally tunable natural laws. Jesus was disgusted that the disciples did not quell the storm threatening to drown them on the Sea of Galilee.(273)

In the Biblical view, a close personal relationship with God, and thus the personal tailoring of law to fit one’s individual circumstances, would be the norm. Miracles would not be the unnatural, as commonly understood today. They are God fine-tuning abstract law to His ultimate goal and law -- love (doing that which enhances life) for everyone.(274)

The second level would happen when we fell out of that close relationship. Natural laws would no longer be fine-tunable to flexibly conform to the highest law of love, but they would still have a steady, if impersonal, reliability.

In a third level, consequent to ever deeper pursuit of distance from God, the laws themselves would begin to fall apart, leading to the return to the original pagan chaos and dissolution of all things -- the Twilight of the Gods, Gotterdammerung.

272. That is no doubt why Jesus, as in Matthew 22:34 ff., chose the two Great Commandments from His scripture, the Old Testament.

273. See Matthew 8:23 and Mark 4:35.
274. Grace is actually a part of any reasonable legal system. Those who enforce laws are given an amount of discretion to decide whether the law ought to be enforce in this case. Juries in America are given the discretion to nullify the law when they believe it does not rightly apply to the given case. That is grace at work. It is an admission that no definition of abstract law will work for all cases -- short of the law of love, to do that which is both truthful and good for the person in question, that which promotes the fullness of life -- shalom.

For a discussion of the law of love, see Bibliography for Defining ‘Oughtness’ & ‘Love’
C. The Logic of Deception

C-1. Hidden Motives will Come Out

The question at hand is that of the knowledge of other minds: granted that other bodies do represent conscious beings like myself, how can I ever know for sure what their real feelings and thoughts are since I perceive directly only their bodies, not their feelings or thoughts. Or, as the "official" Cartesian theory would put it:

People can see, hear and jolt one another's bodies, but they are irremediably blind and deaf to the workings of one another's minds and inoperative upon them.(275)

It is not true, of course, de Cartes notwithstanding, that we are inoperative upon each other's minds, we do it all the time. Educators, advertizers, lovers, et al, thrive on it.

But that being said, there are two plausible ways in which a failure of communication might arise concerning one's feelings, purposes, etc. Either one does not know how to communicate to the observer, or he wishes for some reason to disguise his feelings and purposes from the observer.

If the person wanted to communicate and could not, he would soon find out. His problem would be to learn the language. A person might have problems should he move into a strange social or cultural environment where the clues by which he has learned to communicate have unintended meaning. Oriental facial expressions, for example, differ subtilely in meaning from Western expressions.

One could also suggest that Jones's body simply might not work for Jones or that it might play tricks on him. This, of course, would be to say that Jones' body was diseased or malformed or that God was playing tricks on Jones, that God was not causing the correct perceptual counter-part to Jones' will.

The questions of malformed bodies and of God's trustworthiness would take us far astray, and so we shall admit that they are logical possibilities, but for present purposes, pass them by.

We are left then with the possibility that Jones is deliberately deceiving us. For some reason he wants us to think that his purposes or feelings are other than they really are. Successful and sustained deception takes considerable energy and so is not likely to be an end in itself. So to suggest that Jones is deceiving us is also to suggest that he has a prior motive for doing so. There is some end for which his deceptions are a means. It is this prior motive that will govern the nature of his deception, as well as some feeling on his part that he is not able to gain his end by open and honest means.

It is interesting to note that, as Ryle points out, "keeping our thoughts to ourselves is a sophisticated accomplishment. It was not until the Middle Ages that people learned to read without reading aloud."(276) Deception and disguise probably does not come spontaneously, it is learned, and per-

276. Ibid., p. 27.
haps only under duress.

Let us suppose for the sake of ex-
ample that Jones is a candidate for an
electoral office who disguises his de-
sire for power and wealth from the
electorate by a show of good will.
There will be at least two circum-
stances when Jones will abandon his
deception.

He will do so first if he thinks that
his deception is working against him,
if, for example, he finds that his de-
ception is the wrong sort and gives the
electorate the wrong impression. He
may find (like Hitler) that outright
demagoguery is more effective than
sly milk and honey.

Secondly he will give up his de-
ception when he feels that he has
gained his end securely enough to re-
lax his guard. It is said that power
corrupts. Rather, power enables the al-
ready corrupt to fly their true colors.

The one thing that Jones cannot
do is hold to his deception under any
and all circumstances. For him to do
would be in effect for the deception to
swallow the reality. If a deception is a
deception, there must be some circum-
stances when the deceiver will unveil
himself.

Otherwise, first, there would be
no way empirically to distinguish a
deception from honesty, and sec-
ondly, the governing purpose of the
deception would be suffocated by its
own fabrication. Jones would never
have a chance to enjoy the power and
wealth which was his goal in the first
place. He would in fact be a man of
good will, so far as anyone else were
concerned, for there would then be no
circumstances when he would behave
otherwise.

Thus if the point of having a body
at all is essentially to establish identity
and communication, and thence to ac-
complish purposes within this com-
unity (and it is difficult to see how
purposes can be accomplished any-
where else), the question of deception
is not the bogey it might at first seem.
Sooner or later disguised purposes
come to light.

C-2. Outing the Ghost
in the Machine

Much of psychotherapy is based
on this principle, for the logic of de-
ception applies no less to the subcon-
scious than to the conscious. The
sharper one's detection of subtle body
clues, and the sharper one's ability to
observe behavior and hold it as a
plumb line against the ostensible be-
havior and professed intentions, the
more quickly will one be able to
pierce through to the “inner” motive
that guides one's conduct.

If our analysis is correct, then, we
do not look for a ghostly something
happening inside a machine, rather we
look at the “machine” itself which (in
the relevant sense) is the activity of
the “ghost”. The problem of discover-
ing what the inner motive really is can
arise only on the hypothesis that bod-
ies are inert machines which ghosts do
inhabit, which allows the suggestion
that ghosts can operate independently
of their machines. But if the essence
of a body is that it is the activity of the
agent, then such a problem of princi-
ple does not arise.

Wittgenstein, in a related context,
sees the point: “The human body is
the best picture of the human
soul.”(277) We might add, “The human
body in its activity...”

If one objects that perhaps Jones has other activities which go on independently of anything revealed by or through his body, we must say that that is a fascinating but quite academic suggestion. What Jones might do with his unobservable-in-principle activities which he has no intention of revealing, or what these activities might be, could concern no one but Jones. What we are interested in is how Jones wants to relate to us, i.e. his in some sense public behavior.

Presumably none of Jones's activities are hidden from God since what God “sees” is Jones's will or causing.

The “official” Cartesian theory then misses the point. For, communicating by way of the perceptual world is to be directly operative upon at least one other mind and to be operated upon by at least one other mind. The bugbear behind Cartesian dualism is the too, too solid flesh of inert substance still moldering in our metaphysical closets.

There remains, of course, the practical problem. And here it is quite clear that mistaken judgements are made. We all get away with our deceptions a discouragingly large number of times. But the gap between fact and fabrication is not a metaphysical gap between body and soul. We have in principle various means for putting Jones to the test. As our knowledge of psychological testing increases, deceptions become the more easily detected (and perhaps thus the more cleverly disguised).

The final test, however, is not the sort of thing that can be done with laboratory precision and detachment. The final test always involves commitment, e.g. entrusting Jones with power and seeing what he does with it. Really to know Jones, one must interact with Jones without erecting barriers of detachment.

I use ‘really’ here advisedly, for so long as one remains defensively detached from Jones, Jones may be encouraged to disguise his motives. For he too has a problem of deception by others to overcome and of testing for trustworthiness in those putting him to the test.

D. The Inductive Logic of Dispositions

D-1. Unobservable Mental Processes

This question of ascription of particular states to particular bodies has another facet discussed by Gilbert Ryle in *The Concept of Mind*. I have already suggested that the solution to the “ghost in the machine” problem lies in recognizing that the machine is not the sort of thing inhabitable by ghosts who could use the machine to portray to others occurrences going on “inside” the machine. Rather, the machine, or body, is a perceptual body which is a co-operative effort between God and the agent it presents.

But the ghost has been resurrected in these pages perhaps more than some would care to see, for the agent or self *per se* is not a perceptual object. So let us try to clarify further the relation of the body to the self.

One of Ryle's main thrusts has been aimed at unseating the notion
that one's mental processes were in some inner recesses unobservable in principle by any other than oneself. To a certain measure we agreed with this in the previous section by insisting that the activity of the “ghost” in large part is what is presented by one’s body, and that in the long run, one's inner processes must, indeed are intended to, come out into public view.

Thus Ryle writes: “...the styles and procedures of people's activities are the way their minds work and are not merely imperfect reflections of the postulated secret processes which were supposed to be the workings of their minds”.(278)

But he also writes: “Our inquiry is not into causes (and a fortiori not into occult causes), but into capacities, skills, habits, liabilities and bents.”(279)

I would insist on the contrary that a non-perceptual agent is necessarily implied by the ascription of capacities, skills, etc. to a body, which is not exhaustible in terms of the body and/or a description of its behavior.

If I assert Jones to be a ruthless politician, I am ascribing to him a certain disposition to behave in a given way. Clearly enough, this does not mean that Jones is either always ruthless or always acting in political matters. We would normally accept such an ascription if I could point to certain political events in which Jones did act ruthlessly. From such evidence we would be inclined to generalize on Jones's behavior, perhaps drawing the conclusion that he is unfit for public office. From a few observed facts we conclude a rule of expected behavior concerning Jones. Especially if we were the victim of his behavior.

**D-2. Internal Unity in Observed Processes**

But if this is the case, then we are assuming about the few observed events and any further events involving Jones and politics that there is some relation between these events which justifies our making the generalization from the few particulars.

The obvious and surely correct answer would be that these events are all related by the fact that it is Jones performing them. That is, the persistence of Jones as the identifiable agent of all these actions gives the series of actions an internal unity. The terms of the series of the politically ruthless events then can form relations which are part of a larger whole than the chance conjunction of the terms would form.

Without such an internal unity, one would be hard put to justify linking together the observed past with the unobserved future. We do not know that necessarily Jones will act politically in the future, but if he does, his actions, we think, will most likely be occasionally ruthless.

Our problem now is to show that the physical body we call Jones will not by itself suffice as the persisting self which can unify the events in the sense required for ascribing dispositions.

The most ready to hand answer is that Jones' body cannot be shown to persist if it is no more than a perceptual object, in which case it stops existing every time we blink our eyes or otherwise stop perceiving it. In order to unify our perceptions it would have

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at one time been thought proper to appeal to a non-perceptual material body as the enduring entity. We have, however, discarded this alternative.\textsuperscript{(280)}

It is certainly to be granted that we locate and identify Jones by his body, for as Strawson points out, "material bodies play a unique and fundamental role in particular-identification."\textsuperscript{(281)} But if we have argued correctly in Chapter III, material or perceptual bodies themselves depend for their persistence as the “same” object on an intentional ontology, the intention being that of the first cause.

Moreover, if we are to ascribe the disposition to Jones rather than to God, Jones must be both more than his body and more than simply an entity intentionally caused. Jones must himself be a real cause co-operating with God to express himself.

Strawson notes that states or experiences “owe their identity as particulars to the identity of the person whose states or experiences they are.”\textsuperscript{(282)}

Likewise the events which constitute examples of a disposition owe their identity as examples of that disposition to the identity of the agent whose actions they are. There is no sense in which a series of events can be called examples of a disposition unless they are also examples of a single, enduring-though-time agent's behavior.

The ascription of dispositions, tendencies, etc. involves a transition much like that made in inductive reasoning in natural science. And one can no more ascribe dispositions to a series of events than one can assign laws to classes of events without presupposing an internal unity within the series or class.

In other words, we do not assign dispositions to a series, but to an agent. The alternative, trying to make do with only a disposition and a series but no agent, would leave us with a series of events which was a purely accidental series. Relations within the series would not form part of a larger whole and so would not be internal. The only unity of the “disposition” would be one arbitrarily selected by an observer. Such a series could lead us up to but not beyond the present and therefore could tell us nothing at all of the future, no matter how consistent the observed series might have been.

Contrary to Ryle, then, in a very real sense our inquiry is into causes or agents, and these causes are necessarily presupposed by any talk of dispositions, capacities, skills, etc. The agent is not a perceptual object, and to insist that it be so is to commit a category mistake, for the agent is the cause of the perception or its dispositional activity. What we perceive in dispositions is the activity of agents.

As above, the enduring or eternal is the cause of the changing.\textsuperscript{(283)} It is thus the cause of the series of which the enduring itself is not a part, but that of which both the series and the disposition can be predicated, and without which the series falls apart like a rope of sand and the disposition does not exist. Only on this basis are we justified in extrapolating from a past series into the future to predict behavior or ascribe dispositions.

We shall take up “dispositions” of

\textsuperscript{280} See Chapter II-B, “The Problem of Sameness.”
\textsuperscript{281} P. F. Strawson, Individuals, p. 56.
\textsuperscript{282} P. F. Strawson, Individuals, p. 97.
\textsuperscript{283} See Chapter II-G, “Time and Eternity” on page 69
E. Planning and Imagination

E-1. Planning Precedes Action

Another attack on the ghost in the machine has been aimed at the notion that when a person does something intelligently, he is not thereby doing one thing but two:

To put it quite generally, the absurd assumption made by the intellectualist legend is this, that a performance of any sort inherits all its title to intelligence from some anterior internal operation of planning what to do.\(^\text{284}\)

Thus according to the alleged ghost theory under attack, every intelligent act involves first the planning of it and then its execution.

(\text{It should be noted that reference to a “ghost” rather than a “soul” is a politically correct way of undermining belief in a soul without quite saying so. It deftly piteously” mockingly into the hallowe’en category of “Let’s Pretend”}.)

In order to secure our notion of an active agent being presented to other agents by a body, we would do well to show that there is a meaningful sense in which planning and imagination operate prior to an intelligent action, indeed prior to any action at all as distinct from an accidental event.

Otherwise we are in danger of falling prey to a behaviorist concept of personhood in which what it means to be Jones can be exhausted in terms of a description of Jones’s body and his observed behavior. As Ryle does, however, I also wish to keep these anterior and interior events directly related to observable behavior.

Thus the point will be to show that a non-perceptible planning event does precede an intelligent act because that is our only way to distinguish intelligent from non-intelligent, yet agreeing that there is no “anterior internal operation of planning” entirely distinct from the action.

