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[COMMENT: A worthy read for spiritual and political leadership. The Christian community has for too long relied on civil government to do its discipline and judging. Yes, there are dangers, but the dangers are far worse if the Church allows the control of its future and ministry to be under the control of civil government. It will always lead to tyranny.
The Church badly needs to recover its own identity as a community within the larger community. We need to do what the Amish have done, separate ourselves in certain crucial respects, not necessarily as the Amish, shunning technology, but shunning those things which really do compromise our trust in God and compromise our building of Kingdom conditions among ourselves.
If Jesus is not Lord, then civil government will be lord.
And that will always (as in ALWAYS) in the long run drift (if not catapult) into
tyranny. The secular/pagan world logically cannot sustain honest
ordered freedom. We MUST learn again the real meaning of Biblical
government -- which is always and in every respect under the law and grace of
God. Calvin, I think, was wrong about some things (predestination, lack of freewill...), but he was right about the sovereignty of God
over all things. His interpretation of the sovereignty of God was
fundamental to the separation of the Colonies from King George III. See Politics
Bibliography Page for resources on this.
Calvin believed in an independent church supported and reinforced by a godly civil magistrate.  He stated, “Christ’s spiritual kingdom and the civil jurisdiction are things completely distinct.”  Calvin believed that the church and the state coexisted as two forms of government separated from one another, but both under God and subject to his law-word. As church historian Dr. Joe Morecraft has explained:
[Calvin] also made a clear distinction between church and state — institutionally, functionally and jurisdictionally — without separating Christianity from the state, which, equally with the church, is accountable to the triune God. 
[COMMENT: It needs to be said that the Church-State relationships were being worked out long before Calvin, et al, in the long developing relation between Church and State right from the conversion of Constantine on. Sadly, Christians knew better how to relate to Caesar as enemy than as friend. Once Christians got into power, they tended to get seduced by power just as the pagans had. The primary development of the separation seems to have taken place in English Common law, the Magna Carta, etc. (see below), in which the Church had a significant role in limiting the universal designs of the monarchy. Calvin was building on and developing what had already been in the works for centuries.
By far, the best rendition of that relationship so far has been in the Declaration of Independence and the American Constitution -- rightly interpreted. But it had echoes already in English law. See article on William Blackstone. E. Fox]
Common Law Heritage
As a precursor to the Reformation, the English common law had long recognized this distinction between “temporal” and “spiritual” matters. According to legal scholar Herb Titus:
Even before Calvin wrote his study that called for limited authority both in the church and in the state, the English common law had been developed in such a way as to recognize such limits in principle. In the fourteenth century, Bracton claimed that the common law courts had jurisdiction over “temporal” matters, and the ecclesiastical courts had authority over “spiritual” matters. For several centuries, English judges battled over whether cases involving marriage, tithes, inheritance of property, and the like were “temporal” or “spiritual.” Whatever the merits of these claims and counterclaims, this principle was established: Some “wrongs” were not within the jurisdiction of the civil government courts that enforced the common law but were within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts and vice versa; moreover, some wrongs were not within the jurisdiction of any human court. 
Gary DeMar has stated the historical doctrine of the separation of church and state quite well:
In the simplest terms, separating Church and State means that the institution and the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Church is separate from the institution and the civil jurisdiction of the State. The Church as an institution cannot mingle in the institutional affairs of civil government. Neither can its officers. In the same way, civil government cannot disturb the ministry and operation of the Church by tampering with the Church’s doctrines or courts. 
This principle of the separation of church and state was even articulated by members of the United States Supreme Court! In 1875, while an Associate Justice, Presbyterian William Strong delivered two lectures at Union Theological Seminary in New York on the nature of church/state relations. He stated:
Again, the law recognizes the right of every church to determine finally who are, and who are not its members. Herein is a marked difference between churches and other organizations...But a church is allowed to determine for itself, construing its own organic rules, whether a member has been cut off; and no civil court will inquire whether the motion was regularly made, or issue a mandamus to compel a restoration. It [the civil courts] accepts the decisions of church courts upon questions of membership as not subject to civil law review. 
Five years ago, Chief Justice Roy Moore of the Supreme Court of Alabama wrote an incisive opinion in Yates v. El Bethel Primitive Baptist Church,  explaining the proper jurisdictional separation of church and state. The Alabama high court had involved itself in a church election dispute, and Justice Moore dissented. He explained that the court not only should not interfere with church government, but lacked the jurisdictional power to do so:
The church — as an institution — does not have authority over the affairs of civil government, and the state — as an institution — does not have authority over the affairs of church government... Acknowledgment of this separation comes from a recognition that God is the source of all power. 