Ryle would dismiss the anterior planning from being the basis of calling an action intelligent on the grounds that there would then logically have to be a planning of the planning to decide whether the first planning was intelligent, and so ad infinitum.

He chooses to break the regress by saying first that although planning or thinking can take place mentally and unobserved by others, it can also take place quite openly and audibly, as when one calculates or reads aloud, and thus the thinking and the doing are clearly one and not two acts.

He maintains secondly that it is the skill involved in the operation, not its being inaudible or behind the scenes, that provides a basis for ascribing intelligence to an act.\(^\text{285}\)

But (quite apart from ‘skill’ involving the same inductive logic as dispositions), there are two senses of ‘intelligent’, that which is opposed to ‘dead’, ‘inert’, or ‘accidental’, and that

\(^{284}\) Gilbert Ryle, \textit{The Concept of Mind}, p. 31.

\(^{285}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 30-35, \textit{et al.}
which is opposed to `stupid'. Some of Ryle's examples suggest that he is thinking of the second case, whereas it is the first that is crucial.

Our need is for a distinction between an event with no particular significance and an event with an intended significance, or for a distinction between that which involves a mind and that which does not.

The difference lies precisely in the point that personal actions are intended or deliberate, whereas others are not. It is then on this first distinction that the second is built. An action being intelligent in the first sense, planned rather than accidental, can then be either intelligent (clever) or stupid, in the second sense.

If an action is not planned or deliberate, then it cannot be called either intelligent or stupid in the second sense. One's intelligence is judged by his ability to pursue an end. Thus an event is not an action except to the extent that it is intelligent (first sense), and only actions can be intelligent or stupid (second sense).

Planning, then, is at least logically prior to any action. That is, an action presupposes that an agent has perceived some possibility and chosen it as an end, otherwise it is not an action at all, but only an accidental event.

It follows also that if planning (a function of reason allied with imagination) involves the perception of a possibility, which is not yet a fact, then the planning cannot be simultaneous with the fact or action. Planning must be temporally as well as logically prior to the action. The agent perceives the future, some state of causal possibility wherein lies the intended action, from his own position in the present. And so it is logically impossible for the planning to be wholly one with the overt perceptual action.

The imagination is often taken to be a sort of plaything which responsible adults leave alone. And yet it is only our ability to imagine that allows us to plan or to perceive possibilities in a present situation. The great problem in psychotherapy as well as in all forms of creative work is often not to tie down a wild imagination, but to free the imagination from its fetters. Without our imaginations we could have no sense of futurity, no planning, no hope.

**E-2. Planning Actions**

Ryle draws a distinction between two types of explanation. In the first sort, an event is explained causally such as, “The glass broke because the stone struck it.” In the second sort we might say, “The glass broke because it was brittle.” Thus he writes:

Now 'brittle' is a dispositional adjective; that is to say, to describe the glass as brittle is to assert a general hypothetical proposition about the glass.

How does the law-like general hypothetical proposition work? It says, roughly, that the glass, if sharply struck or twisted, etc. would not dissolve or stretch or evaporate but fly into fragments.

...explanations by motive are explanations of the second type and not of the first type.

The statement 'he boasted from vanity' ought, on one view, to be constructed as saying that 'he boasted and the cause of his boasting was the occurrence in him of a particular feeling or impulse of vanity'. On the other view, it is to be construed as saying 'he boasted on meeting the stranger and his doing so satisfies the law-like proposition that whenever he finds a chance of securing the admiration and envy of others,
he does whatever he thinks will produce this admiration and envy.\footnote{286}

The first view is clearly false, for as Ryle points out, the vain man does not feel vain. And the second view is certainly on the right track by talking in terms of goals one seeks rather than feelings by which one is driven.\footnote{287}

But the second view relies on dispositions of “law-like” propositions, the very things which we concluded in the previous section entail the existence of an agent who was the cause (or chooser) of this disposition and to which the disposition could be ascribed.\footnote{288}

If the planning must take place before the action, we might ask, How long before? Can I plan the action today and execute it tomorrow? Ryle suggests the example of a clown trip ping and stumbling to the crowd's amusement and admiration.\footnote{289}[6]

Of course the clown is not stumbling in the ordinary sense, he is stumbling deliberately. We can easily imagine that on the previous day, he made plans to go through his act before the audience and then thought no more about it until the time came. Such planning is plausible and perhaps even necessary in some cases, but it is not the sort of planning we have been discussing which qualifies an action as intelligent rather than accidental.

Stumbling in the true sense of the word would be accidental, and therefore could be called neither clever or stupid, for such stumbling is not planned to begin with. The previous day's planning would not make the stumbling intelligent for such planning would be compatible with the clown's really stumbling in his act, if for example his mind should wander.

Here, it would seem, is where we find our answer. An act is intelligent (not accidental) if one's mind is “on it”, if it is deliberate. We have come in a circle -- the point being that the planning or deliberation must be immediately preceding the act. Or better, for an event to be an act, the event must be the successful termination of a plan. There is no gap between plan and event. Indeed they are all one act as the finishing of a race is not an event separable from the running of it.

Likewise, our clown might stumble accidentally, but it would not be an action on his part, for he had not planned it and so would not have initiated it. It would only be an accidental event involving himself.

Many events are not planned, and many plans do not terminate in events. If the event does not successfully terminate a plan, then it is not an act, or

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287. To think of feelings as driving forces makes feelings unintelligible in the context of community relations, and isolates individuals by picturing the community as accidental to the fulfillment of feelings. If we consider feelings as emotional perceptions of relationships, rather than as existing simply within a person on their own without reference to the community, then feelings are not drivers but part of the data by which drives or choices select particular courses of action.

Fears, for example, would be something like a perception of relationship in which purposes and capabilities are weighed in the balance, the purposes found to be conflicting and the capabilities on one's own side deficient. Perhaps emotional “measuring” would be better than emotional “perception”. This would be much closer to an Adlerian than a Freudian psychology.

288. Thus our view reverses Ryle’s alignment of law and cause. His first type of explanation he gives as causal, but as we shall see in Volume II, Chapter on induction, our view gives these events a law relation rather than causal. On the other hand, his second type of explanation which he holds to be "law-like", our view would take to b causal, the agent being the cause, par excellence.

at least not that particular agent's act. Our clown may stumble because his rival for applause intentionally trips him. In that case, the accidental stumbling of the first clown is also the intelligent (and therefore clever or stupid) tripping by the second clown.

Ryle's point then is made, that an intelligent (non-accidental) action is not two actions. But this is so not because there is no anterior planning and no reference to causing, but because the planning is part of the same action as the perceivable event. The action, beginning with the planning, spreads over time.

Moreover one's planning does not go on in a world which is in principle inaccessible to his observers. While the process of planning is not perceivable by others, and while plans may be disguised, nevertheless, plans or intentions are for dealing with the world and therefore are not in the long run concealable from the world.

The objection of an infinite regress which Ryle brings against planning being a ghostly occurrence anterior to any action does not arise. For again as he says, doing a thing and doing it carefully or intelligently (in either sense) are not doing two different things. Thus there can be no regress.

A parallel example might help. I might be asked for the definition of a sphere and reply, “The locus of points equidistant from a point”. If my questioner should then say, “Fine, now give me the definition of a perfect sphere”, I could only repeat what I had first given him. Adding perfection to a definition does not add anything at all except in a negative sense to exclude variation from the definition. A definition is a standard of perfection.

Likewise when we ask someone to add up a sum we do not add materially to our request by adding “correctly”. For adding a sum normally means doing it correctly. To add a sum correctly is simply to be adding the sum and not doing anything else that would hinder the success of it.

The request to add a sum is already a request to perform an action, which in itself entails the agent's observation of the present and imagination of future possibilities, choosing from among the possibilities, and carrying his choices to completion. Insofar as he can be said to be adding the sum, that is what he is doing.

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**F. Behaviorism & Its Discontents**

**F-1. The Drive for Certainty Collapses**

Having looked at conclusions of some behaviorists, let us now examine more closely the methods of behaviorism and the logic behind them, in particular the way we might distinguish between public and private, subjective and objective, and sane and insane.

Behaviorism as we have it today stands in a long tradition (beginning at least as early as William of Occam, of “Occam’s razor” fame) of those who have wished to rid the world of unnecessary (especially abstract) entities and to peg down our knowledge to the sorts of experiences one has with his sense organs.

In short, nominalism.

The movement had its roots in a
time when the world was thought to be “out there” objectively enough so that this was felt to be a safe thing to do to ensure the most certain knowledge, indeed, the only safe thing to do. Things were there, we perceived them quite definitely, and if anyone disputed such a fact, he only had to look for himself.

Nominalism was the engine driving Western culture into the empirical mode.

So, the drive to make knowledge more certain was largely a drive to found knowledge on public events. And the physical world seemed fairly obviously public if anything was. And that meant limiting to things measurable by the five senses.

But then developments turned the whole program on its head. Philosophical doubts as already mentioned in the Preface and Chapter I arose concerning the ontological status of our supposedly objective physical world, as to whether the real world was something behind our sense perceptions and to which our sense perceptions were to be ascribed, or whether it consisted solely in the world of perceptions itself.

Berkeley said that inert substance was empirically meaningless and philosophically pointless. Kant agreed at least to the point of insisting that the thing-in-itself could never be an object of perception or of intelligent discussion other than to say that it was there. And many physicists seem now to have done away with the hard, massy Newtonian atom as the building block of the universe.

If the foundation of publicity seemed to be dissolving, we still had our perceptions, it might be said. But even given inert substance, philosophers found themselves driven back into themselves in their attempts to lay bare the foundations of publicity.

For when one tries to follow the line of perception from the supposed external object perceived to the perceptual data that he actually has, he finds this data to be at the end of a chain in some vaguely defined portion of his head. This in turn is in flat contradiction to the non-philosopher who insists that the chair he sees is not in his head, he can see it quite plainly out there.

The man-in-the-street to the contrary, however, any attempt to trace the connecting links between an object and the perception the object is supposed to cause necessarily leads into one's head. This is turn entails that what one sees is not a public entity at all. Sense data are as private affairs as any we have. I cannot see your sense data and you cannot see mine, so that it is generally agreed that to ask, “How do I know then whether you see the same thing as I do when we both see red?” is to ask a hopeless question.

It is hopeless because in principle there is no way to find an answer to the question (as well as the fact that no possible answer would seem to make any difference to the way in which we communicate with each other).

Sameness of color perceptions is not something that can have a public verification, for there is no commonly observed specimen of any color by which to compare observations by different observers. Even on the inert substance theory, where the common element was the inert substance object, one had only his perception of the object, and not the other's as well. That is why we resort to wave length to define colors.

The drive to found knowledge on
public observations seems only to have shown that we are locked in our private world of perceptions in which our sought for publicity is not to be had. The search for public knowledge seems to lead to solipsism, or at least to a systematic skepticism which borders on it.

F-2. Systematic Skepticism

The behaviorist and positivist have tried to overcome this systematic uncertainty by insisting “that all the technical terms of his field are defined in terms that refer to what he himself, the scientist, immediately observes.”

By doing so, the scientist could at least for his own satisfaction bring as much order and certainty into his investigations as the situation would allow, since he would rely on only one observer’s reports, his own, rather than the reports of many observers with differing shades of meaning, ambiguity, etc.

When the strict behaviorist records in an experiment, “The subject sees two different shades of green,” he does not mean by this the same sort of thing that he would mean if he were to say himself, “I see two different shades of green.” The switch from third to first person involves a change in understanding of words. What the scientist would mean when he recorded what the subject sees would exclude all reliance on introspection or personal testimony by the subject.

He might then record, “The subject said he saw two different shades of green”, or even more rigorously, “I heard the subject say, ‘I see two...’” The implication is not that the subject might by lying, but that language might in principle not be the same when spoken by oneself as when spoken by another. Proof is felt to be lacking that language in the two situations has the same significance.

This skepticism is a skepticism as to whether the body under observation is an agent in the sense that the observer experiences himself to be an agent. Because he feels this uncertainty, the behaviorist remains non-committal, simply recording what he does feel certain of, i.e. his own sense perceptions. The drift toward solipsism is still evident.

The great justification for behaviorist principles is the truism that you must begin where you are and not somewhere else. To have certain knowledge you must begin with what you have (taken to be sense perceptions) and proceed from there, not pretending that you can leap out of your skin to observe things from a point of view other than your own. The ghost in my machine cannot get into your machine to observe your viewpoint.

J. O. Urmson points out the solipsistic results of some forms of logical atomism. Since proper names were allowed to apply only to objects of immediate perceptual acquaintance, and the only such objects were held to be inherently private sense data, it followed that no two people could ever be speaking about the same object, hence communication was impossible. Russell wrote in the second of his 1918 Monist lectures (my emphasis):

One can use ‘this’ as a name to stand for a particular with which one is acquainted at the moment. We say ‘This is white’. If your agree that ‘This is white’, meaning the this that you see, you are using ‘this’ as a

proper name. But if you try to apprehend the proposition that I am expressing when I say ‘This is white’, you cannot do it. If you mean this piece of chalk object then you are not using a proper name.\(^{291}\)

The “physical object” is, of course the non-perceptual material object of which our perceptions are supposed to inform us. Since this cannot be an object of direct acquaintance, it cannot have as an ostensive proper name, ‘this’. The public world by which agents were thought to communicate had vanished, or rather discovered itself to be inside one’s head where no one else could observe it.

All this twisting and turning to resolve the apparent dissolution of objectivity led to nearly hopeless statements of doubt about finding truth through secularized science, once thought to be our great hope.

The conclusions are starkly negative:

The hope of finding objective, infallible laws and standards has faded. The age of Reason is gone.\(^{292}\)

The age of Reason is gone....

Nature’s laws are man’s creation, we, not God, are the lawgivers of the universe. A law of nature is man’s description and not God’s prescription.\(^{293}\)

And man’s descriptions of a series of tested events have no internal unity to them -- the events are a rope of sand.

... we can only establish the falsity of the statement under test, but not its truth. The reason is that the latter entails an infinite number of test statements.\(^{294}\)

...because there is no objective unifier of apperception by which to unify the tested events. Each event stands on its own, ontologically isolated.