Because of this jurisdictional separation, the civil government cannot claim the power to second-guess the decisions of church government:
[A] common misconception is the belief that the state is merely the less preferred “power” for determining ecclesiastical and religious matters, or that the power of state may be wielded in the religious sphere whenever it is thought to be necessary or expedient. On the contrary, the state is simply without jurisdiction in such matters: “It belongs not to the civil power to enter into or review the proceedings of a spiritual court.’ 
These basic principles concerning the jurisdictional separation of church and state are foundational to a proper understanding of the First Amendment. Justice Moore’s articulate exposition of this subject was a dissenting opinion, but it was squarely in line with a considerable body of law that properly recognizes the inability of civil government to interfere with church government.  For the latest decision in this line, we turn to the Texas Supreme Court which has recently provided us with a landmark decision based squarely on the principles Justice Moore articulated five years ago — and as the Reformers articulated four centuries ago.
Westbrook: The Tradition Continues
To be clear: In applauding the holding of Westbrook, we do not necessarily mean that we agree with every detail of the way the pastor handled the situation from beginning to finish, nor do we agree with every detail of the court’s reasoning and arriving at its conclusion. Whether or not everything was handled properly is irrelevant to the central issue of this case, namely, the independence of church government from the interference of the civil government in its own affairs. We thank God that the Texas Supreme Court upheld the biblical doctrine of the separation of church and state.
With this caveat in mind, we affirm that the court’s decision has much to teach us. The court begins with an overview of the jurisdictional issue at the heart of the case:
For purposes of our review, we presume the counseling at issue was purely secular in nature as Penley claims. Even so, we cannot ignore Westbrook’s role as Penley’s pastor. In his dual capacity, Westbrook owed Penley conflicting duties; as Penley’s counselor he owed her a duty of confidentiality, and as her pastor he owed Penley and the church an obligation to disclose her conduct. We conclude that parsing those roles for purposes of determining civil liability in this case, where health or safety are not at issue, would unconstitutionally entangle the court in matters of church governance and impinge on the core religious function of church discipline. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.
Daring to Discipline
CrossLand Community Bible Church described itself as a “‘Christ-centered church,’ operated according to biblical principles and practices described in the church’s constitution and statement of faith.”  The church constitution contained the following disciplinary policy:
We believe that one of the primary responsibilities of the church is to maintain the purity of the Body. We are directed by God to be holy. In recognition of the importance of this obligation, the elders will biblically and lovingly utilize every appropriate means to restore members who find themselves in patterns of serious misconduct. When efforts at restoration fail, the elders will apply the Biblical teaching on church discipline, which could include revocation of membership, along with an appropriate announcement made to the membership (Matt 18:15-17; I Cor 5:1-5; Gal 6:1, 2; 2 Thes 3:6). 
CrossLand Church had a firm commitment to the often neglected (and often unpopular), but biblically commanded, duty of a local church to exercise church discipline over its members where appropriate. CrossLand’s constitution states that if one “violates Biblical standards, or which is detrimental to the ministry, unity, peace or purity of the church,” and the member is unrepentant, “the elders will follow our Lord's instructions from Matthew 18:15-20.”  When joining the church, Mrs. Penley, like all members, had agreed to be held accountable according to these standards. In response to a request to “[a]ffirm your willingness to abide by the constitution of this church,” Penley answered, “[s]ure, I can abide by the church constitution...willingly.” 
In the course of marriage counseling with Penley, Westbrook learned of her involvement in an adulterous relationship and initiated the church discipline procedure, following the sequence in Matthew 18. After personal confrontation, and a confrontation involving both Westbrook and his wife, Penley left the church. Nevertheless, Westbrook went to the elders, and they joined to rebuke Penley before the church.
“Secular” Duty or Church Issue?
Mrs. Penley sued the pastor, the church, and the elders, but in a series of procedural moves, all claims were dismissed except for the claim of professional negligence against Westbrook for his role as a professional counselor. The trial court looked at the fact that Westbrook was a licensed marriage counselor and declined to recognize any ecclesiastical immunity. The Supreme Court disagreed.