Science is not a system of certain, or well-established statements; nor is it a system which steadily advances towards a state of finality. Our science is not knowledge (episteme); it can never claim to have attained truth, or even a substitute for it, such as probability; we do not know, we can only guess.\(^{295}\)

Science, according to Popper, proceeds not by finding the truth, but by slow (and not very progressive) elimination of falsehoods, not by verification, but by falsification. Whatever is left standing has some vague sense of probability attached to it. But in the end, it is never verified, it is just a guess because there are too many relevant possibilities which remain standing, but which we can never test. There are too many, they are too far away, we do not have the technology, etc.

... empiricism as a theory of knowledge has proved inadequate ... all human knowledge is uncertain, inexact & partial. To this doctrine we have not found any limitation whatever.\(^{296}\)

So, the quest for certainty via the empirical method has failed, and the drift toward solipsism seems philosophically unavoidable.

The despair of Russell et al is caused largely by their secular rejection of metaphysics, and is not an inherent aspect of empiricism.\(^{297}\)

These doubts of Urmson, Kline, Pop-
per, and Russell are right at the center of discussion of our issues.

The world at large still believes that the secular scientific community knows everything of importance to be known. But no one has announced to the world, or the world has stopped it ears to, the demise of secular science as a way of knowing -- a scary thought indeed.

Full scale doubt about science has not yet filtered down to the public level.

But, education and morality are fast eroding all through what is left of Western Civilization. Honest science, which needs both, is not far behind. Einstein and others have marveled that the empirical world yielded to mathematical measurement and computation. But perhaps it does not. Many top philosophers of science have believed for decades that science has failed us.

But if our argument is correct, the current demise of faith in secularized science was a predictable event. Science has its own Biblical foundations, which have been systematically dismantled for most of that last half millennium.

If the Biblical view of things is correct, one would expect a Godless (metaphysical-less) search for truth to lead into epistemological cul de sacs as the above.

It remains to see whether the Biblical approach where ontology has its own ground staked out can do better, so that epistemology is not forced lamely into double duty as an ontology as well.

For that to succeed, metaphysics must succeed on its own steam. And for metaphysics to succeed, the cosmological argument must succeed.

The Biblical case says that making physical objects (atoms, quarks, etc.) the basic substances out of which all things, even persons, are explained is a terrible mistake.

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It is terrible not only because it is not true, i.e., cannot produce an adequate explanation, but because the results for human life are devastating. The random/chance evolution secular replacement for the doctrine of creation led directly to the millions upon millions of deaths during the 20th century.

There is little hope that the 21st will be different if the Biblical community does not recover its wits.

I think it will.


These are devastating critiques of government-run American education by very adequate authors. See Bibliography for short descriptions.

See also, http://theroadtoemmaus.org, and go to the Education Library.

299. Largely through government and corporate grants, science has largely abandoned the search for truth and been coopted by special interests. The fascist-like collusion between corporations and civil government puts a severe damper on the intellectual freedom of scientists.

300. I think also that the worst aspects of secularism and paganism, tending toward totalitarianism, have stolen a long march on an intellectually, morally, and spiritually bankrupt Western Judeo-Christendom, and that the renewal may be on the far side of persecution and violence.

But life and truth and love spring from a well deeper than any human force can stop.

So pity the rebels rather than the faithful.
G-1. Berkeley & the Foundation of Publicity

The Biblical personalist approach, making persons, active agents (rather than impersonal objects) the basic entities of the cosmos shows signs of singular success.

The Berkeleian development of the preceding chapters indicates that it is unlikely, if not impossible, for us to fall into solipsism, even though we may wish to retain some behaviorist methodologies in certain limited instances.

The cosmological argument for the existence of a first cause developed in the second chapter is by its very nature also proof against solipsism. According to that argument, the close relation between perception and existence means that sense data are themselves evidence for the existence of a first cause.

Sense data, understood to be the activity of an agent, are no longer barriers between the observer and the basic substance of the world. On the contrary, the empirical world becomes the meeting ground between agents. Two people see the "same" object and so can communicate insofar as their respective perceptions represent the same intention of the first cause. (301)

Publicity, then, is not something which rests on a commonly perceived object, but rather on a common cause with a common intention.

The root of publicity as grasped from the perceiver's end (the epistemological question) is that certain types of events command an overwhelming agreement among observers as to their nature and identity, while others do not. The sort that have this agreement often have the additional characteristic of being spatially oriented in a reliable way.

But, while the spatial orientation provides a unique means of identification and individuation, it does not itself provide the publicity. Each of our "spaces" is itself private, and provides a means of identification of self and other only for the one observer. It is a contingent fact that the spatial pictures of different observers correspond.

The epistemological roots of publicity thus lie in agreement, correspondence, and consistency. The ontological roots lie in the intentions of a first cause.

G-2. Subjective / Objective

A set of definitions (subjective-objective, public-private, sane-insane) can now be formulated which will help structure the picture of inter-agent communication.

The word 'subjective' is used in many ways, some pejorative to suggest bias, prejudice, or unreality; some more philosophical such as the Kantian notion of dependence on the nature of the subject or perceiver.

For the purposes of these pages, because I can find no better word for the purpose, the term 'subjective' is being used to mean 'dependent on the will of a given subject', and thus 'ob-
'jective' means ‘not dependent on the will of the subject’.

The sorts of things that might be called subjective, then, are hallucinations, purposes, desires, or any other thing which depends for its existence on the will (conscious or unconscious) of the agent having it.

The term does not per se imply unreality, but is rather a term expressing a causal relationship to an agent. Thus the same event, such as an hallucination, might be subjective with respect to one agent, but objective with respect to others, e.g., a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist did not create the hallucinations, but studies them as events which are objectively in the psyches of his patients, the objects of his study. They are subjective with respect to the patient, but objective with respect to the therapist.

Jones's hallucinations thus have a certain objective reality for those around him, but a reality defined by a certain sort of subjectivity with respect to himself. They are impressions which purport in Jones' mind to be of the objective world but are in fact Jones's own creation. Jones's purposes are equally subjective with respect to Jones, but they can function constructively with objective perceptions rather than overthrow them.

Because all events are caused, all events are subjective with respect to some agent. The perceptual world, for example, has the first cause for its subject. The perceptual world is thus subjective with respect to God of whom it is predicated, but objective with respect to humans for whom it is externally caused.

The truth that subjects are the basic ontological objects leads to profound consequences.

If subjects are the basic ontological objects which create the phenomenal world, then much of metaphysics is going to be the exploration of our own inner consciousness, which is, in our sense, quite objective. What does it mean to be myself? What does it mean to be in relationship?

In that process, a behaviorist focusing on the phenomenal world, looking at what others report, will be helpful, but necessarily incomplete without the behaviorist’s own introspective researches.(302) What can I report about myself?

This kind of introspection, would, as a matter of logical necessity, be linked to the spiritual life, the life of ultimate relationship. The spiritual life is a metaphysical event, which makes both logical and empirical sense if the basic realities are persons, not mechanical things or abstractions.

**G-3. Public / Private**

**a. Berkeley vs. Newton**

If public events are those perceivable in principle by all, generally spatio-temporal events, and private events are those perceivable in principle only by certain agents, perhaps only one agent, then it is evident that all public events must be objective with respect to those perceiving them. Everyone who sees the horse trotting down the street sees something objective. On the other hand, private events could be either objective or subjective with respect to the perceiver. I might

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(302) See above, Preface D-3, “What is Science?” on page xlv, on the nature of every scientific report and discovery being, at bottom, a pile of personal testimonies, the credibility of which is based on trust, the trust of the public in the honesty and competence of the researcher.
see a real (objective) horse, or I might see an hallucination.

In the ontological sense, all spatial events are private since perceptions themselves are private. But the world is constructed so that space/time events have an inter-observer consistency which allows them to function as public events.

No event subjective with respect to a created agent could be public with respect to agents other than God. I cannot perceive Jones’s purposes except as he expresses them in his activities, and I cannot perceive his hallucinations except as he reports observations which appear to be hallucinatory.

Since it is a contingent fact that the perceptual worlds of differing observers correspond to each other, it is logically possible for objective events to be private. All perceptions are ontologically private. So privacy does not necessarily entail subjectivity, still less unreality.

This is all the more so since publicity itself, in that it provides a ground for inter-agent communication, is built on the agreement among agents as to the significance of perceptual events, which as perceptual events, are private experiences.

The sense, then, in which we can talk of a public world perceivable by all is not that there is some single object, a table, which we all perceive, but that the tables that we do perceive are the same table in the intention of the first cause, a cause being that par excellence which can have an intention for the table, and can organize all of our perceptions so that we can communicate consistently.

This is how God replaces Newton’s inert substance as the inter-perceiver organizer of perceptions and the objective unifier of apperception.

The table I perceive represents in my perceptual world the same intention as some like object in your perceptual world. The reason that such a means of inter-agent communication can work is that the spatial-perceptual world provides a means of uniquely identifying every body in it. Using space-time coordinates, I thus can identify and re-identify any body in my world (in principle, at least), and I can without ambiguity direct you to the intentionally-identical object in your world, which you in turn can identify and re-identify.\(^{303}\)

We have now a subjective-objective dichotomy and a private-public dichotomy. But they are not co-extensive.

b. Behaviorism: Absolute or Methodological?

The behaviorist tries to limit himself to the public in order to avoid the intrusion of the subjectivity of the observer. But since public is not co-extensive with objective, nor private with subjective, his attempt can only partially successful. And even in principle, the significance of such a method is not what it is often taken to be.

For on one hand, the public is not necessarily different in kind from the

\(^{303}\) This fact of our mutually coordinated space-time continuum is being brought home with a radically practical impact by the GPSs in our cars. We can within a few yards identify and reidentify any spot on the surface of the earth.

I, in La Habra, California, just recently looked at my previous home in Alexandria, Virginia, via Google Earth, from a height where the building was easily recognizable.

For a more detailed analysis of the identification of individuals, see Strawson, *Individuals*, esp. chapter 1.
private, but is itself a special form of
the private. And the private, on the
other hand, forms the necessary basis
for the public. If there were no experi-
ences which were uniquely and pri-
vately mine, there could also be no ex-
periences which I could share or make
public. We would have no use for the
word ‘I’.

The failure of secularism is ensured by equating ‘empirical’ to the
five senses, and denying its application to other sorts of data -- intuition,
the spiritual, moral sense, the sense of personal presence, imagination, etc.

The five senses have a better chance of being “publicly” tested be-
cause they are more easily defined, compared, and measured. But to de-
dine ‘public’ in terms of the five senses is arbitrary and a fatal mistake. The
five senses are a good check against error in many cases, but they have no
legitimate arbitrary veto over other empirical experiences.

The narrow definition of ‘empiri-
cal’ to the five senses is unwarranted
by the universal evidence of life, and
leads, not to science, but a reduction to
absurdity.

B. F. Skinner’s behaviorism, for
example, turns B. F. Skinner into a
random conjunction of causes and ef-
fects with no internal relationship.
That fact logically prevents B. F. Skin-
ner from being considered an intelli-
gent scientist and writer to whom any
intelligent scientist (should one be dis-
coverable in B. F. Skinner’s world)
would want to listen for knowledge
(let alone wisdom) about the world.
His world is incompatible with the ex-
istence of such intelligent entities. In-
telligence requires the freedom to
choose between truth and falsehood.

G-4. SANE / INSANE

Experiences can be shared. Pur-
poses are shared by talking about them
and by carrying them out since actions
are the terminations of plans or pur-
poses.

Feelings are shared through the
various emotional expressions we all
have. Feelings are shared, not by put-
ing them into other people, but by al-
lowing others to react to them, which
is to say, by revealing one’s own feel-
ings rather than hiding them. In short,
private experiences are made public
and shared through the activity of the
agent whose private experiences they
are. A demand for more than that can-
not logically be made.

Our common distinction between
sanity and insanity, like the behavior-
ist method, relies on publicity to filter
out illegitimate subjectivity. There is
a tacit assumption that certain sorts of
events are public for all, and that any
disturbance of perception of these
events indicates an aberration in the
subject's psycho-somatic apparatus.

Persons are asked, for example, to
identify themselves in space and time
as a test of mental functioning.

But the method, like behavior-
ism, can mislead unless it is remem-
bered that the essential distinction is
the subjective-objective one, not the
public-private one, and that experi-
ences can, do, and indeed must occur
which are private to one individual
and yet are objective. History of full
of situations where the person whom a
large majority thought out of touch
with reality turned out to be the sane
one.

The notion of objectivity provides
the foundation on which both public-
ity and sanity are built, not vice versa.
The task of distinguishing between private-subjective, private-objective, and sane-insane becomes the task of looking for inconsistencies and incoherences with the aid of a notion of publicity. We employ a consistency or coherency test as a means of distinguishing between real and unreal perceptions, but this test itself rests on a reference transcending the perceptual field per se, the ontological, metaphysical realm.

**G-5. Implications for Secular Materialism**

Like methodological naturalism, as a method for eliminating ambiguity and bringing data into a single perspective, behaviorism may have much to commend itself. But as a basis for drawing ontological inferences, it is wildly misleading. The fact that the private is the foundation for the public shoots down the behaviorist and other secular materialist claims to have the only objective science on the (misleading) grounds that it is limited to the publicly verifiable evidence of the five senses.

The claim rests on the illusory publicity of Newtonian massy atoms -- which are the farthest thing from being public. That leaves the behaviorist with *only* phenomena, which are all private -- with no rescue in sight for reliable publicity. All scientific assertions are at bottom a pile of personal anecdotal testimonies, organized and analyzed, to be sure, and, using the above rules of publicity, tested against anecdotes from other researchers. Nevertheless they are still reports based on private experiences. So where is the alleged objectivity of science?

Science can be defended, I think, only on the metaphysical assumptions of the personalist worldview.

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**H. Bodiless Egos and Spiritual Bodies**

**H-1. Perception with No Body**

The notion of a pure individual consciousness devoid of bodily connections makes interesting speculation fodder for a Berkeleian appetite. For the denial of inert substance and the removal of the body percept from the self as such into the “other”, means that having a body or not having one does not of logical necessity affect one’s causal relation with the world.

That is, it is not the function of our bodies to make a *causal* connection between our minds or consciousnesses and physical objects or even other minds.

The reason is that a causal connection is not the sort of relationship that obtains between perceptual objects at all. Relations between perceptual objects have a law relation, not a causal relation. Causality is a relationship that obtains between agents as causes and recipients of perceptions in the dialogue of creation. Thus, the body functions as a means of identification among agents, and as part of
a spatio-temporal calculus in which perceptual events are related according to laws.\textsuperscript{306}

This means that the loss of one's body does not in itself logically entail the loss either of perception of the world or of one's ability to effect changes in the world. Events such as the loss of both eyes leading to the loss of sight might lead us to conclude that the destruction of the body leads to the loss of contact with the perceptual world altogether. But it would be false to conclude that this loss is due to the loss of some causal connection inherent in the body. The causal connection is not “in” the our bodies, or in any bodies at all. All physical bodies, being perceptual, are effects, not causes.

Under the inert substance theory, causal relations seemed to be inherent in physical bodies which pushed each other about. Since this is not the case according to our present discussion, it would still be possible to talk meaningfully of a perceptual field in which no entity corresponding to one's body appeared.\textsuperscript{307}

If such a disembodied ego were to have any communication with other agents via the perceptual world, however, the laws relating perceptual events would have to be much different from what we now understand them to be, for our present understanding of communication is tied strongly, if not completely, to sense organs.

And there would be problems of just what such an ego could perceive or in what sense he could have a view-point or think about “here” or “there”, since he would have no body in terms of which such a distinction could be understood. The frame of his eye would not surround his field of view, giving him certain knowledge of “where he was”. So something else would have to accomplish that.

Whether the loss of a body brings a total loss of perception is a contingent matter, on a Berkeleian view dependent upon whatever reasons God might have for so ordering the nature of things. \textit{That} it in fact does seems to be a reasonable inference from observing the progressive loss of organs of perception. \textit{Why} it in fact does could only be discovered by elucidating the reasons God might have for tying perceptions to bodies, and by elucidating the nature of interpersonal relations and the meaning of death and possible after-life. These items, however, go beyond our present purpose.

It is thus perhaps safest to assume, if indeed we must assume something, that we can extrapolate from our present experience and say that the end of the body means the end of perception as we know it. But the end of the body does not therefore mean the end of the person as such, as Strawson would have it.\textsuperscript{308}

His definition of ‘person’ requires both bodily and mental components. But if our revision of his definition is correct, then the whole person remains, or can remain, without a body. There is nothing in ‘person’ as ‘that to which both cause and effect are ascribable’ which necessitates that a person have a body, but only that a person be capable of having a perceptual field, part of which might be his body.

\textsuperscript{306} Again, more on this in Volume II, chapter on relativity.

\textsuperscript{307} See Strawson, \textit{Individuals}, “Persons”, p. 115 ff. Also, Strawson quote below at end of section G--2.

\textsuperscript{308} Ibid.
The body, that is, might be one of the effects in the person’s perceptual field caused by God, but it also might not be.

On the other hand, as a cause, any person must have a body in the sense that his causings will create some potentially identifying mark in the consciousness of the recipient of the caus- ing. God, at least, will “see” me.

This cannot be made into an argument for the indestructibility of the soul, though it might be part of such an argument. But more important for our purposes, it can be used to make philosophical sense of doctrines about the resurrection of the body.

**H-2. Resurrection Bodies**

Theists, Christians included, have tended to draw a sharp line between this world as we know it and the world which one might find after death. The distinction is often expressed with the earth or the created order on one side and heaven or the life beyond as something ineffably different on the other side.

Christians armed with (and I think misunderstanding) certain Pauline Biblical texts (e.g. I Corinthians 15) likewise have talked about an earthly body as opposed to a spiritual body, the latter being the body given at the final resurrection.

Often Platonic or Gnostic anti- flesh notions infiltrated Christian thinking because Christians were eager to use the intellectual resources of Greek philosophy in their own defense.

But if bodies are what we have been saying they are, then this distinction will not do, at least not so interpreted. Almost inevitably the division rests on an assumption that what we will meet after death will be better, assuming an inherent faultiness, a profound dissatisfaction and discouragement with what we have now.

The Fall has provided fodder enough to feed discouragement about the state of things, but our discouragement has in turn only amplified the Fall, compounding its effect.

This world, the created order, is felt to have an inherently defective nature which is the cause of much of our troubles. Thus, we can blame our troubles on “the world” rather than on our own sin. We talk of bodily evils and bodily lusts as though in some way our bodies were naturally seductive and misleading from the true good.

The very facts of creation, incarnation, and resurrection as central to Christian thinking forbids the denigration of the body as such, however fallen might be the use to which the body is put.

So such a negative view cannot be allied with a Biblical doctrine of creation or with a philosophy which holds that all perceptual objects are caused directly by God.

The body is fallen, not in submission to the law and grace of God, but it is still a creature of God, created in Original Goodness, and meant for redemption and the Kingdom.

A view of inherent body-soul separation might indeed be allied with a notion of bodies as inert substances, things in themselves in which such recalcitrance and seductiveness might reside. Much of Christian theologizing about the doctrine of creation has been weighed down by notions appropriate to Hellenic intractable matter or appropriate to inert matter rather than
persons as active substance.\(^{(309)}\)

Platonic, and most pagan, philosophy almost universally opposes earthly to spiritual, if not as outrightly conflicting, at least as at opposite ends of “the great chain of being.”\(^{(310)}\) Modern secular philosophy has its own version of the difficulty in the body/mind problem.

This opposition can no longer be supported if the earthy, the perceptual, is itself the activity of the spiritual, of active agents. Or to put it another way, our earthly bodies are our spiritual bodies.\(^{(311)}\) Physical bodies are sacraments, outward and visible signs, of the spiritual. They cannot get any more spiritual than they are.

They might become less fallen, put to better use for the purposes of God rather than of our rebellion, they might become the occasion for better personal relations between agents, they might become less subject to wear and tear of age and disease, but they cannot in themselves become more spiritual. Anything God creates, however badly misused, is, as creation, always good.

If this is the case, then any bodies we will ever have will be something like the ones we have now, at least to the extent that they will be part of a perceptual field and will be means of individuation, identification, and communication among agents. This is the point of having bodies, and is central to a religion which conceives of heaven as a community. Angels have bodies, and Jesus had a resurrection body.

Thus much of the disparity between this world and the next disappears, for we cannot oppose this world as a created order against heaven as something other than also a created order. Life after death will be just as much a creation of God as this, indeed, it will be the highest fulfillment of that creation.

To expand a previous quote from Wittgenstein:

Religion teaches that the soul can exist when the body has disintegrated. Now do I understand this teaching? --Of course I understand it -- I can imagine plenty of things in connexion with it. And haven't pictures of these things been painted? And why should such a picture be only an imperfect rendering of the spoken doctrine? .......

The human body is the best picture of the human soul.\(^{(312)}\)

Indeed, the human body with its behavior is, surely, the only picture of the human soul. That is precisely its purpose in the dialogue of creation, to picture ourselves to each other in such a manner that we can share our stories.

Strawson discusses the undesirability of a disembodied existence and approaches our view in some respects from another direction:

...the strictly disembodied individual is strictly solitary, and it must remain for him indeed an utterly empty, though not meaningless, speculation as to whether there are

\(^{309}\) Again, see Total Truth by Nancy Pearcey on the negative effects of Hellenic philosophy upon Biblical theological development.

\(^{310}\) Arthur O. Lovejoy, in The Great Chain of Being, characterizes Platonic philosophy with this phrase, and traces some of its course through Western culture. See esp. Chapter II.

\(^{311}\) Norman O. Brown from a secular viewpoint has struggled against this dualism. He has many interesting comments in Life Against Death, Chapter XVI, on “The Resurrection of the body”. His “body mysticism” would not be wholly acceptable to a Biblical position, but it nevertheless suggests some much needed correctives to the Western attitude toward the body.

\(^{312}\) Philosophical Investigations, p. 178e. See section C-2 above, “Outing the Ghost in the Machine” on page 135
any other members of his class. ...in order to retain his idea of himself as an individual, he must always think of himself as disembodied, as a former person. That is to say, he must contrive still to have the idea of himself as a member of a class or type of entities with whom, however, he is now debarred from entering into any of those transactions, the past fact of which was the condition of his having any idea of himself at all. Since then he has, as it were, no personal life of his own to lead, he must live much in the memories of the personal life he did lead; or he might, when this living in the past loses its appeal, achieve some kind of attenuated vicarious personal existence by taking a certain kind of interest in the human affairs of which he is a mute and invisible witness -- much like that kind of a spectator at a play who says to himself: 'That's what I should have done (or said)' or 'If I were he, I should...'. In proportion as the memories fade, and this vicarious living palls, to that degree his concept of himself as an individual becomes attenuated. At the limit of attenuation there is, from the point of view of his survival as an individual, no difference between the continuance of experience and its cessation. Disembodied survival, on such terms as these, may well seem unattractive. No doubt it is for this reason that the orthodox have wisely insisted on the resurrection of the body.\(^{313}\)

Psychological studies on sensory deprivation strongly support that not-very-hopeful view of such an existence.

C. S. Lewis describes just such a physically/spiritually disintegrating life in *The Great Divorce* as typical of those who -- by their own choice -- are headed for hell. Hell is pictured by Lewis as the systematic distancing of persons from, yet incessantly trying to control, one another.

Jean Paul Sartre paints a similar scene in *No Exit*, a story of three mutually hostile and contrary persons locked into a room in hell. They have no escape from the room nor from each other, yet are compulsively in need of each other. Hell, as one of them says, is other people.

On the Biblical view, bodies, relationships, with our mutual dependencies and giftedness -- all go together to make up heaven. We either build heaven with God and one another, or, as per Strawson, Lewis, and Sartre, we build hell all by our own solipsism-bent selves.

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\(^{313}\) *Individuals*, p. 115-16. C. S. Lewis in *The Great Divorce* explores some of this theme in the entertaining manner of a bus trip from hell up to heaven.
Study Guide for Chapter IV
The Community of Creation

I. Summary:
In your own words, write a summary of the theme of this chapter, and make a personal application as is appropriate.

II. Questions on Chapter Four:
1. In what way does the author think philosophers should “become as little children”?

A - Discovering the Personal “Other”
2. Why is animism closer to the mindset of infants than is the world of inert substance or of secularized science?
3. Is it realistic to take early childhood growth experience as the pattern for the meaning and structure of personality?
4. What is P. F. Strawson’s definition of ‘person’?
5. What is meant by the assertion that “our bodies are... part of the not-self equally with other perceptual objects”?
6. What is the significance of my body surrounding my visual field? or that “the perceiving subject exists at the periphery of his visual field”?
7. How can the perceiving subject and the perceived object have no spatial relation between themselves as persons? And if so, how are they spatially related?
8. What is the importance of my always being at the 0,0,0 coordinates (the absolute center) of my cosmos? What has that to do with self-centeredness?
9. Where is the line to be drawn in a Berkeleyan view, between the self and not-self -- if not between their respective bodies?
10. How does the author’s definition of ‘person’ differ from that of Strawson’s? Does it “work”?
11. In what sense can the world be God’s body?
12. In what sense would God “see” our bodies?
13. How does the infant discover the meaning of cause and effect?
14. How does learning about cause and effect provide the basis for the empirical world?
15. How are personal and impersonal related in terms of ontological priority?
16. What is the essential difference between personal and impersonal as the child discerns between the two?
17. Why does the problem of “ascribing” personality not arise for the child?

B - Body-Mind Ascription in a Plural “Other”
18. Why is it important that we ascribe bodies to agents or souls rather than vice-versa?
19. What is the “dialogue of creation”? What are the two reciprocal and complimentary sides to this dialogue?
20. Describe the process of a child coming to distinguish between personal and impersonal objects.
21. What does mother’s coming to stand out as one object among many play in the discovery of personal vs. impersonal objects?
22. What discovery by the child is at the foundation of learning the personal and impersonal distinction?
23. In what way do certain objects come to have a more personal meaning than others?
24. What are the three senses in which ascription of agency to an object might need justification. Are there other senses?
25. Describe the two primitive stages in learning what personhood means.
26. How do robots fail to exhibit love? Is this failure inherent and inevitable?
C - The Logic of Deception

27. In what two plausible ways might a failure of communication happen?
28. What are two circumstances in which a deceiver is likely to abandon his deception? And why would he not likely hold to his deception under any and all circumstances?
29. How can we use the activity of the “machine” to discern the unseen motives of the “ghost”?
30. Why is the gap “between fact and fabrication” not a metaphysical gap between soul and body, but rather a practical communication and sleuthing problem?

D - The Inductive Logic of Dispositions

31. Why does the author disagree with Gilbert Ryle’s assertion that “our inquiry is not into causes....”?
32. Describe the internal unity necessary for using observed events to generalize to habits or dispositions. What has this to do with an unseen but necessary causal agent?
33. Why is the reality of “Jones”, the agent, necessary, along with the reality of God, in the ascription of habits and dispositions?

E. Planning & Imagination

34. How does the author differ from G. Ryle on the existence of a soul or ghost?
35. How are the two meanings of ‘intelligent’ relevant to the discussion?
36. Why, and in what sense, must the planning of an event be immediately preceding the act for the act to be intelligent?
37. How does the author agree with Ryle that an intelligent action is not two events?
38. How does the author deal with Ryle’s fear of an infinite regress of plannings?

F. Behaviorism and Its Discontents

39. What influence did nominalism and empiricism have on each other?
40. Can you see any non-Berkeleian way out of the dilemma of publicity ending up in the very private space within our heads?
41. Why do we define color by wavelength, a totally colorless definition?
42. Show how the behaviorist and positivist seem to drift inevitably toward solipsism.
43. How would you assess the radical skepticism of some top philosophers of science? Is it realistic? Is there any remedy for it?
44. Describe how the lack of internal unity and of an objective unity of apperception might actually point to the answer to the skeptics.
45. Would you agree with the author that a restoration of the Biblical cosmology could restore the credibility of science?

G. Three Sets of Definitions

46. How does a Berkeleian cosmos restore the foundations of publicity?
47. Describe the three sets of definitions.
48. Describe the differences between realistic, healthy subjectivities vs. unrealistic and destructive subjectivities.
49. How is the spiritual life necessarily related to our issues?
50. How can private events be public? Give examples.
51. In a world of private perceptions, on what can publicity be based?
52. Describe how God replaces the Newtonian world of atoms, etc., as the objective unifier of apperception.
53. What is the error upon which behaviorism was founded?
54. Describe the ontological relation between public and private.
55. Why was the secular limitation of science to the five senses a destructive
attempt when taken as an ontological assertion?