Penley’s whole theory rested on the fact that Westbrook was a professional counselor, not just a pastor, and this moved the issue out from the ecclesiastical immunity and into civil liability. Penley argued that Westbrook was a licensed counselor with a professional duty of confidentiality, and that he breached this duty by disclosing Penley’s information to the elders of the church, and that this breach of a “secular” duty took the case out of the church autonomy protection. The fact that the court did not take this position shows the very high value the court placed on church autonomy: 
When a pastor who holds a professional counseling license engages in marital counseling with a parishioner, the line between the secular and the religious may be difficult to draw. In that instance, secular rules that govern the professional relationship may conflict with or impinge upon religious tenets or standards of conduct to which the church and its members have voluntarily bound themselves. Deciding which should yield requires a careful analysis of the respective interests sought to be protected. 
Westbrook was immune, the court stated, because “this disclosure [of confidential information] cannot be isolated from the church disciplinary process in which it occurred.”  Because of this, the court could not intervene — even though the professional negligence claim was a strong one when considered alone. They stated: “Churches have a fundamental right “to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.’” 
“Spheres of Sovereignty”
The Texas Supreme Court “recognizes two spheres of sovereignty when deciding matters of government and religion. The religion clauses are designed to ‘prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [religion or government] into the precincts of the other,’ and are premised on the notion that ‘both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.’” 
As an aside, the Westbrook court relied entirely on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, applied to the states through the incorporation doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment. This doctrine has been the subject of considerable controversy itself,  but for our purposes that is beside the point. The court would have reached the same result under the Texas Constitution  without any reference to the U.S. Constitution. In doing so, the issues of principle — the jurisdictions of church and state — would have been the same.
Continuing its exposition of the jurisdictional differences, the court noted:
It seems to be settled law in this land of religious liberty that the civil courts have no power or jurisdiction to determine the regularity or validity of the judgment of a church tribunal expelling a member from further communion and fellowship in the church. Membership in a church creates a different relationship from that which exists in other voluntary societies formed for business, social, literary, or charitable purposes. 
The Supreme Court continued its brilliant analysis of the doctrine of the separation of church and state by reinforcing the fact that both the church and the state are separate entities and must maintain their distance:
Church relationship stands upon a different and higher plane, and the right of a church to decide for itself whom it may admit into fellowship or who shall be expelled or excluded from its fold cannot be questioned by the courts, when no civil or property rights are involved. 
Penley urged the court to use a “neutral-principles approach” test in determining her professional-negligence claim against Westbrook. The court dismissed this plea by stating:
A church’s decision to discipline members for conduct considered outside of the church’s moral code is an inherently religious function with which civil courts should not generally interfere. Courts have no jurisdiction to “revise or question ordinary acts of church discipline” and “cannot decide who ought to be members of the church, nor whether the excommunicated have been justly or unjustly, regularly or irregularly cut off from the body of the church.” 
They continued by stating:
This is because “the judicial eye cannot penetrate the veil of the church for the forbidden purpose of vindicating the alleged wrongs of excised members; when they became members they did so upon the condition of continuing or not as they and their churches might determine, and they thereby submit to the ecclesiastical power and cannot now invoke the supervisory power of the civil tribunals.”
The Court discussed the issue of disgruntled parishioners trying to sue church members for holding them accountable to the very standards they agreed to be held to:
Disgruntled parishioners cannot circumvent ecclesiastical immunity by suing church members rather than the religious body itself...else such immunity “would be an empty protection” and “there would be an inappropriate chilling effect on the ability of churches to discipline their members.” 
The court noted that “the autonomy of a church in managing its affairs and deciding matters of ‘church discipline...or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them’ has long been afforded broad constitutional protection.” 
It is significant that the court used the term “church autonomy” in speaking of the church being outside the jurisdiction of the court. Use of the new term makes it crystal clear that the court is not keeping out of the church matters just as an exercise of discretion; ’ it is keeping out because it lacks the jurisdictional power to interfere at all. 
Penley’s petition to the court sought to emphasize the fact that she was no longer a member of Crossland Church, and on that basis to argue that Westbrook could no longer disclose any information about her sins to the church. In rejecting this claim, the court upheld the biblical duty of the local church to “break fellowship with” Penley because she was unrepentant. The court properly concluded:
Penley’s voluntary forfeiture of her membership did not, in CrossLand’s or Westbrook’s view, forestall the church’s duty under its constitution to “tell it to the church” and admonish church members to “break fellowship with [Penley].” Their decision to so proceed was based on their interpretation of Matthew 18:15-20, an inherently ecclesiastical matter. We hold that court interference with that decision through imposition of tort liability in this case would impinge upon matters of church governance in violation of the First Amendment. 