56. Why is subjective-objective a more basic distinction than public-private for the sane-insane distinction?

H. Bodiless Egos & Spiritual Bodies

57. Why is it “not a function of our bodies” to make a causal connection between our mind and physical events?

58. What is the difference between a law relation and a causal relation?

59. What difficulties might attend a bodiless ego?

60. In what sense can the body be a picture of the soul?

61. Explain the connection between the Christian insistence on a resurrection body and the ultimate Biblical goal of a community.

Chapter Reflections:

In your own words, relate your new insights from reading and meditating on the information contained within this chapter. What difference would it make to you personally whether the claims and assertions of this chapter were true or not?
Freewill & Causality

A philosophy of inert substance has left in its wake many, if not most, in the modern world doubting the reality of freedom. Freedom in a world of inert substance is freedom with only one choice, which is no freedom at all. Now that animism is so dead that even its inert substance corpse is ignored, we find ourselves talking in terms of "laws" which govern, or at least describe, the behavior of the world. But again, these laws as interpreted by most philosophers of science leave no more elbow room for a concept of freedom to maneuver than did the old inert substance.

Our first move in this chapter will be to show that freedom in the required sense is not only metaphysically possible, but necessary for the rationality of the world. We then move on to consider whether this freedom in fact obtains in mankind, looking at the possibility of empirical evidence, psychological determinism, the logic of purposing, and an epistemological argument asserting that knowledge presupposes freedom.

A. Freewill - Metaphysically - Both Possible & Necessary

A-1. Four Kinds of Causes

Aristotle gave Western philosophy four notions of causes which, more or less, have stuck in our language, though not all of them are in common use today.

1. An efficient cause is what the English word ‘cause’ means to most persons, i.e., the active, pushing, producing, creating cause, as is the “first cause” which we have been discussing.

2. A material cause is the “stuff” out of which the cause makes his creation. The nature of the material will determine what sorts of things can be created. The material can be physical, psychological, spiritual, any kind of “stuff” out of which things can be created. Songs are created out of different material than houses or cars.

3. The final cause is the purpose for which the object is created. A pencil is created for writing.

4. A formal cause is the idea or
“blue print” in the mind of the cause (person), by which he does his creating. It gives the form of the object to be made.

Our quest is to sort out how freedom can be consistent with a reasonable understanding of causation.

A-2. Genuine Freedom

We first stake our claim on a genuine notion of freedom. Freedom is not merely the gap in our present knowledge of how the psyche works, and it is not self-determinism in the sense of being determined by one's "character" rather than by external circumstances. Freedom as argued for here means the ability to make a genuine choice between real alternatives, so that after the event it is meaningful to say that it could have been otherwise, and that the reason it could have been otherwise is rooted in an ability to change something, however small, free of any conditioning external to that ability itself and to whatever sustains it.

Further, freedom is not a concept to be opposed to causality as though excluded by it. Rather, it is precisely in the concept of cause that we find this real freedom. The impersonalist cosmos has badly warped our understanding of the meaning of cause and determination and their relation to freedom, bringing upon the human race enormous trouble. We must sort out the meaning of the words 'determine' and 'cause' since they are often understood to militate against any notion of freewill.

The logic of the word 'determine' is parallel to the logic of 'cause' and its passive derivatives, 'caused' and 'uncaused'. This is no surprise since 'cause' and 'determine' are often used synonymously, with the slight difference that 'determine' generally refers to events while 'cause' refers more broadly to objects also. 'Determine' also has an ambiguity which needs to be laid to rest.

According to the previous three chapters, freedom is built into the concept of cause, for only if the cause is free is it able to perform its defining function as "the differentiator between possibility and existence."

If the cause is not free to cause or not cause, then there is no difference between existence and possibility; for then all that is caused must be caused, all that is must be, and nothing else is causally possible.

If a first cause is a cause to which the derived language of causality, i.e. the caused-uncaused distinction, does not apply, then we have a built-in freedom. Since a first cause has no causal antecedents and only pure possibility as a material cause, its activities are limited only by the scope of pure possibility.

A “material cause” (as distinct from an efficient cause, which in the Biblical cosmology is limited to persons) can be literally physical matter, it can be psychological or spiritual matter, or just about any kind of contextual “stuff” imaginable.

But in the case of a first cause, the material cause is purely logical, the precondition of not being self-contradictory, with no other predeterminant, efficient, formal, final, or material, at all.

Pure possibility, in other words,

“exists” in only the logical sense, its limit being only the totality of any logically consistent reality. The first cause, on the other hand, exists not only as logically consistent within itself, but non-contingently as a being, an individual, a person, in and of itself, and thus eternally.

We can therefore distinguish two senses in which the caused-uncaused distinction would not apply to the first cause. It would not apply first with respect to the existence of the first cause, which is what makes it a first cause in the metaphysical sense.

And secondly, it would not apply with respect to the activity of the first cause. That is, the activity of the first cause is caused by itself, not by any outside constraint or force. That is what makes it a first cause which can differentiate between existence and possibility.

**A-3. Free Agent - a Definition**

A free agent, freedom being essential to being a person, now becomes:

any being which is, in any degree, a first cause with respect to its own activity.

In this sense, every person is a first cause.

Clearly, created agents are not uncaused with respect to their existence, but it would remain open that God might create agents to whom the derived ‘caused-uncaused’ language does not apply with respect to their activity, in short, created persons, beings to whom both effect and now cause are ascribable. Created persons are effects because their being is caused by the First Cause, and they are causes of events with respect to other persons who can receive the effects of their causing, that is, who can perceive their behavior.

To say then that all events are "determined" implies that something is doing the determining, that is, the causing. It is tempting to say that the past determines the present. And indeed, this might have been a mildly plausible argument in the days when inert substance held philosophical sway. For then the laws of nature would be characteristics of this substance, and the universe could be something like a gigantic machine or cosmic set of billiard balls with a given momentum, rolling inexorably out of the past into the future.

But even granted inert substance, the view would seem to suppose that a non-existing past would have to cause the existing present, a thing hard to imagine. How can something existing only in the past be causing something existing in the present?

The belief in such a process hung on the “inertia” of the massey atoms moving through space-time. The past was inertially rolling into the future, so to speak, promoting the illusion of a past causing the future. God was, as Berkeley foresaw, sidelined by Newton’s inert matter.

Contemporary science has therefore discarded both inert substance and causal (i.e. producing) relations between different points of time. Instead of causes we have laws relating different times.

Thus it is sometimes said that laws determine events. But this is misleading, for such laws as we discover are descriptions of behavior, not causes. Events might be determined

315. See Chapter II-C, "Cause, Law, & Volition" on page 38 ff.
(caused) according to laws, but not by laws.

To suggest the latter would suppose a logical causation between states of the universe at different times, and hence to conflate causal and logical necessity, whereas, as any self-respecting empiricist would insist, the connection between states of the universe at different times is contingent. In other words, it would suppose that these abstract entities called “laws” would themselves have causal power, which would be, as they say, “a stretch”.

Thus when it is said that the present is “determined by” the past, the most that can legitimately be meant is that the present is “determinable” (knowable) from the past by some observer, not that it is “caused by” the past.

The ambiguity in ‘determine’ between the epistemological ‘discover’ and the ontological ‘cause’ covers some large metaphysical errors.

To say, then, (as we must) that the world is ontologically determined is to say that there is a first cause which is determining, i.e. causing, what happens. If the first cause is causing in a rational manner (as in “intelligent designer”), then that causing activity, perhaps billions of years earlier, might in principle be determinable (knowable) by later observers. The observers could inductively reason out the laws (intentions - final cause, and blue-print - formal cause) by which the efficient cause was operating. That causal rationality is precisely what makes science possible.

Such was the commonly held belief shared by almost all early researchers whose work gave rise to science as we know it.

We have therefore in principle bridged the gap between freedom and determinism. To be determined is to be determined by a free agent. A free agent is a causally determining agent. And thus the argument for a "first cause" is at the same time an argument for a "first free agent". The concept of an inert, dead cause was an error inspired by the impersonal worldview.

**A-4. Freedom or Chaos**

The absence of a causal principle as differentiator between possibility and existence sends us directly into ontological chance and randomness, total chaos, back into the unintelligible “coincidentia oppositorum” of the Perennial Philosophy where the laws of neither logic nor causality apply. The contingency of the empirical world becomes wholly negative and thus wholly unintelligible.

The cause of something is different from the reason/purpose for it, but both logically imply a personal being behind them. So we are forced back to the reality of a free and rational will. The notion of a rational science is not dependent, as secularists assume, on an impersonal causal chain. Rather, the causal chain itself requires the purposive, personal decision.

Our direct empirical contact with cause is our own experience of being caused, and of ourselves being a cause. We secondarily experience causes by perceiving effects of causes, which is our only direct empirical experience of effects. That is the structure of the empirical world.

So, freewill does not imply a disorderliness in the world. It is the very

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316. See Section I-C-1, “The Search for Substance” on page 8, for the Perennial Philosophy.
thing which gives stability to being and doing, the lynch pin of rationality without which all stability immediately and irredeemably collapses into chaos. Determinism is not the foundation of the orderliness of nature, rational freewill is the foundation -- not only because it is rational, but because it is free and therefore causal.\(^{(317)}\)

\(^{317}\). See below, “The Logic of Purpose” on page 167.

**B. The Empirical Evidence**

**B-1. Ambiguity in Testing**

If we have escaped the grip of material determinism by the past, the spectre of "Calvinistic" determinism still stares us in the face. It remains to discover whether God in fact has caused other free agents to exist, or whether He strictly determines all activity.

And since it is not logically necessary that God either must or must not create other free agents, we have an empirical question as to whether He did or not. The relevant candidate, of course, is *homo sapiens*, or *homo agens* -- man the knower and man the doer.

Other may have fared better, but I have found no empirical or experimental evidence that could prove the case one way or the other. The difficulty lies in setting up an experiment whose results would either exclude all freedom or exclude a blanket determinism. There does not seem to be any experiment which cannot be interpreted according to either hypothesis, for or against freedom, so long as it is looked at in a very "detached" fashion.\(^{(318)}\)

For example, experiments dealing with conditioned responses are inconclusive, since few supporters of freewill would suggest that there is no determinism at all in man's makeup.

On the other hand, so far as I know, it has not been conclusively proven that freedom is totally absent even from dogs salivating at the ring of a bell. Presumably if the dog were to lose all interest in food, the ring would sooner or later come to have little interest for him as well.

The meaning and opportunity attached to a situation often has a great deal to do with the type of response to a given stimulus. Babies, as noted, who are severely deprived of early emotional care have been known to die from no discoverable physical cause. Soldiers in concentration camps under severe brainwashing stress have died likewise with no known physical cause.\(^{(319)}\) The things to which people normally respond can come to mean nothing to them. Even death can be chosen when meaning erodes to an extreme.

It is plausible, in other words, that  

\(^{319}\). A psychiatrist, Dr. Meher, discusses this in a talk, "Brainwashing - the Ultimate Weapon". In the 1960's the talk was obtainable free of charge by sending a blank recording tape to the Administrative Division, U. S. Army Signal Corps, R and D Laboratory, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.

Meher's talk was on the devastation caused by new Chinese brainwashing techniques in the Korean War, and the defenses against such techniques.
in such cases the stimuli no longer are meaningful because the stimuli no longer fit with the subject's goals or with any desired goal he feels able to attain. He chooses to "give up". At any rate, to demonstrate more or less constant connections between means and ends, or between the ends and the signals associated with the ends, is hardly proof of determinism.

The trick would be to show that the ends themselves are determined (chosen) by some cause other than the subject himself.

**B-2. Honest Testing**

The following has been offered as an example of psychological evidence for determinism.

Three persons were given papers with sentences written on them. One person's sentence had something to do with the weather; another's with royal authority; and the third with horses. Then the three were asked verbally to write the sound "rain" on their paper. Of course, no indication was given as to spelling. One spelled it "rain", another "reign", and another "rein". It takes no Sherlock Holmes to tell who spelled it which way.

Psychological determinism has been offered as a valid inference from such experiments since the same results would turn up in nearly every trial of the experiment. The persons, it is contended, were psychologically determined to produce the particular spellings by the conditioning of the sentence given them beforehand.

If taken in an extremely limited way, such a conclusion would certainly be correct. But taken as a general inference of human determinism, it is unwarranted.

What the experiment shows is the truism that whether determinism or freedom is the case, it always operates in the context in which it finds itself. This context, naturally enough, includes one's awareness of his situation. When certain factors are dominant in one's awareness, they will tend to dominate in one's choices also.

But this is a determinism of raw material, or of material cause, not of efficient cause. One's freedom works not only within the context of what is actually given, but within the context of awareness. When the material in one's awareness is programmed beforehand, such as was done by the sentences, then only very limited conclusions can be arrived at from the results.

What sort of experiment could then given evidence for or against freewill? Since the experiment is to decide whether a person could make a rational choice, the first and indispensable condition is that the person must be made clearly aware of a genuine choice. Nowhere in the above experiment is this done.

Indeed, it is deliberately hidden. The mental cards are stacked by giving the edge to one or the other of the possible alternatives without revealing the others. If the persons has been told that there were three spellings of that particular sound and shown what these spellings were and what they meant, then they would have been presented with a clear choice. As it was, no choice was unambiguously given to anyone, thus it was not a test for freewill.

The question the experiment must decide is: "Was the subject able to choose between the alternatives of which he was aware?"
The trouble is that when a choice is clearly and unambiguously given to a subject, then we still find ourselves unable to draw conclusions about whether he made the choice freely or whether he could have made that and only that choice. One can point to a long history of personal background which seems to "explain" or lead up to this choice. But it remains nevertheless that such a history of consistent development is compatible with a person exercising freewill equally with one somehow "determined" by his psychological past.

C. Psychological Determinism

It should be noted that psychological determinism would operate the same way as physical or perceptual determinism, i.e. it would imply a present determiner or agent. To suggest otherwise, e.g. that one's past in itself causally determines a person, would be to import from mechanics into psychology a view of causality that was wrong even in mechanics, the view depending on inert substance. Gilbert Ryle touches the same point discussing Cartesian dualism:

As thus represented, minds are not merely ghosts harnessed to machines, they are themselves just spectral machines.

Since, according to the doctrine, minds belonged to the same category as bodies, and since bodies are rigidly governed by mechanical laws, it seemed to many theorists to follow that minds must be similarly governed by rigid non-mechanical laws.

The problem of the Freedom of the Will was the problem how to reconcile the hypothesis that minds are to be described in terms drawn from the categories of mechanics with the knowledge that higher-grade human conduct is not of a piece with the behavior of machines.\(^{(320)}\)

Alfred Adler comments on similar errors of his fellow psychologists:

Every semblance of causality i.e., determinism in the psychical life, is due to the tendency of many psychologists to present their dogmas disguised in mechanistic or physical similes. At one time they use as a comparison a pump-handle moving up and down, at another a magnet with polar termini, and another a sadly harassed animal struggling for the satisfaction of its elementary needs. It is plain that from a standpoint like this, few of the fundamental varieties shown by man's psychical life can be observed.\(^{(321)}\)

It is logically impossible for the past to control the future as an efficient cause without both reifying the past into a quasi-present and turning it into an agent. An efficient cause must be simultaneous with what it causes. A being who holds me in existence must be doing it while I am existing, not at some point in the past, no matter how "recent".

The past can be said to determine the future for an agent only in the sense of a material cause, by providing the material or experience with which he learns about the "other", the non-self, discovering how it behaves and what sort of things can be accomplished in it. A material cause would lead to determinism if and only if it provided one choice and no other. If it presents more than one choice, then it

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320. Concept of Mind, p. 20.
is logically compatible with freewill. Here is where the above experiment on ‘rain’, ‘reign’, and ‘rein’ went wrong. It provided “awareness material” which psychologically slanted the outcome toward a single choice.

For agents who are neither omniscient nor accustomed to creating ex nihilo, a material cause is a precondition for freedom, not a bar to it. We cannot create ex nihilo, and so must have something with which to work.

A proverbial bird is said to have commented on how much faster he could fly if there were no air to slow him down. A created man perched in a perfect vacuum, physically or psychologically, would be about as able to use his freedom as the bird would be able to fly in the vacuum.\(^{322}\)

It is precisely our past experience and our present context that develops our freedom and gives a context within which to work, far from forcing it inexorably into one preordained channel.

Floyd Matson in *The Broken Image* has this to say about scientific determinism:

The constructive science of behavior will dare to look upon all men as moral agents, and upon their behavior as the expression of a choice -- in agreement with Sartre that "this decision is human and I shall carry the entire responsibility for it."

And it will agree with Socrates, in his final words to his scientific friends, that even in the last extremity the mind of man has reasons that his organic machinery knows not of:

“For, by the Dog! these bones and sinews, I think, would have been somewhere near Megara and Boeotia long ago, carried there by an opinion of what is best; if I had not believed it better and more just to submit to any sentence which my city gives than to take to my heels and run. But to call such things causes is strange indeed. If one should say that unless I had such things, bones and sinews and all the rest I have, I should not have been able to do what I thought best, that would be true; but to say that these, and not my choice of the best, are the causes of my doing what I do...would be a very far-fetched and slovenly way of speaking.”\(^{323}\)

Right to the point.

Having experiences or learning does not limit freedom. It is that by which freedom grows. Thus to point to one's past as being his determinant other than as providing a material context for freedom is to go astray. The argument relies on the *non-sequitur* that to have a past to which one can point is to preclude freedom. It is above all else the free agent, the cause, that not only can have a past but that has freely created past time by the very fact of his causing.

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322. Compare quote from P. F. Strawson in *Individuals*, at the end of Chapter IV above.

D. The Logic of Purpose

D-1. Purpose -

a Deductive System

There is another sense in which determinism might get a grip on the psyche -- by way of logic. Since there are two sorts of necessity, causal and logical, either might be the source of determinism. This would all the more be so if the manner in which purposes operate were modeled on the logical, pyramidal pattern of a deductive system, as I believe indeed to be the case.

All thinking and choosing must follow the cannons of logic on pain of being self-defeating. Or, in other words, one of the preconditions for thinking and choosing would be the limitations of pure possibility, i.e., non-contradiction. If it can be shown that these limitations lead to determinism, then the psyche is indeed determined.

The logic of purpose works much in the manner of a deductive system. If I am asked why I did some particular thing, I generally give reasons which mount up in an ascending order of importance and comprehensive-ness. And for every reason that I give, I can still, it seems, be asked "Why?"
The persistent questioning pushes one toward higher and more ultimate levels of goals.

If I could find my truly ultimate goal, then all my other reasons would follow from it, and my life pattern would be completely understood and predictable for perhaps any possible circumstance. Actions would be decided syllogistically, the ultimate goal supplying the major premise, the situation at hand the minor premise, logic the conclusion.

Major premise: I want to be rich.
Minor premise: this will make me rich.

Conclusion: I will do this.

In Matthew 22, Jesus was asked the meaning of the law. He replied with the Two Great Commandments, to love God and one’s neighbor, concluding, “On these two commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets.” That is, the whole of Scripture, the whole intention of God for the living of life, is summed up in these two commandments. So, as some early Church fathers said, “Love, and do as you wish.” If you are indeed loving, if loving your neighbor as yourself is your major premise, then, as some early Church fathers noted, you can do

324. This is the effect of Leibniz’s "sufficient reason", which has to do with reasons, not causes. Or, more accurately, combined with the principle of perfection, it conflates reasons and causes, or logical and causal necessity. The principle of perfection becomes the sufficient “reason” for God’s choosing. But God does not have a real choice in the matter. Hence for Leibniz, there is no contingency in the world. Or, as F. Copleston puts it:

‘...for Leibniz, the difference between truths of reason and truths of fact, that is, between necessary and contingent propositions, is essentially relative to human knowledge.’ A History of Philosophy, Newman Press, Westminster, MD., 1959, Vol. IV, p. 281

Once God chooses perfection, and He must, all else follows with absolute necessity.

The fallacy here, I believe, is that the concept of perfection is not seen to be purely formal. The choosing of a merely formal concept does not in fact determine anything, excepting that, in this case, whatever one does, he will do it perfectly. But the “whatever” remains unspecified. Until we can move from the “whatever” to an existing and specific “something”, we have not resolved the mystery of why I behave as I do.
no wrong. As a matter of logic all your subsidiary purposes will be good, and you will be fulfilling the whole law of God.

Loving persons are thus very predictable -- for those who understand the meaning of love.

Thus at first glance, one might say that there is hardly anything more rigidly deterministic than the deductive logic of purposes. Once the premises are given, then the rest follows without appeal.

But, there is the clue: "Once the premises are given..." The question is, who or what determines the premises. Logic does not do that. The answer would seem to be that the premises are presented in the "material" of life, the material cause. One meets the premises or possible ultimate goals in experience.

But if, as seems the case, life, the array of material causes, provides more than one potential goal (we can hate, ignore, abuse as well as love), and if we can be aware of these alternatives, then there is a contingent factor accounted for neither by logic nor by the material cause, namely, why out of the possible goals, any particular one is chosen rather than others. There is no logical reason why any of several possibilities could not be chosen. To account for this, we must have an efficient cause, and this efficient cause can be only the self.

Some have said that "happiness" is the goal for which we all aim, but this is true only if happiness is taken in a formal, abstract sense such as "the fulfillment of desire", in which case the statement is a tautology, and the particular contents of desire still need to be chosen to invest one's happiness in particular goals. Only then do we have a minor premise which, with the major premise of love, can give us a helpful conclusion. The difference between a possibility and an actual goal implies a self, a free agent, a differentiator between possibility and existence, i.e., a chooser with a particular choice in mind.

If it is in fact true, therefore, that the material presented by the world of experience does offer more than one alternative for action and that we as agents can be aware of these alternatives, then the case against freewill collapses.

If life does so provide, and selves, persons, are the basic ontological entities, to whom both cause and effect are ascribable, then the case for freewill appears to be solid and secure.

D-2. Freedom, Ultimate Purposes, & Three Sorts of Determinism

Certain alternatives are genuine alternatives and can be also at the highest order in the deductive pyramid of purposes. I can choose at the top of my purpose pyramid to be either loving or selfish, truthful or deceitful, open or hidden. That is the point of the two Great Commandments. The command to love is meant to apply to all other decisions, no exceptions. I might, naturally, want to add to the list, survival. More than one purpose, of course, opens the door to potential conflict. So long as they do not conflict in practice, there is no problem.

Whether goals conflict might depend on the cosmos in which one lives. In a secular cosmos, truth-telling might conflict with survival, in which case one would have to choose which to follow. In a Biblical cosmos,
the conflict between truth-telling and survival would be limited to life in the here and now, but might promote life in the here-after.

If we do have such real choices at the top, then when asked, "But why did you choose this ultimate purpose rather than another?" the respondent can answer only, "Because I want to." And that is both logically and causally sufficient. Sartre again

...this decision is human and I shall carry the entire responsibility for it.

When one has reached the ultimate "reason why", then he has reached the point _par excellence_ at which freedom operates. One can say that everything else following from this is determined. But it is determined logically by the ultimate purpose which is freely chosen, which is to say, determined psychologically by the agent. When I choose love, I _want_ all my choices to be determined (caused) by that motive. And this, by definition, is freewill. To have causally possible choices is to have freewill.

We have then, three sorts of causal determination, (1) the material, (2) the psychological, and (3) the logical. The material, i.e. the given in experience, determines the context for freedom for both opportunities and limitations. The self determines, i.e. chooses, from among the array presented by the material of experience which goal shall be pursued. And logic determines the implications of a sought-after goal in a given empirical situation.

The "something however small" which a free agent is able to change, free of external conditioning, is the final end or goal of that agent in the context of possibilities.

Both religion and psychotherapy provide practical examples of this, enabling people to use their freedom to better explore the material of experience. Thus they can more fully discover what life is worth and what possibilities it offers.

On the other hand, with slight changes the same techniques can be used to manipulate another's behavior. If a person knows the "character" of another, that is, knows in what sort of goals the other is generally interested and the picture the other has of the world in which he hopes to attain these goals, he can often lead his victim by the nose. Unsavory advertisers and politicians make a science of such techniques.

But such power depends heavily on the victim's ignorance of his tormentor's designs and methods. Once he knows these, he is in a good position to avoid this manipulation. He can again assert his freedom.

In any case, mere predictability is not a sign of determinism. It may equally be the sign of manipulation through threat, ignorance, or, more happily, a sign of steadfast purpose.

It seems now that we can describe the structure of how freewill operates, but we have not yet produced any em-

325. An example of ultimate goals would be the decision to live constructively in community life versus the decision to try to orient the world according to one’s own will regardless of others, the decision to try to be “God”. This is the central theme of the Bible, and the ultimate choice we face between good and evil, heaven and hell.


326. See above, Section A, "Freewill - Metaphysically - Both Possible & Necessary" on page 159.
pirical evidence to show that man in fact has this sort of psychological structure.

The answer to that is, I believe, that due to the impossibility of a decisive experiment, there is no experimental evidence pointing either way. Empirically we cannot appeal to publicly testible evidence, but only to our private awareness of alternatives and of freedom to choose one or the other.

But that is not the end of the story.

**E. The Epistemological Argument**

While there may be no publicly demonstrable proof as such concerning freedom, there is a curious connection between freedom and knowledge that makes freedom a necessity for anyone who claims to assert the truth, empirical or otherwise. For, to be an assertion at all, a statement must be made by a person who has the freedom to choose between asserting the true and the false.

If he does not have this freedom, if his assertion does not rest on his awareness of the alternative possibilities and on an ability to cast his lot with the truth, if his doing issues directly from his being, then his assertions have the same logical status as the monkey's "assertions" about Odysseus while accidentally typing out the *Iliad*. There is no meaning without intention. What meaning we might find in the monkey's *Iliad* is parasitic on an accidental correspondence with grammatical and verbal conventions meaningful to humans. To intend the truth, I must be free to choose between it and falsehood. The sense in which we trust other persons is otherwise incoherent.

We find a parallel in symbolic logic, where the existential and universal quantifiers operate as the asserters. They make the difference between a concept and a fact by asserting the predicate to have or not to have an objective referent. The quantifiers thus hold the logical position of the agent, the asserter.

The person who asserts that man is determined thus puts himself in the logical bind of being able to make no meaningful statements at all because nothing he utters can have the logical status of an assertion. His utterances would be meaningful only (again) in the accidental sense of the monkey's *Iliad*. He has no way of explaining error and no way of showing why his assertions in particular are determined by what is true whereas the assertions of his opponents are otherwise determined.

There would be no meaning in such a world. The illusion of meaning can be maintained by the determinist only so long as the he imagines himself to be divorced from the subject of his assertions about the world being completely deterministic. He must think of himself as a metaphysically detached observer, the "ideal" observer of so much philosophical and scientific fiction. The bubble bursts when he realizes that he is talking about himself being determined equally with other others.

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327. This is probably true of any grammatical system in any culture or language. Grammar is the primary way we humans structure meaning and communication.
To become involved in personal relationships is to abandon determinism. The psychological determinist who wants to keep his family together does not go home from his laboratory and treat them in a deterministic way.

Just as cause is the basis of metaphysics, so freedom is the basis of epistemology.

Harking back to a previous theme, to know oneself as a self is to be involved and interacting, for one discovers both himself and the "other" through interaction in the same primitive experience. Thus when he discovers himself as a cause, he in the same discovery knows himself to be free. To be a cause is to be free. The causal activity of the "other" in the dialogue of creation does not preclude freedom of the self, but works with it to build up the perceptual world of law relations.

The case then seems to be that empirically there is no publicly verifiable evidence one way or the other for freedom.

But, in a more positive vein, we can say first, that likewise no reliable evidence that can be brought to bear against freewill. The factor that weighed oppressively against freewill in the past was a metaphysics which incorporated the logically untenable inert matter view of substance and cause.

Secondly, if these pages are correct, then the only metaphysical view that can survive investigation is one in which freewill or personal causing is the basic concept.

Thirdly, although there is no public evidence for freedom, yet the ability to assert any truth at all depends on the asserter being free to choose between true and false.

And fourthly, we do have a private empirical awareness of alternatives and often a sense of freedom to choose between them.

We are “locked”, paradoxically, into freedom. The cosmological argument for God sets the metaphysical stage for the very meaning of freedom and personhood. Rational, ordered freedom is the essence and foundation of the Biblical worldview.

In the Biblical view, the law is not the enemy of freedom, but the supporter of it. The law of God, both natural and moral, is meant to create, protect, and defend our rational freedom.