Westbrook: A Message of Encouragement
The decision in Westbrook is landmark. Rarely in recent times have we seen a court so clearly uphold the jurisdictional distinctions between church and state when it comes to restraining state power — rarer still when it is the highest court of the state. For the decision to be unanimous (which Westbrook was) is virtually unheard of.
The decision in Westbrook should be encouraging to Christians for many reasons. First, pastors should be encouraged that biblical church discipline can be carried out under the authority of church government, without fear of being overturned in civil court. Second, historians should be encouraged that there is a court which remembers the almost-forgotten historical meaning of “separation of church and state.” And third, Christian citizens should be encouraged that the court had the understanding to respect this historical principle of jurisdiction, a principle grounded ultimately in the Scriptures themselves.
Finally, the Reformers (e.g., Calvin, Knox, Beza, Gillespie) would have been pleased. As the great Puritan Richard Baxter wrote in his classic work, The Holy Commonwealth:
God doth not communicate all that Power in kind which is Eminently and Transcendently in himself to any one man, or sort of Officers; but distributeth to each their part; Civil Power to Civil Rulers, and Ecclesiastical to Church-Rulers. 
We are grateful that this theological truth lives on as a legal reality today.
 All nine of the justices on the Texas Supreme court ruled in this case.
 50 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 949, 2007 WL 1861168 (Tex.).
 Originally, the suit was against Westbrook as well as the church elders and the church itself, alleging defamation, breach of fiduciary duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and professional negligence. Subsequently, all claims were dismissed except the professional negligence claim against Westbrook himself.
 Thomas Jefferson was not the first person to coin this term. For example Richard Hooker and Roger Williams both used the phrase “Wall of Separation of Church and State” in their writings before Jefferson used the phrase in his letter to the Danbury Baptists. John Calvin used the phrase “wall of separation” as well in his commentaries on Genesis and Acts. For a detailed and scholarly overview of Jefferson’s thought on this subject, see: Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation Between Church and State by Daniel L Dreisbach (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2002).
 Matthew 22:21 (KJV).
 See Herbert W. Titus, God, Man, and Law (Oak Brook: Institute in Basic Life Principles, 1994).
 See also 1 Samuel 13:9-14 where Saul assumed the priestly role by not waiting for Samuel to make the burnt offering. “And Samuel said, What hast thou done? And Saul said, Because I saw that the people were scattered from me, and that thou camest not within the days appointed, and that the Philistines gathered themselves together at Michmash; Therefore said I, The Philistines will come down now upon me to Gilgal, and I have not made supplication unto the LORD: I forced myself therefore, and offered a burnt offering. And Samuel said to Saul, Thou hast done foolishly: thou hast not kept the commandment of the LORD thy God, which he commanded thee: for now would the LORD have established thy kingdom upon Israel for ever.”
 Matthew 22:21.
 “The power of the keys is far distant from the power of the sword and though one of them might need the helpe of the other, when they go astray, and administered, the one of them doth not intercept, but establish the execution of the other.” John Cotton, The Way of the Churches of Christ in New-England (London, 1645), 2 as quoted in Daniel J. Ford, In the Name of God, Amen (St. Louis: Lex Rex, 2003), p. 230.
 In the preface to the reprint of Aaron’s Rod Blossoming, David C. Lachman writes: “Gillespie wrote primarily against the prevailing error of his time and place, the “Erastian’ view which taught that, in a Christian state, the chief magistrate ought to be the head of the church as well as of the state and that, consequently, there should be no independent ecclesiastical government or discipline. The government of the church should be co-terminus with and subsumed under that of the state.” David C. Lachman, Preface, in George Gillespie, Aaron’s Rod Blossoming (London, 1646; reprint, Harrisonburg, Virginia: Sprinkle Publications, 1985).
 George Gillespie, in his note “To The Candid Reader,” would state the issue this way: “The controversy is not about taking from the magistrate what is his, but about giving to Christ that which is his. We hold a reciprocal subordination of persons, but a co-ordination of powers.” Gillespie, xvi.