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F. Changing Purposes

So, one asks, "Just how then does a change of purpose take place?"

A major reorientation of life goals is not an everyday occurrence. Indeed, as psychotherapy and spiritual conversion experiences illustrate, such an event can be a major upheaval, often accompanied by considerable pain.

In such a process, there would be an interplay between general goals and particular choices.

One rarely, if ever, simply sees a new life goal and chooses it in toto.
Large goals are much too complicated for that. Rather we get glimpses of what life would be like in that direction as against this direction. We have a "vision" of a new way of life. But such a vision is never at first complete. It would be only a glimpse brought about by some experience or other. Then in the particular choices one meets, he sees that to pursue this new way, he must make some of these particular choices differently from the way he had before.

The particular embodies the general. If he alters his particular actions, then the new experiences given thereby will in turn alter his general vision. The vision will be filled in and better understood. It may then be abandoned or the more hotly pursued.

Much of life is just such testing to see what life offers. An emotionally and spiritually healthy person is free to test his visions and opportunities.

Allan Munn in *Free Will and Determinism* suggests that what appears to be final cause or purpose in living beings is duplicated by certain mechanical "animals" which employ feedback devices to "inform" them about their environment.

One well-known example of this is the 'homing' rocket. Its 'brain' continually corrects the rocket's path for changes in the internal functioning of the rocket, changes in the state of the surrounding atmosphere, and evasive action of the enemy, to 'home-in' on the target.

Among other examples are Ashby's 'Homeostat' and Grey Walter's 'Tortoise'. This latter wanders about 'exploring' the environment until it becomes 'hungry' (its battery runs down), it looks around for and heads for 'food' (a battery charger), groping around obstacles in its path in a most life-like manner.

Thus, we see there is nothing peculiarly mysterious about 'final cause'. In a penetrating theoretical study Braithwaite shows it to be a special kind of the more ordinary, temporally prior cause, as our examples above have illustrated.\(^{330}\)

Munn's examples of feedback devices are beautiful models of the logic of purposive behavior in a context, but like logic, they fail to produce an argument for determinism right at the crucial point.

Decision-making about ultimate goals is the crucial point, not the mechanically grinding out of the logical implications of an already-given goal in a given context. The "animals" illustrate the latter, not the former. The "animals" cannot decide their "purposes". The "Tortoise" does not make the decision that it will hunt for food when it gets hungry, much less decide to follow a new way of life. It does so because it was constructed to do so. The "animals" are only extensions of their maker's purposes and so their doing follows directly from their being. And the makers, significantly enough, can change the goals of these "animals" -- a "Calvinistic" determinism.

There seems little doubt that any given observable behavior can be duplicated by a machine. But it is only if we assume beforehand that what it means to be free can be exhausted in terms of publicly observable behavior that we can conclude that these "animals" explain purpose or final cause.

Ian Ramsey, when asked whether the Christian can ever "suppose that there could be machines which might show emotions -- rage, fear excitement, desire?" replies:

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\(^{330}\) *Freewill & Determinism*, p. 37.
I should say: Of course he can. Machines might show all that these words mean in terms of observable behavior. But whether we could say that the machines "had" the emotions as we might say I "had" the emotions, is the point at issue. Could a machine display genuine, i.e. self-disclosed, ownership? (331)

If freedom and selfhood are not exhaustible in terms of observables, then duplication of observable behavior provides no evidence either way.

The question of freedom is not to be decided by particular experiments. It is rather a matter of what is presupposed by our ability to do any experimenting at all, to know anything at all, in short, to be a self.

Ramsey again:

Is not the presupposition of all language and experience that there is an irreducible "I"? (332) ...as in “I AM”?

332. Ibid., p. 61.
I. Summary:

In your own words, write a summary of the theme of this chapter, and make a personal application as is appropriate.

II. Questions on Chapter Five:

A - Metaphysically - Both Possible & Necessary

1. How does the author deal with the supposed opposition between causality and freewill?
2. Is the author’s definition of ‘free agent’ an adequate definition?
3. Why is it illogical to say that the present is caused by the past?
4. In what sense cannot laws determine events?
5. Describe the proper relation between the ontological and the epistemological meanings of ‘determine’.
6. Has the author adequately and effectively “bridged the gap” between freedom and determinism?
7. What is the consequence of having no causal principle?

B - The Empirical Evidence

8. How might “Calvinistic” determinism loom into the picture?
9. Why is it difficult, perhaps not possible, to prove empirically that there is or is not freewill?
10. Why was the experiment with the words ‘rein’, ‘reign’, and ‘rain’ inconclusive?
11. Why is giving a clear explanation of the choices involved in a test for freewill necessary, but still does not create a test for freewill?

C - Psychological Determinism

12. Why must the causing of an event be simultaneous with the event itself?
13. What are material and efficient cause, and how do they work together?
14. How was material cause misused in the ‘rain’, ‘reign’, and ‘rein’ experiment?
15. Why do created agents require a material cause for their free activities?
16. Would you agree with Socrates’ response to his friends’ advice to flee concerning causes, motives, and freedom? Explain.

D - The Logic of Purpose

17. How does the logic of purpose work as a deductive system?
18. Does it make sense to say that life provides an array of logically possible choices? If “yes”, then does it also make sense to say that we have causally possible choices?
19. In what two senses can “happiness” be a goal? And what confusion often arises in our thinking of happiness as a goal?
20. Why can a respondent reply only, “Because I want to”, to a query about his top level choice?
21. Discuss the relation between the three sorts of determinants.
22. Why does the control often attempted by politicians, advertizers, and psychologists not indicate that we are devoid of freedom?

E. The Epistemological Argument

23. Explain why freewill is necessary to making assertions of truth.
24. There appears to be no empirical publicly verifiable evidence for freewill. In what sense, then can we point to positive evidence?
25. How can we be “locked” into freedom?

F. Changing Purposes

26. How would you critique Allen Munn’s assessment of robots?
27. Do you agree with Ian Ramsey?
G. Irreducible Complexity

28. Explain “irreducible complexity” with an example.

29. Chapter Reflections:

In your own words, relate your new insights from reading and meditating on the information contained within this chapter. What difference would it make to you personally whether the claims and assertions of this chapter were true or not?
Chapter VI

Personhood & Cosmology

A. Personality - a Grudging Admission

The subtitle of our present Volume I is The Substance of Persons & Community, looking for the fundamental undergirding of persons and of community, and anticipating the development of a personalist cosmos in which relations between persons would be fundamental to the nature and meaning of the cosmos. Thus we began this book asking what would happen if the basic entities of the cosmos turned out to be personal, as true in the Biblical worldview, rather than impersonal, as true in the secular and pagan worldviews.

Most philosophers of recent centuries have seen persons as little more than an accidental addendum to the wider, more scientifically important, and vastly impersonal cosmos, now dominated by the theory of evolution as the primary explanatory paradigm.

But the astonishingly fine-tuned nature of that impersonal cosmos, as discovered by secular science, has forced many secular pursuers of truth (often grudgingly) to admit the so-called “anthropic principle”, that the cosmos looks a lot like it was designed for us humans (anthropoids), and almost specifically for us here on earth.

Anthony Flew, for example, atheist leader when I was writing Personality, Empiricism, & God at Oxford in the early 1960’s, a few years ago granted that the likelihood of cramming more information than is contained in the Encyclopaedia Britannica by random chance into every cell in our bodies is somewhat slim. He therefore granted also that the project required some sort of intelligent mind.

He did not at that time become a believer in a personal God who intervenes in our lives, he said, only in some kind of Intelligent Designer.

Few have explored the idea that the Biblical worldview, which speaks of just such an Intelligent Designer, might have an intellectually credible case for asserting what Flew cautiously granted. But that is what the preceding and following pages are intended to accomplish.

It is time now at the end of Volume I to sum up some of the implications of persons indeed being the basic entities of the cosmos.

All of this will impact strongly on

333. See Preface, page xxvii.
many things that will follow from this foundational worldview discussion.

### B. Freedom - Being, Intending, & Doing

We have developed the First Cause as being a personal rather than the usual impersonal entity of secular and pagan philosophy. A primary quality of a person is rational freedom, the ability to choose between real options, which, having been chosen, could have gone otherwise. There is a real freedom with real positive contingency.

In order for that to be the case, there must be a difference between three things: 1. the being, 2. the intending, and 3. the doing of the cause.

One’s intending cannot be the same as one’s being, for then the intending would not be free, but would issue out of the primary nature of one’s being.

As with any person, my being is not the same as my doing, yet that distinction is often not understood, and, for many, hard to grasp.

Nevertheless, what I do is different from who I am, my being. It is my being which is doing the doing. My being stays the same, my doings change. I am still the numerically same Earle Fox at 76 that I was at birth, but my doings are vastly different.

If there were no such difference, then the doing of the cause, such as it might be, would flow directly from its being, just as a billiard ball acts from the nature of the ball itself, not from any free choice of the ball. It bounces off the other balls and off the side of the billiard table with predictable pattern and precision which the competing players attempt to discern and selectively produce. The ball has no capacity to do otherwise. The doing of the ball is thus predictable from its being, as is not the case with the free agent who is freely and purposefully knocking it about with a cue, intent on getting it into the pocket and winning the game.

The purpose of the natural sciences is to determine the being, the identity, of a physical object so that its behavior can be predicted. Despite enormous efforts, no one has been able to systematically predetermine the doings of a free agent without knowing beforehand his intentions, his inner, non-empirical purposes.

In the case of an impersonal First Cause, its doing would flow likewise from its inherent nature and being, which means that the whole of existence would be predictable from knowing the nature of that being. Just such knowledge is the goal of many scientists who are looking for the so-called “unified field” theory, which would unite all aspects of basic physics into one theory, from which, it is supposed, the whole of the cosmos would be derived and predictable.

Secular cosmology tries to follow the trail in space down to the smallest entity, the cosmological atom, whatever that might be, and then to follow the trail of that atom back in time to its original state of affairs. Then, if it can overcome the “negative contingency” and infinite regress deficits, it can “bounce back” with an explanation of everything else in the cosmos. That original state of affairs would be...
the cosmological atom at its beginning point in time, in effect, the impersonal First Cause.

But a being which is free has a choice, which, it turns out, is the very basis for a positive, rational contingency. A world created by a First Cause with freewill would not have to be what it is. The world could have been differently caused. The difference would depend solely on the possible decisions available to the First Cause. We could have a rationally, positively contingent empirical world. And thus the First Cause would manifest the fundamental, ontological distinction between its being and its intending and then its doing.

Given our definition of ‘eternity’ as ‘perduing through time and change as an ontologically, numerically identical entity’, the being of the First Cause would remain the same, but the doing would be that which marks time.

The capacity to intend and do requires a conscious capacity to see possibilities and to choose from among them. The realm of pure possibility is, in that manner, the uninhibited playground of the First Cause. Total freedom.

Human persons are created in that Image, and thus able to share (albeit limitedly) in freedom of the same kind. We creatures are, with respect to our chosen doings, first causes.

C. Rationality

A second primary quality of persons is rationality. A cosmos in which science is possible is a cosmos which is rational (obeys consistent laws) and therefore predictable. Is there a sense in which a secular or pagan cosmos could be rational, and thus produce science? Only if the original “atom” can be shown itself to be rational.

The rationality of this Original State of Affairs rests partly on whether it provides the needed “bounce” so as to provide a rational explanation of what it allegedly produces.\(^{335}\)

In a secularized cosmos, at least as currently imagined, it does not appear that we could have a contingent empirical world except in the negative sense. If its behavior were predictable, it would be a necessary world, logically knowable and predictable from a knowledge of the nature of an impersonal First Cause, or as Bertrand Russell would have it, predictable, backwards or forwards, from any total state of the universe at any time. (Nevermind that there could be no “knowers” in such a cosmos, since knowing requires freedom.)

The question to put would thus be whether on the secular view the alleged First Cause, the Original State of Affairs, was itself contingent, and if so, in what sense. What would be the explanation of its being? Would it be contingent only negatively -- contingent, but not on anything? If so, it would be resting, as the Hindus say, on the back of a cosmic Turtle, that is, a total and opaque mystery which

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334. On “bouncing back”, see Chapter II-E-2, “Continuity: Negative Flop & Positive Bounce” on page 52, toward end of section.

would thus not provide the “bounce” by which an explanation could be had.

Or, could we imagine such a beginning entity or “stuff” to be a First Cause in the sense which the cosmological argument for God attributes to the personal First Cause? i.e., that passive causal language would not apply because it is self-sufficient?

If the cosmos (1) were not positively contingent, that is, not contingent on something itself rational at the ultimate level, and, (2) were not self-sufficient and rational in its own nature, then the rationality of the cosmos itself would be in question.

It is difficult to see how rationality can apply to a cosmos in which freedom is not fundamental, for only a freely choosing person can operate rationally, that is, with consistent intention, and can discern and understand the rationality of other things, including other persons and cosmoi. That would be as true of a First Cause as it is of we humans.

Therefore, if a First Cause is not free to choose between true and false, or between other various possibilities, then there is no sense in which it can be said to be (1) either understanding or speaking the truth -- except, again, in a strictly accidental sense, like monkeys typing out the Iliad, or (2) creating rationally. All our supposed perceptions of order in the cosmos would be illusions, thus rendering inductive reasoning impossible. The Kantian objective unity of apperception would be totally and fatally missing.

The order imagined in such a cosmos would be totally arbitrary and thus without rational explanation.

Some will reply that science does not operate on intentions, which are denied, even (or especially) of a First Cause. No Intelligent Designer allowed. Science, it will be said, operates on impersonal “laws”. It will be part of our aim in Volume III, The Substance of Natural Science & Epistemology, to show that laws, as we have already suggested are necessarily personal intentions.

Secularized science and cosmology operate on a gratuitous assumption, seldom acknowledged, that the original source of the cosmos is itself rational without benefit of intentional freedom, that its supposedly determined laws are “just there”, reasonable and detectable.

The third volume will fill out our reasons for believing that not to be the case. Indeed, some high-level secular philosophers of science have already thrown in the towel on the matter.

Freedom and rationality are necessary complements. And they both therefore rest on the distinction within the Cause between its being and its intending and its doing, a distinction not sustainable in the impersonal secular mode of thought.

The distinction between being and doing, with the resultant potential for freedom and rationality, are fundamental aspects of what it means to be a person.