 George Gillespie, Aaron’s Rod Blossoming (London, 1646; reprint, Harrisonburg, Virginia: Sprinkle Publications, 1985), Chapter II, p. 3. See also Dan Ford, In The Name of God Amen, p. 229 for a further discussion of Gillespie’s thought on the biblical doctrine of separation of church and state.
 See, for example, Calvin’s opening dedication in the Institutes to the King of France, where he is concerned with proper government amongst the civil and spiritual spheres.
 John Calvin, Institutes of the ChristianReligion, Henry Beveridge, trans., Book IV, Chap. XI, § 5 (Grand Rapids: Wm. B.Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994).
 Calvin’s Institutes, 4.20.1, as quoted by Douglas Kelly, The Emergence of Liberty in the Modern World: The Influence of Calvin on Five Governments from the 16th Through 18th Centuries. (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1992), p. 15.
 See Doug Kelly, The Emergence of Liberty, p. 139.
 Ibid, p.15.
 Joe Morecraft, III, “The Global Influence of John Calvin,” unpublished paper.
 Titus, 71.
 Gary DeMar, “Newsweek Gets it Right (sort of),” 13 September 2006, http://www.americanvision.org/articlearchive/09-13-06.asp.
 Hon William Strong, Two Lectures upon the Relations of Civil Law to Church Polity, Discipline, and Property (New York, NY: Dodd & Mead, 1875), pp. 38-39. Associate Justice William Strong served on the U.S. Supreme court from 1870-1880. Emphasis added. He was President from 1866-1869 of National Reform Association which since 1864 has called for an amendment to the United States Constitution which confesses Jesus Christ as King of the nation. Additionally, he opposed a national church. See http://www.natreformassn.org/purpose.html
 847 So. 2d 331 (2002).
 Ibid. at 355 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
 Ibid. at 356-57, quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 730 (1871).
 66 Am. Jur. 2d Religious Societies § 13.
 Ibid. at *2.
 David C. Lachman, in his preface to the reprint of Aaron’s Rod Blossoming, quotes from William Cunningham’s Discussions on Church Principles, echoing points made by the Texas Supreme Court about the nature of the “secular” versus the sacred duty of Westbrook: “that there is no act so purely ecclesiastical but that in some of its aspects and consequences it may come legitimately under the cognizance of the civil power; and no act so civil that it may not, provided it be done by a member of the church, come legitimately under the cognizance of the ecclesiastical authorities,” there is yet no “great difficulty in setting the line of demarcation between things civil and temporal, and things ecclesiastical and spiritual.” Continues Lachman, “Even when civil and ecclesiastical matters are combined in some practical affair, when the proper principles are applied, they may be easily disentangled.”
 Westbrook at *5.
 Ibid. at *8.
 Ibid. at *5, quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
 Westbrook, quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971), and Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 410, (1985) (quoting McCollum v. Bd. of Ed., 333 U.S. 203, 212, (1948)).
 See Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977), and Raoul Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989).
 “All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences. No man shall be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent. No human authority ought, in any case whatever, to control or interfere with the rights of conscience in matters of religion, and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious society or mode of worship. But it shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to protect equally every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public worship.” Tex. Const. art. 1, § 6.
 Westbrook at *6.
 Ibid. The Supreme Court cited a string of cases articulating this principle further. These included Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872); Brown v. Clark, 102 Tex. 323, 116 S.W. 360 (Tex.1909); Minton v.Leavell, 297 S.W. 615 (Tex.Civ.App.-Galveston 1927, writ ref’d); Williams v. Gleason, 26 S.W.3d 54 (Tex. App .-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 902 (2001).
 Ibid. at *8 (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 730).
 Ibid. at *7 (quoting Williams, 26 S.W.3d at 59).
 Ibid. at *6
 Use of the term “legal autonomy” carefully avoided a term which has been used in some older legal materials, “ecclesiastical abstention.” “Abstention” gives the incorrect impression that the court could proceed if it wanted to in adjudicating the ecclesiastical issue. In its choice of language, the court was following the advice of the National Association of Evangelicals in their brief for Westbrook. Brief for National Association of Evangelicals as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 4-5, Westbrook v. Penley, 50 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 949 (2007), 2006 WL 2843840. See also Douglas Laycock, “Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy,” 81 Columbia Law Review 1373 (1981); Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, “Construction and Application of Church Autonomy Doctrine,” 123 A.L.R. 5th 385 (2004).
 Ibid. at *13.
 Richard Baxter, A Holy Commonwealth, William Lamont, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 130-132.
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