And it is just such persons who form the community indicated in the subtitle of this Vol. I, The Substance of Persons & Community.

We have, I trust, indicated a viable

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336. Much more will be said on the subject of inductive reasoning in Part II, The Substance of Natural Science

337. See above, Chapter IV-F-2, “Systematic Skepticism” on page 144.
candidate for being the metaphysical foundation for such a community -- and thus for science itself, and the scientific community, namely the Biblical creator God.

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**D. An Internal Community**

**D-1.**

Scientists spend much time investigating how the secular primary entities, the physical “atoms” of existence, are processed along into galaxies, solar systems, stars, and planets. But, if persons, not physical “atoms”, are the primary entities, then we would do well to likewise investigate how persons are formed and nurtured.

The necessary distinction within a person between being, intention, and doing suggests a kind of intra-person community. These three parts of each individual person must work together within the person for the person to function as a consistent whole. In practical fact, they often do not, seeming to have contrary minds of their own, to the detriment of the self. Much of our internal discontent, anxieties, and neurotic behavior stems from just such conflict.

A created person is the “child” of the marriage, as it were, between that which supplies its being and that which supplies it purpose and direction, that is to say, authority. One’s purpose and direction govern one’s doing. For a child to grow into a free and stable adult, it must experience its being as affirmed by the purposive authority in its life.

In human families, our mothers are the first and primary conveyors of our stability of being, and our fathers typically the primary conveyors to us of purpose and direction. Only if there is a complementarity between the mothering and fathering such that the discipline of fathering affirms, not negates, the goodness and stability of the foundation of being given through mothering, can the child emerge as a whole and healthy child.

But the ultimate source of being and authority is God, not human parents. Or, to say the same thing, God is our real Parent. On the Biblical view, human parents are the launching devices which are meant to propel us out to a relationship with Him. If the character of God is such that His gift of our being is affirmed by His law and authority, then, likewise, we can be raised up strong and healthy creatures.

This is anticipating Volume II, *Yahweh or the Great Mother?*, but is said here to indicate that the nature of the Community of Creation (see 338. See Bibliography for *The Law & the Grace of God* on the foundation of morality and ethics in one’s purpose for existence, which logically can be given only by one’s creator.

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338. See Bibliography for *The Law & the Grace of God* on the foundation of morality and ethics in one’s purpose for existence, which logically can be given only by one’s creator.

339. See Bibliography for *Psychology, Salvation, and the Ordination of Women* on the fundamental nature of gender roles. See also the audio tape, *Man and Woman in the Image of God*.

340. For more on this, see Bibliography for *Biblical Inner Healing*, a study on a Biblical psychology.

341. This 3-Volume series is the first fundamental foundation for a Biblical worldview. God is our Creator. The second fundamental foundation is law, morality. Being Creator, God is also Sovereign.
Chapter IV) begins right at the bottom of it all, right within the nature of persons, the fundamental entities of the cosmos.

And thus we flesh out the theme of our three volume title: A Personalist Cosmology in Imago Dei.

The “Imago Dei” part is essential because the Image of God is ontologically the most stable and unchangable aspect of the cosmos, the being of God -- which supplies the basic pattern for our ontology, and hence for our cosmology and anthropology.

Being “made in the image of God” is not merely religious fluff. It is the foundation of our personhood which gives us intelligence, the foundation of natural law which makes the world intelligible, and therefore also the foundation of science.

D-2. Persons - the Irreducible Complexity of the Cosmos

The Intelligent Design movement has come up with the notion of “irreducible complexity”, started by Michael Behe, who defined the term:

...an irreducibly complex system [is] one "composed of several well-matched, interacting parts that contribute to the basic function, wherein the removal of any one of the parts causes the system to effectively cease functioning". (342)

If persons are the basic ontological entities of the cosmos, and if the three aspects of being, intending, and doing are each necessary to the functioning of a person, and each of them is part of the person but different from the other two, as seems to be the case -- then it follows that persons are, as it were, the “atoms” of the cosmos, the objects which cannot be divided, the three parts of which can neither be interchanged nor left out. You cannot reduce the complexity and still have a functioning person.

Persons are then, in their tri-partite construction, irreducibly complex, with the original Creator of all, the uncaused Cause, the I AM, being the ultimate explanation for all other things, including all other persons.

This fact will weigh in heavily later in volume II discussions on the nature of science, in particular regarding evolution and intelligent design, because this tri-partite nature is fundamental to the meaning both of ‘causality’ and ‘intelligence’ -- both necessary to science.

Epilogue

We bring to a close Personality, Empiricism, & God, Volume I of A Personalist Cosmology in Imago Dei.

I had not planned, when I went to Oxford in January of 1961, to rewrite the cosmological argument for the existence of God. I went because I knew (1) that Christians could win the intellectual war on ethical theory and morality, showing that only the Biblical
worldview could sustain a moral order, and (2) I strongly suspected that Christians could also win the “science vs. religion” war, not by religion conquering science, but rather by showing that science and specifically Biblical religion logically imply each other, and that neither reason nor revelation can survive without the other.

I went to Oxford to see what would happen if I examined the Christian faith in the light of the best of modern academics. What slowly and surprisingly emerged turned out to be the cosmological argument for God. It fell into place, I was not looking for it, realising what had happened only as and after it was done. I did not see the full potential impact until later when I would present the material to different audiences.

It was intellectually inescapable. The intellectual credibility of Biblical faith is logically built into the nature of God Himself -- a logical fact, or so I think the above pages illustrate.

Volume II, *The Substance of Science & Epistemology*, then follows, pursuing our personalist ontology into specific areas of the scientific enterprise, notably the metaphysical foundation of inductive reasoning, the bedrock of all empirical study.

Volume III, *Yahweh or the Great Mother?*, will take the notions of the above chapters and compare them in detail with the primary alternative, what is often called the “Perennial” worldview, as in the title of Aldous Huxley’s book, *The Perennial Philosophy*. *Yahweh or the Great Mother?* will pursue matters into worldview, theology, and Biblical revelation.

Volumes I and II explore what is called general revelation, those areas knowable by reasoning on our own from our experiences of life. Volume III brings us into specific revelation, about those things which we must be told by God to understand about Himself, such as His purposes for us.


Only the Biblical worldview has the capacity to define moral words such as ‘ought’, ‘should’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’, etc. because only the Biblical worldview is founded on a personal God who creates the world ex nihilo, and who therefore can give the existing created world a reason for existence, that being the only logically possible basis for moral order.

345. See above, Chapter II, “The ‘Perennial’ Impersonalist Closed Circle” on page 85
Study Guide for Chapter VI
The Cause as Person

I. Summary:
In your own words, write a summary of the theme of this chapter, and make a personal application as is appropriate.

II. Questions on Chapter Six:
1. What has forced even some secular scientists and philosophers to accept the “anthropic principle”?

A - Freedom, Being, & Doing
2. Why must there be a difference between the being and the doing of a free agent?
3. How might the difference between being and doing apply in cosmology?
4. Why is positive contingency important in cosmology?
5. How is the realm of possibility the “playground” of the First Cause?

B - Rationality
6. How could a secular or pagan cosmos be rational, and (according to the author) why is that so? Do you agree? Why so?
7. Why does the author conclude that the secular cosmos could not be a contingent event?
8. What does the “back of a Turtle” signify?
9. Can rationality apply to a cosmos in which freedom is not fundamental?
10. Explain the “gratuitous assumption” to which the author refers. Is he right that secular cosmology wrongly makes this assumption?
11. Do you think the author has provided a “viable candidate”? Explain.

C - An Internal Community
12. Does the author’s use of gender distinctions in a cosmological setting make sense to you?

Chapter Reflections:
In your own words, relate your new insights from reading and meditating on the information contained within this chapter. What difference would it make to you personally whether the claims and assertions of this chapter were true or not?
Bibliography

The following materials are suggested for further study. There is a growing number of excellent material becoming available as Christians explore deeply the nature of our humanness from both a Biblical and an empirical methodology.
The Road to Emmaus

The Road to Emmaus produces the following materials by Earle Fox, D. Phil., related to the healing of the soul and other areas of Christian apologetics. They will be increasingly available from the Emmaus website, http://theRoadtoEmmaus.org (see Shopping Mall), or at local or online bookstores. For current availability and prices, visit the website in order to contact Emmaus Ministries.

The Road to Emmaus has a new commercial Shopping Mall at www.Emmaus-Mall.org. These items below will increasingly be added to the resources available there for purchase.

Healing

BASIC NEW TESTAMENT. (6-audio album) On the meaning of the new birth, justification, the crucifixion, and other topics.

THE FALL & THE OLD TESTAMENT TURN-AROUND. (7-audio album) On dependent mankind trying to live self-sufficiently, the devastation of the human psyche and community, and beginnings of redemption.

FOUNDATIONS FOR A BIBLICAL PSYCHOLOGY. (9-audio album) Providing the fundamentals of the Biblical view of human nature.

GOD & HEALING ALBUM -- 20-audio overview of Biblical inner healing from the above. Used for counselees to get basics of Biblical inner healing.

HEALING THE INNER HURTS (5 1-hour workshops on 3 audio/video cassettes) A weekend conference on the healing of memories.

INNER HEALING. (8-audio album) On the basics of emotional healing and the healing of memories.

JESUS & WHoleness. (10-audio album) On God in Jesus reaching into our self-destructive circle to draw us to Himself.

THE SACRAMENT OF SELFHOOD (Video, 1 3/4 hr, 2 segments) The nature of the self as an outward and visible sign of the nature of God.

SPIRITUAL TRANSFORMERS. (4-audio album) On moving from life in the flesh to life in the Spirit.

Human Sexuality

BIBLICAL SEXUALITY & THE BATTLE FOR SCIENCE -- (Paperback 208 pp.) Basic text on dealing with the "new morality", homosexuality, "inclusiveness", science and religion, pluralism, sex and gender roles, the extraordinary failure of Kinseyan sexology, and many other issues.

HOMOSEXUALITY: DIALOGUE IN DARKNESS OR HONEST DEBATE? -- (4-audio album) -
1. The Church Has AIDS (the pan-sexual agenda); 2. Homosexuality, the Bible, and Science (the overwhelming negative evidence against the pro-homosexual position); 3. Darkness or Debate? (the mind control techniques used by the pro-homosexual lobby to control the public debate on the sexuality issues); 4. The Prize of the Upward Call; 5. Where Now?


HUMAN SEXUALITY - THE SECULAR DEBACLE (Video, 1 hr 50 min, 2 segments) The disastrous sexuality as fed through SIECUS, Planned Parenthood, and Kinsey Institute into our public schools.

MAN & WOMAN IN THE IMAGE OF GOD (Video, 1 hr 45 min, 2 segments) Dr. Fox on the Biblical view of sex and gender relations, building on YAHWEH OR THE GREAT MOTHER?


TWO KINDS OF PERSONHOOD (Paper, 16 pp.)
Abortion -- he who sets the definitions controls the debate. A response to an embryologist's definition of 'personhood' which makes infants disposable.

New Testament
The following four approximately 2-hour audio tapes are a series on four vital New Testament themes, helping to relate Biblical theology with inner healing. There are over 50 audio tapes, some available on video, dealing with various aspects of the healing nature of the Christian faith.

- Born Again -- Faith and the restoration of our self-image in God.
- Justification by Faith -- How faith and justification bring healing.
- Why Jesus Had to Die -- The connection between the crucifixion and our own identity.
- The Price Jesus Paid -- What was the price? to whom was it paid? and, what has that to do with our inner healing?

Theology/Apologetics

YAHWEH or the GREAT MOTHER? (2 videos, 4 hours, 6 sessions, study guide) Essential background on Biblical vs. pagan worldview. For dealing with issues of sexuality, moral values, and theology as encountered in "New Age" and eastern philosophies and in secular materialism.


BIBLICAL THEOLOGY AND PELAGIANISM.
(Reprint from JOURNAL OF RELIGION.) Why the exercise of freewill is not contrary to the sovereignty of God and does not render the grace of God unnecessary. Mistaken assumptions made by almost all discussions of the issues.


SPIRITUAL WARFARE in the 20th CENTURY -- (Audio album, 6 talks on 4 tapes, approx. 1 hr each) 1. Two Worldviews - the Battle Lines. 2. What is Spiritual Warfare? - Who Owns the World? 3. Unsheathing the Bible - in a Scientific Age. 4. Political Warfare. 5. Education Warfare. 6. Education: for Life or Death? Spiritual warfare begins in prayer and Scripture study, but it must come out of the closet to engage the enemy "in the flesh".

Philosophical Background
DEFINING 'Oughtness' AND 'Love'. (Reprint from JOURNAL OF RELIGION) -- philosophical proof that any moral language, whether legislative, judicial, constitutional, necessarily presupposes reference to a Creator.

PERSONALITY, EMPIRICISM, & GOD -- Unpublished doctoral thesis. Expected to be published in 2007 or -08. The philosophical case for saying that the Biblical doctrine of creation is a logically necessary foundation for empirical science and scientific method. http://theRoadtoEmmaus.org will publish updates on publication progress.

Education

These are devastating critiques of government-run American education by very adequate authors. See Bibliography for short descriptions.

SEX EDUCATION - TWO OPPOSING PHILOSOPHIES -- (Paper, 10 pp.) Letter to editor exchange between Dr. Fox and Robert Selverstone, Ph. D., president of SIECUS (Sex Information and Education Council in the United States). Dr. Fox points to morality as a necessary part of academic freedom and responsible education.

EDUCATION: FOR LIFE FOR DEATH? -- (Audio, approx... 40 min.) On the two precisely contrary philosophies of education which emerge from the Biblical view of objective truth vs. the secular/pagan view of relative truth. (Flip side contains DOING IT SOMEONE ELSE'S WAY on the need for obedience. Included in Spiritual Warfare album.)
EDUCATION WARFARE (Audio, approx. 1 hr)
The spiritual warfare in occupying the high ground in our educational systems. (Flip side contains POLITICAL WARFARE. Included in Spiritual Warfare album.)

For further information on The Road to Emmaus and resources available, go to www.theRoadtoEmmaus.org, and to www.EmmausMall.org.
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For topics not found in normal alphabetical order, look under some other general topic. The match in the text may not be a literal match with the indexed word, but a similar theme, i.e., ‘secularized’ or ‘secularism’ might be under ‘secular’, or, ‘myth’ may refer to ‘mythology’ or ‘mythic’ on the indicated page.